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STANCES
Anthony V Alfierit
I promised to show you a map you say but this is a mural
then yes let it be these are small distinctions
where do we see it from is the question
Adrienne Rich**
INTRODUCTION

The literature of lawyering is far reaching, encompassing doctrine, ethics, institutions, and advocacy. In recent years, scholars intent on bridging the divide between theory and practice have
enriched this literature by drawing on interdisciplinary work in anthropology, linguistics, and sociology. This integration has opened
up new visions of lawyer/client discourse, interpretation, and practice. The visions reflect the postmodern turn to contest, contingency, exclusion, hierarchy, multiplicity, partiality, and plasticity.'
This turn has begun to reveal a sociolegal world of lawyer/client
discourse-voices, narratives, stories-that is contested. In this
world, lawyer knowledge is partial; lawyer interpretation is contingent upon multiple categories of age, class, disability, ethnicity, gender, race, and sexual orientation; and lawyer/client relations are
configured by a dominant-subordinate hierarchy of exclusion. Accordingly, the practices of lawyering-interviewing, counseling, negotiation, litigation-appear not as the neutral conventions of a
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law; A.B., Brown University, 1981; J.D., Columbia University School of Law, 1984.
I am grateful to Naomi Cahn, Mary Coombs, Clark Cunningham, Richard Delgado,
Marc Fajer, Michael Fischl, Ellen Barker Grant, Lili Levi, Peter Margulies, Austin Sarat,
Stephen Schnably, Jean Stefancic, James Boyd White, and Steven Winter for helpfully
commenting upon earlier drafts of this essay. I also wish to thank David Bodian,
Porsche Shantz, Kathleen Young, and the University of Miami School of Law library staff
for their research assistance. My analysis, however unfinished, of modern/postmodern
lawyering has benefited greatly from ongoing conversations with Marie Ashe, Naomi
Cahn, Clark Cunningham, Steven Winter, and Lucie White. They are surely not responsible for my misjudgments.
**
Adrienne Rich, Here is a map of our country, in AN ATLAS OF THE DIFFICULT WORLD:
POEMS 1988-1991 at 6 (1991).
I For lucid explications of postmodernism, see Marie Ashe, Inventing Choreographies:
Feminism and Deconstruction, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1123 (1990); Drucilla Cornell, Toward A
Modern/Postmodern Reconstruction of Ethics, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 291 (1985); Pierre Schlag,
"Le Hors de Texte, C'est Moi"--The Politics of Form and the Domestication of Deconstruction, 11
CARDOZO L. REV. 1631 (1990); Steven Winter, Painless Postmodernism (Dec. 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Cornell Law Review).
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skilled craft, but rather as unstable interpersonal and institutional
contexts for the play of lawyer power and client resistance.
This postmodern analysis has begun to erode the modernist
foundations of lawyering. 2 These foundations embody commitments to express historical forms of lawyer/client discourse, interpretation, and practice. The forms construct a modernist aesthetic
marked by a devotion to craft, reason, understanding, and text.
Carried on by tradition, craft invests normative value in the professional skills and attitudes of lawyering. Reason includes logic and
pragmatism in that value system. Understanding adds the norms of
empathy and self-reflection.
The good modernist lawyer employs skilled craftsmanship,
pragmatic reasoning, and empathic understanding to engage the
multiple texts-client, doctrinal, institutional-of the sociolegal
world. The activity of engaging those texts in advocacy involves a
process of translation. Because that process is distorting, certain
textual meanings will be lost. This loss is the tragedy of modernist
lawyering. It is a tragedy, however, experienced as imperfection,
rather than as the negation of meaning.
The modernist version of tragedy-as-imperfection is crucial to
discerning why the aesthetic canons of modernist lawyering are no
longer adequate to describe or explain the sociolegal world. Under
postmodern scrutiny, the content of lawyer knowledge is incoherent
and unverifiable. The composition of lawyer discourse is suppressive. The organization of legal practice is disempowering. Nevertheless, the foundations of modernist lawyering remain substantially
intact. Whatever movement is detectable grows in part from the
challenge mounted by the scholars gathered here.
In this Essay, I present a rough outline of this emerging challenge. To illuminate its main themes, I survey the different stances
posed by the instant collection of works. Under the thematic of
"modernist" stances, I examine approaches to lawyering that struggle with the epistemic difficulty of deciphering and translating client
stories into paternalistic and disciplinary legal discourses which
distort the meaning of such stories. Under the thematic
"postmodernist" stances, I explore approaches to lawyering that
recognize this difficulty as a given, yet strive to find room to liberate
the client-subject and to permit lawyer/client intersubjectivity in order to reconstruct dominant legal discourses.
2

For an incisive analysis of the evolution of the modernist postition, see Pierre

Schlag, Missing Pieces: A Cognitive Approach to Law, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1195, 1209-20 (1989).
See also Dennis Patterson, Postmodernism/FeminismlLaw, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 262-79

(1992).
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At the outset, I confess that I may have erred towards the overbroad and unambiguous in distinguishing these thematic stances.
Like all dichotomies, the modern/postmodern dichotomy may overextend and underappreciate the insights of an inchoate and perhaps
irresolvable body of scholarship. At best, the thematics may prove
to be a useful heuristic device to guide future inquiry. For this initial inquiry, the Essay is divided into two parts. In Part I, I address
the modernist stances garnered from the writings of Clark Cunningham,3 James Boyd White, 4 and Naomi Cahn. 5 In Part II, I consider
the postmodernist stances gleaned from the writings of William Felstiner and Austin Sarat, 6 Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, 7 and
8
Lucie White.
I
MODERN STANCES

The works of Clark Cunningham, James Boyd White, and
Naomi Cahn elegantly express a modernist faith and doubt in lawyering. Together, they share three articles of that faith: translation,
tragedy, and empathy. Through lawyer empathy, each seeks to
enter and to translate the sociolegal worlds of clients while diminishing the tragedy and, at times, the folly of their efforts.
A. Translation
Clark Cunningham explicitly adopts the stance of storyteller to
disclose the linguistic and institutional forces of subordination permeating the process of legal representation. 9 To frame his story, he
proposes the metaphor of the "lawyer as translator," invoking an
image of" 'speaking for another' that is not inherently silencing of
that other."' 0 By means of this metaphor, Cunningham straddles
the modern/postmodern dilemma-simultaneously asserting the efficacy of translation and the false necessity of silencing. For Cunningham, a translator consenually amplifies and alters the voice of
3
Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator,Representation as Text: Towards an
Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1298 (1992).
4 James B. White, Translationas a Mode of Thought, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1388 (1992).
5 Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman Standardin
Theory and in Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398 (1992).
6
William L.F. Felstiner & Austin Sarat, Enactments of Power: Negotiating Reality and
Responsibility in Lawyer-Client Interactions, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1447 (1992).
7
Richard Delgado &Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1258 (1992).
8
Lucie E. White, Seeking "... the Faces of Otherness... " A Response to ProfessorsSarat,
Felstiner, and Cahn, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1499 (1992).
9 Cunningham, supra note 3, at 1299-1300.
10 Id. at 2 (quote is in an original draft, on file with author) (emphasis added).
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the other, thereby transforming her meaning." The postmodern
quandary is whether silencing must be an inherent aspect of that
transformation.
Cunningham offers the metaphor of lawyering as translation to
demonstrate "that one can understand at least some of the silencing
of the client's voice as the lawyer's failure to recognize and implement the art and ethic of the good translator . .12
By his definition, the good translator is one "who shows conscious awareness of
shifts in meaning and who collaborates with the speaker in managing these changes."' 3 Borrowing from the discursive methods of
legal ethnography, Cunningham argues that translation "can be an
effective way of recognizing the difference of 'the other' and expanding imagination sufficiently to have some understanding of the
other's story."' 4 Collaboratively executed, therefore, translation
may alleviate much of the client silencing produced by lawyer discourse. Full understanding of the client-other apparently is unnecessary to accomplish that reduction.
To test this thesis, Cunningham recounts a story of a mishandled translation centering on his representation of M. Dujon Johnson, a black graduate student arrested by state police and charged
with disorderly conduct. The miscarried translation began with
Cunningham's first reading of the police report. From this reading,
Cunningham initially concluded that police troopers unlawfully
stopped and searched Johnson, and then converted the illegal stop
into a pretextual disorderly conduct arrest when Johnson protested
their misconduct. 15 Building his case theory on this conclusion,
Cunningham pursued a Fourth Amendment defense strategy. Accordingly, he filed a pretrial motion to suppress evidence of Johnson's alleged disorderly conduct. 16 To Cunningham's surprise, the
county judge denied the motion and declared the incident an "attitude arrest."' 17 Cunningham recalls: the "opinion jolted me out of
thinking about what happened only in Fourth Amendment terms."18
Although dismayed by the denial of his motion, Cunningham
explains that the judge's characterization of the arrest suggested an
alternative reading of Johnson's narrative that had been silenced by
Cunningham's own Fourth Amendment strategy. On this reading,
the arrest symbolized "an escalating clash of conflicting attitudes:
"

''

Id. at 1300.

12

13

Id. at 1301.
Id.

14

Id. at

15

Id. at 1303-10.

16

Id. at 1311-13.
Id. at 1320.
Id. at 1322.

17

18
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Johnson's demand for respect and [the police trooper]'s show of
authority."19
The revision ofJohnson's case to portray the struggle of a black
man to preserve his individual dignity and identity in the face of
state violence disrupted Cunningham's representation. Recognizing his misreading, Cunningham moved to refashion the process of
representation itself. For the modernist lawyer, the discovery of a
narrative misreading requires a new strategic intervention, such as a
new case theory. For the postmodernist, the same discovery evinces
absence and negation, and thus provides the occasion for a new vision of the lawyer/client relation to enable increased collaboration
in constructing the discursive meanings of representation. Cunningham opted for both. He sought to redescribe the arrest incident and to reformulate Johnson's claim for relief. Furthermore,
spurred by Johnson's refusal to plea bargain and his demands for
the restoration of his dignity and the vindication of his rights, Cunningham proposed that Johnson himself cross-examine the arrest20
ing trooper at trial.
Cunningham conceived of the cross-examination not only as a
means to satisfy Johnson's dignity interest and meet his demand for
procedural justice, but also as a "bridging experience" to communicate Johnson's experience of indignity to the jury and ensure the
convergence of procedural justice and substantive relief. 21 Cunningham presumed that this dual translation would decrease the
likelihood that Johnson would be again silenced. Cunningham
notes: "[b]y thinking of the cross-examination, rather than the verdict, as the relief, .

. .

we could make available a legally enabled ex-

perience that shared structural and substantive elements with the
experience of harm." 22 But, before Cunningham implemented his
trial strategy of translation, the county prosecutor dismissed the
complaint against Johnson. In granting the dismissal, the judge
reiterated:
"I think this was an attitude ticket. We see a lot of attitude tickets
23
and um, no question about it."

To Cunningham's surprise, 24 Johnson reacted with outrage, castigating the outcome as "patronizing, patronizing!" 25

23

Id. at 1325.
Id. at 1326-28.
Id. at 1327-28.
Id. at 1328.
Id.at 1329.

24

Id.

25

Id.

19
20
21
22
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Later, Cunningham explored the trial outcome with Johnson.
In doing so, he learned that Johnson experienced disempowerment
during the very process of representation that Cunningham conceived and directed purportedly in Johnson's best interest. For the
modernist lawyer, empowerment resembles a weak version of autonomy defined by client decisionmaking. The client is empowered if
she makes an informed and voluntary decision regarding a lawyergenerated option. For the postmodernist, empowerment approximates a strong version of autonomy denoted by the emancipation of
the client-subject. The client-subject is emancipated when her covert resistance grows into overt political intervention. 26 Confronting
Cunningham with this latter version, Johnson declares:
"You're the kind of person who usually does the most harm. You
have a guardian mentality, assume that you know the answer. You
presume you know the needs and the answers. Oversensitivity.
Patronizing. All the power is vested in you. I think you may go
'27
too far, assuming that you would know the answer."
To understand Johnson's reaction to the process and outcome
of representation, Cunningham revisits the metaphor of translation.
His starting point is the centrality of language "in the constitution
of knowledge ....-28 Language, Cunningham contends, "can dramatically affect a person's understanding of experience." 29 The task
of the translator is to "continually confront the flaws of the expression he is creating in the second language, return to the 'other' in
30
the first language, and then begin the endeavor anew."
Cunningham embraces this task by retelling the story of the
Johnson representation. He experiences the task of translation as a
cycle "of creating meaning only to discover its limits, returning
anew to discover what aspects of the client's experience were excluded, trying again, failing again, yet trying once more."'s For
Cunningham, the tragic quality of this cycle of endless and unfinished translation is offset by the "promise" of dislodging the elements of domination plaguing even client-centered acts of
representation.3 2 Here again, Cunningham displays his modernist
faith that the lawyer/client relation may be purged of the contaminations of power. For the postmodernist, the corruptions of hierarchial power cannot be ousted from the lawyer/client relation.
26

See Kelly Oliver, FractalPolitics: How to Use "the Subject", 11 PRAXIS INT'L 178, 190-

92 (1991).
27
Cunningham, supra note 3, at 1330 (footnote omitted).
28 Id. at 1331.
29 Id. at 1338.
30
Id.
31 Id. at 1339.
32
Id. at 1348.
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They are a constitutive part of that relation-open to resistance, but
not disinterment.
Cunningham demonstrates his modernist faith by construing
client narrative as a world text imbued "with inherent, autonomous
meaning" to be transcribed, observed, and examined. 33 He claims
that such a construction of the client's social reality supplies thick
description to the process of representation. At the same time, he
comments that obtaining and communicating that description may
"interfere" with "effective" representation. 34 The client may hesitate to furnish a full textual description. Further, temporal and strategic considerations may militate against its acquisition.
Had Cunningham prevailed at the Johnson suppression hearing, his original translation/silencing strategy might prove defensible on instrumental grounds. Cunningham makes no mention of
any such necessitarian rationale. Instead, he discusses the logic of
the suppression motion as a vehicle to shift the locus of the trial
from substantive criminal law to the broader protections of the
Fourth Amendment; and moreover, the shock of witnessing the
judge's disfigurement of constitutional principles to safeguard the
illegitimate police exercise of state authority.3 5 As a result, it is unclear whether Cunningham sanctions translation/silencing strategies when they work, that is when the client wins. Similarly, it is
unclear to what extent and under what conditions Cunningham values client collaboration in translation or whether he prefers a more
narrow range of participation in, for example, circumstances where
the client's material interests warrant greater lawyer intervention.
Based upon Cunningham's own description of how he planned the
cross-examination strategy for trial, it appears that Johnson's primary role was to acquiesce in Cunningham's decisions. 36 In this
sense, Cunningham reenacted the ritual of authority and submission
imposed by the police, prosecutor, and judge.
Cunningham devotes scant discussion to this subject. We learn
that Johnson yearned for respect and that the police and judge accorded him none. 3 7 But we do not learn why Cunningham was so
inattentive to this concern in the course of representation. Hence,
we are left to wonder whether-in the same way that a "lack of re-

33

Id at 1349.

34 Id. at 1362.
35 Id. at 1363-66.
36 Id. at 1326 n.48. Cunningham states: "I was the first to raise the idea [of crossexamination], but Johnson immediately responded that he had been thinking about asking us if he could participate in cross-examining [the arresting trooper]." Id.
37 Id. at 1366-68.
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spect" was a crucial part ofJohnson's "story of racial oppression"8
a lack of respect may be a constitutive part of translation.3
If the act of marginalizing difference in translation does not imply a lack of respect, then how do we understand Cunningham's
treatment of race in theJohnson case? With great insight, Cunningham writes:
I had from the outset a common-sense impression that what happened that night was a "racial incident," but as a lawyer I did not
talk about "the case" that way, and therefore I ceased to think in
terms of racial issues as our various translations shaped and limited our shifting understanding of what was legally relevant. 3 9
Here, Cunningham's description of the Johnson case suggests
that certain properties of the social world-class and race for example-are not easily translated into lawyer discourse. The act of
translation in fact may exclude or trivialize such differences. Even if
translation respects difference, there is no guarantee that the institutions of the juridical state will grant like recognition. 40 Cunningham
acknowledges this danger, noting that "[t]he final, authoritative description of 'what happened' was spoken in chorus by the prosecutor and judge: 'this is a $50 attitude ticket.' "41
Cunningham attributes to language the cause of his inadvertent
eradication of Johnson's racial identity during his original act of
translation: "While one is speaking a language, its limitations seem
so natural that they are invisible." 4 2 Although this attribution may
be correct, Cunningham ignores the fact that discourse is intimately
bound up in the negations of interpretive violence: marginalization,
subordination, and discipline. 43 These interpretive practices govern
the rules of legal discourse. Moreover, Cunningham overlooks the
tie connecting interpretive and material violence. 44 Indeed, he
never speaks of violence-the violence of language, of translation,

Id. at 1368.
Id. at 1370-71.
In this respect, Johnson comments: "The judge wasn't interested in a translation
of what I had to say; he was interested simply in justifying the actions of the troopers.
You are assuming that the judge-the system-was interested in a translation." Id. at
n.250.
41
Id. at 1372.
42 Id. at 1377.
43 For a discussion of interpretive violence, see Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive
Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107, 2125-30
(1991).
44 On the interpenetration of interpretive and material forms of violence, see Lucie
White, Paradox, Piece-Work, and Patience, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 853 (1992).
38
39
40
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of representation, or of state agents. In the modernist lawyer canon, who would have believed him anyway? 45
B. Tragedy
James Boyd White turns the modernist stance into an admission
of tragedy. Evaluating representation as a form of translation 4 6 and
a method of creating meaning, he urges lawyers to honor rather
than appropriate legal texts: "we must make [their] terms our own,
and give them meanings of our own making."'4 7 This arguably is
proper when the text is composed of constitutional, statutory or
common law rules, but what of the living texts of lawyer practice? Is
it possible to honor the living text of the client-other? Is it possible
to honor a client's story while displacing its narrative terms and
meanings?
White suggests that lawyers consider different ways of telling
stories, using different languages and voices, in the hope of arriving
at a shared point of view. He cautions, however, that the language
of the law renders unmediated voices improbable. 48 Rather than be
diverted by this condition, White prods us to assess the merits and
values of legal discourse, notwithstanding its imperfections. Of critical importance for him is the enabling and inhibiting power of legal
language, even if the adopted version of that language omits portions of the social world or of an individual identity. 49
To White, the effacement of reality and identity is a tragedy that
accompanies the translation of conventional language into legal discourse. Although that erasure reflects the exertion of power, it is an
assertion wielded on behalf of the powerless. Thus, White admonishes lawyers to heed the violence of legal discourse, but not to be
dissuaded from its exercise. This is the tragic imperfection of the
modernist stance: the accommodation to violence. That accommodation cannot be saved by White's appeal to the lawyer craftsman's
application of professional skill and moral attitude.50
45
In his correspondence with Cunningham, Johnson writes: "I did not tell you it
was a racial issue, although I knew from the very beginning that it was (my arrest) racially motivated. I would have confided this, but who would have believed me anyway?"
Cunningham, supra note 3, at 1385 (emphasis added).
46
For an alternative exposition of translation, see JAMES B. WHITE, JUSTICE AS
TRANSLATION 254-58 (1990) (defining translation as the "composition of a particular
text by one individual mind in response to another text" in a manner that honors the
difference of the other and asserts the autonomy of the self).
47 White, supra note 4, at 1390.
48 Id. at 1391-93.
49 Id. at 1394-95.
50 Id. at 1395.
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Empathy

Feminist stances purport to challenge the theory/practice dichotomy underlying conventional lawyering. 5' Yet, Naomi Cahn
52
observes that feminist stances are often "divorced" from practice.
Cahn attributes this decoupling to a practical failure to translate theoretical insights into "substantive and methodological ways of helping women."5 3 Her objective is to facilitate that translation, to
return theory to practice. 5 4 She writes that "[a]s theory remains
grounded in practice and ethnographic, localized study, not only of
courts, but also of what happens in the attorney-client relationship . . . . 55
For Cahn, theory and practice are intertwined. To illustrate
this thesis, Cahn tells "a story of representation." 5 6 The story describes representation as a complex process of constructing and valuing multiple legal narratives. 5 7 Cahn focuses on several aspects of
that process, including: "1) the client's representations to herself
concerning the nature of her problem and her use of the legal system; 2) the client's representations to her lawyer; 3) the lawyer's
representation of the client to the world outside of the attorneyclient relationship .. .
To explicate the multiple dimensions of representation, Cahn
employs the methodology of the theoretics of practice movement. 59
Thus, she examines the intersection of theory and practice in specific lawyer/client situations, here involving sexual violence against
women. 60 Her text is the language of the reasonable man encoded
61
in the law of sexual harassment, battered women, and rape.
Cahn contends that the reasonable man standard excludes consideration of women as reasonable actors. She demonstrates how
51

See, e.g., Phyllis Goldfarb, The Theory-Practice Spiral. Insights from Feminism and

Clinical Education, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1599 (1991); Elizabeth Schneider, The Dialectic of
Rights and Politics: Perspectivesfrom the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589 (1986).
52
Cahn, supra note 5, at I (in original draft, on file with author).
53 Id. at 1 (quote in an original draft, on file with author).
54 Cahn admits to reservations "about whether the legal process can meaningfully
address women's needs." Id. at 1398.
55

Id. at 1446.

61

Id.

56 Id. at 1429 n.138.
57 Id. at 1438 n.181.
58 Id. at 1439 n.186.
59 See, e.g., Alfieri, supra note 43; Clark Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking
About Law as Language, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 2459 (1989); Gerald Lopez, Reconceiving Civil
Rights Practice:Seven Weeks in the Life of a Rebellious Collaboration, 77 GEo. LJ. 1603 (1989);
Lucie White, Subordination, RhetoricalSurvival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearingof
Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1990); Symposium, Theoretics of Practice: The Integration of
Progressive Thought and Action, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 717 (1992).
60 Cahn, supra note 5, at 1400.
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the standard operates to subordinate and engender violence against
women. 6 2 To halt such physical and interpretive violence, Cahn
proposes reforming conventional theories and methods of representation. She offers the reasonable woman standard as creating
6
the possibility of change.
Cahn argues that the reasonable woman standard embodies women's perceptions of sexual harassment, domestic violence, and
rape. The standard thus serves to foster women's credibility and to
preserve women's stories.64 Despite its effectiveness in communicating and validating the experiences of difference, Cahn also finds
that the reasonable woman standard essentializes and marginalizes
women by exploiting stereotypes of virtue and passivity. 65

She

notes that both the positive and negative attributes contained in
such stereotypes may prove useful in uncovering conditions of dis66
empowerment and strategies of resistance.
Cahn's transformative strategy is designed to reclaim and reconstitute the power embedded in women's stereotypes through
application of the reasonable woman standard. 6 7 As she acknowledges, this strategy is complicated by the diversity of client "backgrounds and motivations" and by the difficulty of translating client
"experiences into legally cognizable claims or defenses." 68 The acknowledged multiplicity of women's experiences distorts the representation process insofar as feminist lawyers "must try to fit [the]
client ('the victim') into an acceptable story so that she can win." 69
In this way, stereotypes necessarily infect the application of the reasonable women standard.
Cahn defends her strategy on instrumental grounds. The reasonable woman standard makes feminist representation "easier"
and mitigates institutional distrust of women's stories. 70 The strategy, however, may actually harm clients. Cahn recognizes "the potentially damaging effects of stereotyping within the attorney-client
relationship. " 7 1 Nonetheless, she seems willing to permit the feminist lawyer to "choose to portray her client in a certain way so that she
'72
will win."
62

Id. at 1404.

63

64
65
66

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

67

Id. at 1418-19.

68

Id. at 1420.

69

Id. at 1421.

70

Id. at 1422.

71

Id.

72

Id. (emphasis added).

1400, 1444.
1409-10.
1415-17.
1417-18 n.104.
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Vesting the power to name 73 women in lawyer discourse reproduces the essentialization and marginalization that Cahn protests.
Cahn points out these results, observing that women's stories which
74
do not fit neatly within conventional discourse will be excluded.
Women, she laments, "must still accommodate their experience to
75
someone else's reasonableness standard."
Paradoxically, Cahn both challenges and ratifies instrumental
accommodation in representation. This is the paradox of modem
practice and postmodern theory. The study culled from her domestic violence practice, the case of Arlene Sims, reveals this opposition
and the ensuing tension of irreconciliation. Cahn introduces Arlene
Sims as a victim of spouse-inflicted domestic violence struggling to
76
enforce a court issued order of protection against her husband.
Investigating the case to establish evidence for a contempt proceeding, Cahn highlights two incidents of abuse in violation of the
court's order of protection. In the first incident, Sims's husband
beat her with a chair. 77 In the second incident, Sims stabbed her
78
husband with a knife to fend off another attack.
Cahn is troubled by this second incident, especially by the "inconsistencies" in Sims's story. 79 To comprehend the incidents,
Cahn develops alternative case theories based on "reasonable
woman" and "victim" stories. In the reasonable woman story,8 0
Sims is "confused about when exactly she had stabbed [her husband] with the knife." 8 ' In the victim story, Sims is "stuck in an
abusive situation ...
2

unable to step out of a cycle of violence with

8
her husband."
Cahn asserts that both theories and stories are true.8 3 Because
of the relative truth content of each version, Cahn adopts an instrumental calculus to determine her strategy of representation at the
contempt proceeding. On this calculus, the question becomes
"whether [Sims] would have a better chance at winning a contempt
proceeding if she appeared to be a victim or a reasonable
73
By naming, I mean the act of describing and classifying women in terms of certain essentialist characteristics. See ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN 177
(1988) (showing "how fundamental assumptions of feminist theory help to disguise the
conflation of the situation of one group of women with the situation of all women.").
74 Cahn, supra note 5, at 1422-23.
75
Id. at 1423.
76
Id. at 1424-30.
77 Id. at 1424.
78
Id. at 1426-27.
79 Id. at 1427.

80

Id.

81
82
83

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1428.
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woman." 8 4 Cahn selects "the reasonable woman approach because
it allowed Ms. Sims some dignity in telling her story to the judge
85
and in front of her husband.
Significantly, on the date of trial, Sims declined to proceed,
withdrawing the complaint against her husband.8 6 Although denied
the opportunity to test her strategy in practice, Cahn concludes that
"[ilt did work to make Ms. Sims feel that she could tell her story in
court." 8 7 According to Cahn, a reasonable woman standard enables
clients to "feel more 'fluent' within the legal system ...."88 Cahn,
however, presents little support for these conclusions. Without
backing, they seem more ideological than real.
Cahn's unwillingness to bolster her conclusions may be traced
to her own postmodern doubt. Cahn concedes that doubt, remarking: "[e]ven to me, [Sims's] behavior initially seemed somewhat risky, not quite reasonable. '8 9 Cahn admits that her image of a
reasonable woman is informed by her own experiences. Unlike
Sims, she is "not a black mother of three who receives AFDC and
has been battered by [her] husband." 90 To empathize with Sims's
situation, Cahn seeks "to know as many facts about her life as possible...... ,"91 Here, Cahn confronts the postmodern recognition of
the partiality of knowledge. This inevitable partiality weakens her
conclusions and limits her plea of thick description on behalf of
Sims. Even if that plea could be fully mustered, it is unlikely to obtain a fair hearing in a legal process where the partiality of class,
92
gender, and race are constant.
This institutional partiality accounts for Cahn's contradictory
stance of embracing a standard of reasonable conduct that simultaneously affirms and denigrates women's lives. 93 The contradiction
is unsurprising; as Cahn mentions, "[t]he reasonable woman standard developed from the experiences of outsiders. ' 94 Differences
of class, ethnicity, gender, race, and sexual orientation characterize
those experiences. 95 Although the reasonable woman standard potentially includes a multiplicity of women's experiences, the legal
84

Id.

85

Id.

86

89

Id.
Id. at 30 (quote in an original draft, on file with author).
Id. at 1435.
Id. at 1429.

90
91

Id.
Id.

92
94

Id. at 1430.
Id.
Id. at 1432.

95

Id. at 1435.

87
88

93
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process and, by extension, the act of representation, systematically
96
exclude them.
This is the source of Cahn's modern/postmodern tension. As
she calls for a "return to the excitement of learning from our clients'
experiences in order to craft more effective and responsive legal
theories," modernism claims the prerogative to reshape those clients' stories. 9 7 As she demands that feminist lawyers give clients
"space to speak their own words," modernism cabins that space. 98
As she instructs lawyers to "draw... strength from communities of
disempowered people," 9 9 modernism consolidates lawyers'
power.10 0
Cahn realizes that these tensions are not of her own making but
are inherent in the process of representation. She traces them to
the competing imperatives of "construct[ing] a narrative that tells
the client's story as she would like it to be told"1 0 1 and implementing "concrete strategies that show the inadequacy of existing standards."' 10 2 To resolve such tensions, Cahn encourages feminist
lawyers "to be critically aware of [their] motivations" and to better
understand their actions when they seize "others' images" to ensure
10 3
legal victory.
Moreover, Cahn urges feminist lawyers to rethink the practice
of feminist representation.10 4 Rethinking requires contextual struggle in the practice of representation, especially within the lawyer/client relationship.' 0 5 This struggle ineluctably confronts the
issue of power. Cahn identifies two distinct types of power: male
patriarchy and lawyer paternalism. 0 6 She suggests that feminist
07
lawyers unavoidably exercise paternalism to combat patriarchy.'
For Cahn, feminist paternalism is a kind of doctrinal "distortion."' l0 8
The limits of doctrine constrain feminist lawyers to shape clients
into reasonable women/victims in order to "win."' 1 9 To curtail
such distorting paternalistic tendencies, Cahn recommends that
feminists assess: "how explicit their perspective is to themselves
96
97

Id. at 1431-32.

98

Id..

Id. at 1436.

99 Id. Cahn recommends changing prevailing community attitudes, though it is unclear how she intends to do so. Id.
100 Id..
101 Id. at 42 (quote in an original draft, on file with author).
102
Id. at 1432.
103
104

105
106
107
108
109

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1440.
at 1440-41.
at
at
at
at

1439-40.
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1443-44.
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and their clients; how well it accords with existing ethical norms;
and how it affects client narrative." 1 10
In spite of her sensitivity to the motions of sociolegal power,
Cahn's treatment of paternalism as a functional distortion assumes
too much. It declines to explain why paternalism is justifiable when
exerted explicitly and omits meaningful comparison of explicit and
implicit forms of paternalism. Further, Cahn's treatment neglects to
establish why paternalism should be judged by the ethical norms of
the existing adversarial system. In fact, she overlooks powerful criticisms condemning the internal, paternalistic tilt of governing ethical
norms." 1 This omission is perplexing given Cahn's own forceful
critique of the ethical norms dominant in feminist practice.1 12 Additionally, Cahn does not explain why paternalism should be appraised by its effect on client narrative. Even granting the legitimacy
of this appraisal, without a fuller definition of client narrative it is
difficult to gauge the impact of paternalism, much less to assess the
accuracy of that measurement.
Because Cahn hesitates to pursue these matters, her calls for
critical self-awareness, collaboration, and dialogue in feminist representation sound plaintive. 1 3 Empathy is no cure when feminist theory affords its practitioners license to "choose to use their own
experiences to inform the representation process." 114 While this
freedom may allow women's experiences to be heard in the law,
those experiences will be based on the lives and choices of lawyersnot clients. Appeals to feminist lawyers to share information and
power with their clients do not salvage the paternalism implicit in
this rhetorical stance.' 15 Notwithstanding Cahn's contextualized approach, the competing aesthetics of client-centered decisionmaking
and lawyer authority may be incompatible. 1 6 The importance of
Cahn's analysis lies in highlighting this inconsistency at the intersection of doctrine and practice.
110

Id. at 45 (quote in an original draft, on file with author).
For recent disputed accounts of paternalism, see DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS ANDJUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 317-57 (1988); Stephen Ellmann, LawyeringforJusticein a Flawed
Democracy, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 116 (1990) (book review); David Luban, Partisanship,Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client Relationship: A Reply to Stephen Ellmann, 90 COLUM.
L. REV. 1004 (1990).
112
See Naomi R. Cahn, Defining Feminist Litigation, 14 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 1 (1991).
113 Cahn, supra note 5, at 1443-44.
114 Id. at 1442-43.
115 Id. at 1444.
116 See, e.g., Robert Dinerstein, Clinical Texts and Contexts, 39 UCLA L. REV. 697
(1992); Robert Dinerstein, Client Centered Counseling: Reappraisaland Refinement, 32 ARIZ.
L. REV. 501 (1990); Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 717 (1987);
Peter Margulies, "Who Are You to Tell Me That?" Attorney-Client DeliberationRegardingNonlegal Issues and the Interests of Nonclients, 68 N.C. L. REV. 213 (1990).
111
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II
POSTMODERN STANCES

The works of Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, William Felstiner and Austin

Sarat, and Lucie

White

proceed

from a

postmodern distrust of lawyering. Their common insight is the recognition of the power of the lawyer-subject: the power to speak, to
negotiate, and to dominate. Yet, unlike other postmodern theorists
7 they afwho imprison human agency and reject intersubjectivity, 11
firm the possibility, however confined, of human emancipation and
community.

A.

Power and Speech

The postmodern stance of Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic
is animated by a focus on the relationship between power and
speech in society." 8 Their thesis is that within the conventions of
First Amendment doctrine, speech alone is ill-equipped to remedy
broadly entrenched, systemic patterns of racism. They argue that
the marketplace ideology of free speech limits the emergence of a
"countervailing message" adequate to challenge racism in a historical context."i 9 On their analysis, "free speech . . .is least helpful
where we need it most."' 20 To illustrate this point, they examine

the demeaning historical depiction of four American minority subgroups of color: Mexicans, Blacks, Asians, and Native Americans. 12 1
Delgado and Stefancic find parallels among the socially constructed "stock characters" and "stigma-pictures" depicting minority subgroups.' 2 2 They question the belief that lawyers can simply
"enlarge [their] sympathies [and reimagine these character portraits] through linguistic means alone."' 23 Labelling this belief the
"empathic fallacy," they challenge the presumption that lawyers
"can . . .think, talk, read, and write [their] way out of bigotry and

narrow-mindedness, out of [their] limitations of experience and perspective."' 12 4 The modernist lawyer indulges this belief, invoking
empathy as a nostrum, hence forgetting the situatedness of his own
perspective.

Although Delgado and Stefancic controvert the empathic presumption, they decline to dismiss it altogether. Instead, they offer a
117
(1989)
118
119
120
121
122
123
124

See, e.g., CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE
(espousing a structuralist theory of patriarchy).
Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 7, at 1258.
Id. at 1260.
Id. at 1259.
Id. at 1260.
Id.
Id. at 1261.
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more limited version of intersubjectivity.' 25 Consistent with his embrace of the empathic fallacy, the modernist lawyer proffers an expansive version of intersubjectivity. This version is instilled by a
romantic humanism ungrounded in context. To clarify their more
rooted contextual version, Delgado and Stefancic summarize the
dominant forms and images of racially repressive speech.' 26 The
outgrowth of repression is disempowerment: "speech of the Indians-as well as that of African-Americans, Mexicans, and Asianshas been mangled, blunted and rendered inarticulate by whites who
27
then became entitled to speak for them."'
For Delgado and Stefancic, stereotyping and its corollary disempowerment deny dominant and subordinate groups "the opportunity to interact with each other on anything like a complex,
nuanced human level."' 2 8 In place of interaction, there is an infliction of power.' 2 9 The modernist lawyer is immersed in discourses
and relations of power. The counter discourse of resistance contests but does not impede the infinite permutations of power: racism, sexism, homophobia, etc. Constructivist theory teaches that
"countervailing speech" will not overcome the assaults of racism.
To claim otherwise, according to Delgado and Stefancic, is to misunderstand "the relation between the subject, or self, and new
narratives." 13 0
Delgado and Stefancic contend that racism is embedded in cultural narratives and, therefore, is concealed from historical view.
The modernist lawyer denies the cultural entrenchment of race.
Without that denial, his own culturally-intertwined legal narratives
dissolve into racially-privileged mystification. Because racism forms
"part of the dominant narrative" that lawyers deploy to construct
13
the social world, "speech [is] an ineffective tool to counter it." 1
Like narrative, speech is confined by the boundaries of dominant
culture: "[w]ithin that general framework, only certain matters are
open for discussion ...."132 The modernist lawyer overlooks these
cultural boundaries, mistaking self-regulated forms of client speech
for full disclosure.
Delgado and Stefancic argue that certain areas of speech are
not only closed to lawyers but are also unrecognizable by them: "we

129

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

130

Id. at 1277.
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Id. at 1279, 1278.
Id. at 1280.
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1261-75.
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are our current stock of narratives, and they us."1 3 3 It is our own

living narratives that "shape and determine us, who we are, what we
see, how we select, reject, interpret and order subsequent reality.' 1 34 In this way, racist narratives are self-perpetuating.
Delgado and Stefancic dismiss overblown claims to selfreconstitution. The modernist lawyer is prone to such illusory
claims, deluding himself about the organic character of his sociolegal vision. These claims maintain that self-reconstitution is merely a
matter of reformist education acquired through reading, talking,
and writing.' 3 5 Delgado and Stefancic regard such claims of "reform" as a repetition of the empathic fallacy.' 3 6 The marketplace
ideology pervading First Amendment doctrine fuels their skepticism. Because racism is a persistent and thereby "normal" facet of
that market, they question the likelihood of speech-based correction.' 3 7 Racism itself may be unsusceptible to such correction, for
"racism contains features that render it relatively unamenable to re13 8
dress through words."'
To identify covert and overt acts of racism, Delgado and
Stefancic propose that "sympathizers" learn the "code-words" of
race and "racial signalling."' 1 9 Racism, they stress, "is often a matter of interpretation ....

14 0

For the modernist lawyer, interpreta-

tion is unsullied by racism. Rightly applied, the interpretive cycle
expels the tainted properties of class, gender, and race, gradually
rendering the representation process an unalloyed medium of
communication.
Delgado and Stefancic denounce the interpretive obliteration of
racism: "[s]ociety generalizes the wrong lesson from the past,
namely that racism has virtually disappeared."' 14 1 The modernist
lawyer tolerates this disappearance, approving a discourse in which
racism survives unnamed. By contrast, Delgado and Stefancic point
to the continuing presence of racism in public "pictures, images,
133 Id. See also Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal Power
and NarrativeMeaning, 87 MicH. L. REV. 2225, 2245 (1989) ("[O]ur very ability to construct a world is already constrained by the cultural structures in which we are
enmeshed.").
134 Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 7, at 1280.
135
For an indictment of these claims, see Steven L. Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommensurability in ConstitutionalLaw, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1441, 1497 (1990) ("Ihe naive faith
in normative dialogue as a means to accomplish change begins to look like nothing so
much as faith in a 'talking cure.' ").
136
Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 7, at 1281.
137

138
139

140
141
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Id. at 1282.
Id. at 1283.

Id.
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narratives, plots, roles, and stories ... ,"142 These predominantly
"negative" images deform the perceptions of both majority and minority persons.1 43 The internalization of subordinate stories, Delgado and Stefancic warn, "precludes the stigmatized from
participating effectively in the marketplace of ideas."' 14 4 They add:
"even when minorities do speak they have little credibility." 145
Both Dujon Johnson and Arlene Sims, for example, experienced
this debasement of credibility. Even when lawyers encourage public
speech, as in the cases of Johnson and Sims, they harbor doubts
about its effectiveness and veracity. This racial marginalization, Delgado and Stefancic argue, weighs so heavily on the character of the
legal imagination and in the content of legal discourse that "more
speech, more talking, more preaching, and more lecturing" is probably fruitless.' 4 6 The modernist lawyer discounts this probability,
remaining wedded to his reformist discourse.
Delgado and Stefancic's lesson of Racial Realism-the notion
that "things will never get better"14 7 -teaches lawyers to reevaluate
speech, particularly the neutral images conjured by modernist
speech. Additionally, it instructs lawyers to restructure the process
of representation to empower minority clients in interpersonal and
institutional settings. Empowerment enables not only individual
speech acts but collective acts as well. As Delgado and Stefancic
suggest, understanding the dialectic of dominant and subordinate
speech is merely a beginning.
B.

Power and Negotiation

The postmodern stance of William Felstiner and Austin Sarat is
informed by "It]he view that social relations are constructed and
power is exercised through complex processes of negotiation
.. .."148 This view rests on dynamic notions of human agency and
social interaction. Both individual action and social interaction,
they argue, are linked to social structure. The media of action and
exchange that comprise the practices of everyday life produce and
49
reproduce that structure.'
Felstiner and Sarat contend that power-suffused social structures are encoded in the mundane experiences of everyday life. The
act of encoding is mediated by past situational practice. Entrenched
142
143
144

145
146

147
148
149

Id. at 1287.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1288.
Id. at 1289.
Felstiner & Sarat, supra note 6, at 1447.
Id. at 1448-49.
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patterns of historical practice constrain the range of reformist
moves available to lawyers and clients. Nevertheless, Felstiner and
Sarat assert "that structure and power are vulnerable to major
changes of practice."' 15 0 That sanguine assertion inspires their central thesis of deep-structure negotiation. This postmodern variant
of structuralism suggests that social phenomena are negotiated
overtly, in a manner fairly recognizable, as well as covertly,
"through the exercise of power and attempts at resistance and
subversion." 151
Felstiner and Sarat's post-structuralist negotiation thesis permits wide latitude in the study of social structure and power, especially in the context of legal representation. To verify their thesis,
they study the enactments of power specific to lawyer/client interactions during the divorce process. They find that such "power is not
possessed at all," but rather circulates throughout the lawyer/client
relationship exhibiting mobility and volatility.' 5 2 The constant circulation of power molds the substance of that relationship within
153
discrete cases and across fields of practice.
Felstiner and Sarat's conception of the negotiated quality of
power challenges more deterministic, conventional views of the nature of the lawyer/client relation in divorce representation. These
views hold to a reductionist, lawyer-based conception in which
power is one-dimensional and uncontested. Departing from this
conception, Felstiner and Sarat establish two different types and associated arenas of lawyer/client power negotiation: negotiations of
"reality" regarding the goals of representation and negotiations of
"responsibility" concerning control over case management. 154
To chart these overlapping forms and forums of negotiation,
Felstiner and Sarat provide a case history taken from a female California lawyer's divorce practice. Here, they treat power not as a
static property of constituent identities or fields, like a "thing" appended to status or a role, but as a shifting relation "continuously
enacted and re-enacted, constituted and re-constituted."' 15 5 Their
investigation of this relation focuses on the "microdynamics" of law56
yer/client encounters during the process of representation.'
Felstiner and Sarat claim that these encounters implicate both
individuals and social worlds. In this sense, the encounters signify
opaque and partial meetings of limited accessibility. At these meet150
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ings, both the lawyer and the client construct and exchange accounts of their respective social worlds. Felstiner and Sarat define
this interaction as a "process of story-telling and interrogation in
which lawyer and client seek to produce for each other a satisfying
rendition of her distinctive world." 157 The process is both evasive
and interdependent, characterized by moments of concealment,
doubt, and suspicion, all of which limit the assimilation of
knowledge. 158
For Felstiner and Sarat, the variable elements of mutual dependency and suspicion displace the conventional taxonomy of lawyer
representation in terms of categories such as autonomy, paternalism, and vanguardism. Contrary to this taxonomy, they conjecture
that "no one may be in charge," either in "defining the objectives,
determining strategy, or devising tactics" of representation. 59
Even when the lawyer/client relation indicates fixed patterns of interaction, the fluidity of power dislocates that configuration, restor160
ing the unstable contest of negotiation.
Felstiner and Sarat's concept of relational power as continuously negotiated in lawyer/client interactions decenters the representation process, rendering modernist commitments untenable.
Under paternalistic and vanguard accounts of modernist representation, relational power is substantially denied. Instead, power is said
to operate unilaterally, flowing unobstrusively from the lawyer to
the client. Under competing autonomy accounts, there is evidence
of negotiated power, but it is restricted and renamed. Its narrow
ambit corresponds to the prevailing weak version of autonomy construed as consent.
Modernist commitments are further challenged by Felstiner
and Sarat's observation that relational "enactments of power are situationally and organizationally circumscribed .. ,"161 The added
variables of culture, context, and institution severely limit lawyers'
ability to reinvent stable, generalizable categories of representation. Without resort to conventional categories of interaction, the
lawyer/client relation drifts among competing social constructions.
Sarat and Felstiner's postmodern vision of the representation
process divests lawyers of epistemological confidence. UnlikeJames
Boyd White's modernist archetype, these lawyers lack the authoritative comfort of relying on professional skill and moral attitude for
vindication. Intent upon "[d]eveloping a mutually satisfying sense
157
158
159
160
161

Id. at 1454-55 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 1455-56.
Id. at 1456.
Id. at 1457.
Id. at 1458.
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of what reasonably can be expected or achieved" in legal representation, they flounder amid the multiple, shifting constructions of the
postmodern world.162 As Sarat and Felstiner's case study indicates,
the lawyer and client may be unable to negotiate a mutually satisfactory understanding of what is legally and socially possible. Sometimes dissatisfaction arises from client nondisclosure or lawyer
misinterpretation. 163 And sometimes dissatisfaction lies chiefly65with
64 and self-deception.'
the lawyer's practices of manipulation'
Two lessons of Felstiner and Sarat's postmodern power "play"
are the intractability of lawyer self-deception and the ambiguity of
client "exit. '"166 Here, I use self-deception to refer to the lawyer's
penchant for overestimating his power to negotiate the reality and
responsibility of legal representation. 1 6 7 Felstiner and Sarat cite
study, noting
this tendency in summarizing the findings of their6 case
8
its display in the conduct of the divorce lawyer.'
Felstiner and Sarat also mention, without elaboration, that the
client featured in the study eventually "asked that [they] stop observing conferences and not interview her further."' 169 Because they
already have pointed out that the "usual client response" to
profound lawyer dissatisfaction "is exit rather than voice,"' 170 it is
puzzling that Sarat and Felstiner decline to speculate on the reason
behind the client's sudden exit. Perhaps the client enacted a form of
displaced resistance against the few agents subject to her control.
Perhaps exit, in its many rhetorical guises, is the only true power of
clients.171
Sarat and Felstiner's reluctance to explore more broadly the
concept of client exit is dismaying given the strength of their analysis. Indeed, the concept seems well-suited to their discussion of
power and negotiation. Assuming the dynamic of human agency,
exit affords both a form of power and an instrument of negotiation.
It signals resistance and withdrawal. Moreover, it is germane to virtually all aspects of the lawyer/client relation.
Id. at 1460.
Id. at 1461.
164
Id. at 1462-66.
165
Id. at 1495 ("The gap between programmatic objectives and actuality in this case
is obvious.").
Id. at 1464, 1466.
166
Id. at 1494 ("In the end, [the lawyer] Wendy imagines that she produces not only
167
optimal outcomes, she also produces new women.") (emphasis added).
Id. at 1493-95.
168
169 Id. at 1493 n.121.
Id. at 1464.
170
171
On the ambiguity of exit, see Martha Mahoney, EXIT- Power and the Idea of Leaving
in Love, Work, and the Confirmation Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1283 (1992).
162
163
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Power and Risk

A third postmodern stance is animated by power and risk. This
is the stance of Lucie White. White constructs her stance from
meta-theories of discourse and interpretation. Integrating the
works of Clifford Geertz and Michel Foucault, she sees words and
images as conceptual "screens" or "filters" through which people
constitute and interrogate the social world.1 72 To White, knowledge is contingent: "[d]epending on the screen one looks throughthe matrix of terms or concepts through which one filters what one
17 3
sees-the same event can take on many different appearances."
Turning to the practice of lawyering, White connects Geertz's
sociology of knowledge to Foucault's archeology of power, producing a meta-theory of knowledge/power that resembles a holograph:
"an evanescent fluid, it takes unpredictable shapes as it flows into
the most subtle spaces in our interpersonal world."' 174 For White,
the value of this new meta-theory is that it provides "situated microdescriptions of lawyering practice."1 75 These micro-descriptions locate the routine deployment of power in the lawyer/client
relationship.
Although White is interested in mapping the movements of
lawyer/client power, her larger purpose is to reconstruct entrenched habits of lawyer speech and consciousness in order to aid
"clients' efforts to empower themselves."' 17 6 White contends that
the meta-theory of knowledge/power affords disempowered people
a politics of resistance, albeit a politics that is "visible only in the
microdynamics of everyday life."' 177 This politics is "neither
vanguard-driven, nor co-opted," but a "self-directed, democratic
politics among subordinated groups .... ,,178 With this political
reconfiguration, "alliance and collaboration between professionals
17 9
and subordinated groups" becomes possible.
White's political enthusiasm is tempered by the realization that
lawyers may overrate the utility of meta-theory. She notes that there
is a danger in overlooking the partiality of knowledge in the haste of
theory-building. That danger risks not only "erasing or obscuring"
the world of others, but also "deluding" ourselves into thinking that
"we have finally seized the power to comprehend the world."' 180

173
174

White, supra note 8, at 1500-01.
Id. at 1500.
Id. at 1501.
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Id. at 1502.
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According to White, this deception is a byproduct of totalizing
theory. It misleads lawyers in their analysis of the systematic domination of legal institutions.1 8 1 Instead of concentrating on the institutional constraints impinging on the circulation of power, lawyers
enamored with meta-theory rely upon crude, mechanistic descriptions of institutional power. White cites this misplaced reliance as a
barrier to the development of a "theoretics and a reconstructive
politics of institutionaldesign."1 82 The absence of a sophisticated institutional politics inhibits the comparison of "specific institutional
forms of power against varying flows of power" as well as the explanation of "why some institutions congeal power more than
83
others."1
White's focus on the complex enmeshing of institutional and
interpersonal forms of domination is essential to gaining an understanding of subordination as a matrix of knowledge/power. Because of its complex compositional materials, the matrix of
subordination will cast varied institutional impressions, linking gender and race in one context, race and class in a second, and gender
184
and disability in a third.
White fears that even with this appreciation, lawyers will succumb to the tendency to perceive "human interactions as strategic
contests."' 185 This reductionist tendency demeans personhood by
construing moments of human intersubjectivity in terms of power,
rather than communion. 18 6 At the same time, White disparages
suppositions of "easy access to empathy."' 18 7 She inveighs against
"privileged agents of empathy" who "sanguinely name the feelings
of less powerful others, without cautioning that to name another's
feelings is also to silence her voice." 18 8 For White, this "imperialist
version of humanism" permits the reenactment of domination under
color of representation. 189 She complains that the act of representation, even when mediated by the filter of empathy, objectifies the
181
182
183
184

Id.
Id.
Id. at 10 (quotes are in an original draft, on file with author).
See, e.g., Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participationand Subordinationof Poor

Tenants' Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. (forthcoming 1992) (housing);
Anthony V. Alfieri, Disabled Clients, Disabling Lawyers, 43 HASTINGS LJ.769 (1992) (disability); William Simon, The Rule of Law and the Two Realms of Welfare Administration, 58
BROOK. L. REV. 777 (1990) (public assistance); Lucie White, Goldbergv. Kelly on the Paradox of Lawyeringfor the Poor, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 861 (1990) (public assistance). Id.
185 White, supra note 8, at 1506.
186 Id.
187 Id. at 12 (quote in an original draft, on file with author).
188 Id.
189 Id. at 1507.
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client. Furthermore, she decries the view that empathy must rest on
sameness, recalling the tendency to " 'essentialize' " the other.19 0

To White, the wages of meta-theory are paid out in the practice
of interpersonal domination. These wages purchase an ephemeral
stability in the otherwise turbulent development of a postmodern
practice of law. White is unwilling to abide by this exhange relation.
But, she is reluctant to deny its inevitability. Instead, she abandons
certainty and risks the reiteration of "imperial violence" for the
chance "to listen when others speak to us, and to be moved."19 1 For
White, the "Other" is neither an object nor a text, but "a human
face." 1 9 2 This is White's postmodern paradox: to represent a less
93
powerful Other with tools of domination.'
CONCLUSION

The modern and postmodern stances outlined here are preliminary sketches. They do not, indeed cannot, capture the richness of
nor exhaust the issues raised in the original works. Nor do these
sketches fully map the contours of the developing contest between
modern and postmodern theories of lawyering. Even now, those
contours are just materializing. For the moment, we must be satisfied with the opportunity not only to watch, but also to participate in
the making of a sociolegal mural. Where we see it from is the
question.
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Id. at 1508.
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Id. at 19 (quote in an original draft, on file with author).
Id. at 1504 n.25.
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IMAGES OF THE OUTSIDER IN AMERICAN
LAW AND CULTURE: CAN FREE
EXPRESSION REMEDY SYSTEMIC
SOCIAL ILLS?
Richard Delgadot &Jean Stefancic tt

INTRODUCTION

Conventional First Amendment doctrine is beginning to show
signs of strain. Outsider groups and women argue that free speech
law inadequately protects them against certain types of harm.' Further, on a theoretical level, some scholars are questioning whether
free expression can perform the lofty functions of community-building and consensus-formation that society assigns to it.2
We believe that in both situations the source of the difficulty is
the same: failure to take account of the ways language and expression work.3 The results of this failure are more glaring in some areas than others. Much as Newtonian physics enabled us to explain
the phenomena of daily life but required modification to address the
larger scale, First Amendment theory will need revision to deal with
issues lying at its farthest reaches. Just as the new physics ushered
t
Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado. J.D., U. California-Berkeley, 1974.
tt

Technical Services Librarian, University of San Francisco School of Law. M.L.S.,

Simmons College, 1963; M.A., University of San Francisco, 1989.
We thank Robert Nagel and Steve Shiffrin for their encouragement and suggestions. Portions of this article were delivered in talks at UCLA, Cornell, Washington &
Lee, Harvard, and Yale Universities.
I See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982); Charles R. Lawrence III, If
He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE LJ. 431; Catharine
A. MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, 2 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 321 (1984); Mari J. Matsuda,
Public Response to Racist Speech: Consideringthe Victim's Story, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 2320 (1989);
see generally infra notes 146-49 and accompanying text (speech law inadequately protects
minorities); infra part III (sometimes speech law hinders efforts of minorities, making
matters worse).
2 See, e.g., Derrick Bell & Preeta Bansal, The Republican Revival and RacialPolitics, 97
YALE L.J. 1609 (1988); Richard Delgado, Zero-Based Racial Politics and an Infinity-Based
Response: Will Endless Talking Cure America s Racial Ills?, 80 GEo. L.J. 1879 (1992); Robert
Justine Lipkin, Kibitzers, Fuzzies and Apes Without Tails: Pragmatism and the Art of Conversation
in Legal Theory, 66 TUL. L. REV. 69 (1991).
3 See i!fra parts II, III.
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in considerations of perspective and positionality, 4 First Amendment thinking will need to incorporate these notions as well.
Our thesis is that conventional First Amendment doctrine is
most helpful in connection with small, clearly bounded disputes.
Free speech and debate can help resolve controversies over whether
a school disciplinary or local zoning policy is adequate, over
whether a new sales tax is likely to increase or decrease net revenues, and over whether one candidate for political office is a better
choice than another. 5 Speech is less able, however, to deal with systemic social ills, such as racism or sexism, that are widespread and
deeply woven into the fabric of society. Free speech, in short, is
least helpful where we need it most.
We choose racism and racial depiction as our principal illustration. Several museums have featured displays of racial memorabilia
from the past. 6 One exhibit recently toured the United States; 7 in
January, Time reviewed the opening of another.8 Filmmaker Marlon
Riggs produced an award-winning one-hour documentary, Ethnic
Notions, with a similar focus. 9 Each of these collections depicts a
shocking parade of Sambos, mammies, coons, uncles-bestial or
happy-go-lucky, watermelon-eating-African-Americans. They
show advertising logos and household commodities in the shape of
blacks with grotesquely exaggerated facial features. They include
4

See Laurence Tribe, The Curvature of ConstitutionalSpace: What Lawyers Can Learn

from Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1989) (drawing further analogies between
modern and modernist legal thought and relativity physics).
5 For example, in trying to decide whether corporal punishment in public schools
will promote or deter unruly behavior, the proponents of the various positions might
offer expert psychological testimony, give additional philosophical or moral arguments,
appear before the school board, engage in a sit-in-all aimed at persuading the decisionmaker and encouraging each other. See Tinker v. DesMoines Indep. Community
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (school expression protected).
6 We have identified the following: Alternative Museum, New York City, Prisoners
of Image: Ethnic and Gender Stereotypes, curated by Robbin Henderson and Geno
Rodriquez (1989); The Balch Institute for Ethnic Studies, Philadelphia, Ethnic Images in
Advertising (1984), Ethnic Images in Comics (1986), Ethnic Images in World War I
Posters (1988), Ethnic Images in Toys and Games (1990); Berkeley Art Center, Berkeley, Ethnic Notions: Black Images in the White Mind, TheJanette Faulkner Collection
of Stereotypes and Caricature of Afro-Americans (1982); Galeria de Ia Raza, San Francisco, Cactus Hearts/Barbed Wire Dreams: Media, Myths, and Mexicans, curated by
Yolanda Lopez (1988) (telephone interviews with Phyllis Bischof, Librarian for African
and African American Collections, U.C. Calif. at Berkeley; Jan Faulkner, Collector and
Clinical Professor, Psychiatry, U.C.S.F.; Robbin Henderson, Director, Berkeley Art
Center (Feb. 1992)). See also Jessie Smith, Images of Blacks in American Culture: Reference Guide to Information Sources 289 (1988) (listing collections of Black Americana).
7 "Ethnic Notions." Interview with Jan Faulkner, supra note 6.
8 Robert Hughes, Two Centuies ofStereotypes, TiME, Jan. 29, 1990, at 82 (describing
opening of exhibit at Corcoran Gallery).
9 Ethnic Notions (P.B.S. 1986) (on file with authors). By the same film-maker see
also Color Adjustment, TV documentary on racial images of the last forty years on
prime time television.
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minstrel shows and film clips depicting blacks as so incompetent,
shuffling, and dim-witted that it is hard to see how they survived to
adulthood. Other images depict primitive, terrifying, larger-thanlife black men in threatening garb and postures, often with apparent
designs on white women.
Seeing these haunting images today, one is tempted to ask:
"How could their authors-cartoonists, writers, film-makers, and
graphic designers-individuals, certainly, of higher than average education, create such appalling images?10 And why did no one protest?" The collections mentioned focus on African-Americans, but
the two of us, motivated by curiosity, examined the history of ethnic
depiction for each of the four main minority subgroups of colorMexicans, African-American, Asians, and Native Americans-in the
United States." In each case we found the same sad story: Each
group is depicted, in virtually every epoch, in terms that can only be
described as demeaning or worse. In addition, we found striking
parallels among the stigma-pictures that society disseminated of the
four groups. The stock characters may have different names and
appear at different times, but they bear remarkable likenesses and
seem to serve similar purposes for the majority culture. We review
this history in Part I.
In Part II, we offer our answer to the "How could they" question. In brief, we hold that those who composed and disseminated
these images simply did not see them as grotesque. Their consciences were clear-their blithe creations did not trouble them. It
is only today, decades later, that these images strike us as indefensible and shocking. Our much-vaunted system of free expression,
with its marketplace of ideas, cannot correct serious systemic ills
such as racism or sexism simply because we do not see them as such
at the time. No one can formulate an effective contemporaneous
message to challenge the vicious depiction; this happens only much
later, after consciousness shifts and society adopts a different narrative.' 2 Our own era is no different. This is the dominant, overpow10 Cf ROBERT JAY LIFTON, THE NAZI DOCTORS (1986) (pointing out that German
administrators and physicians who carried out atrocities were highly educated); I-III
ELIE WIESEL, AGAINST SILENCE (1985) (same).
11 See infra part I (summarizing the four groups' depiction).
12 See infra text accompanying notes 169-72 (noting that the occasional prophet
who speaks out against racism of the day generally lacks an audience); Richard Delgado
&Jean Stefancic, Norms and Narratives: Can Judges Avoid Serious Moral Error?, 69 TEX. L.
REV. 1929 (1991) (judges rarely see beyond current moral paradigm). Of course, it is
possible that consciousness will not progress, but regress or remain at the same leveli.e., we may never condemn David Duke or the Willie Horton commercial. David Duke is
an ex-white supremist who campaigned for state and national office in the late 1980s and
early 1990s. The Willie Horton commercial featured a black recidivist; its purpose was
to imply that Democrats are soft on crime.
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ering lesson we draw from reviewing two centuries of ethnic
depiction.
The belief that we can somehow control our consciousness despite limitations of time and positionality we call the empathic fallacy.13 In literature, the pathetic fallacy holds that nature is like us,
that it is endowed with feelings, moods, and goals we can understand.1 4 The poet, feeling sad, implores the world to weep with him
or her. 15 Its correlate, which we term the empathic fallacy, consists of
believing that we can enlarge our sympathies through linguistic
means alone. By exposing ourselves to ennobling narratives, we
broaden our experience, deepen our empathy, and achieve new
levels of sensitivity and fellow-feeling. We can, in short, think, talk,
read, and write our way out of bigotry and narrow-mindedness, out
of our limitations of experience and perspective. As we illustrate,
however, we can do this only to a very limited extent.
In Part III, we show that our system of free speech not only fails
to correct the repression and abuse subjugated groups must face,
but often deepens their dilemma. Part IV addresses the question,
"if not remonstrance, then what?" We suggest a program of social
reform that includes speech as only one element, and limn a new,
variable theory of the First Amendment that incorporates the insights articulated in this Article.
I
IMAGES OF THE OUTSIDER

A small but excellent literature chronicles the depiction in popular culture of each of the major minority subgroups of color-African-Americans, Mexicans, Native Americans, and Asians. 16 In this
The term, as well as the fallacy it names, are our own inventions.
14 For the earliest known discussion of this fallacy, see JOHN RUSKIN, 3 MODERN
PAINTINGS 152 (1885); see also W.K. Wimsatt, Jr., & M.C. Beardsley, The Affective Fallacy,
57 SEWANEE REV. 31 (1949) (further discussion of literary fallacies).
13

15

JOSEPHINE MILES, PATHETIC FALLACY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 10-56 (1965)

(giving examples, from prominent poets, of nature weeping, smiling, groaning, all in
sympathy with humans); see also infra notes 167-68 and accompanying text (setting out
our view that both fallacies are rooted in hubris).
16 Some of the works we found particularly helpful are the following: ARTHUR G.
PETTIT, IMAGES OF THE MEXICAN AMERICAN IN FICTION AND FILM (1980); CATHERINE SILK
&JOHN SILK, RACISM AND ANTI-RACISM IN AMERICAN POPULAR CULTURE (1990); RAYMOND W. STEDMAN, SHADOWS OF THE INDIAN: STEREOTYPES IN AMERICAN CULTURE
(1982); E. WONG, ON VISUAL MEDIA RACISM: ASIANS IN THE AMERICAN MOTION PICTURE
(1978); FROM DIFFERENT SHORES: PERSPECTIVES ON RACE AND ETHNICrrY IN AMERICA
(Ronald Takaki ed., 1987) [hereinafter DIFFERENT SHORES]; SPLIT IMAGE: AFRICAN

AMERICANS IN THE MASS MEDIA (Jannette L. Dates & William Barlow eds., 1990) [hereinafter SPLIT IMAGE].

For additional works, see bibliographies in SILK & SILK, supra (dealing with AfricanAmericans). See also EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM (1985) (dealing with Asian-Ameri-
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Part, we summarize that history and draw parallels among the ways
that society has traditionally depicted the four groups.
A. African-Americans
Early in our history, as everyone knows, slave traders rounded
up African villagers and transported them to the New World in
chains. En route, many died; those who survived were sold and
forced to work in the fields and houses of a colonial nation bent on
economic development and expansion. By the eve of the Civil War,
over 4,000,000 African-Americans 17 were condemned to exist in
some form of this American Nightmare.
Slave codes regulated behavior, deterring rebellion and forbidding intermarriage. They also prohibited Southern blacks from
learning to read and write,"' thereby denying them access to the
world of print then replete with arguments about "the rights of
man." The dominant image of blacks in the popular theater and
literature of the late eighteenth century was that of the docile and
contented slave I9 -child-like, lazy, illiterate, and dependent on the
protection and care of a white master. The first appearance of
Sambo, a "comic Negro" stereotype, occurred in 1781 in a play
called The Divorce.2 0 This black male character, portrayed by a white
in blackface, danced, sang, spoke nonsense, and acted the buffoon.
The black man's potential as a sexual and economic competitor was
21
minimized by portraying him as an object of laughter.
Blackface minstrelsy found a new popularity in the 1830s when
Thomas D. Rice created Jim Crow, modeled on an elderly crippled
black slave who shuffle-danced and sang.2 2 It is thought that Rice

even borrowed the old man's shabby clothes for a more authentic
cans); Appendix at the end of this Article (containing works on the four ethnic groups
and on racial depiction in general).
For examples of sexist images concerning women, see TAMA STARR, THE "NATURAL
INFERIORITY" OF WOMEN: OUTRAGEOUS PRONOUNCEMENTS BY MISGUIDED MALES

(1991).

For a discussion of other minority groups and their role in U.S. civil rights history, see
STETSON KENNEDY, JIM CROW GUIDE: THE WAY IT WAS 26-46 (1990).
17
LERONE BENNETT, JR., BEFORE THE MAYFLOWER: A HISTORY OF THE NEGRO IN

AMERICA 1619-1964, 373 (rev. ed. 1966).
18 SILK & SILK, supra note 16, at 4.
19 See SPLIT IMAGE, supra note 16, at 6. On black characters and types generally in
U.S. literature, see STERLING BROWN, THE NEGRO IN AMERICAN FICTION (2d ed. 1972)
(detailing recurring caricatures, such as the contented slave, wretched freedman, tragic
mulatto, brute Negro, entertaining clown, etc.); John L. Grigsby,Judas, Jesus,Job or Jes A
Happy Ole Nigga: Or, Will the Real Uncle Tom Please Step Forward?, 1986 PUBS. MISS. PHIL.
AsS'N 5 1.
20

SPLIT IMAGE, supra note 16, at 5-6.

21 See id. at 6. On a related image-the "Coon"-see id.;James Dorman, Shaping the
Popular Image of the Post-ReconstructionAmerican Black: The "Coon Song" Phenomenon of the
Gilded Age, 40 AMER. Q. 451 (Dec. 1988).
22 See SPLIT IMAGE, supra note 16, at 7.
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stage performance. Rice's performance ofJump Jim Crow won him
immediate success in the United States and England. By the 1840s
minstrel shows were standard fare in American music halls. 23 In
these shows, whites in blackface created and disseminated stereotypes of African-Americans as inept urban dandies or happy childlike slaves. 2 4 Probably more whites-at least in the North-received
their understanding of African-American culture from minstrel
shows than from first hand acquaintance with blacks or their ideas.
Beaause laws forbade slaves to learn to read or write, slave culture was primarily oral. Thus, it is highly significant that former
slaves such as Frederick Douglass and William Wells Brown published accounts of captivity, life on plantations, and escapes to freedom. 25 These early slave narratives, published in the North and
circulated among abolitionist societies, presented counterimages to
the prevailing myths of the dominant culture. The abolitionist
movement reached its apogee with the publication of Harriet
Beecher Stowe's Uncle Tom's Cabin. Though Stowe was successful in
presenting the slave master as villain, her portrayal of Uncle Tom
changed the stereotype of the black slave only a little: Previously he
had been docile, content, or comic, while in her depiction he be26
came gentle, long-suffering, and imbued with Christian piety.
After the Civil War, the black image bifurcated. The "good
slave" image continued, but was soon joined by an ominous
"shadow" figure. The Uncle Tom character became romanticized, a
black mouthpiece espousing an apologia for the beliefs of the old
genteel white Confederacy. 2 7 Though never overtly sexual, his masculine form re-emerged as the avuncular storyteller Uncle Remus,
as well as various other "uncles." 28 His feminine form evolved into
a "mammy" figure-cook, washerwoman, nanny, and all-round domestic servant-responsible for the comfort of the Southern white

23

Interview with George Frederickson, in Ethnic Notions, supra note 9.

24

The dandified image (the "Coon") showed the folly of the North's policy con-

cerning freedom, while that of the happy Southern slave reassured whites that blacks
were happiest in "their natural condition." See SPLIT IMAGE, supra note 16, at 7. The

dandified urban "coon" image, played by white actors, reappeared in the 1920s and
continued until the 1950s in the phenomenally popular radio serial "Amos 'n' Andy."
See MELVIN ELY, THE ADVENTURES OF AMos 'N' ANDY: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN PHENOMENON (1991).
25 See THE CLASSIC SLAVES NARRATIVES (H. Gates ed., 1987); SPLIT IMAGE, supra

note 16, at 10.
26

See id. at 8.

WILLIAM L. VAN DEBURG, SLAVERY AND RACE IN AMERICAN POPULAR

(arguing that Uncle Tom's character was but a slight improvement over previous stereotypes).
SPLIT IMAGE, supra note 16, at 11; SILK & SILK, supra note 16, at 142.
27
28
SPLIT IMAGE, supra note 16, at 12-24.
CULTURE 35-36 (1984)
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household. 2 9 With no life of her own, imbued with practical wisdom, she took an intense interest in the welfare and well-being of
the white family she cared for.
During the tumultuous Reconstruction period, the sexuality denied to uncles and mammies found a crude outlet in a new stereotype of the recently freed male Negro as brutish and bestial.3 0 The
Ku Klux Klan and other illegal raiding parties justified their reign of
terror as necessary to control newly freed blacks whom they believed ready to force sex on any white woman they might encounter. 3 ' This stereotype, appearing in novels with titles like The Negro
as Beast,3 2 was offered to justify the widespread lynching that took
3
2,500 black lives between 1885 and 1900. 3
The myth of the out of control ambitious black was fueled by
currents prevalent in the marketplace of Western thought during
the late nineteenth century. Some of these ideas have been identified by Catherine Silk and John Silk: 1) the growth of American imperialism; 2) the absorption of "inferior races;" 3) the white man's
burden mentality-the white South bearing the burden in the U.S.;
4) the manifest destiny belief of the Anglo-Saxons; and 5) the new
34
social science theory concerning genetic inferiority.
Many of these ideas found expression in the powerful, crass,
and influential writings of Thomas Dixon. His work represented an
effort to satisfy his two goals in life: making money and converting
people to racism. He believed that whites, both Northern and
Southern, were duty bound to protect the Anglo-Saxon heritage,
particularly white women, who were destined to produce a superior
race. 35 In 1905, Dixon wrote The Clansman, a tale of two families,
36 It
one Northern and one Southern, united through marriage.
proved a sensation, particularly in the South. Ten years later, film-

29 SILK & SILK, supra note 16, at 139; SPLIT IMAGE, supra note 16, at 11; VAN
DEBURG, supra note 26, at 43.
30 See SPLIT IMAGE, supra note 16, at 11. This obsession with matters sexual dates
back to Puritan times in Massachusetts, and has surfaced in similar stereotyping of the
four major racial groups in the United States. See STEDMAN, supra note 16, at 81; VAN
DEBURG, supra note 26, at 122-25 (on recurring image of the Negro as beast).
31 See SILK & SILK, supra note 16, at 48-49; see also ALLEN W. TRELEASE, WHITE
TERROR: THE Ku KLUX KLAN CONSPIRACY AND SOUTHERN RECONSTRUCTION (1971).
32 SILK & SILK, supra note 16, at 49; see also H. Faulkner, HomespunJustice: The Lynching in American Fiction, 22 S.D. REV. 104 (1984).
33 SILK & SILK, supra note 16, at 39; see Faulkner, supra note 32.
34 SILK & SILK, supra note 16, at 49.

35 Id. at 50; see Russell Merritt, D. 11' Griffith 's The Birth of a Nation: Going After Little
Sister, in CLOSE VIEWINGS: AN ANTHOLOGY OF NEW FILM CRITICISM 215 (1990).
36 SILK & SILK, supra note 16, at 50.
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maker D.W. Griffith used the plots of this and another of Dixon's
novels 3 7 for his epic three-hour film, The Birth of a Nation.38
The film transformed Dixon's novels into vivid visual images,
featuring uncles, mammies, buffoons, an interfering mulatto mistress, and a chase scene in which a black man with animal-like traits
pursues a young white woman until she leaps to her death from a
pedestal-like perch at the edge of a cliff.39 The film played to audi-

ences throughout the country. New white immigrants from Eastern
and Southern Europe saw the film in numerous movie houses in
poor neighborhoods, where it played for almost a year. In the
South it played for fifteen years. A special screening was held at the
White House for Dixon's former classmate, President Woodrow
Wilson, his guests, and the entire Supreme Court. 40 Wilson later
4
described the film as "like writing history with lightning." '
Blacks could do little to confront the overwhelming popularity
of The Birth of a Nation. The NAACP, by then established with its
own newspaper, mobilized opposition. But the film's momentum
was unstoppable. Film critics, many of them liberal, though decrying its racism, praised the film for its technical and artistic merits.4 2
In contrast, efforts to present the story of Reconstruction from
a black point of view were unsuccessful. Novelist Albion Tourgee, a
white superior court judge and activist, used black characters who
spoke in their own voices to show the freed man as a person who
worked hard and attempted to succeed, but was victimized by the
Ku Klux Klan. 43 Tourgee believed the answer to racism lay in portraying blacks as normal-like everyone else.4 4 His novel, Bricks

Without Straw, attracted a devoted but small audience; the South's
treatment of blacks no longer interested many Northerners, and few
Southerners were willing to listen. Black writers suffered a similar
fate. While Charles Chesnutt, author of The Conjure Woman, was included in a list of "the foremost storytellers of the time," his publisher refused to release his next novel because the previous two
about racial themes had been commercially unsuccessful. 4 5 As Silk
37
38

THE LEOPARD'S SPOTS (1902).
SILK & SILK, supra note 16, at

125.
Id. at 126-27; see MERRrrr, supra note 35; James Kinney, The Rhetoric of Racism:
Thomas Dixon and the "Damned Black Beast," 15 AM. LIT. REALISM 145 (Autumn 1982).
40
SPLIT IMAGE, supra note 16, at 135; SILK & SILK, supra note 16, at 121, 127.
41
SILK & SILK, supra note 16, at 127. Wilson's comment probably was intended as
39

praise, for he added: "[O]ne of my regrets is that it is so horribly true." Id.

See id. at 128.
Id. at 31-32.
See id. at 36.
45 Id. at 45; SPLIT IMAGE, supra note 16, at 11-12; VAN DEBURG, supra note 26, at
100-02. On the status of the Negro at that time, see RAYMOND W. LOGAN, THE NEGRO IN
AMERICAN LIFE AND THOUGHT: THE NADIR, 1877-1901 (1954).
42
43
44
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and Silk point out, "[M]essages only reach those people who are
willing to listen. Only when a later audience became receptive...
46
could [their] tales be ... appreciated."
Although blacks had gained formal legal equality, the Supreme
Court, in 1896, upheld segregation in Plessy v. Ferguson.47 Lynchings
continued; racist stereotypes prevailed. Blacks had little access to
the press or the film industry and could do little to change the racism that both industries promulgated. Nevertheless, blacks joined
the army in droves during World War I. Segregation in the ranks
was rigidly enforced, however, and many blacks returned angry and
disheartened. 48 After the war, unrest in the country led to at least
twenty-five urban race riots,49 many in the previously peaceful
North. 50 Repressive images immediately increased and prevailed
for a little over a decade. Then, as the disruption abated, a few writers, such as Eugene O'Neill and Sinclair Lewis, portrayed blacks and
their plight sympathetically. Black writers and artists in New York
created the Harlem Renaissance.5" Blacks' image metamorphosed
yet again. Whites, excited and enthusiastic over this new artistic
rapprochement with blacks, quickly praised them and their work for
elements of the exoticism and primitivism popularized by Gauguin.
Echoing early images of good-natured, happy-go-lucky blacks, white
society began to regard African-Americans as musically talented,
rhythmical, passionate, and entertaining. 52 Although these developments heralded a somewhat more positive image of blacks, nevertheless the new images retained elements of condescension and
previous stereotypes. 5 The majority-race critics, intellectuals, and
artists who were entranced by the Renaissance may have intended
no harm, yet they perpetuated views of African-Americans as the
54
exotic other.
With World War II, black soldiers and workers were needed for
the war effort; the more virulent forms of racism were held in abeyance. However, when the war ended and the soldiers returned, racial hostilities again sharpened. Having experienced a relatively
racism-free environment during the war, black workers and soldiers
were not prepared to return to lives of menial work and subservi& SILK, supra note 16, at 46.
163 U.S. 543 (1896).
48
See SILK & SILK, supra note 16, at 61.
49 Id. at 62.
50
BENNETr, supra note 17, at 288.
51
SILK & SILK, supra note 16, at 63; VAN DEBURG, supra note 26, at 120-21, 202-03.
52
See SILK & SILK, supra note 16, at 63, 135; see also Ethnic Notions, supra note 9
(detailing roles of entertainers such as Paul Robeson and Burt Williams during this
period).
53 VAN DEBURG, supra note 26, at 121-22.
54 See The Congo, in THE NEW POETRY 291 (H. Monroe ed., 1932).
46

47

SILK
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ence to whites. For many, expectations of improvement were fed by
war propaganda depicting the U.S. as fighting for freedom.5 5 Activism sprang up; the Civil Rights movement began, and once again
the dominant image of blacks took on new forms: the cocky, streetsmart black who knows his rights; the unreasonable, opportunistic
community leader and militant; the safe, comforting, cardigan-wearing ("nice") black of TV sitcoms; and the Black Bomber of superstud films, all mutations of, and permutations of, old familiar
56

forms.

B.

Other Groups
1. Native Americans

The experience of other groups parallels that of blacks. For example, when the colonists arrived in Virginia and Massachusetts in
the seventeenth century, they brought with them images of the Indian created in England and Europe. Early explorers described native peoples of the "new world" as innocent, ingenuous, friendly,
and naked.5 7 At first, relations between the two groups were cordial. Later, however, more settlers arrived, bringing with them English concepts of property-land transfer, titles, deeds-that were
foreign to Indian thought. Indians who did not cooperate with the
settlers' plans were forced off their lands; eventually hostilities
broke out, 58 resulting in a conflict that lasted over two centuries.
Early writings about Native Americans reflected two romanticized images-"the Indian princess," incarnated most notably in Po6
cahantas,5 9 and "the man Friday," 60 found in Robinson Crusoe, '
earlier as the troublesome servant Caliban, 62 later as the faithful
55
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-ConvergenceDilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 524 (1980); Mary Dudziak, Desegregationas a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61, 71-73 (1989).
56 See Color Adjustment, supra note 9 (describing last 40 years of media depiction
and noting, among other things, the resemblance between current shows featuring sanitized, myth-making Rhodes Scholar, super-Negroes and previous images); see also SPLIT
IMAGE, supra note 16, at 254-80 (same); George Zinkhan et al., Changes in Stereot)pes:
Blacks and Whites in Magazine Advertisements, 63 JOURNALISM Q. 568 (Autumn 1986)..
57
STEDMAN, supra note 16, at 253 (noting descriptions that explorers Christopher
Columbus and Amerigo Vespucci gave). For further writings on Columbus and his early

impressions, see THE FOUR VOYAGES OF COLUMBUS (J.M.Cohen trans. & ed., 1969).
58 DEE BROWN, BURY My HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE 2-5 (1972); FAIRFAX DOWNEY,
INDIAN WARS OF THE U.S. ARMY (1776-1865) (1963); ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT (1990).
59
STEDMAN, supra note 16, at 17-41; see JOHN BOWMAN, POWHATAN'S DAUGHTER

(1973).

supra note 16, at 42-57.

60

STEDMAN,

61

DANIEL DEFOE, ROBINSON CRUSOE ( Michael Shinagel ed., W.W. Norton & Co.

1975) (1719)).
62

WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST

Press 1987) (1611).

(Stephen Orgel ed., Oxford University

1268

CORNELL L4 W REVIEW

[Vol. 77:1258

loyal Chingachgook, 63 and in the twentieth century the buffoon and
sidekick Tonto. 64 The first instance of the "captivity narrative" appeared in Massachusetts in 1682 with Mary Rowlandson's "Captivity
and Restoration. ' 6 5 Early fiction portrayed Indians as looters, burners, and killers-but not rapists, 66 because New Englanders knew
that Indians rarely committed rape. 6 7 But the erotic elements of
Rowlandson's story, although mild and subordinated to her religious message, 68 made it the prototype for later captivity tales that
emphasized sexual aggression directed toward Simon-pure
69
captives.
Other writers followed suit without Rowlandson's delicacy, portraying Indians as animal-like and sub-human, 70 a characterization
whose roots go back to Paracelsus (1493-1541), who proposed that
Indians were not among "the sons of Adam." 7 1 Shakespeare explored this theme when he wrote The Tempest and created a servant for Prospero-Caliban-whose name was an anagram of the
newly coined word "cannibal. ' 72 Cotton Mather and other Puritan
writers called Indians wolves, lions, sorcerers, and demons possessed by Satan. 73 By the nineteenth century, Indians had become
savage, barbarous, and half-civilized. 7 4 In early movies restless na75
tives and jungle beasts were practically interchangeable elements.
63

JAMES FENIMORE COOPER, THE LAST OF THE MOHICANS

(William Chorvot ed.,

Houghton Mifflin 1958) (1826).
64

STEDMAN,

(1974).

RANGER
65
STEDMAN,

supra note 16, at 50-51; see JENNI
supra note 16, at 75; see M.

CALDER, THERE MUST BE A LONE

ROWLANDSON, THE SOVEREIGNTY

& GOOD-

NESS OF GOD, TOGETHER WITH THE FAITHFULNESS OF His PROMISES DISPLAYED: BEING A
NARRATIVE OF THE CAPTIVITY AND RESTORATION OF MRS. MARY ROWLANDSON (1682).
66 STEPHEN OSBORNE, INDIAN-HATING IN AMERICAN LITERATURE 1682-1859, 50(10)

Diss. Abstr. Int'l 3228A (1990); STEDMAN, supra note 16, at 77-78 (historian Richard
Drinnon has referred to this literature as "violence pornography").
67
STEDMAN, supra note 16, at 78.
68 Id. at 75; see PERRY MILLER, THE NEW ENGLAND MIND: THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY (1939) (providing a full exposition of "the anatomy of the Puritan mind").
69 STEDMAN, supra note 16, at 75, 81; see Jean Ehly, Horrifying Story of an Indian Captive, W. FRONTIER ANN. 26 (1975).
70 STEDMAN, supra note 16, at 120. This stereotype occurred with blacks as well. See
supra notes 34-42 and accompanying text.

supra note 16, at 121.
Id. at 123. For a treatment of the cannibal concept, see MICHAEL HARNER & ALFRED MEYER, CANNIBAL (1979); MARVIN HARRIS, CANNIBALS AND KINGS: THE ORIGINS OF
CULTURES (1977).
73 STEDMAN, supra note 16, at 125.
74
Id. at 124; see RoY H. PEARCE, SAVAGISM AND CIVILIZATION: A STUDY OF THE INDIAN AND THE AMERICAN MIND (rev. ed. 1965); Robert Keller, Hostile Language: Bias in
Historical Writing About American Indian Resistance, 9 J.AMER. CULTURE 9 (Winter 1986).
75
STEDMAN, supra note 16, at 126. Vine Deloria,Jr., wrote "[W]e were never slaves.
71

STEDMAN,

72

We gave up land instead of life and labor. Because the Negro labored, he was consid-

ered a draft animal. Because the Indian occupied large areas of land, he was considered
a wild animal." VINE DELORIA, JR., CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS 7-8 (1969).
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No wonder, then, that Indians were removed, with little protest
from the dominant society, to reservations, just as wild and rare
beasts were confined to animal reserves.
Later movies of the "cowboys and Indians" genre built on these
images when they featured war dances, exotic dress, drunkenness,
surprise attacks, scalping, raiding, raping, tomahawks, tomtoms, and
torture. 7 6 D.W. Griffith, creator of Birth of a Nation,77 incorporated
these elements and more in The Battle of Elderbush Gulch (1913). In
that movie, a white woman, trapped in a cabin surrounded by Indians, awaits her fate, not knowing whether the Indian attackers will
kill her or whether one of her white defenders will shoot her before
letting the Indians take her alive. 78 By 1911, portrayal of Indians in
film had become so demeaning that representatives of four western
tribes protested to President William Howard Taft and to Congress. 79 But little change occurred until World War II, when
Hollywood transferred the enemy role to the Japanese and
Germans. Many of these early Indian movies are still shown on television, feeding the psyches of new generations of Americans with
the familiar stereotypes80
Shortly after the end of the war, Hollywood released Broken Arrow (1950), the first movie ever to feature an Indian as heroCochise of the Apaches. Though artistically and historically flawed,
it was widely praised.8 1 Other "noble savage" films reversed the
stereotype in the opposite direction, portraying Native Americans
with exaggerated nobleness 82-a striking parallel to the treatment
adulating whites gave black writers during the Harlem
83
Renaissance.
76

On Indians in films, see JON TusKA,

THE FILMING OF THE WEST (1976); JOHN E.

O'CONNOR, HOLLYWOOD: STEREOTYPES OF NATIVE AMERICAN IN FILM

77

(1980).

78

See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
STEDMAN, supra note 16, at 108.

79

Id. at 157. During this period, some of the titles, in themselves, tell the story.

E.g., ON THE WARPATH (1909), THE FLAMING ARROWS (1911), POISONED ARROWS (1911),
INCENDIARY INDIANS (1911), THE INDIAN RAIDERS (1910), THE CHEYENNE RAIDERS
(1910), ATrACK BY ARAPAHOES (1910), THE DUMB HALF-BREED'S DEFENSE (1910), SAVED
FROM THE REDMEN (1910), LOVE IN A TEPEE (1911), THE HAIR RESTORER AND THE INDIAN

(a "comedy" of 1911); see also sources cited supra note 76.
80 Similarly, stereotypes in adult fiction are replicated in juvenile literature. See "I"
IS NOT FOR INDIAN: THE PORTRAYAL OF NATIVE AMERICANS IN BOOxS FOR YOUNG PEOPLE

(Naomi Caldwell-Wood & Lisa A. Mitten comps., 1991); Magda Lewis, Are Indians Nicer
Now?, What Children Learn From Books About Native North Americans, in How MUCH TRUTH
Do WE TELL THE CHILDREN?, THE POLITICS OF CHILDREN'S LITERATURE 135 (Betty Ba-

con ed., 1988).
81

82
83

supra note 16, at 209, 218-20.
Id. at 206-09, 218-20.
See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
STEDMAN,
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In 1969, N. Scott Momaday, a Kiowa-Cherokee writer, won the
Pulitzer Prize for his novel House Made of Dawn.84 In 1972, PBS ran a
BBC production of The Last of the Mohicans.85 In each of these cases,
much of the audience was struck by the intelligence of the Native
American voice-a far cry from the earlier steady diet (still heard
today) of chiefs saying "ugh," braves shrieking war whoops, and
Tonto saying "me gettum." 86 It was not always so. Thomas Jefferson wished Congress could speak half as well as orators of Indian
nations.8 7 William Penn praised the Lenni Lanape language of the
Delaware for its subtlety. 88 Yet, speech of the Indians-as well as
that of African-Americans, Mexicans, and Asians-has been mangled, blunted and rendered inarticulate by whites who then became
entitled to speak for them. Like the other groups of color, Native
Americans have been disempowered by the very element which,
they are told, will save them.8 9
2. Asian-Americans
With Asian-Americans, we find the same pattern we found elsewhere: the dominant depiction in popular culture is negativealthough rarely seen as such at the time-and the stereotype shifts to
accommodate society's changing needs. 90
In the middle years of the nineteenth century, Chinese were
welcomed into the land for their labor: They were needed to operate the mines, build railroads, and carry out other physical tasks necessary to the country's development. 9 ' The industrious immigrants
soon, however, began to surpass white American workers. They
opened small businesses, succeeded in making profitable mines that
others had abandoned. 92 Not surprisingly, Chinese became the
84

STEDMAN,

85
86

Id. at 58.

supra note 16, at 183.

The gray-eyed Saxon soldier, squinting over his rifle sights, is a little more articulate: The only good Indian is ....
87
STEDMAN, supra note 16, at 62.
88 Id. at 62-63; see WILLIAM PENN'S OWN AccouNT OF THE LENNI LENAPI OR DELAWARE INDIANS (A. Myers ed., 1970).
89 See Vine Deloria, Jr., Identity and Culture, in FROM DIFFERENT SHORES: PERSPECTIVES ON RACE AND ETHNIcrrY IN AMERICA 94, 102 (Ronald Takaki ed., 1987). Indian
talk that matched an even harsher racial stereotype of the mid-nineteenth century was
created in ROBERT MONTGOMERY BIRD, NICK OF THE WOODS: OR, THE JIBBENAINOSAY
(1837).

For discussion of Bird and his influence on American culture, see Ronald

Takaki, The Metaphysics of Civilization: Indians and the Age of Jackson, in FROM
SHORES, supra, at 61-75.
90

See, e.g., supra notes 26-30, 57-79 and accompanying text.

91

See

DIFFERENT

ALEXANDER SAXTON, THE INDISPENSABLE ENEMY: LABOR AND THE ANTI-CHI-

19-45 (1971); WONG, supra note 16, at ii-v.
ii-iii. For a history of this period, see PING CHIU,
1850-80: AN ECONOMIC STUDY (1963).

NESE MOVEMENT IN CALIFORNIA
92 WONG, supra note 16, at
NESE LABOR IN CALIFORNIA,

CHI-
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scapegoats for the 1870s Depression. Unionists and writers exaggerated negative traits thought associated with them-opium smoking, gambling-and succeeded in having anti-Chinese legislation
enacted. 93 By 1882 public sentiment had been mobilized sufficiently so that Congress was able to pass an Exclusion Act, which
reduced the number of Chinese in the U.S. from 105,000 in 1880 to
94
65,000 in 1908.
During this period, Japan's international position was on the
rise, yet U.S. writers and politicians depicted all Asians as inferior,
unassimilable, willing to work inhuman hours at low wages, and
loyal to foreign despots. 9 5 When Japan defeated first China and
then Russia, it began to replace China as the "yellow peril." 96 By
1924, all Asians were barred, an exclusion the Supreme Court had
upheld for the Chinese in 1889. 9 7 During a period of increasing
tensions between the two countries, the film industry portrayed Japanese and other Asians-during this period few distinctions were
made-in unremittingly negative terms. As with African-Americans
and Native Americans, Asian men were depicted as cunning, savage,
and as potential rapists interested in defiling white women.9 8 (In
sharp contrast, white male actors were seen as having legitimate ac99
cess to Asian women.)
As U.S. militancy grew, films began to devalue Asian-principallyJapanese-life.1 0 0 Not even they valued life, the narratives of
the day said. Why should we value theirs? During earlier periods,
when racism against Asians was relatively quiescent, writers and
film-makers employed the stock character of the Charlie Chan' 0 1the hapless, pidgin-talking Asian, in many respects the functional
93
94
TIONS

SAXTON, supra note 91, at 19-45; WONG, supra note 16, at xi-xvii.
R. WESTEN, RACISM IN U.S. IMPERIALISM: THE INFLUENCE OF RACIAL ASSUMPON AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1893-1946 (1972) (reviewing history of immigra-

tion quotas and policies); WONG, supra note 16, at xx. For a general treatment of antiAsian sentiment, see STUART CREIGHTON MILLER, THE UNWELCOME IMMIGRANT: THE
AMERICAN IMAGE OF THE CHINESE

1785-1882 (1969).

95
DONALD HATA, "UNDESIRABLES," EARLY IMMIGRANTS AND THE ANTI-JAPANESE
MOVEMENT IN SAN FRANCISCO, 1892-1893 (1979); MILLER, supra note 94; WONG, supra

note 16, at xi-xvii.
96 WONG, supra note 16, at xx; see RICHARD A. THOMPSON, THE YELLOW PERIL, 18901924 (1979).
97
See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); see also SHIN S. TSAI,
THE CHINESE EXPERIENCE IN AMERICA 56-81 (1986).
98 E.g., WONG, supra note 16, at 25, 72-74; see RONALD TAKAKI, STRANGERS FROM A
DIFFERENT SHORE (1989) (detailing resistance to Asian immigrants); supra notes 77-78

and accompanying text (anti-Black and anti-Indian movies by D. Griffith).
99 WONG, supra note 16, at 24. Viz, by being kamikazes, prepared to die for the
Emperor, etc.
100 Id. at 29, 124-28; see PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR 52-73 (1983).
101 TAKAKI, slpra note 98; WONG, supra note 16, at 3, 108.
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equivalent of the Sambo or uncle.' 0 2 But as anti-Japanese sentiment
increased, we began depicting even domestic Asians as foul and
tricky.' 0 3 Anti-Asian films were easy to produce and profitable;
Hollywood would often assign a Japanese actor to play a Chinese
04
villain and vice versa.'
W.R. Hearst sponsored Patria,an anti-Asian film serial that began in 1919 and continued for several years, depicting Asians as a
Yellow Menace. 10 5 At one point, Woodrow Wilson became disturbed by the virulence of Hearst's production and wrote asking him
to soften it.106 Hearst responded by changing the series so that it
became dominantly anti-Mexican. 1 0 7 In the period immediately preceding and following World War II, anti-Japanese images continued
to proliferate.1 0 8 A stock character was the master Oriental criminal, often played by Anglo actors in make-up.10 9 By this time, films
and novels were distinguishing between Chinese (who were good),
and Japanese (who were bad). 110 After Pearl Harbor, intense antiJapanese propaganda resulted in federal action to intern 110,000
Japanese Americans, many of whom had lived in the United States
2
all their lives."' Many lost farms, houses, and other property. 1 It
later came to light that much of the evidence of likely sabotage and
fifth column activities had been fabricated.' '
Following World War II, depictions of blacks and Indians were
upgraded to some extent,1 4 but those of Asians only a little. Many
See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
WONG, supra note 16, at 34-38, 55-103.
WONG, supra note 16, at 74 (much in the manner that Hollywood created the
"generic Indian" with either whites or Indians of any convenient tribe assigned to play
the part).
Id. at 88-92.
105
Id. at 93.
106
102
103
104

107
108

Id.
Id. at 111-14, 124-28;see PROPAGANDA ON FILM: A NATION AT WAR (R.A. Maynard

ed., 1975).

109 See RICHARD GRIFFITH & ARTHUR MAYER, THE MOVIES 108 (1970). Compare
WONG, supra note 16, at 102-03, with supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text (discussing white actors in blackface portraying blacks in minstrel shows).
110 WONG, supra note 16, at 136-38; seeJOE MORELLA & EDWARD EPSTEIN, THE FILMS
OF WORLD WAR 11 (1973); Lewis Jacobs, World War II and the American Film, 7 CINEMA J.

(1967-68).

111 IRONS, supra note 100 (describing events that led up to and followed this tragic
chapter in our history). For two Supreme Court cases upholding curfews placed on
Japanese-Americans, see Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) and Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
112 B. HoSoKAwA, NISEI: THE QUIET AMERICANS 348 (1969); see MAISIE CONRAT &
RICHARD CONRAT, EXECUTIVE ORDER 9066: THE INTERNMENT OF 110,000 JAPANESE
AMERICANS (1972).
113 NISEI, supra note 112, at 292-30 1; see generally IRONS, supra note 100 (internment a
product of war hysteria and military alarmism).
114 See supra notes 50-55, 80-87 and accompanying text.
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ofJames Bond's villains, for example, have been Asian." 15 In recent
days, Japan has once again become a serious economic rival of the
United States, producing automobiles, computers and other products at a price and quality American industry has proven unable to
match. Predictably, a further wave of anti-Asian sentiment and ster6
eotyping is re-emerging.11
3.

Mexican-Americans

Images of Mexican-Americans ("Chicanos") fall into three or
four well-delineated stereotypes-the greaser, the conniving,
treacherous bandido, the happy-go-lucky shiftless lover of song,
food, and dance, and the tragic, silent "Spanish" tall, dark, and
handsome type of romantic fiction-which change according to society's needs." 1 7 As with blacks, Asians, and Indians, most Americans
have relatively few interpersonal contacts with Mexican-Americans;
therefore, these images become the individual's only reality. When
such a person meets an actual Mexican-American, he or she tends to
place the other in one of the ready-made categories. 1 8 Stereotyping thus denies members of both groups the opportunity to interact
with each other on anything like a complex, nuanced human
level. 119
During and just after the conquest, when the U.S. was seizing
and then settling large tracts of Mexican territory in the Southwest,
"Western" or "conquest" fiction depicted Anglos bravely displacing
shifty, brutal, and treacherous Mexicans. 120 After the war ended
and control of the Southwest passed to American hands, a subtle
shift occurred. Anglos living and settling in the new regions were
portrayed as Protestant, independent, thrifty, industrious, mechaniWONG, supra note 16, at 173-80, 182-83.
116 Jim Carrier, Japanese-American Relive Days of Shame: Bashing Binge Bringing Back
Scars of Racism, DENVER POST, Mar. 22, 1992, at IA; Lance Morrow,Japan in the Mind of
America, TIME, Feb. 10, 1992, at 16, 19-20, 23-24.
117 PErrr, supra note 16 (cataloging and describing the evolution of these and related images). For treatments of Mexicans in popular and high literature, see C. ROBINSON, WITH THE EARS OF STRANGERS: THE MEXICAN IN AMERICAN LITERATURE (1963); C.
115

ROBINSON, Mexico and the Hispanic Southwest, in AMERICAN LITERATURE (1970); Carl AIlsup,

Who Done It? The Theft of Mexican American History, 17 J. POPULAR CULTURE, Winter 1983,
at 150.
118 If the Mexican is quiet, the observer will think, "Oh, he is one of that kind"; if
ebullient and outgoing, will assimilate him or her to the other type, and so on.
119 Delgado, supra note 1, at 137 (summarizing sources on how stereotyping accomplishes this); see PIERRE L. VAN DEN BERGHE, RACE AND RACISM: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECnVE (2d ed. 1978). On the efficacy of racial images and their cultural encoding in
our very ideas and vocabulary, see P. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS

(1991).
120 PETTrIT, supra note 16, at 32-40. These images naturally tended to justify U.S.
expansion. See generally RODOLFO ACUNA, OCCUPIED AMERICA: A HISTORY OF THE CHICANO

(1981).
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cally resourceful, and interested in progress; Mexicans, as traditional, sedate, lacking in mechanical resourcefulness and
ambition. 12 1 Writers both on and off the scene created the same
images of indolent, pious Mexicans-ignoring the two centuries of
enterprising farmers and ranchers who withstood or negotiated with
Apaches and Comanches and built a sturdy society with irrigation,
12 2
land tenure, and mining codes.
In the late conquest period, depiction of this group bifurcated. 123 As happened at a different period with African-Americans,
majority-race writers created two images of the Mexican: the
"good" (loyal) Mexican peon or sidekick, and the "bad"
fighter/greaser Mexican who did not know his place.' 24 The first
was faithful and domestic; the second, treacherous and evil. As with
other groups, 125 the second ("bad") image had sexual overtones:
the greaser coveted Anglo women and would seduce or rape them if
given the opportunity. 126 Children's books of this time, like the
best-selling Buffalo Bill series, were full of Mexican stereotypes used
to reinforce moral messages to the young: They are like this, we like
that. 127 The series ended in 1912.
The first thirty years of this century saw heavy Mexican immigration of mainly poor workers. The first Bracero programs-official, temporary importation of field hands-appeared. 2 8 With
increasing numbers, white-only signs, segregated housing and
schools appeared, aimed now at Mexicans in addition to blacks. 12 9
Since there was now an increased risk of interaction and intermarriage, novels and newspaper writing reinforced the notion of these
immigrants' baseness, simplicity, and inability to become
30
assimilated.
121
PETrIT, supra note 16, at xiv-xvii; see Juan Garcia, Americanization and the Mexican
Immigrant, in DIFFERENT SHORES, supra note 16 at 69, 69-70.
122
PETrr, supra note 16, at xix-xx; Garcia, supra note 121, at 69-71. For a background and treatment of cultural relations between the two groups, see ANGEL DEL Rio,
THE CLASH AND ATTRACTION OF Two CULTURES: THE HISPANIC AND THE ANGLO SAXON
WORLDS IN AMERICA (J. Shearer trans. & ed., 1965).

123
124
125

See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 23-25, 39-40 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 38-39 (Blacks), 67-69 (Indians), 98-99
(Asians).
126
PETrIT, supra note 16, at 22-25; see also CECIL ROBINSON, WITH THE EARS OF
STRANGERS: THE MEXICAN IN AMERICAN LITERATURE (1963) (tracing this and other Latin
stereotypes).
127
PETTIT, supra note 16, at 137. Compare this series to sources cited supra note 80
(portrayal of Indians in children's books).
128
PETTIT, supra note 16, at 84, 154-57; Garcia, supra note 121.
129
See PETrTIT, supra note 16, at 84-85.
130
See id. at 85-104; see also I & II ALBERTJOHANNSEN, THE HOUSE OF BEADLE AND
ADAMS AND ITS DIME AND NICKLE NOVELS:

(1950).
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The movies of this period13 1 depicted Latins as buffoons, sluts,
or connivers;13 2 even some of the titles were disparaging: for example, The Greaser's Gauntlet.'3 3 Films featured brown-skinned desperadoes stealing horses or gold, lusting after pure Anglo women,
shooting noble Saxon heroes in the back, or acting the part of hapless buffoons.13 4 Animated cartoons and short subjects, still shown
on television, featured tequila-drinking Mexicans, bullfighters,
Speedy Gonzalez and Slowpoke Rodriguez, and clowns-as well as
Castilian caballeras, light-skinned, upper class, and prone to wear35
ing elaborate dresses and carrying castanets.'
World War II brought the need for factory and agricultural
workers and a new flood of immigrants.' 3 6 Images softened to include "normal," or even noble, Mexicans, like the general of Marlon
Brando's Viva Zapata.13 7 Perhaps realizing it had overstepped,
America diminished the virulence of its anti-Mexican imagery. Yet
the Western genre, with Mexican villains and bandits, continues;
and the immigrant speaking gibberish still makes an appearance.
Even the most favorable novel and film of the post-war period, The
38
Milagro Beanfield War, ends in stereotypes.'
A few writers found their own culture alienating or sick and
sought relief in a more serene Southwest culture. As with the Harlem Rennaissance, these creative artists tended to be more generous
to Mexicans, but nevertheless retained the Anglo hero as the central
figure or Samaritan who uplifts the Mexican from his or her tradi13 9
tional ignorance.
II
How COULD THEY? LESSONS FROM THE HISTORY OF
RACIAL DEPICTION

As we saw in Part I, the depiction of ethnic groups of color is
littered with negative images, although the content of those images
131
Between 1900 and the war, more Americans watched movies than read books.
See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text; see also PETrrr,supra note 16, at 13.
132 See PErrr,supra note 16, at 112-14, 123-26, 128-31; Blaine Lamb, The Convenient
Villain: The Early Cinema Views the Mexican-American, 14 J. WEST 75 (1975).

133 See PETrrr, supra note 16, at 131; for a filmography see id. at 264-69.
134 PErrT, supra note 16; see Juan Garcia, Hollywood and the West: Mexican Images in
American Films, in OLD SOUTHWEST/NEW SOUTHWEST 75 (Jody Nolte ed., 1987).
135 See Pmrrrr,supra note 16, at 137-45; see also George Roeder, Jr., Mexicans in the
Movies: The Images of Mexicans in American Films, 1894-1947 (1971) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with University of Wisconsin). For another treatment of Mexican
women, see Beverly Trulio, Anglo-American Attitudes Toward New Mexican Women, 12 J.
WEST 229 (1973).
136 See PErrrr,supra note 16, at 155.
137 Id. at 224-31.
138 Id. at 237-45.
139 Id. at 158-77.
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changes over time. In some periods, society needed to suppress a
group, as with blacks during Reconstruction. Society coined an image to suit that purpose-that of primitive, powerful larger than life
blacks, terrifying and barely under control. 140 At other times, for
example during slavery, society needed reassurance that blacks were
docile, cheerful, and content with their lot. Images of sullen, rebellious blacks dissatisfied with their condition would have made white
society uneasy. Accordingly, images of simple, happy blacks, con1 41
tent to do the master's work, were disseminated.
In every era, then, ethnic imagery comes bearing an enormous
amount of social weight.1 4 2 Nevertheless, we sense that we are in
control and that things need not be that way. We believe we can use
speech, jiujitsu fashion, on behalf of oppressed peoples. 143 We believe that speech can serve as a tool of destabilization. It is virtually
a prime tenet of liberal jurisprudence that by talk, dialog, exhortation, and so on, we present each other with passionate, appealing
messages that will counter the evil ones of racism and sexism, and
thereby advance society to greater levels of fairness and
humanity. 144
See supra notes 30-39, 51-52 and accompanying text.
Other ethnic groups, at various times and in response to different social needs,
were depicted as: Charlie Chans; hapless, lazy Mexicans interested only in singing and
dancing; conniving Indians or greasers; devious or superindustrious Asians willing to
work inordinate hours; and so on-all depending on what society needed-immigration
or the opposite, cheap or excess labor, suppression, indifference, guilt assuagement, and
so on.
142
That is, images respond to powerful forces and needs, always preceding and facilitating change. The relocation, Bracero program, Japanese internment, etc., then
happens ineluctably and in a way that seems natural, permissible, and "right." Our First
Amendment and system of free expression keep the needs of the control group, the
creative community, the mass of people, and the subjugated groups themselves all nicely
in balance. See also STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TExT IN THIS CLAss? THE AUTHORITY OF
INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES (1980) (the background of assumptions that make up the
dominant world view in any era limits how we see the world, but is always contingent,
never necessary); STEVEN LUKES, POWER: A RADICAL VIEW 21-25 (1974) (powerful
groups manipulate discourse to prevent others from appreciating how things work).
Compare Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 12 (reviewing judges' role in deciding cases
embracing "serious moral error"), with Adam Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence,in 5 GLAsGow EDITION OF THE WORKS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF ADAM SMrrH (R. Meek et al., eds.,
1978) (commercial interests determine law and culture).
143
For the view that speech may serve this counter-hegemonic function, see Stephen M. Feldman, Whose Common Good? Racism in the Political Community, 80 GEO. L.J.
1835 (1992); Ed Sparer, FundamentalHuman Rights, Legal Entitlements, and the Social Struggle: A Friendly Critique of the CriticalLegal Studies Movement, 36 STAN. L. REV. 509 (1984).
See sources cited supra note 2; Lipkin, supra note 2 (discussing "conversational144
ism"). For classic works on dialogism or the Republican revival, see Robert M. Cover,
Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REV. 4 (1983); Frank I. Michelman, Foreword:
Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986); Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences
and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689 (1984).
140
141
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Consider, for example, the current debate about campus
speech codes. In response to a rising tide of racist incidents, many
campuses have enacted, or are considering enacting, student conduct codes that forbid certain types of face-to-face insult. 145 These
codes invariably draw fire from free-speech absolutists and many
campus administrators on the ground that they would interfere with
free speech.1 4 6 Campuses, they argue, ought to be "bastions of free
speech."' 47 Racism and prejudice are matters of "ignorance and
48 Supfear," for which the appropriate remedy is more speech.'
pression merely drives racism underground, where it will fester and
emerge in even more hateful forms. Speech is the best corrective
for error; regulation risks the spectre of censorship and state control.' 49 Efforts to regulate pornography, Klan marches, and other

types of race-baiting often meet similar responses. 150
But modernist and postmodern insights about language and the
social construction of reality show that reliance on countervailing
speech that will, in theory, wrestle with bad or vicious speech is
often misplaced. This is so for two interrelated reasons: First, the
account rests on simplistic and erroneous notions of narrativity and
change, and second, on a misunderstanding of the relation between
the subject, or self, and new narratives.
A.

The First Reason-Time Warp: Why We (Can) Only
Condemn the Old Narrative

Part I showed that we simply do not see many forms of discrimination, bias, and prejudice as wrong at the time.151 The racism of
See Matsuda, supra note 1; Lawrence, supra note 1 (discussing this controversy).
See Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: ConstitutionalNarratives in Collision,
85 Nw. U.L. REV. 343, 358-61 (1991).
147
See id. at 359-60 (discussing this argument).
148
Benno Schmidt, Professor of Law & President, Yale University, Remarks at Campus Speech, panel discussion and program, Yale Law School (Oct. 11, 1991).
149
For an exposition of these and related arguments, see Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 DUKE LJ. 484; see also Delgado, supra
note 146, at 358-61, 376; Schmidt, supra note 148.
150 That is: Let the marketplace (i.e., more speech) decide; do not prohibit the
speech but, rather, speak out against it.
151
To summarize our argument:
(i) That the intensely negative images we described in Part I appeared with little
visible, much less effective, popular protest implies that most readers did not see these
images as troublesome. See notes 19-24, 27-33, 36-41, 43-46, 59-78, 93, 98-113, 120-37
and accompanying text;
(ii) Early writers ("ahead of their time") who spoke out against racism were ignored
until the social paradigm changed, and conditions were right for a new message. See
sources cited supra notes 43-46; infra notes 169-73;
(iii) Since writers take their cue from the market, it seems plausible that those who
originated the hateful images did so with a sense (conscious or unconscious) that the
market would welcome, or at least accept, these images. Common sense tells us that
145
146
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other times and places does stand out, does strike us as glaringly
and appallingly wrong. But this happens only decades or centuries
later; we acquiesce in today's version with little realization that it is
wrong, that a later generation will ask "How could they?" about
us.152 We only condemn the racism of another place (South Africa)
or time. But that of our own place and time strikes us, if at all, as
unexceptionable, trivial, or well within literary license.1 53 Every
form of creative work (we tell ourselves) relies on stock characters.
What's so wrong with a novel that employs a black who .... or a
Mexican who . . . . ?154 Besides, the argument goes, those groups
are disproportionately employed as domestics, are responsible for a
high proportion of our crime, are they not? And some actually talk
this way; why, just last week, I overheard ....
This time-warp aspect of racism makes speech an ineffective
tool to counter it. Racism is woven into the warp and woof of the
way we see and organize the world 15 5 -it is one of the many preconmost writers will not write or artists draw images that they know will create a public
uproar, or will cause their editors or publishers to reconsider associating with them, etc.;
(iv) With latter-day racism, it seems likely that most examples-e.g., Willie Horton-are test-marketed first, to see whether or not they fall within the paradigm or to see
whether they will accomplish the desired effect;
(v) Speech is paradigm dependent. Judges, see Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 12,
and law reformers, see Christopher Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?-Toward Legal
Rightsfor Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972), both frequently miss the moral
significance of a case or opportunity for law reform. If this happens, often with individuals charged with being agents of moral change, it seems likely that ordinary writers and
readers will be no more blessed with social sensitivity;
(vi) A small amount of direct evidence shows that some modern-day creators have
lived to regret their own participation in negative racial stereotyping. See, e.g., the collection of interviews with TV actors, producers, and writers in ColorAdjustment, supra note
9 (interviews with early TV and film figures regretting their own participation in programs and films now regarded as racist).
It may well be that some of the instances of racist imaging we describe were not, in
fact, created and disseminated blithely-without the author's unawareness of their pernicious nature-but were created with full awareness of this. See, e.g., supra notes 34-42
and accompanying text (describing Thomas Dixon, some of whose works may have been
consciously racist and aimed at tapping national subcurrent of anti-black sentiment).
We prefer the more charitable view-that much of racial stereotyping is unconscious on
the author's part. The more dire interpretation, however, also supports our thesis that
there is relatively little empathy on which outsiders may rely, and that the system of free
expression is no stalwart friend of racial reform.
152
For detailed analysis of a similar mechanism by which even eminent judges fail to
notice the danger in certain cases, see Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 12 (describing
justices, such as Taney and Holmes, who ignored "saving narratives" and, as a result,
wrote opinions that are now regarded as travesties).
153
Sources cited supra note 151; see supra note 10; Van Deburg, supra note 26, at 122
(majority-race viewers protest small deviations from racist paradigms).
154
Conversation with anonymous motion picture art director in Los Angeles, CA,
Sept. 14, 1985 (informant's name withheld at request of author).
155

DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUS-

(1987) (noting that racism is ubiquitous and discouragingly difficult to eradicate);
see supra Part I (racist imagery flourished in every era); see also infra text accompanying
TICE
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ceptions we bring to experience and use to construct and make
sense of our social world. 15 6 Racism forms part of the dominant
narrative, the group of received understandings and basic principles
that form the baseline from which we reason. 15 7 How could these
be in question? Recent scholarship shows that the dominant narrative changes very slowly and resists alteration. 15 8 We interpret new
stories in light of the old. Ones that deviate too markedly from our
pre-existing stock are dismissed as extreme, coercive, political, and
wrong.' 5 9 The only stories about race we are prepared to condemn,
then, are the old ones giving voice to the racism of an earlier age,
ones that society has already begun to reject. We can condemn Justice Brown for writing as he did in Plessy v. Ferguson, but not university administrators who refuse remedies for campus racism, failing
60
to notice the remarkable parallels between the two.1
B.

The Second Reason: Our Narratives, Our Selves

Racial change is slow, then, because the story of race is part of
the dominant narrative we use to interpret experience. The narrative teaches that race matters, that people are different, with the differences lying always in a predictable direction. 6 1'It holds that
notes 186-88, 221 (examples of present-day racism only dimly viewed as objectionable);
Color Adjustment, supra note 9 (same).
156
See Symposium, Legal Storytelling, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 2073 (1989) (including articles
by Ball, Bell, Delgado, Matsuda, and Williams on race and narrative).
157 But see Richard Delgado, Stoytellingfor Oppositionistsand Others: A Pleafor Narrative,
87 MicH. L. REV. 2411, 2413-16, 2431-42 (arguing that "counterstorytelling" can sometimes jar or displace comforting majoritarian myths about racial progress). For the view
that reform efforts are almost invariably met with skepticism and disbelief, see Stone,
supra note 151, at 450.
158
See, e.g., Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 12. See generally BELL, supra note 155
(arguing that racial progress is slow, and majority society is rarely receptive to pleas for
justice). For another view of the prospects for reform, see Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell
and the Ideology of Law Reform: Will We Ever Be Saved?, 97 YALE L.J. 923 (1988) (reform
slow because: (1) mindsets of whites and blacks radically different, and (2) majoritarian
positions are firmly rooted in white self-interest).
159 See generally Delgado, supra note 157.
160
In Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550-51 (1896), the Court failed to see any
difference between requiring blacks to sit in a separate railroad car and a similar imposition on whites. For Taney, if blacks found that requirement demeaning, it was only
because they chose to put that construction on it; the cars were equal, and the races had
similar accommodations. See also Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959) (making similar criticism of Brown v. Board of Education: whites forced to associate with blacks were mistreated just as seriously as blacks
denied the right to associate with whites-both were denied freedom of action).
In the campus-speech controversy, some argue that the right of a racist to hurl an
ethnic insult must be balanced against the right of a person of color not to receive it.
Who is to say which right (to speak-or not to be spoken to) is superior? Denying one
right strengthens the other, but only at the expense of the first.
161
On the dominant narrative, its content, and comforting function, see Delgado,
supra note 158; Delgado, supra note 157, at 2417. For a discussion of the hold that ra-

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

1280

[Vol. 77:1258

certain cultures, unfortunately, have less ambition than others, that
the majority group is largely innocent of racial wrongdoing, that the
current distribution of comfort and well-being is roughly what merit
and fairness dictate.1 62 Within that general framework, only certain
matters are open for discussion: How different? In what ways?
With how many exceptions? And what measures are due to deal
with this unfortunate situation and at what cost to whites? 16 3 This is
so because the narrative leaves only certain things intelligible; other
arguments and texts would seem alien.
A second and related insight from modern scholarship focuses
not on the role of narratives in confining change to manageable proportions, but on the relationship between our selves and those narratives. The reigning First Amendment metaphor-the marketplace
of ideas-implies a separation between subjects who do the choosing and the ideas or messages that vie for their attention.1 64 Subjects are "in here," the messages "out there." The pre-existing
subjects choose the idea that seems most valid and true-somewhat
in the manner of a diner deciding what to eat at a buffet.
But scholars are beginning to realize that this mechanistic view
of an autonomous subject choosing among separate, external ideas
is simplistic. In an important sense, we are our current stock of narratives, and they us. 16 5 We subscribe to a stock of explanatory
scripts, plots, narratives, and understandings that enable us to make
sense of-to construct-our social world. Because we then live in
that world, it begins to shape and determine us, who we are, what we
166
see, how we select, reject, interpret and order subsequent reality.
cism exercises on our psyches, see Charles A. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego and Equal
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
162 Source cited supra note 161; see Diana Reep & Faye H. Dambrot, Effects of Frequent
Television Viewing on Stereotypes: "Drip, Drip," or "Drench?", 66 JOURNALISM Q. 542 (Autumn 1989); Gregory Sawin, How Stereotypes Influence Opinions about Individuals, 48 ETC.
210 (Summer 1991).
163
On the view that the cost of racial remedies is always placed on blacks or lowincome whites, see Derrick Bell, Bakke, Minority Admissions, and the Usual Price of Racial
Remedies, 67 CAL. L. REV. 3 (1979).
164 On the reigning marketplace conception of free speech, see Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE
SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT

(1948);

JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGrTICA

(Michael Davis ed., 1965) (classic early statement). See also Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A LegitimatingMyth, 1984 DUKE LJ. 1 ("market" shown to favor entrenched
structure and ideology).
165 Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 12, at 1933, 1957.
166

Id;

see MILNER BALL, LYING DOWN TOGETHER: LAW, METAPHOR AND THEOLOGY

135 (1985); 1 & 2 PAUL RICOEUR, TIME AND NARRATIVE (1984-85). For modernist/postmodern expositions of this view, see, e.g., PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMAN,
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY

(1978).

(1967);

NELSON GOODMAN, WAYS OF WORLDMAKING
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These observations imply that our ability to escape the confines
of our own preconceptions is quite limited. The contrary beliefthat through speech and remonstrance alone we can endlessly reform ourselves and each other-we call the empathicfallacy.' 6 7 It and
its companion, the pathetic fallacy, are both based on hubris, the belief that we can be more than we are. The empathic fallacy holds
that through speech and remonstrance we can surmount our limitations of time, place and culture, can transcend our own situatedness.
But our examination of the cultural record, as well as postmodem
understandings of language and personhood, both point to the
same conclusion: The notion of ideas competing with each other,
with truth and goodness emerging victorious from the competition,
has proven seriously deficient when applied to evils, like racism, that
are deeply inscribed in the culture.168 We have constructed the social world so that racism seems normal, part of the status quo, in
need of little correction. It is not until much later that what we believed begins to seem incredibly, monstrously wrong. How could
we have believed that?
True, every few decades an occasional genius will rise up and
offer a work that recognizes and denounces the racism of the day.16 9
Unfortunately, they are ignored-they have no audience. Witness,
for example, the recent "discovery" of long-forgotten black writers
such as Charles Chesnutt, Zora Neale Hurston, or the slave narratives.' 70 Consider that Nadine Gordimer won the Nobel Prize after
nearly 40 years of writing about the evils of apartheid;' 7' Harriet
Beecher Stowe's book sold well only after years of abolitionist sentiment and agitation had sensitized her public to the possibility that

167
For examples of writers who urge this view (namely, that reading and vicarious
experience can quickly and easily deepen empathy), see, e.g., Susan Feagin, Imagining
Emotions and Appreciating Fiction, 18 CAN. J. PHIL. 485 (1988); Gelja Frank, Becoming the
Other, 8 BIOGRAPHY 189 (1985). See also Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 12, at 1931-32
n.8 (summarizing the many claims of the law-and-literature movement). For a more
balanced view of empathy, potential and limits, see Martha Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 90-95 (1987).
168 See also ELY, supra note 24; ColorAdjustment, supra note 9 (noting that socially progressive TV shows from modern era-e.g., East Side-West Side, Frank'sPlace, The Nat King
Cole Show-had brief runs, while Amos 'NAndy had a long run on both radio and TV). Cf
WAYNE C. BOOTH, THE COMPANY WE KEEP: AN ETHICS OF FICTION 40 (1988) (minds we

use in judging and interpreting stories have been formed, in large part, by those very

stories).
169
E.g., SILK & SILK, supra note 16, at 31-32, 45 (occasional writer or artist able
somehow to work against weight of dominant narrative).
170 E.g., CHARLES CHESNuTr, THE CONJURE WOMAN (1898); ZoRA NEALE HURSTON,
THEIR EYES WERE WATCHING GOD (1937).
171
Paul Gray& Bruce W. Nelan, The Power of a Well-Told Tale, TIME, Oct. 14, 1991, at
91.
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slavery was wrong.' 7 2 One should, of course, speak out against social evils. But we should not accord speech greater efficacy than it
73
has. 1
C.

The Nature of the Evil

Another way of approaching speech's role in correcting racism
is by examining not language but the referent, race. This examination shows that racism contains features that render it relatively
unamenable to redress through words. Racism, even when blatant,
resists efforts to rally others against it. Further, talking often makes
matters worse.
1. How Much Racism Exists? The Difference Perspective Makes
As we have shown, much racism is not seen as such at the time
of its commission. 17 4 But the extent of even the blatant variety is
often underappreciated by whites. The reason is simple: Few acts
of clear-cut racism take place within their view.' 75 Racism is often
covert; the vignettes tend to be played out behind the scenes when
no one else is watching. A merchant who harasses well-behaved
black teenage shoppers will probably not do so if other whites are
watching. A white apartment owner or employer will probably not
deny a superbly qualified black applicant an apartment or job if a
176
friend or observer is present.
As a result of its often covert nature, many persons of the majority race, even those of good will, consistently underestimate the
extent of racism in society. 177 Persons of color, those who are on
the receiving end of racism, generally report much more of it than
178
do whites and naturally place greater priority on its remedying.
This puzzles some whites, who wonder whether blacks are exagger79
ating or trying to guilt-trip them to gain an unfair advantage.
172
Cf Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 12, at 1936 & nn.23-24 (Douglass and other
abolitionists publishing and speaking out during period before book's appearance).
173
See supra part IV (making suggestions for decreasing cultural lag).
174
See supra part I.
175
For an earlier exposition of this view, see Richard Delgado, CriticalLegal Studies
and the Realities of Race-Does the FundamentalContradictionhave a Corollary?,23 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 407, 407-08 (1988); WILLIAMS, supra note 119 (detailing extent of racism's
inscription in minds of most individuals).
176 Sources cited supra note 175.
177 Id.; see also Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A CriticalReview of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978)
(arguing that racism is endemic and law is often impotent to redress it).
178 Delgado, supra note 175, at 408; cf. Derrick Bell, Racism: A Prophecy for the Year
2000, 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 93 (1989) (implying whites place saving the environment and

reducing pollution above justice for blacks).
179
For a similar perspective from a black writer, see Randall L. Kennedy, Racial
Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745, 1809-10 (1989).
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The problem is perspective: Imagine that one's body were somehow magnetically charged. One would go through life astonished at
how many metal filings there are in the world and how much we
need a clean-up operation. Those not caught in this Kafkaesque dilemma would naturally fail to appreciate the situation's urgency. 8 0
2.

The Subtle Nuances

Racism's victims become sensitized to its subtle nuances and
code-words-the body language, averted gazes, exasperated looks,
terms such as "you people," "innocent whites," "highly qualified
black," "articulate" and so on-that, whether intended or not, convey racially charged meanings.1 8 1 Like an Aleut accustomed to
reading the sky for signs of snow or a small household pet skilled at
recognizing a clumsy footfall, racism's perpetual victims are alert to
the various guises racism and racial signalling take. Sympathizers of
majority hue often must labor to acquire the knowledge that for minorities comes all to easily.
3.

On Seeing What One Does Not Want To See

Some refuse to see racism in acts that trigger suspicion in the
mind of any person of color. 18 2 A well-qualified black applicant fails
to get thejob. Perhaps it was his tie, his posture, his age, or the way
he held himself that caused his rejection. Perhaps he seemed too
diffident or too anxious to get the job. Perhaps he had traits, such
183
as voice intonations, that might irritate the firm's customers.
Choosing to believe in a race-free world reduces guilt and the need
for corrective action. Racism is often a matter of interpretation;
when an interpretation renders one uncomfortable and another
184
does not, which will a person often make?
180

Cf FRANZ KAFKA, THE METAMORPHOSIS (Willa Muir and Edwin Muir, trans.

1968). One could see a parallel between the predicament of the insect-man protagonist
of Kafka's novel and that of blacks forced to accept an alien view that denies their own
reality. That is, both are compelled by outside forces to live life in a fashion other than
the one they would otherwise choose).
181 On the "subtle" or latter-day variety of racism, see Thomas Pettigrew, New Patterns of Racism: The Different Worlds of 1984 and 1964, 37 RUTGERS L. REv. 673 (1985); see
also David 0. Sears, Symbolic Racism, in ELIMINATING RACISM 53 (Phyllis A. Katz & Dalmas A. Taylor eds., 1988).
182 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 499-506 (1988); Thomas
Ross, The Richmond Narratives, 68 TEx. L. REv. 381 (1989) (criticizing Croson Court for
refusing to see racism in governmental history that to others spoke loudly).
183 In short, absent a confession from the actor, the motive might always have been
something else.
184 See Darryl Brown, Racism and Race Relations in the University, 76 VA. L. REv. 295
(1990) (suggesting that we construct ideas of race and racism to make transgressions all
but invisible); Lawrence, supra note 161 (stating that operation of unconscious masks
racial acts).
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Unlearning the Lessons of the Past

Finally, members of the majority race forget how to see and
condemn racism. Society generalizes the wrong lesson from the
past, namely that racism has virtually disappeared. 18 5 We notice, for
example, that today there are fewer Sambos than in the past.18 6 We
thus conclude that those writers from the past must have been acting against conscience, that is, had vicious wills and realized that
what they were doing was wrong (as we realize it today), but went
ahead and did it anyway. Yet, we think, "I do not act against conscience and neither do my friends."
In fact, those earlier writers were acting blithely, not against
conscience, any more than we do today in maintaining our own versions of racism and racist imagery. The Willie Horton commercial' 8 7 strikes many as falling within the bounds of fair play, perhaps
only slightly exaggerated-at any rate the sort of thing that one
must expect in the rough-and-tumble world of politics. Besides, do
not blacks in fact commit a high percentage of violent crime; did I
not read that ...

?

III.
How

THE SYSTEM OF FREE EXPRESSION SOMETIMES MAKES
MATTERS WORSE

Speech and free expression are not only poorly adapted to remedy racism, they often make matters worse-far from being stalwart
friends, they can impede the cause of racial reform. First, they encourage writers, filmmakers, and other creative people to feel
amoral, nonresponsible in what they do. 18 8 Because there is a marketplace of ideas, the rationalization goes, another film-maker is free
to make an antiracist movie that will cancel out any minor stereotyping in the one I am making. My movie may have other redeeming
qualities; besides, it is good entertainment and everyone in the industry uses stock characters like the black maid or the bumbling
18 9
Asian tourist. How can one create film without stock characters?
185
See also supra notes 174-80 and accompanying text (noting black-white discrepancies in perception).
186 See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
187 The Willie Horton commercial depicted a black criminal recidivist. It aired as
part of the 1988 presidential campaign as an attempt to portray the Democrats as soft on
crime.
188 Conversation with anonymous art director, supra note 154 (art director reasoned
that a film on which he was working could do little harm, even though it contained
stereotypes he admitted were vicious,'since other films could counterbalance the one he
was making; further, he stated that his attitude was widely held in the film industry).
189 Id.
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Second, when insurgent groups attempt to use speech as an instrument of reform, courts almost invariably construe First Amendment doctrine against them.1 90 As Charles Lawrence pointed out,
civil rights activists in the sixties made the greatest strides when they
19 1
acted in defiance of the First Amendment as then understood.
They marched, were arrested and convicted; sat in, were arrested
and convicted; distributed leaflets, were arrested and convicted.
Many years later, after much gallant lawyering and the expenditure
of untold hours of effort, the conviction might be reversed on appeal if the original action had been sufficiently prayerful, mannerly,
and not too interlaced with an action component. This history of
the civil rights movement does not bear out the usual assumption
19 2
that the First Amendment is of great value for racial reformers.
Current First Amendment law is similarly skewed. Examination
of the many "exceptions" to First Amendment protection discloses
that the large majority favor the interests of the powerful. 19 3 If one
says something disparaging of a wealthy and well-regarded individual, one discovers that one's words were not free after all; the
wealthy individual has a type of property interest in his or her community image, damage to which is compensable even though words
were the sole instrument of the harm. 194 Similarly, if one infringes
the copyright or trademark of a well-known writer or industrialist,
again it turns out that one's action is punishable. 19 5 Further, if one
disseminates an official secret valuable to a powerful branch of the
military or defense contractor, that speech is punishable. 19 If one
speaks disrespectfully to ajudge, police officer, teacher, military official, or other powerful authority figure, again one discovers that

190
191

See infra text accompanying notes 191-92.
Lawrence, supra note 1, at 466-67 (pointing out that courts construed First

Amendment law narrowly, so as to uphold convictions of peaceful civil rights protestors;
citing cases).
192 Id.
193 Delgado, supra note 146, at 377-78 (reviewing the following and other "exceptions" to the First Amendment).
194 On the tort of defamation in general, see Eaton, The American Law of Defamation
Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., and Beyond, 61 VA. L. REV. 1349 (1975). Of course,
an impecunious plaintiff may sue for defamation, just as a wealthy person may. But the

poor individual is likely to have less of a property interest in his or her reputation and so
will find suit less attractive than one with a higher standing and profile.
195 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985). As

with libel, intellectual property law can be employed by middle income persons who
nevertheless somehow have managed to secure a property interest worth protecting and
who can afford the high cost of litigation. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
196 See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1988) (per curiam); United States
v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 999 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
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one's words were not free;1 9 7 and so with words used to defraud, 198

form a conspiracy, 199 breach the peace, 20 0 or untruthful words given
20 1
under oath during a civil or criminal proceeding.
Yet the suggestion that we create new exception to protect
lowly and vulnerable members of our society, such as isolated,
young black undergraduates attending dominantly white campuses,
is often met with consternation: the First Amendment must be a
seamless web; minorities, if they knew their own self-interest, should
appreciate this even more than others. 20 2 This one-sidedness of
free-speech doctrine makes the First Amendment much more valuable to the majority than to the minority.
The system of free expression also has a powerful after-the-fact
apologetic function. Elite groups use the supposed existence of a
marketplace of ideas to justify their own superior position. 20 3 Imagine a society in which all As were rich and happy, all Bs were moderately comfortable, and all Cs were poor, stigmatized, and reviled.
Imagine also that this society scrupulously believes in a free marketplace of ideas. Might not the As benefit greatly from such a system?
On looking about them and observing the inequality in the distribution of wealth, longevity, happiness, and safety between themselves
and the others, they might feel guilt. Perhaps their own superior
position is undeserved, or at least requires explanation. But the
existence of an ostensibly free marketplace of ideas renders that effort unnecessary. Rationalization is easy: our ideas, our culture
competed with their more easygoing ones and won. 20 4 It was a fair
197 See, e.g., Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Toledo Newspaper
Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402 (1918).
198 See ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 304-08, 1048 (3d ed.
1982).
199 Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (criminal conspiracy); LAWRENCE
SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 29-30, 132-34 (1977) (price-fixing conspiracies).
200 See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words);
Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (dictum) (discussing shouting fire in a
crowded theatre).
201 See EDWARD CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 544-48 (1984).
202 See LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY (1986) (racist speech must be protected-part of the price "we" pay for living in a free society); Schmidt, supra note 148;
Strossen, supra note 149.
203 On "triumphalism"-the view that conquerors always construct history so that
they appear to have won fairly through superior thought and culture rather than by
force of arms, see Richard Delgado, Norms and Normal Science: Toward a Critiqueof Norma-

tivity in Legal Thought, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 933 (1991); Martin, College Curriculum Scrutinized
in "Politically Correct" Spotlight, DENVER POST, Jan. 25, 1992; cf. MILTON, supra note 164.
For the view that many Enlightenment figures were genteel or not-so-genteel cultural
supremacists, see BELL, supra note 155, at 26-51 (pointing out that the document's Framers calculatedly sold out the interests of African-Americans in establishing a union of
free propertied white males).
204 See Delgado, supra note 158; Delgado, supra note 157 (discussing majoritarian
myths' and stories' role to soothe, still guilt); see also SHELBY STEELE, THE CONTENT OF
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fight. Our position must be deserved; the distribution of social
20 5
goods must be roughly what fairness, merit, and equity call for.
It is up to them to change, not us.
A free market of racial depiction resists change for two final reasons. First, the dominant pictures, images, narratives, plots, roles,
and stories ascribed to, and constituting the public perception of
minorities, are always dominantly negative. 20 6 Through an unfortunate psychological mechanism, incessant bombardment by images
of the sort described in Part I (as well as today's versions) inscribe
those negative images on the souls and minds of minority persons. 20 7 Minorities internalize the stories they read, see, and hear
every day. Persons of color can easily become demoralized, blame
themselves, and not speak up vigorously. 20 8 The expense of speech
also precludes the stigmatized from participating effectively in the
marketplace of ideas. 20 9 They are often poor-indeed, one theory
of racism holds that maintenance of economic inequality is its prime
function 2 0 -and hence unlikely to command the means to bring
countervailing messages to the eyes and ears of others.
Second, even when minorities do speak they have little credibility. Who would listen to, who would credit, a speaker or writer one
associates with watermelon-eating, buffoonery, menial work, intellectual inadequacy, laziness, lasciviousness, and demanding resources beyond his or her deserved share?
Our very imagery of the outsider shows that, contrary to the
usual view, society does not really want them to speak out effectively
in their own behalf and, in fact, cannot visualize them doing so. Ask
yourself: How do outsiders speak in the dominant narratives?
Poorly, inarticulately, with broken syntax, short sentences, grunts,
and unsophisticated ideas. 2 1 ' Try to recall a single popular narrative of an eloquent, self-assured black (for example) orator or
speaker. In the real world, of course, they exist in profusion. But
when we stumble upon them, we are surprised: "What a welcome
'exception'!"
(arguing merit and competition as the route to success for African-Americans).
205
Sources cited supra note 204.
206
See supra part I.
207
See Delgado, supra note 1, at 136-40 (summarizing studies); Pettigrew, supra note
181.
208
Delgado, supra note 146, at 379; Delgado, supra note 1, at 137, 139-40.
209
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 17-19 (1976).
210
This "economic determinist" view is associated with Derrick Bell, and earlier
with Charles Beard.
211
See supra notes 19-21, 24, 85-89 and accompanying text (noting that image of
outsider groups often contains speech impediments or inarticulateness).
OUR CHARACTER (1990)
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Words, then, can wound. But the fine thing about the current
situation is that one gets to enjoy a superior position and feel virtuous at the same time. By supporting the system of free expression
no matter what the cost, one is upholding principle. One can belong to impeccably liberal organizations and believe one is doing
the right thing, even while taking actions that are demonstrably injurious to the least privileged, most defenseless segments of our society. 21 2 In time, one's actions will seem wrong and will be
condemned as such, but paradigms change slowly.2 1 3 The world

one helps to create-a world in which denigrating depiction is good
or at least acceptable, in which minorities are buffoons, clowns,
maids, or Willie Hortons, and only rarely fully individuated human
beings with sensitivities, talents, personalities, and frailties-will
survive into the future. One gets to create culture at outsiders' expense. And, one gets to sleep well at night, too.
Racism is not a mistake, not a matter of episodic, irrational behavior carried out by vicious-willed individuals, not a throwback to a
long-gone era. It is ritual assertion of supremacy, 21 4 like animals
sneering and posturing to maintain their places in the hierarchy of
the colony. It is performed largely unconsciously, just as the animals' behavior is. 2 15 Racism seems right, customary, and inoffensive

to those engaged in it, while bringing psychic and pecuniary advantages. 21 6 The notion that more speech, more talking, more preaching, and more lecturing can counter this system of oppression is
appealing, lofty, romantic-and wrong.
IV
WHAT THEN, SHOULD BE DONE?

IF

NOT

SPEECH, WHAT?

What can be done? One possibility we must take seriously is
that nothing can be done-that race and perhaps sex-based subjugation, is so deeply embedded in our society, so useful for the power212 The American Civil Liberties Union, for example, follows a policy of challenging
virtually every campus speech code as soon as it is enacted. See, e.g., Doe v. University of
Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989); U.W.M. Post, Inc. v. Regents, Univ. of Wis.,
774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991); Strossen, supra note 149 (author is national president, A.C.L.U.).
213
See supra notes 169-72 and accompanying text; Delgado & Stefancic, supra note

12; cf Warsh, From Heretic to Honored Theorist. How Ronald Coase Came to Win the Nobel,
POST, Oct. 30, 1991, at F-3.
Compare Delgado, supra note 146 (responding to Professor Schmidt), with Ruth
Colker, Anti-SubordinationAbove All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1003
(1986) (arguing that prime function of racism, sexism, to subjugate their victims; law's
role should be to undo this effect).
215
See Lawrence, supra note 161.
216
BELL, supra note 155 (developing his "economic determinist" interpretation of
American race-relations law).
WASH.
214
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ful, that nothing can dislodge it. No less gallant a warrior than
Derrick Bell has recently expounded his view of "Racial Realism":
things will never get-better, powerful forces maintain the current
system of white-over-black supremacy. Just as the Legal Realists of
the early years of this century urged society to cast aside comforting
myths about the uniformity, predictability, and "scientific" nature of
legal reasoning, legal scholars must do something similar today with
respect to race. 2 17 Reformers must labor for what they believe right
with no certainty that their programs will ever prove successful.
Holding out the hope that reform will one day bear fruit is unnecessary, unwise, and calculated only to induce despair, bum-out, and
paralysis.
We agree with much of what Bell says. Yet we offer four suggestions for a program of racial reform growing out of our research
and analysis. We do this while underscoring the limitations of our
own prescriptions, including the near-impossibility of getting a society to take seriously something whose urgency it seems constitutionally unable to appreciate. First, society should act decisively in cases
of racism that we do see, treating them as proxies for the ones we
know remain unseen. Second, past mistreatment will generally
prove a more reliable basis for remedial action (such as affirmative
action or reparations) than future- or present-oriented considerations; 21 8 the racism of the past is the only kind that we recognize,
the only kind we condemn. 2 19 Third, whenever possible we should
employ and empower minority speakers of color and expose ourselves to their messages. 2 20 Their reality, while not infallible and
certainly not the only one, is the one we must heed if we wish to

217 Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REv. 1 (forthcoming 1992).
218 This casts doubts on Professor Sullivan's thesis that we should not focus on the
past but devise racial remedies based on today's conditions and perceptions. Kathleen
M. Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last TermsAffirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV. L. REv. 78
(1986).

219 Except, of course, where the racism of the past (lynchings, beatings, use of longcondemned words and images) appears today-in which case we of course seize on and
denounce it roundly.
220

Victims of racism are apt to see its enactments and nuances more readily than its

perpetuators, supra notes 169-78 and accompanying text, and for that reason are more
likely-with encouragement-to speak out against it. But will the majority listen? See
supra text notes 155-61, 174-87 and accompanying text (expressing our reservations); see
also Duncan Kennedy, A CulturalPluralist Casefor Affirmative Action in Legal Academia, 1991
DUKE L.J. 705 (proposing empowerment of minority spokespersons through race-con-

scious affirmative action).
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avoid history's judgment. 22 1 It is likely to be the one society will
adopt in 30 years.
221
Our candidates for items that today seem innocuous or only mildly troublesome
(warranting, perhaps, the "Oh, come on!" reaction)-but that history will declare unspeakable ("How could they?")-include the following:
The English-only movement
Black super-stud films
The Willie Horton commercial
"Political correctness," when used as a put-down for someone trying to redress racism or diversify the academy
Code words such as "articulate (or qualified) black," "those people," "welfare
mothers," and "inner-city crime"
Portraying affirmative action as carried out at the expense of "innocent whites"
Refusal to recognize Indian treaty rights
TV programs and films that feature cowboys and Indians (still), blacks only in the
role of domestic workers, or minorities or foreigners speaking in funny accents
Maintaining that the right of the racist to hurl a racist epithet trumps or is equally
balanced with the right of the victim not to have it addressed to him or her
Immigration quotas and policies aimed at excluding people from developing nations but allowing virtually unlimited entry to propertied Europeans
Sports teams with racist names (Redskins) or stereotypical logos
Op-Ed pages of major newspapers, like the one that appeared in Denver Post, Jan.
9, 1992, at 7-B, featuring three stores, side by side, as follows:
Kisling, Piling It Higher and Higher (col. 1), which began as follows:
On the island of Wak, in the South Seas, every time Wak-O,
the big volcano, started belching black smoke and the ground began trembling, the people began trembling too.
But they didn't tremble as hard as the king. He shook because he knew that if Wak-O erupted his nene was cooked, even if
he managed to escape the great river of boiling lava.
This was because over many centuries of volcanic eruptions,
Wakians, in their wisdom, gradually learned how to deal with
these more or less regular upheavels: Wak-O erupt, king die.
Next to it appeared Hamblin, Heartaches in Black Ghettos: Who Benefits? (col. 2), which
begins as follows:
Of all the liberals who wallow in support of the pathetic status
of ghetto residents, I have the greatest aversion for the politicians
who mislead the public and for the community activists who venerate them. I suspect they are the greatest beneficiaries of heartache in black ghettos. Otherwise, how could they champion
them?
- contains the following excerpt as evidence that inner cities are beyond redemption:
FACT: One in four black men ages 20 to 29 in the ghetto are
either in prison or on parole. It is a status that makes them riffraff
in mainstream America and killers among their own.
FACT: By now, many of us know the Centers for Disease
Control have reported that homicide is the primary cause of death
among young black men, who stalk and murder each other by a
ratio of 101.1 per 100,000. It is a kill rate that is six times higher
than for other people in America. The CDC reports that the preferred method which young blacks choose to exterminate themselves is with an "illegal" handgun.
FACT: The six largest black ghettos are located in California,
Michigan, Missouri, New York, Florida and the District of Columbia. They account for 51 percent of U.S. casualties where blacks
kill each other.
- and concludes as follows:
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Scholars should approach with skepticism the writings of those
neoconservatives, including some of color, who make a practice of
telling society that racism is ended. 22 2 In the sense we have described, there is an "essential" unitary minority viewpoint; 2 23 the
others are wrong. 224 Finally, we should deepen suspicion of reme-

dies for deep-seated social evils that rely on speech and exhortation.
The First Amendment is an instrument of variable efficacy, more
useful in some settings than others. Overextending it provokes the
anger of oppressed groups and casts doubt on speech's value in settings where it is, in fact, useful. With deeply inscribed cultural practices that most can neither see as evil nor mobilize to reform, we
should forthrightly institute changes in the structure of society that
will enable persons of color-particularly the young-to avoid the
worst assaults of racism. 2 25 As with the controversy over campus

racism, we should not let a spurious motto that speech be "everywhere free" stand in the way of outlawing speech that is demonstrably harmful, that is compounding the problem.
Because of the way the dominant narrative works, we should
prepare for the near-certainty that these suggestions will be criticized as unprincipled, unfair to "innocent whites," wrong. Understanding how the dialectic works, and how the scripts and
counterscripts work their dismal paralysis, may, perhaps, inspire us
to continue even though the path is long and the night dark.

But if a few sillies insist on spending their time aspiring to
move mountains by trying to transform cavities like Harlem and
Detroit into habitable havens again, so be it. In the meantime, I
wish they would leave the rest of us alone in our serenity to nurture our children and to get on with our lives beyond the deadly
ghettos.
Finally, next to it appeared Rosenthal, Americans Wouldn't Like To Be Japanese (col. 5),
portraying Japanese as employing "tricks" and gaining unfair economic advantage
through excessive internal cooperation, "conformity, obsequiousness [and] rigidity," all
amounting to a "system [that] is being used deliberately against us," and concluding:
"A U.S. president should have the courage to say all that."
222 E.g., RICHARD RODRIGUEZ, HUNGER OF MEMORY (1982) (each author stating that
race plays a much less important role today); see also STEVEN CARTER, CONFESSIONS OF AN
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY (1991) (reciting less extreme statement of same position);
THOMAS SOWELL, CIVIL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OR REALITY? (1984); SHELBY STEELE, THE
CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER: A NEw VISION OF RACE IN AMERICA (1990).
223
Essential, that is, to our own salvation.

224 On the debate about "essentialism" and whether the minority community contains one or many voices, see Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal
Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990); Kennedy, supra note 179.
225 On the special vulnerability of children, see Delgado, supra note 1, at 137-38,

142-43, 146-48.
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APPENDIX
RESOURCES FOR THE STUDY OF ETHNIC
DEPICTION IN THE UNITED STATES
A.

GENERAL WORKS

ROGER DANIELS & HARRY

H. L.

KITANO, AMERICAN RACISM:

RATION OF THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE

EXPLO-

(1970).

FROM DIFFERENT SHORES: PERSPECTIVES ON RACE AND ETHNICITY IN

AMERICA (Ronald Takaki ed., 1987).
Richard M. Gardner, Toward a Definition of Stereotypes, 26 MIDWEST Q.,
Summer 1985, at 476.
James Craig Holte, Unmelting Images: Film, Television, and Ethnic Stereotyping, MELUS, Fall 1984, at 101.
JOEL KOVEL, WHITE RACISM: A PSYCHO-HISTORY
GUSTAVUS

MYERS,

HISTORY

OF BIGOTRY

(1970).

IN THE

UNITED STATES

(1943).
WILLIAM STANTON, THE LEOPARD'S SPOTS:

SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDES

TOWARD RACE IN AMERICA, 1815-1859 (1970).
Bruce M. Tyler, Racist Art and Politics at the Turn of the Century, 15 J.
ETHNIC STUD. 85 (1988).
B.

AFRICAN-AMERICANS

Ralph G. Allen, Our Native Theatre: Honky-Tonk, Minstrel Shows, Burlesque, in THE AMERICAN THEATRE: A SUM OF ITS PARTS 273
(1971).
LEONARD C.

ARCHER, BLACK IMAGES IN THE AMERICAN THEATRE:

NAACP

PROTEST CAMPAIGNS-STAGE, SCREEN, RADIO & TELEVI-

SION

(1973).

Donald G. Baker, Black Images: The Afro-American in Popular Novels,
1900-1945, 7 J. POPULAR CULTURE 327 (1973).
JUDITH R. BERZON, NEITHER WHITE NOR BLACK: THE MULATTO
CHARACTER IN AMERICAN FICTION (1978).
BLACK FILMS AND FILM-MAKERS: A COMPREHENSIVE ANTHOLOGY
FROM STEREOTYPE TO SUPERHERO (Lindsay Patterson ed., 1975).
BLACKS IN AMERICAN MOVIES: A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY (Anne

Powers ed., 1974).
DONALD BOGLE, TOMS, COONS, MULATTOES, MAMMIES, AND BUCKS:
AN

INTERPRETIVE

HISTORY

OF BLACKS

IN AMERICAN

FILMS

(1973).
Joseph Boskin, Sambo: The NationalJester in the PopularCulture, in THE
GREAT FEAR: RACE IN THE MIND OF AMERICA 165 (Gary B. Nash

& Richard Weiss eds., 1970).
ANN CHARTERS, NOBODY: THE STORY OF BERT WILLIAMS (1970).

Eugenia Collier, A House of Twisted Mirrors: The Black Reflection in the
Media, 67 CURR. HIST. 228 (1974).
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(1978).
Thomas R. Cripps, The Myth of the Southern Box Office: A Factor in Racial Stereotyping in American Movies, 1920-1940, in THE BLACK ExPERIENCE IN AMERICA: SELECTED ESSAYS 116 (James Curtis &
THOMAS CRIPPS, BLACK FILM AS GENRE

Lewis Gould eds., 1970).

Thomas R. Cripps, The Noble Black Savage: A Problem in the Politics of
Television Art, 8 J. POPULAR CULTURE 687 (1975).
THOMAS CRIPPS, SLOW FADE TO BLACK:

FILM, 1900-1942 (1977).
SAM DENNISON, SCANDALIZE My NAME:
POPULAR MUSIC

THE NEGRO IN AMERICAN

BLACK IMAGERY IN AMERICAN

(1982).

Marilyn D. Fife, Black Image in American TV- The First Two Decades, 6
BLACK SCHOLAR 7 (1974).
John H.Franklin, "Birth of a Nation"--Propagandaas History, 20 MASS.
REV. 417 (1979).
GEORGE

M.

FREDRICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND:

THE DEBATE

ON AFRO-AMERICAN

CHARACTER

AND DESTINY,

1817-1914 (1971)
Alan W. C. Green, 'Jim Crow," "Zip Coon" The Northern Origins of
Negro Minstrelsy, 11 MASS. REV. 385 (1970).
JAMES V. HATCH, BLACK IMAGE ON THE AMERICAN STAGE: A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PLAYS AND MUSICALS,

1770-1970 (1970).

Herbert Hill, Uncle Tom: An Enduring American Myth, 72 CRISIS 289
(1965).
REGINALD HORSMAN, RACE AND MANIFEST DESTINY: THE ORIGINS OF
AMERICAN RACIAL ANGLO-SAXONISM

(1981).

NATHAN IRVIN HUGGINS, HARLEM RENAISSANCE

(1971).

Theodore W. Johnson, Black Images in American Popular Song,
1840-1910 (1975) (unpublished dissertation, Northwestern
University).
WINTHROP D. JORDON, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATrITUDES
TOWARD THE NEGRO, 1550-1812 (1968).
JACK TEMPLE KIRBY, MEDIA-MADE DIXIE: THE SOUTH IN THE AMERI-

CAN IMAGINATION

(1978).

George R. Lamplugh, The Image of the Negro in PopularMagazine Fiction, 1875-1900, 57J. NEGRO HIST. 177 (1972).
DANIEL J. LEAB, FROM SAMBO TO SUPERSPADE:

ENCE IN MOTION PICTURES

THE BLACK EXPERI-

(1975).

Daniel J. Leab, The Gamutfrom A to B: The Image of the Black in Pre1915 Movies, 88 POL. SCI. Q. 53 (1973).
Stanley Lemons, Black Stereotypes as Reflected in Popular Culture, 1880-

1920, 29 AMER. Q. 102 (1977).
David W. Levy,Racial Stereotypes in Antislavery Fiction, 31 PHYLON 265
(1970).
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TV: AFRO-AMERICANS IN
1948 (1983).
Jack B. Moore, Images of the Negro in Early American Short Fiction, 22
MISS. Q. 47 (1968).
FRED. MACDONALD, BLACKS AND WHITE

TELEVISION SINCE

JAMES

P.

MURRAY,

To

FIND AN IMAGE:

BLACK FILMS FROM UNCLE

TOM TO SUPER FLY (1973).
JAMES R. NESTEBY, BLACK IMAGES IN AMERICAN FILMS, 1896-1954:
THE INTERPLAY

BETWEEN

CIVIL RIGHTS AND FILM

CULTURE

(1982).
CONSTANCE

E.

OBUDHO, BLACK-WHITE RACIAL ATTITUDES:

AN AN-

(1976).
Jaclyn C. Palmer, Images of Slavery: Black and White Writers, 41 NEGRO
NOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

HIST. BULL. 888 (1978).

Cecil L. Patterson, A Diferent Drum: The Image of the Negro in the Nineteenth Century Songster, 8 CLAJ. 44 (1964).

D. PEAVY, AFRO-AMERICAN LITERATURE AND CULTURE SINCE
WORLD WAR II: A GUIDE TO INFORMATION SOURCES (1979).

CHARLES

MARGARET PERRY, THE HARLEM RENAISSANCE:
LIOGRAPHY

AN ANNOTATED BIB-

(1982).

JIM PINES, BLACKS IN FILMS:

A

SURVEY OF RACIAL THEMES AND

(1975).
Alan H. Rose, The Image of the Negro in the Pre-Civil War Novels ofJohn
IMAGES IN THE AMERICAN FILM

Pendleton Kennedy and William Gilmore Simms, 4J. AMER. STUD. 217
(1970).
HENRY T. SAMPSON, BLACKS IN BLACK AND WHITE: A SOURCE BOOK
ON BLACK FILMS (1977).

T. SAMPSON, BLACKS IN BLACKFACE: A SOURCE BOOK ON

HENRY

(1980).
Alexander Saxton, Blackface Minstrelsy and Jacksonian Ideology, 27
AMER. Q. 3 (1975).
EARLY BLACK MUSICAL SHOWS

CATHERINE SILK & JOHN SILK, RACISM AND ANTI-RACISM IN AMERICAN POPULAR CULTURE (1990).
JESSIE SMITH, IMAGES OF BLACKS IN AMERICAN CULTURE:

GUIDE TO INFORMATION SOURCES
SPLIT-IMAGE:

REFERENCE

(1988).
(Janette L.

AFRICAN-AMERICANS IN THE MASS MEDIA

Gates & William Barlow eds., 1990).
CATHERINE

STARKE,

BLACK

PORTRAITURE

IN

AMERICAN

STOCK CHARACTERS, ARCHETYPES, AND INDIVIDUALS

FICTION:

(1971).

Orrin C. Suthern, II, Minstrelsy and PopularCulture, 4 J. POPULAR CUL-

658 (1971).

TURE
RONALD

T.

TAKAKI,

IRON

CAGES:

TEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA
NANCY

M.

RACE

AND

CULTURE

IN

NINE-

(1979).

TISCHLER, BLACK MASKS: NEGRO CHARACTERS IN MODERN

SOUTHERN FICTION

(1969).
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UP: THE MINSTREL SHOW IN NINE(1974).
Minstrel Men and Minstrel Myths,
Blackface:
Robert C. Toll, Behind the
C. TOLL,

ROBERT

BLACKING

TEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA

29

AMER. HERITAGE

93 (1978).

ANDREW TUDOR, IMAGE AND INFLUENCE: STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY

OF FILM

(1975).

Charles R. Wilson, Racial Reservations: Indians and Blacks in American
Magazines, 1865-1900, 10 J. POPULAR CULTURE 70 (1976).
CARL WITrKE, TAMBO AND BONES: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
MINSTREL STAGE (1930).

F. YELLIN,

JEAN

THE INTRICATE KNOT: BLACK FIGURES IN AMERICAN
LITERATURE, 1776-1863 (1972).

C.

NATIVE AMERICANS

ROBERT

F.

BERKHOFER, JR., THE WHITE MAN'S INDIAN

(1978).
B. Black &

WHITE ON RED: IMAGES OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN (Nancy

Bette S. Weidman eds., 1976).
JOHN

C.

BOWMAN, POWHATAN'S DAUGHTER

(1973).

Ward Churchill, Film Stereotyping of Native Americans, 5 BOOK FORUM
370 (1981).
Jean Ehly, Horrifying Story of an Indian Captive, WESTERN FRONTIER
ANN., no. 1 (1975) at 26.
LESLIE FIEDLER, THE RETURN OF THE VANISHING NATIVE (1968).
THE FOUR VOYAGES OF COLUMBUS (J. M. Cohen trans. and ed.,
1969).
RAYMA GREEN, AMERICAN INDIAN STEREOTYPES, FESTIVAL OF AMER.
FOLKLIFE PROGRAM BOOK 18 (1979).
MICHAEL HARNER & ALFRED MEYER, CANNIBAL (1979).
MARVIN HARRIS, CANNIBALS AND KINGS: THE ORIGINS OF CULTURES

(1977).
THE KALEIDOSCOPIC LENS:

GROUPS

HOW HOLLYWOOD VIEWS THE ETHNIC

(Randall M. Miller ed., 1980).

Magda Lewis, Are Indians Nicer Now?: What Children Learnfrom Books
about Native North Americans, in How MUCH TRUTH Do WE TELL
THE CHILDREN? 135 (Betty Bacon ed., 1988).
Horace Melton, King of the Dime Novels, WESTERN FRONTIER ANN., no.
1 (1975), at 22.
JOHN E. O'CONNOR, THE HOLLYWOOD INDIAN: STEREOTYPES OF NATIVE AMERICANS IN FILMS (1980).
Stephen Osborne, Indian-Hating in American Literature, 1682-1857,
DISS. ABSTRACTS INT'L, Apr. v.50 (10) (1990).
RoY H. PEARCE, SAVAGISM AND CIVILIZATION: A STUDY OF THE INDIAN AND THE AMERICAN MIND (rev. ed. 1965).
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PROLOGUE

This is a true story. It is the story of how the law punished a man
for speaking about his legal rights; of how, after punishing him, it
silenced him; of how, when he did speak, he was not heard. This
pervasive and awful oppression was subtle and, in a real way,
largely unintentional. I know because I was one of his oppressors.
I was his lawyer.
Earlier drafts of this Article began with the above somewhat
melodramatic and self-flagellating words. Although I still hope that
the story you are about to read is true, I no longer wish to begin by
asserting its meaning. Instead, I strive to present this story in a
form that you can interpret yourself, and in so doing, to exemplify a
method for both studying and changing the practice of law.
In a recent article, Lucie White points out that the word "client" derives from the Latin verb "cluere," meaning "to be named,
hear oneself named." In ancient Rome, persons under the patronage of patricians were called "clientem" because they were
known by the name of their patron.' White explains that because,
even for the most enlightened modem day lawyers, "advocacy is a
practice of speaking for [the client,] ... the advocate ... inevitably
replays the drama of subordination in her own work." 2 The story
told below shows how powerful the forces of such client subordination can be despite a lawyer's conscious intent and efforts, but the
Article as a whole also strives to offer some hope against White's
word "inevitably." I offer the metaphor of the lawyer as translator
as a way of both understanding and altering the ways lawyers change
the meanings of their clients' stories. By implying that law is a language foreign to the client, the metaphor suggests that the meaning
of the client's story will "inevitably" be transformed through the
lawyer's representation; no sentence can be perfectly translated
from one language to another. 3 Yet if one feels a sense of loss in
speaking through a translator, there can also be something gained.
1 Lucie E. White, Goldberg v. Kelly on the Paradox of Lawyeringfor the Poor, 56
BROOK. L. REV. 861, 861 n.2 (1990) [hereinafter Paradox of Lawyering].
2

3

Id. at 861.
By stressing the inevitability of meaning change, the translation metaphor sug-

gests, for example, that the interviewing techniques advocated in the influential texts
authored by David Binder and his colleagues at UCLA, see DAVID BINDER & PRICE,
LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1977); DAVID
BINDER, ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1991),
although valuable, may not be sufficient to assure that the case constructed by the lawyer
continues to be the client's "own story" in a way that is meaningful for the client. See
infra note 159. For differing assessments of the limitations of the "client-centered"
model of lawyering, see Anthony V. Alfieri, The Politics of Clinical Knowledge, 35 N.Y.L.
SCHOOL REV. 7 (1990); Robert Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement, 32 ARiz L. REV. 501 (1990); Robert Dinerstein, "Clinical Texts and Contexts," 39
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By speaking through a translator, one can be heard and understood
in places where otherwise one is mute. The translator does not silence the speaker but rather seeks to enhance the speaker's voice by
adding her own. The good translator does not alter the speaker's
meaning without the speaker's consent, and may even collaborate
with the speaker to produce a statement in the foreign language that
is more meaningful than the speaker's original utterance. Thus,
translation offers both an image of the constraints upon a lawyer's
ability to represent fully his client's story and a model for recognizing and managing the inevitable changes in meaning in a way that
4
may empower rather than subjugate the client.
More than ten years ago, William Felstiner, Richard Abel, and
Austin Sarat pointed out the need to study the process by which
disputes are transformed from a layperson's initial sense of injury
into legal claims, and noted the dearth of empirical research and
scholarly attention to this issue. 5 Legal scholarship that begins with
a court's written opinion or even that (all too rarely) delves back to
the complaint filed at the outset of litigation misses entirely this critical transformation process. Yet we know that the vast majority of
lawsuits filed are resolved without a court decision on the merits and
that an even larger number of disputes are handled by lawyers without ever utilizing litigation. 6 The ways lawyers transform their clients' stories into legal terms are the most profoundly important
ways that the legal system has effect; yet these transformations have
been largely invisible to and unstudied by the legal academy.
What scholarship exists, almost all very recent, provides troubling reports. 7 Works by Tony Alfieri, Gerald Lopez, and Lucie
White on poverty and civil rights practice-drawing primarily on
their own experiences in these fields-conclude that lawyers routinely silence and subordinate their clients while purporting to tell
UCLA L. REV. 697 (1992); and William Simon, Homo Psychologicus: Notes on a New Legal
Formalism, 32 STAN. L. REV. 487 (1980).
4 Of course, client subordination is caused by many other factors than the problem
of "translation" nor will better translation by itself necessarily empower most clients.
The translation metaphor is offered to supplement, not supplant, other critiques and
models oflawyering. It is interesting to note, however, that even one of the most prominent advocates of a radical reconception of lawyering, Gerald Lopez, views "translation"

as a necessary aspect of any effort (even by a non-lawyer) to help another person solve a
problem. Gerald Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1, 9-14 (1984).
5 William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming,
Blaming, Claiming.... 15 LAw & Soc'y REV. 631 (1980).
6 See Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous
Law, 19J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1, 11-13 (1981).
7 A good, brief survey of the empirical literature on attorney-client relations appears in the article by William L.F. Felstiner and Austin Sarat in this symposium issue.
See William L.F. Felstiner & Austin Sarat, Enactments of Power: Negotiating Reality and Responsibility in Lawyer-Client Interactions, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1454-58 (1992).
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"their" stories.8 Although these writers tend to emphasize the role
of gender, race, and class in such client subordination, the news
from other fronts is no better. Felstiner and Sarat have concluded
from an extensive empirical study of divorce cases-in which lawyer
and client often share the same race, gender, and class featuresthat "clients largely talk past their lawyers" and that the lawyer's
interpretation takes place without a shared understanding. 9 The anthropologist-lawyer team of William O'Barr and John Conley concludes from its studies of legal discourse that "the law has come to
define the problems of ordinary people in ways that may have little
meaning for them, and to offer remedies that are unresponsive to
their needs as they see them." 1 0 Significantly, research consistently
shows that people who have been involved with the American legal
system have a more negative view of it than those who have not."
Litigant discontent is pervasive and notably independent of out2
come; "winners" are as critical as "losers."'
In using the metaphor of lawyering as translation, this Article
suggests that one can understand at least some of the silencing of
the client's voice as the lawyer's failure to recognize and implement
the art and ethic of the good translator-a translator who shows
conscious awareness of shifts in meaning and who collaborates with
the speaker in managing these changes. It also suggests a methodology, drawn from anthropology and sociolinguistics, for making a
lawyer aware of how meaning is changing and for revealing the complex significances of the story to be translated. This methodology,
termed the ethnography of legal discourse, begins by recording as
much as possible of what takes place during the representation of a
8 Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconciling Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of ClientNarrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107 (1991); Anthony V. Alfieri, Speaking Out of Turn: The Story of
Josephine V, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 619 (1991) [hereinafter Speaking Out of Turn];

Anthony V. Alfieri, The Antimonies of Poverty Law and a Theory of Dialogic Empowerment, 16
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 659 (1987-1988); Gerald P. Lopez, Reconceiving Civil
Rights Practice: Seven Weeks in the Life of a Rebellious Collaboration, 77 GEO. L.J. 1603 (1989);
Paradox of Lawyering, supra note 1; Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills,
and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1990) [hereinafter
Sunday Shoes].
9 Austin Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Law and Social Relations: Vocabularies of Motive in Lawyer/Client Interaction, 22 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 737, 742 (1988) [hereinafter Sarat &
Felstiner, Vocabulariesof Motive].
10

JOHN M. CONLEY & WILLIAM M. O'BARR, RULES VERSUS RELATIONSHIPS:

THE

177 (1990).
11 Austin W. Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Lawyers and Legal Consciousness: Law Talk
in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 98 YALE L.J. 1663, 1687 (1989).
12 See Tom R. Tyler, Client Perceptionsof Litigation, 24 TRIAL 40 (1988); see also ToM R.
TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 178 (1990) ("In evaluating the justice of their experiences [people] consider factors unrelated to outcome, such as whether they have had a
chance to state their case and been treated with dignity and respect.").
ETHNOGRAPHY OF LEGAL DISCOURSE
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client.13 These records are then treated as texts which are given
close and repeated reading with the goal of evoking the significance
of what was said and done from the standpoint of each participant
and, particularly, from the viewpoint of the client. The resulting interpretation is generated through a collective process, perhaps with
colleagues and, most importantly, with the client herself. The experience of anthropologists, sociologists, and linguists with similar
methodologies suggests that this approach can be an effective way
of recognizing the difference of "the other" and expanding imagina4
tion sufficiently to have some understanding of the other's story.'
In Part I I tell the story of one case I personally handled, and
include many verbatim texts of what was actually written and said.
While representing this client, I consciously strove to emulate the
translator's art and ethic, with decidedly mixed results. In Part II I
further explicate the metaphor of lawyering as translation, and in
Part III I summarize the theory and practice of ethnographic description of legal discourse. In Part IV I apply the translation metaphor and ethnographic methods to the texts that appear in Part I,
and in Part V I share my client's comments on the case as a whole
and on my interpretations of what happened. I hope to recreate for
you my own experience of growing understanding as it developed
through use of the translation metaphor and the methods of
ethnography.

13
In order of preference, forms of recording are videotaping, audiotaping, verbatim transcripts, comtemporaneous notes, accounts written soon after the event, and
more distant written recollections checked against other persons present at the time.
As explained infra notes 245-46 and accompanying text, my client has consented to
the use of his real name and to the disclosure of confidential attorney-client communications in this Article. I have also used the real names of the arresting police officers and
the trial judge, and reproduce in figures 1 and 2 actual court and police documents.
14 By preserving the integrity of the client's own words in texts that are studied and
by including the client in the interpretation of those words, the ethnographic method
hopefully de-centers the lawyer and strips him of some of the power that may blind and
deafen him. Feminist and critical race theorists suggest that those who have personally
experienced disempowerment and marginalization can attain a "multiple consciousness" that enables them to imagine other kinds of marginalized viewpoints. See Richard
Delgado, When a Story isJust a Story, 76 VA. L. REV. 95 (1990); Richard Delgado, Storytellingfor Oppositionistsand Others, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 2411, 2414 (1989) [hereinafter Delgado, Storytelling]; Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as
JurisprudentialMethod, 11 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 7 (1989). In a more modest way that
hopefully guards against what Delgado and Stefanic term the "empathic fallacy," Richard Delgado &Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and Culture: Can Free
Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 1261 (1992), the ethnographic method may provide a similar insight into the worldview of those situated very
differently, a way of responding to the postmodern concern with being trapped within
one's own subjectivity.
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THE CASE OF THE ATTITUDE PROBLEM

A.

The Beginning

This story begins with a sentence of deceptive simplicity, contained within the complaint in a misdemeanor case:
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The defendant named in this complaint, M. DujonJohnson, was
arraigned in a district court' 5 in Washtenaw County, where the University of Michigan is located. The county seat is Ann Arbor, a
wealthy and sophisticated college town located about 40 miles west
of Detroit. The other major town in the county is Ypsilanti, a more
working-class community with a substantial African-American population. This district court serves Ypsilanti Township, a fairly rural
area adjacent to Ypsilanti marked by pockets of suburban
encroachment.
Johnson asked for court-appointed counsel because of his limited income. The General Clinic at the University of Michigan Law
School was appointed to represent him. At the time, I was one of
two clinical professors who taught the General Clinic. The case was
assigned to a team of two student attorneys, and I was their supervising attorney.
B.

The Police Report

Apart from the rather uninformative misdemeanor complaint,
the first information we received about this case came from the police incident report,1 6 which we obtained before the initial client interview. The report, reprinted below verbatim, was signed and
apparently authored by Michigan State Trooper Wayne Kiser. The
abbreviation which appears throughout as "U/S" ("undersigned")
sometimes refers to both Kiser and his partner, Trooper Frank
Mraz, and sometimes only to Kiser.

15 In the Michigan court system, the district court is the lowest court of record, with
jurisdiction over misdemeanors and civil cases in which the amount in controversy is less
than $10,000. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.8301, 27A.8311 (1987). Populous counties are
typically divided into several districts, with a separate court for each district. Id.
§ 27A.8101; § 27A.8120(2) (creating district court for Ypsilanti Township).
16
WAYNE KISER & FRANK MRAZ, MICHIGAN DEP'T OF STATE POLICE, ORIGINAL INCIDENT REP. No. 026-4901-88 (1988) [hereinafter POLICE REPORT].
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PERSON/DWLS:

VENUE:
Primary incident occurred at: Intersection of Hewitt and Wathtenhw
Ave. Vehicle VB Hewitt crossing Washtsinw,lvt.
Secondary venue occurred at: TOTAL GAS ST9. located on the NW corner
of intersection described in primary venue.
DATE/TIME:
Incident occurred on 09/05/88 at: 04:30 A.M. (Monday).
VEHICLE INVOLVED:
1977 TriUmph 2Dr Convertable. Blue in color bearing 89/MI 721 VRJ.
Disposition of vehicle: Towed from scene to Ypsi Towing. No Hold.
INFORMATION:
U/S while on patrol were EB on WashtenaW Ave approaching Hewitt Rd.
Said intersection was controlled by a traffic signal, traffic signal
w&A obAdrved flashing Yellow for EB and WB WashtenaW Ave traffic.
Signal wah further observed, Flashing RED for traffic NB and SB on
Hewitt Rd.

Vbhicle listed above was observed to be travelling NB on Hewitt Rd.
and at An 6stimated speed of 35 MPH. Vehicle did NOT stop or slow for

thi flathing RED signal.
Vehicle Was then pursued by U/S and a subsequent traffic stop ensued.
U/S observed driver of vehicle to look over at patrol unit, now About

to make a NB turn onto Hewitt and behind target vehicle.
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Vehicle then made an Abrupt left tu'h into th* tOTAL OAS fthtioh And
pulled into one of the pump stations.
U/S pulled up to the pump station ntar auspect vehicle. U/t obsgrved
th6 driver to 6xit his vehicle and begin wAlking up towardl the
bUildint.
U/S obtAined the drivers attention and requested samb to return to the
vihicle.
Driver began walking towards officeS.

CONTACT DRIVEP./OeSERVATIONS:
Upon making contact with the Driver U/S was met with i atd Actions.
with Driver stating that this wasnt hncessary. U/S advisad the Driver
that running a RED light was a necessary stop. Tpr. KISEA making
contact with Driver requested subject to produce hit HICH bDiv4ki
license, Registration and Proof of Insukance for the motor vehicl&.
Driver's attention was then directed away from U/S And to Tpr HAAZ who
waS utilizing his hand held flash light t; look into thb driver tide
of the vethicle. Driver was observed to make statements directed
towards Tpr. MRAZ indicating to the effect, "What are you doing
looking in my car"?
Further. Driver stated U/S have no right looking insidi his vehicle
and that he knew the law well enough to know "WE" need a srarch
warrant to look into his vehicle.
TPR RISER at this time again asked Driver to produce his License at
which time Driver again asked what he was being "Harrassed" for.

U/S explained that they observed him run the RED light and that this
Was the reason for being stopped, and U/S did not feel they were
conducting themselves in any offensive manner. Driver then began
indicating that he did NOT run the RED light, that he came to 6
complett Stop and that U/S were making th4s up for a reason to Harrass
homebody.
Driver continued with verbal accusations of U/S being the "Strong

Arbed Vitilanties" and "Taking things out on the Working Public".
Driver t'peatedly stated: "I have no respect for YOU people", and

"You Are Bigots".
tJhen driver was asked questions pertaining to and surroUnding the
4vents leading up to the incident at hand, would make strong, detailed

emarka indicating that the POLICE cant get away with these kinds of

things,

CAUSE FOR ARREST:

U/S upon continuing the normal course of action on this traffic stop
filt un&asy With the Situation as the Driver was acting in a manner

Such to create U/S with a concern for *afety of Officers. U/S has made

2

rPRT
TPR:

RAZ FRAp.
IPISEA. WAVNE

2 o4

.7'
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many traffic stops and has not come into contact with 06riohl actint
in this nature without attempting to hid* somethint or pofiibly having
contraband or a weapon about their person or hccisaibl inbidt
vehicle.
U/S requested driver to place his hands on the hood of hit vehicie and
li1 oad his feet back in the normal wall Se&rch position. U/S &*Itid the
subject if he possessed any weapons, Cunt. knives. dtc... briv k

stated that U/S could not search him unless he was Arretstd fo home
offense.
U/S again explained to the subject that they wished to pat him down
only to dispell the possibility of him hAving any weAponi.
Driver continually stated that he was HOT letting U/S at him down.
Driver was arrested.for Disorderly Person. Driver wia theh handcuffed
and patted down with no weapons being found.
Subsequent radio traffic with HSP #26 RIO Koths r~fdrnch Drivert.

status and vehicle information found Driver to be Subpbnddd on two (2)
VCJ's out of Detroit.
#1. Suspension Date / 12/30/87 FCJ # E'36428 / Careless Driving.
#2. Suspension Date / 12/30/87 FC3 # E736429 / Reg and/or ?lite
violation.
ARRESTEDt

H DUJON-JOHNSON B/M 04/25/59 of: 800 W Huron St Apt. #5, Ann Arbor.
HI. OLN # 252 S66 000 318. SS# 381 74 1S77. Employed: U of 4 Medical
Records Section/also Student UofH. S-10 145 Elk Bro. Married.
Count #1.
DWLS. Citation issued. Bond of t100.00 requested. Held at HSP
pending that action.

Count #2.
Disorderly Person.

UD-7B issued. PR bond given. panda subjects

cont
tact with 14-B Dist Ct of Juris within 10 Days.
SOS REOUEST:
MSP #26 R/O Koths sent request via LEIN to SOS for certified copy of
driving record for arrested.
PROSECUTOR CONTACT:
Copy of this complaint sent to Wash Co Pros Ofe for teview and
Authorization of Disorderly Person.

-
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WITNESSESs

Due to the Drivers actions and statements beinj mide, U/S madi contact
with the two on duty employees of the TOTAL GAS STA.
Said employees were within eyesight of the vehicle in qUlition and

wUre riquested to supply U/S with their name(s) for any pokaibl
future complaint this subject would mhkd pertaining to Actiong of

ofticerk this night.
#1.

ALLEN ADKINS W/H oft

#2.

PATRICIA WINTON W/F of:

Subject #1 listed above indicted to U/S that he did not watch the
entire incident however did observe that the B/H aubject was giving
U/S officers a hard time and not being very cooperative.
Subject #2 indicated about the same observation(i) Al did #1.
COMPLAINT STATUSi
CLOSED.
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Upon reading the report, I immediately concluded that the encounter between our client and the state troopers was an improper
7
Terry-stop that had escalated into a pretext arrest. In Terry v.Ohio,'
the Supreme Court extended the Fourth Amendment's prohibition
of "unreasonable searches and seizures" to include the common police practice known as "stop-and-frisk," an interference with liberty
short of a full arrest in which a police officer approaches a person
she suspects of criminal activity for a brief interrogation.", In order
to protect the officer's safety during this brief encounter with a possible criminal, the officer is allowed to "seize" the suspect long
enough to conduct a "pat-down" search for weapons if the officer
has particularized reasons for believing that the suspect is presently
armed and dangerous.' 9 The Court emphasized that such a stopand-frisk, a procedure now named the "Terry-stop" after the Terry
case, requires more than an "unparticularized suspicion or
20
'hunch'."
Taking the incident report as true, it was clear that although the
troopers could ask our client to produce his drivers license and registration if they had seen him violate a traffic law, that traffic violation alone gave them no reason to believe he was armed and
dangerous. As for the statements appearing under the heading
"Cause for Arrest" in the report, they certainly added up to no
more than mere suspicion. A pat-down search incident to a Terrystop must be based on some particular observation that indicates
the suspect has a weapon on his person or in reaching distance, such
as a suspicious bulge or a sudden movement toward a pocket, combined with evidence of potential dangerousness, typically supplied
21
by the crime the officer suspects the person committed.
Under my analysis, which continued to take the report as true,
when our client (quite justifiably) refused to submit to the pat-down
search, the trooper converted the stop into a pretext arrest to cover
the impropriety of the search. Under United States v. Robinson,2 2 a
police officer may conduct a complete body search of a person upon
arrest regardless of whether the officer has any basis for believing
that the arrestee has weapons, contraband, or other evidence on his
person. 23 When an officer makes an arrest in order to take advantage of the broad Robinson exception to the usual Fourth Amend17
18

19
20
21

22
23

392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Id. at 30, 31.
Id.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 27, 30.
414 U.S. 218 (1973).
Id. at 235.
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ment requirements for conducting searches, that arrest is termed by
24
most commentators as a pretext arrest.
In our case, it seemed clear to me, the troopers arrested our
client on the pretext that he was "a disorderly person. '2 5 The
"hunch" that our client had a weapon turned out to be wrong and
the troopers were then forced to carry through the charade that our
client had committed a misdemeanor.
C.

The Initial Client Interview

Students in the Michigan General Clinic work in teams of two.
Although each team is closely supervised by a clinical professor who
bears the ultimate professional responsibility for representation,
one goal of the clinic is to encourage the students to view the cases
as their own and thus enter fully into the professional role of lawyer.
To this end, the initial client interview usually occurs without the
professor present, although, with the client's consent, the interview
is videotaped for later review by the students and the professor.
The two student attorneys met DujonJohnson for the first time
on January 25, 1989, more than four months after his arrest on September 5, 1988. The interview took place in the Clinic's conference
room, a converted faculty office located off the opulent neo-Gothic
library reading room of the Michigan Law School. Johnson was
seated at the end of a massive wooden table with the student attorneys located on either side of him along the sides of the table.
Above the table, suspended from a florescent light fixture, was a
microphone for audio pickup. The video camera was rather obtrusively mounted on an adjacent file cabinet that concealed the recording equipment within. Following standard clinic practice, the
students obtained Johnson's written consent to the video recording
of the interview before the equipment was turned on.
The videotape of the interview lasted about 50 minutes. I
viewed it in the company of the students several days later with
three major objectives in mind: to critique the students' interviewing techniques, to get an initial impression of the client, and to
check his story against the police report for inconsistencies.
24
This substantive Fourth Amendment law is discussed infra at notes 162-91 and
accompanying text.
25
The police report indicated that Johnson was also charged with driving while
license suspended ("DWLS"). POLICE REPORT, supra note 16, at 1. That charge, however, could not have been the basis for the arrest and pat-down, because the troopers
only learned about the suspended license afterJohnson was searched and cuffed. Id. at
3. The license suspension apparently arose out of a misunderstanding regarding
whetherJohnson had paid two prior tickets. The prior tickets were taken care of and the
DWLS charge was dropped before we entered the case.
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As for my impressions of Dujon Johnson, he seemed poised,
articulate and likeable. Indeed, I remember commenting to the students that it seemed that our client was managing the impressions
he created in the interview with at least as much care as the students
were managing their interviewing techniques. I learned by way of
background that Johnson had served in the military and worked
both as an assistant in a law school library and as a paralegal. He
was currently finishing his undergraduate degree at the University
of Michigan and planning to get a Master's degree in Chinese Studies. He was married and lived in Detroit. His means were very limited. At the time of the interview, he had been unable to repair his
car and had to commute the forty miles to Ann Arbor for classes by
bus. He had no prior criminal record. He was black, a fact we knew
before the interview from the identifying abbreviation in the police
26
report: "B/M" ("Black Male").
As I viewed the tape, I noted four major inconsistencies between the police report and Johnson's story of what happened that
night.27 First, our client adamantly maintained that he had come to
a full stop before proceeding through the intersection. Second, he
insisted that the troopers did not tell him that he had run a red light
or otherwise explain their actions until after his arrest. Third, he
said he was neither belligerent nor demonstrative before he was
handcuffed. Finally, he denied accusing the troopers of being
"strong armed vigilantes" or of "taking things out on the working
public." He did, however, confirm saying, "I have no respect for
you people." His response when asked if he said, "you are bigots,"
was ambiguous: "I may have said that. I don't think I said, 'you are
bigots.' "
D.

The Suppression Motion

Our client's story further confirmed my theory that this was a
case of a pretext arrest. I also saw in one detail ofJohnson's narrative a way of advancing this theory in a pretrial motion. He insisted
he was neither demonstrative nor belligerent before Trooper Kiser
demanded that he submit to a frisk, a claim that seemed consistent
with the personality he displayed during the interview. Arguably, if
the demand to be frisked was illegal, then our client was entitled to
complain loudly; indeed state law suggested he would have even
26 The two students and I were all white men. The judge, the prosecutor, and
Trooper Kiser were also white men; Trooper Frank Mraz was identified by the judge as a
Native American, but our client described him as white.
27
After consulting with me, the students decided not to show the police report to
our client before or during the interview.
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had the right to resist by force. 2 8 But rather than wait until the trial
to challenge the legality of the frisk order, it occurred to me to take
the offensive and file a suppression motion.
Typically, a motion to suppress on Fourth Amendment grounds
is brought to prevent the introduction of incriminating physical evidence. The purpose of our motion was somewhat unusual: to suppress all statements made by our client from the moment that the
trooper demanded that he submit to the pat-down search, on the
theory that these statements were the "fruit" of constitutional violations. If, as our client reported, the only arguably "disorderly" conduct took place after the encounter escalated into the frisk order,
suppression of this evidence would greatly weaken, if not destroy,
29
the prosecution's case.
I was far from certain that this somewhat novel tactic would succeed in securing a pretrial dismissal. In part, the motion was appealing simply for tactical reasons. It created the basis for a pretrial
evidentiary hearing that would give us the opportunity to cross-examine the troopers for discovery and to preserve their testimony for
possible impeachment use at trial. I also wanted a chance to introduce the judge to our Fourth Amendment theory before trial and
28 The relevant case law held that a citizen has the right to resist an illegal arrest
even by force if necessary as long as the force is no greater than needed. See People v.
Landrie, 335 N.W.2d 11 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983). The illegality of an arrest is a complete
defense to the charge of resisting arrest, and the state cannot evade this defense by
charging peace disturbance instead of resisting arrest. People v. Davenport, 215
N.W.2d 702 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974).
29
Here, excerpted from our brief in support of the suppression motion, is the story
we told the court:
In the police report there is absolutely no evidence other than unparticularized suspicion or hunch that defendant was armed and dangerous.
The troopers approached defendant after he had emerged from his car.
He stood in their plain view. There is no indication that the officers had
any visual clue, such as a lump in his waistband, that might make them
suspect defendant of carrying a weapon on his person. He made no
threatening movements of any sort. Indeed, all that is reported is the
irate questioning of the police officer's actions and accusations of misconduct and harassment. Taking the report at face value, we are asked to
believe that the officers could reasonably conclude that defendant was
"attempting to hid [sic] something or possibly having [sic] ... a weapon
about [his] person" simply because he made what some people would
think were rude statements to police.

At no time during the incident in question did defendant do more
than object to demands made of him by the police and ask the reason for
these demands. The troopers could not have had a reasonable suspicion
that defendant was armed and dangerous. The request for pat down thus
was improper and the fruit of that unlawful conduct should be
suppressed.
Defendant's Motion to Suppress at 5-7, People v.Johnson, (No. 88-1205 (1989)) (on file
with Cornell Law Review).
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test his receptivity. If he was receptive, we might elect to have a
bench trial, but if he was not, we would proceed with a jury.
E.

The Suppression Hearing

The Ypsilanti Township courthouse rises incongruously out of
a wasteland of abandoned fields. A sweeping driveway takes one
past a man-made pool complete with fountain and ducks, and up to
a modern glass and brick complex. Inside, all is clean and well-appointed; the two courtrooms are flanked by convenient conference
rooms and a comfortable lounge marked "for lawyers only."
The undisputed monarch of this small but impressive domain
was Judge John Collins. I had appeared before Judge Collins on a
number of previous occasions and had mixed feelings about him. I
had been told that was an auto worker before becoming a lawyer
(Ypsilanti Township is the site of a major automotive plant). He had
worked as a prosecutor, township attorney, and in private practice
before his elevation. I was surprised on more than one occasion to
hear him draw on his personal familiarity with one or more of the
parties before him in discussing a case. Indeed, I sometimes wondered how many township residents he did not know. His style was
folksy but authoritative. 3 0
When we showed up in court for the hearing on our suppression motion, we found that despite notice to the prosecutor and the
troopers that we intended to examine both troopers at the hearing,
neither trooper appeared. The judge accepted the prosecutor's explanation that their supervisor at the state police post had not received sufficient advance notice.
We were therefore forced to begin with our client's testimony
and then continue the hearing to another date for the troopers' testimony. Thus, the only testimony at the first hearing was from our
client. I have no notes of his testimony, and we never ordered a
transcript. Now as I write this article, I have no clear recollection of
what he said other than an impression that it was consistent with his
interview and favorable to his case if believed. In retrospect, I find
ominously significant my lack of attention to his testimony.
My recollection is that Judge Collins paid little overt attention
to Johnson's testimony either. Much of the time his chair was rotated away from the witness stand, so that he could not have looked
at our client while he testified even if he had wanted to do so. One
point definitely did catch his attention, though: the claim that the
troopers might have stopped Johnson because he was black. I do
30 In personality and style, Judge Collins resembles the "Law Maker" judge described by Conley and O'Barr. See CONLEY & O'BARR, supra note 10, at 87-90.
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not recall that our client specifically made this claim during his testimony; however, because we had attached the police report to our
motion, the judge could have constructed this claim out of the statements in the report that Johnson told Kiser "[you are] making this
up [the traffic violation] for a reason to Harass somebody" and
"You are bigots." I know that this point attracted Judge Collins's
attention because he volunteered at some point during that first
hearing that Trooper Mraz was an Indian (i.e. Native American); he
seemed to thereby imply that the actions of the trooper team that
night could not have been racially motivated.
At the conclusion of our client's testimony, we made a futile
attempt to obtain a ruling on our motion based solely on the record
as it stood, arguing that the prosecutor had the burden of producing
the troopers to rebut our client's testimony. The judge would have
none of it. He wanted to hear "both sides of the story," and so the
hearing was continued to a date five weeks later to take the troopers'
testimony. The prosecutor agreed that he would produce both
troopers without requiring us to subpoena them.
The appointed day for the continued hearing came, but
Trooper Kiser did not.3 ' The prosecutor said that Trooper Kiser
was ill. Thus the only testimony was from Trooper Mraz, who
seemed a quiet and well-spoken young man.
We took the lead in examining Mraz. Consistent with my usual
practice as a clinical teacher, I allowed the student attorneys to conduct the hearing following a detailed outline that we had rehearsed
in advance. I spoke only to deal with evidentiary objections and to
ask a few follow-up questions at the conclusion of the testimony. I
was delighted with the results of the student's examination of Mraz.
When initially asked to admit that Johnson did not appear armed
and dangerous when first seen,3 2 Mraz responded with a suggestive
evasion:

31
Our client was also not present. We had told him that although he was not required to be present (since he had already testified), we strongly encouraged him to
come to assist us in the examination of the troopers and to observe them as preparation
for trial. He had indicated that he would be there so his absence was unexpected. Discussions between the student attorneys and Johnson about attending this hearing
proved to be a significant source of tension in the attorney-client relationship. See infra
notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
32
The student's question was: "At the point and time which you got out of the car
and saw the defendant walking up to the station, he didn't appear to be acting in a way
that would indicate that he was armed and dangerous, did he?" Evidentiary Hearing at
4 (1988) (No. 88-0128), People v.Johnson (on file with Cornell Law Review) [hereinafter
Hearing].
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At that point there was no way of telling, he had clothes on it was
winter time, 3 3 he could have been armed, he could have been
dangerous. Any time you make a traffic stop, it could be a [sic]
armed and dangerous person behind the wheel, or a passenger in
the vehicle.
The student pressed for an answer:
Q

But there was nothing that he specifically did that indicated
that he was carrying a weapon? At that point.
A Like I said, stated every time we pull over somebody we treat
it as if they were armed and dangerous.
Q So, at that point and time, you didn't really have any reason to
believe there was any criminal activity afoot, did you?
A Besides running the red light, no.
34
[colloquy between court and counsel deleted]

Like I said before, I treat them like everyone is armed and danger35
ous, I don't relax.
The student attorney then went through a litany of possible reasons under Terry that would justify a frisk, and Mraz consistently ad3 6
mitted that none were present in their encounter with Johnson.
33
In fact the arrest took place on September 5. We never pointed out this inconsistency to Mraz or the judge.
34
At this point I objected that the witness had not answered the question. The
judge directed us to rephrase the question, which I stated as, "whether or not there was
anything he specifically did that led them to believe that he was armed?" Hearing, supra
note 32, at 6.
35 Id. at 5-6.
36 The relevant testimony included the following:
Q So during the time right after Mr. Johnson came back to the area of
the two cars, and Trooper Kiser began asking questions.., did you
see any lumps or bulges in his clothing?
A No I did not.
Q That might conceal a weapon?
A A lot of times you don't see bulges in the clothing.
Q But at that point you didn't see anything that looked like a weapon?
A No I did not.

Q During the course of the incident you heard Mr. Johnson accuse you
and Trooper Kiser for harassing you didn't you?
A Yes.
Q And you also heard him call you and Trooper Kiser bigots, is that
correct?
A Yes.
Q But you never heard him threaten you or Trooper Kiser with physical
harm did you?
A No.
Q And you never heard him state that he was carrying any kind of
weapon or contraband did you?
A No.
Q And he didn't make any furtive gestures did he?
A Is, what do you mean by furtive?
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He then attempted with some success to trap Mraz into admitting
that our client was frisked, not because he appeared armed and dangerous, but simply because he spoke up for his rights.

Q Then isn't it true that Mr. Johnson didn't really do anything

A
Q
A

Q
A

Q
A

that caused Trooper Kiser to submit him to a pat down
search, other than make the statements that [are] recorded in
your report?
I'm sorry what statements are they?
That him calling you and Trooper Kiser bigots and accusing
you of harassing him.
No. The reason Trooper Kiser patted him down is that, for his
safety along with mine. Any time somebody exits the car that
we believe, we don't know ok, we do a pat down, it's not a
search, it's a pat down for any sense of weapons.
I understand.
And he, Mr. Johnson ah, argued about that our pat down, was
illegal and said you are not patting me down, that brings up
our intensity level a little bit higher, more cause for alarm, so
Trooper Kiser patted him down for offensive weapons.
So, the reason, the main reason for the pat down was then
because he had refused to submit voluntary [sic]?
Basically the pat down was done for the officer's safety, the
37
troopers' safety, myself and Trooper Kiser.

I then conducted the following series of follow-up questions:
Q

A
Q
A
Q
A

It's your testimony that it is your policy, your partner's policy
to conduct a pat down search of any driver who is outside his
car after a traffic stop, is that your testimony?
That's correct.
And it was for that reason in this case you asked Mr. Johnson
to submit to a pat down search, is that correct?
I did not.
Or your partner did?
Yes.

Q I mean he didn't make any sudden movements with his hand toward a
pocket or the interior of any of his clothing.
A Well, when he was talking, he was talking with his hands, and they
were moving thrashing about and so forth. As far as going into a
pocket or anything like that, I don't recall him making any motion
going into his pocket.
Q And he didn't try to run away at any point, did he?
A No.
Q And he didn't try and get back into his car and leave, before the
arrest was made?
A No.
Id. at 8-10.
37 Id. at 10-11.
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Ok. And it is your testimony that when your partner asked
Mr. Johnson to submit to a pat down search, Mr. Johnson refused, is that true?
A That's true.
Q His refusal, in your testimony heightened you [sic] suspicion
of him, is that your testimony?
A Yes.
Q And because of his refusal, you and your partner then did
conduct a pat down search, is that your testimony?
A No.
Q Because of his refusal, you and your partner arrested him?
A My partner arrested him.
Q All right. And he arrested because of his refusal to submit to
the pat down search?
A No, he arrested him for being disorderly throughout the
whole incident.
Q If Mr. Johnson had not refused to voluntarily submit to a pat
down search, he would have not been arrested for a disorderly person at that time, isn't that true?
A I can't ah, I can't say one way or another.
Q Because you did not make the arrest?
A You're asking me a hypothetical and I can't answer what
would have been, I can only answer the facts of the case.
Q Was Mr. Johnson's refusal to submit to the pat down search,
one of the reasons he was arrested for being a disorderly
person.
A Yes.
Q At that point, what other things had he done, to be a disorderly person, other than refuse to submit to the pat down
search?
A By saying that the only reason that we stopped him was because he was black, that we couldn't do things that we did as
far as myself flashing the flashlight in through the windows to
check for any contraband in the vehicle, Trooper Kiser stopping him in the first place, because he knew his rights, his
howlering [sic - hollering?] at the, ah myself and Trooper Kiser for things that he knew we were doing illegally, all led up
to that, acting disorderly.
THE COURT:
Maybe for the record, when we got into
this bigot and racial thing, maybe for the
record we should indicate that Mr. Dujon
Johnson is a black american.
MR. CUNNINGHAM: That is correct your honor.
THE COURT:
And can we stipulate as to what the nationality or race the other officers are.
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PROSECUTOR:

Q

A
Q
A

We're going to, I'm sure that this isn't
the end of this hearing, your honor, so
we're going to have Trooper Kiser on the
stand at some point and time, so he can
probably tell us himself.
Trooper Mraz, was it your understanding, that part of what
Mr. Johnson was saying prior to his arrest that he believed he
was being stopped and investigated because that he was
black?
Yes.
You said he was hollering?
Yes, he kept yelling at us, "you can't do this, you can't do
38
that" and of course of our traffic stop.

The prosecutor's examination of Trooper Mraz was limited:
Q Just a few questions.... What did you stop, what was the
traffic offense for?
A The stop was made initially because of the ah, ah Mr. Johnson
running the flashing, going under the flashing red light, ah on
northbound Hewitt and Washtenaw.
Q When you came upon him, or at what point and time was the
arrest made, do you recall? Was there any search prior to the
arrest?
A No.
Q Now, when you asked him if you could perform a pat down
search on him, or when you went to perform a pat down
search on him, what words did you use?
A You can't ah.
Q What you [sic] words did you use?
A Did I use. I didn't use any words.
38

My questioning then concluded with the following interchange:

Q Who was present at the time other than you and your partner?
A

There were two people in the Total gas station booth.
Inside the booth?
A Inside.
Q Do you have any evidence that they could hear what they were
saying?
A NoIdonot.
Q He was hollering only at you and your partner, is that true?
A Yes.
Q As far as you know, you and your partner are the only ones that heard
what he said, as far as you know?
A As far as I know.
Q Ok. My understanding of your testimony is that you listed five things
that he did, which caused him to be arrested for disturbing the peace
or being a disorderly person. Is there anything else you want to add
in terms of what he did, or have you told me everything as far as you
remember?
A As far as I remember.
Q I don't think we have any more questions at this time.
Id. at 14-17.

Q
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Q
A
Q
A

Did you, were any words used?
Trooper Kiser talked to him.
Ok. What did he say?
He informed him that the reason that he was doing a pat
down, for ah, all I'm going to do is check for offensive
weapons.
Q And did he, was it a question, was it, was he looking for a
response, was he asking him if he could pat him down?
A Basically informed him that he was going to be doing a pat
down for the safety of both the troopers present.
Q Now, tell me about his, about the defendant's demeanor.
A Very hostile toward the, myself and Trooper Kiser.
Q What about his tone of voice?
A In an angry type voice.
Q What was the intensity of his voice?
A Loud.
Q What about his physical actions.
A Thrashing about, waving his arms and fists and saying (sic).
Q Is this usual, on a civil infraction for somebody to act like this?
A No, no not at all.
Q And uh, what were some of his personal behaviors? .... Towards yourself and just his actions in general on that specific
date and time.
A Hostile toward us, really for no uh.
Q Any other customers in the area in the parking area.... Were
there any other individuals?
A No.
Q Pedestrian traffic?
A No.
Q That's it. Nothing further.
THE COURT: Did you know this individual?
A No I did not.
THE COURT: Did you get any indication that Officer Kiser
knew him?
39
A No.
Mraz's testimony ended at this point. One of the cliches of
teaching trial practice is the warning against asking one too many
questions, the wisdom of knowing when to stop. We were so
pleased with Trooper Mraz's testimony-his admission that there
were no specific facts suggesting our client was armed and dangerous, his description of their practice of treating every driver as if the
person were armed and dangerous, and his catalogue of the "things
our client had done" to be a disorderly person-that we decided to
submit our motion for decision that day rather than insist on ob39

Id. at 17-21.

J.

S. S

taining the testimony of Trooper Kiser at yet another continued
hearing. Although I still wanted a chance to meet Trooper Kiser
and preserve his testimony for impeachment use at trial, I was willing to give up these desires rather than risk altering what I viewed as
a near-perfect record for our motion.
The hearing on our motion therefore concluded that day with
brief arguments by one of the student attorneys and the prosecutor.
Of course I was prepared for the possibility of losing our motion,
despite the strength of the record. However, when the judge immediately issued his bench opinion after our arguments, I was shocked
by the words he used in articulating his decision to deny our motion:
THE COURT: Well, there's no doubt in my mind, this is definitely an attitude arrest and had the person not exhibited the attitude that he exhibited he never would have been arrested, I think
that's pretty obvious, and I don't think there's anything wrong
with that. I think that officers out on the street are human subject
to the same human responses that other people have, and that
they react as humans react.
I don't have any problems at all with the traffic stop, this is a
valid traffic stop[.] [T]he elements of a valid stop are that a stop
must be based on specific and [sic] conduct which would lead a
reasonable person to believe that criminal activity is afoot, that's
Terry versus Ohio. Civil infraction is sort of a [hybrid], it really
isn't quote criminal activity, but certainly the officers had justification to stop this vehicle[.] [T]hey didn't just see a black man in a
gas station and say ["]oh there's a black man in the gas station,
let's go and arrest him,["] and that didn't happen. [And] the fact
that one person is black and the other person is caucasian does
not make it a racial instant [sic-incident?]. I don't see any problem with stopping this individual.
[O]nce having stopped him, he was the author of his own
problems[.] [H]e started getting, acting strange and unusual,
started walking away from the car as if he was conducting some
business in the gas station, raising his hands, howlering [sic] at the
officers, causing a disturbance of his own making, howlering [sic]
racism because they stopped him for running a red light[.] I'm
sure that these two officers had no clue when they saw this person
run the red light, whether he was black or white or brown or red
or green or any other color[.] [T]hey just didn't know and so the
person was walking around with a chip on his shoulder and these
officers were the object of that behavior.
Then the officer asked him, and again in the Terry case, they
say once a valid stop is made the officer may engage in a protective search if there's reason to believe the stopped individual is
armed and presently dangerous[.] [O]n this particular case they
didn't have any reason to believe that the person was armed and
presently dangerous. I have said on numerous occasions and I
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think I'll continue to say until some Court tells me that I'm dead
wrong, that the first duty a police officer has in this society is to
survive and I don't think that I'm ever going to find that the police
officer is acting unreasonably when he stops an individual for a
valid stop and does a brief pat down to protect both himself and
his partner.
In this particular case there seems to be a request for pat
down which was denied[.] [N]ow at that point and time, had the
individual agreed to the pat down and it turned out that he did
not have any weapon, then obviously that would have been the
end of it and the police would have just exercised their discretion
and moved on. On this particular case, the individual case, the
individual says no, I'm not going to let you pat me down[.] [At]
that point and time I think the officers exercised their discretion
and said look, we didn't have to arrest this guy for disorderly conduct for running his mouth in the manner that he did, but if he's
gonna act like this then we're gonna exercise that discretion and
arrest him. [O]nce they put him under arrest they have a right to
do a pat down search, which they did. I think it's definitely an
attitude ticket, no question about it. 40
The most obvious surprise in the bench opinion was the judge's
apparent refusal to follow the authority of Terry. He acknowledged
that in this case the troopers "didn't have any reason" to believe
that our client was armed and presently dangerous. Yet he implied
that the troopers nonetheless could require our client to submit to a
search, by saying that he did not think he would ever find that a
police officer had acted "unreasonably" by conducting a pat-down
search, because the officer's "first duty" was to survive.
The more enduring surprise, though, was the judge's confident
description of "what happened" as an "attitude ticket." I had never
heard the phrase before, but I thought I had a good idea of what the
judge meant. Our client was arrested for having a "bad attitude,"
pure and simple. The judge was sure that this was what happened,
did not think there was "anything wrong with that," and was as casual as he was confident in his comments.
In describing my reaction to hearing Judge Collins's bench
opinion, I use the word "shock" quite deliberately without any desire to be overdramatic. "Shock" evokes the image of touching a
live wire, producing two successive, but very different reactions.
First, I felt momentarily paralyzed and numb -my breath was taken
away, I was speechless. What could I possibly say? The judge had
with casual authority sanctioned not just a specific instance of police
misconduct, but a whole way, a whole world of police-citizen inter40

Id. at 27-29.
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action, that seemed to me clearly unlawful. What was obvious to
him, and obviously acceptable to him, was obviously wrong to me.
But the death-like paralysis of a shock passes, sometimes to be
replaced with galvanized movement, for a shock can be a jolt that
revitalizes. Judge Collins's bench opinion jolted me out of thinking
about what happened only in Fourth Amendment terms.
F.

Returning to the Client's Story

At the time of the suppression hearing I was working on an earlier article that experimented with the metaphor of translation both
by examining its epistemological implications and by applying it to
two earlier clinic cases I had handled. (The article was called A Tale
of Two Clients: Thinking About Law as Language.)4 1 I presented a draft
of the article at a symposium about a week before Johnson's trial
was scheduled to begin. In the small-group symposium discussions
that preceded my presentation, 4 2 I found myself talking more about
Johnson's case than about the two cases described in the draft. In
the midst of the symposium I decided to devote my twenty minute
presentation in the final session to a presentation and discussion of
the Johnson case, not just as an illustration of my theory of lawyering as translation, but as a shared opportunity with the other symposium participants to apply and test that theory in practice.
To prepare for my presentation, I went back and reviewed the
videotape of the initial client interview. In particular I watched sev"what
eral times the following portion in which Johnson described
43
station:
gas
the
at
car
his
exited
he
after
happened"
CL: He whipped around and pulled in off of Hewett. In other
words, he pulled in as if he was blocking my car. And,
um, I didn't do anything about it, as far as I was
concerned. And the guy said "Hey Yo." That kind of
ticks me off. I saw a police officer getting out, putting on
black gloves, and he says "Hey yo, you." And I said
you're not talking to me, are you? "Yeah, I am talking to
41

See Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: ThinkingAbout Law as Language, 87

MICH. L. REV. 2459 (1987).
42 The Law Review editors

who organized the symposium had designed an admiraconference, symposium authors, editors, and conferthe
day
of
first
the
For
format.
ble
ence participants met in small editing groups to read, discuss, and provide feedback on
the papers. This procedure resulted in much more collaborative and less adversarial
interaction than is often found at such conferences. See Kim L. Scheppele, Foreword:
Telling Stories, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 2073, 2076-77 (1989) (describing symposium format).
43
I produced this and later transcriptions from the videotaped interview by recording the audio portion of the videotape on cassette tape which was then stenographically
transcribed by my secretary. I then edited her transcript by repeatedly watching the
videotape to correct ambiguities and fill in barely audible segments from context. "CL"
indicates statements by the client; "ST" indicates statements by either student attorney.
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you." I asked him what he stopped me for. Well, he
walked to me ST:

How far from the car were you when he called you?

CL:

Four meters from the car. He pulled in front of the car,
blocking it after I got out. And he was the first one out of
the car because I really didn't realize they were there until
he said "Hey yo." By that time he was right in front of
my car and I was walking away. And I said, "You are not
talking to me, are you?" And he said, "Yeah, you, yo."
And he was putting gloves, his old black gloves onmacho kind of thing. And -

ST:

Were they white?

CL: Yeah.
ST:

Both of them?

CL: Yes. I said, "Is there a problem here?" He said, "Yeahcome here." And as he was talking the other officer had a
flash light and was looking into my car.
ST:

So that one guy was talking to you and the other guy was
flashing a light into your car? Were you, were the
windows in your car rolled up?

CL:

Everything was rolled up. I told him, "You don't have
permission to look in my car nor can you look without my
consent." I wasn't sure but that's what I told them-I'm
not sure if that's the law. "But if you want to look, that's
OK. I have nothing to hide."
I said, "What did I do wrong?" He said, "What's your
name?" I said, "What did I do wrong?" He said, "What's
your name?"
So they said, "Do you have your license?" "I don't have a
license on me, it is in the car." So I went inside the car.
And I said "I want to know why you stopped me."
So I had my wallet with my running bag with the gear. I
moved all the bagels and reached out my wallet.
He said, "You stand over here." I said, "What's the
problem? And he said, "You stand over here." He said,
"Are you going to be a tough guy?" I said, "I want to
know why you stopped me. You just can't arbitrarily stop
me for no reason."
So then the guy takes out his cuffs. I asked him, "What
are you doing?" I said "You are arresting me?" But he
didn't say a thing.

ST:

He didn't answer you!?
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CL: No. No. I told him, "Now unless I'm mistaken and unless
I'm misinterpreting the Supreme Court opinion, if you are
putting cuffs on me, and you are detaining me, I am
certainly under arrest. And if you are arresting me, then
read me my rights and then I want to know why you are
arresting me."
He put the cuffs on me, told me to turn around, and I
said, "I want to know why you are arresting me." He sort
of turned me around and pushed my head forward.
CL: Part of the conversation when my face was on the hood
was essentially that I let him know I did not appreciate
him addressing me in the type of language he used.
ST:

In what type of language did he use?

CL:

He didn't use profanity. He just [inaudible]. I told him
that I was a tax-payer. If this was a suburbanite, you
wouldn't approach him with "Hey, yo." My wife and I
worked hard to go to school, to be respectable, and I
didn't appreciate you treating me like I was a sixteen-year
old kid, which obviously I am not.
He claims that, he claims then that "I treat everybody like
that." "Well I don't think you do, personally." And that
44
was really the end of the story.

As I watched this segment of the tape, the word "attitude" kept
percolating in my mind. I found myself naming this "The Case of
the Client with an Attitude Problem" and then suddenly working
out the implications of that pun. Our client did in fact have an
"attitude problem," but the problem was not his attitude but that of
Trooper Kiser. As soon as I thought in terms of this
characterization of "what happened," I was amazed by how much
more I "saw" and "heard" in Johnson's narrative than when I had
viewed it initially, having already framed what happened in Fourth
Amendment terms. Every action by the police bristled with
assertive authority. The car did not simply "pullE] up to the . . .
station near [his] vehicle," as neutrally described in the police
report; it "whipped around and blocked [his] car." When Trooper
Kiser "obtained the driver's attention," he did so by calling out

"Hey, yo!"

The most obviously symbolic detail was Johnson's

observation that as Trooper Kiser approached, he "put on his black

gloves."
44 Videotape of Initial Client Interview with M. Dujon Johnson at the University of
Michigan General Clinic (Jan. 25, 1989) (on file with author) [hereinafter Initial
Interview].
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I also noticed in Johnson's story a recurrent pattern in each
exchange between Johnson and Trooper Kiser: Johnson would ask
a question and receive an order instead of an answer; Johnson
would repeat the question and receive the same order.4 5 According
to Johnson's account, he never argued with the troopers nor lost his
temper until after the arrest. Instead, his attitude was a consistent
demand for respect, typified by the initial interchange. When Kiser
said "Hey yo," Johnson replied, "you're not talking to me, are
you?" My impression was not that Johnson actually thought the
trooper was addressing someone else, but rather that our client had
refused to acknowledge an address that was demeaning. His
insistence on an explanation from Kiser for the stop and frisk was
likewise not just a search for information, but maintenance of a
considered position that he was a citizen who deserved an
explanation from the police. When Johnson referred to himself as a
"respectable" person, he seemed to mean that not only was he "of
decent character," but more literally "worthy of respect," a respect
that Trooper Kiser refused to give.
The encounter thus became transformed for me into an
escalating clash of conflicting attitudes: Johnson's demand for
respect and Kiser's show of authority. Seen in this light, the arrest
no longer seemed motivated by the trooper's desire to search the
client. Rather, Johnson was arrested for being a "disorderly
person"-that is a person who would not take orders, who was
stubbornly resistant to authority, what Trooper Kiser referred to as
"a tough guy."
Indeed, in the taped interview, Johnson recognized that his
response to authority was a central issue and eloquently explained
why he did not consider his actions to be those of a "disorderly
person." When asked if he used profanity at any point during the
encounter, Johnson said:
I don't use that kind of language. First of all-[pause]-authority,
I think a person should respect it. At the same time, that places a
high level of standards on authority. So while I respect authority,
the abusing of it I don't respect. I told him [Kiser], I don't respect
46
you whatsoever.
At my symposium presentation, I shared the first excerpt from
the client interview as well as portions of the police report and the
bench opinion. Almost everyone found the details I had previously
ignored, especially the black gloves, to be essential in persuasively
45 As one of the students perceptively observed later, the client was always hearing
demands when he had asked for answers. The client himself emphasized that "he
wouldn't answer me."
46
Initial Interview, supra note 44.
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recreating what happened from the client's viewpoint. Although all
the comments contributed to the events of the next week, two comments from a fellow participant, Derrick Bell, 47 had the most imme-

diate and long-lasting effects. One comment lay fallow until much
later, and will therefore be discussed below. His other comment
had immediate effect. He observed that both the two tales of my
draft article and Johnson's case were fundamentally about clients
who sought to preserve their dignity and identity. His comment
highlighted a fact that I have not shared yet in this article, precisely
because it had been largely excluded from my thinking about the
case up until the time of the symposium.
One day during the period between the two evidentiary'hearings on our suppression motion, one of the students stopped me to
relate a telephone conversation he had just had with Johnson. In
this conversation our client had revealed for the first time that, at
the arraignment before our appointment, the prosecutor had offered to dismiss the criminal complaint ifJohnson paid court costs.
Johnson told the student he had refused this deal.
Johnson's rejection of a deal that for fifty dollars would have
eliminated the risk of being found guilty made clear that he wanted
something more than simply being cleared of the misdemeanor
charge. Therefore, I began to think that my translation task might
require not only an innovative expression of "what happened" but
also a "new word" for relief.
G.

Collaborating With the Client

Several days after the symposium ended, Johnson came in for a
meeting to plan for the upcoming trial. He arrived a few minutes
early, before the students had come down to the clinic, so I took the
opportunity to talk with him. I asked him what he wanted out of this
case. His response, as best as I can reconstruct from my memory
and a few notes taken at the time, included the following points: "I
would like to have my reputation restored, and my dignity. The inconvenience can't be corrected. It got me a little unsettled, which is
very unusual for me. It's my honor, my name. I feel violated. They
tarnished my name." We talked for a few minutes about the results
of the arrest, how his car was towed, how he spent several hours
held at the state police post, how he had to show up late for work
the next day and felt that people knew he had gotten into some kind
of trouble.
47 Professor Derrick Bell is a distinguished African-American lawyer and academic.
See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987); Derrick Bell, The Supreme Court,
1984 Term-Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1985).
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I then told him how I had been thinking about his case and
relating it to my ideas about representation. I said I wanted to find a
way to communicate to the judge and jury what the events had
meant to him. During the ensuing conversation, we developed the
idea of literally giving him a voice in the courtroom by having him
cross-examine Trooper Kiser.4 8 The idea had some appeal as a matter of trial strategy because such a cross-examination might almost
re-enact for the jury the confrontation of that night, giving them a
chance to see Johnson and Trooper Kiser interact directly rather
than through proxies. In effect we would be saying:
Observe Dujon Johnson as he asks the trooper to explain his actions; he was doing the same thing that night. Today he stands
behind a podium with the force of this court behind him as he asks
his questions; therefore, he receives answers. That night he stood
with only his own courage behind him; therefore, he received no
answers, only orders to submit to arbitrary authority. Today he
receives the respect to which all free citizens in a democracy are
entitled; he deserved no less that night.
But more importantly, under this novel approach the trial itself
could potentially provide the reliefJohnson sought: the restoration
of his dignity. The very structure of the trial would enable him to
obtain the answers, and the respect, he was denied that night. The
trooper would have to answer questions about why he stopped
Johnson, "what the problem was," and why he needed to conduct a
pat-down search. If Trooper Kiser was a smart witness, he would
answer directly and with courtesy, thus treating his interrogator as a
respectable person. If he did not treatJohnson with respect, assuming that Johnson conducted the examination properly, the jury,
hopefully, would vindicate Johnson's view of who had the attitude
problem that night.
I emphasized to Johnson that this approach would require a
substantial amount of preparation time and would involve perhaps
some higher risk of conviction; the strategy could backfire and alienate thejury. He said he was more than willing to put in the required
time and take the risk.
Reflecting back on this strategy, it seems to me that I was trying
to use the cross-examination of the trooper as a bridging experience
for two different translations. First, I wanted to translate to the jury
48 As best as I can recall, I was the first to raise the idea, but Johnson immediately
responded that he had been thinking about asking us if he could participate in crossexamining Kiser. I did not discuss this important change in trial strategy with the student attorneys before presenting it to the client, thus "taking over" the case from them
at a critical point. My intervention at this point without first involving the students was
inconsistent with the goal of encouraging them to take primary responsibility for their
clinic cases, see supra p. 1310, and probably was a mistake in terms of clinical pedagogy.

IURVNPLL LA W R, VIP- W

I13i

LVOL.l:1'

our client's understanding of what happened by creating an analogous event in the courtroom. I also wanted to bridge the gap between the relief our client said he wanted and the relief that the
limited vocabulary of the law enabled us to express. The law attempts to tailor judicial remedies to the harm caused. We speak of
making a plaintiff "whole" as if courts can always restore what was
taken. But in this case, clearing Johnson of the charge of peace disturbance seemed to have nothing in common with the harm he felt,
as made clear by his refusal to accept the prosecutor's deal. By
thinking of the cross-examination, rather than the verdict, as the relief, however, we could make available a legally enabled experience
that shared structural and substantive elements with the experience
of harm.
G.

The Disastrous Day of Trial

On the morning of trial we arrived at court early, armed with
our detailed jury instructions and trial brief. But yet another surprise awaited us in this case. As soon as our case was called, the
prosecutor rose and said:
Your honor, in this case I've had an opportunity to talk to the
police officers about this case. I've reviewed it myself. I've made
the decision and the record should reflect it's solely my decision
that the People do not wish to proceed. We're moving to dismiss.
It's a 90 day, hundred dollar misdemeanor. Under the facts of the
case even if the Defendant were found guilty a nominal fine would
probably be the appropriate sentence. I don't see a great use to
the taxpayers of the State of Michigan to expend literally
thousands of dollars with police officer's time and overtime, witness fees, court time, to proceed in this particular case. And
again, it's fully my decision. Due to the nature of the case, also
due to the nature of other cases I have to have prepared by Monday morning I would like to state that the police were ready to
proceed. They do not agree with my decision, that the witnesses
were in fact here this morning and this is over their objection, the
Michigan State Police. But I cannot justify a trial on the costs to
49
the taxpayers of the State of Michigan.
The judge responded as follows:
Well, I said on the record from the very beginning that there
was no question in my mind that it was an attitude ticket. I'm not
saying that that's even improper. The police officers do have a
good deal of discretion. We see it everyday. Sometimes they ex41)
Dismissal at 3-4, People v. Johnson (No. 88 1205) (April 7, 1989) (on file with
Cornell Law Review) (the prosecutor on the day of trial was a different person than the
prosecutor at the evidentiary hearings).
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ercise it in a manner that we think is commendable, other times
we think that maybe they shouldn't have exercised it that way. But
nevertheless they do have discretion.
We give a man a badge and a gun and a bunch of training and
put him out on the street, we have to assume that they have some
discretion and give them some discretion to operate. I think this
was an attitude ticket. We see a lot of attitude tickets and um, no
question about it. If the person had behaved in a different manner the ticket never would have happened and I don't find fault
with the Prosecutor in bringing it, I don't find fault with the Prosecutor in dismissing it.
[To the students] As a practical matter there are very few people that would have spent the kind of time and effort and legal
talent to fight, as the Prosecutor has pointed out, a fifty dollar
attitude ticket. Very few people would have gone through the ef-

fort you did. But it's a great experience for you. 50
It might have been a great experience for the students, but it
certainly was not for Dujon Johnson. I could tell that he was fuming. His first words as he left the courtroom were "Patronizing, patronizing!" I decided to take advantage of the unexpected free time
that we all suddenly had in our morning schedule to "debrief" with
our client in the "lawyers only" lounge at the courthouse. What I
thought would be a 20 minute conversation turned into a deeplychallenging, and for me soul-searching, exchange.
Immediately after we settled in the lawyers' lounge, Johnson
said, 5 ' "I didn't get what I wanted. I'm very upset by this." The
students asked why he was not at least happy that he did not have a
conviction. The ensuing discussion led him, with my encouragement, to talk about how he felt about our representation.
He said that our representation of him placed part of his life in
the control of someone other than himself. Too much of the case
had been out of his hands "from the get-go." "Sometimes I feel like
I'm not an adult, always responsible to someone else." He observed
that
the fact you are in law school makes you see differently. I can't
fault you guys for having more control over your life than I have;
this is my lot in life. The fact I had to come to you and I'm not
50

Id. at 9-11.

51 Of course, I do not have a recording or transcript of this conversation with our
client. What follows is a reconstruction taken almost directly from notes I made at the
time. The phrasing and sequence therefore may be slightly different than what actually
occurred.
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paying you, that fact alone means that I'm in the back-seat. 5 2
Even today during court this morning, I'm in the back-seat. 5 3 Always the secondary person.

He said that at times we had made him conscious that he was
different and specifically treated him as if he was "an indigent mentally as well as physically." He felt that this treatment suggested that
we expected him to exhibit a kind of "laziness, nonchalance." He
gave specific examples of conversations in which the students had
reminded him of the importance of attending various court dates.
He asked, "Why must I qualify myself, reveal my soul to you, convince you that I wasn't there for good reasons?"

54

Our client then spoke more directly about how it seemed we
were treating him "differently."
I have a big thing about respect. Sometimes it was as if you were
talking to a child, trying to make me understand as if I had no
common sense .... Do you guys actually think I'm stupid, lazy
and slow? Most black people have that stereotype, of being that
way. You don't know that?... The way you guys talk to me and
approach me- it's a little like the way Trooper Kiser approached
me.

Up to this point, Johnson had been speaking primarily to the
two student attorneys. But he then turned his attention to me.
You're the kind of person who usually does the most harm. You
have a guardian mentality, assume that you know the answer. You
presume you know the needs and the answers. Oversensitivity.
Patronizing. 5 5 All the power is vested in you. I think you may go
too far, assuming that you would know the answer.

52 As I recall, Johnson made this point literally by stating that whenever he and the
students travelled in the same car, the two students sat in the front seat while he rode in
the back. There had been several such trips because the students had offered to pick
Johnson up at the bus station in Ann Arbor and take him to court.
53 By this statement,Johnson was referring to the fact that he was sitting behind the
bar in the audience section rather than at counsel table when the prosecutor moved to
dismiss and the judge responded. I cannot recall why this was the seating arrangement.
Certainly we would have had our client seated with us for the trial. Perhaps we forgot to
make room forJohnson at the table when the case was called and were too surprised by
the prosecutor's motion to explicitly invite Johnson to cross the bar and join us. I will
confess it never occurred to me to ask Johnson if he wanted to respond to the prosecutor's motion himself or to speak directly to the judge.
54 Apparently Johnson was referring, at least in part, to a telephone conversation
with one of the student attorneys in which the student encouraged him to attend the
hearing during which the troopers would be examined and to a later telephone discussion when one of the students asked him why he failed to appear for that hearing. See
supra note 31.
55 This was the second time that day Johnson had used the word "patronizing."
The first time was in reference to the judge's speech in the courtroom. See supra p. 1329.
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And here the story ends, at least the story of my efforts to represent Dujon Johnson. 56 After the symposium, but before the trial
date I had thought of changing that earlier article into A Tale of Three
Clients, by addingJohnson's case to illustrate how the translation approach could be applied. But faced with Johnson's devastating critique, I quickly changed the title back to A Tale of Two Clients. I was
hesitant to assume "that I knew the answer"; indeed, I was sure I did
not understand "what had happened" well enough to write about it.
But in a sense, the story has continued, as I have presented this
case to various audiences, thought about it, and finally attempted to
write about it. The next sections tell the story of my struggle to
understand what happened, and thereby test the translation metaphor as a way of both thinking about and changing the way I practice law.
II
TRANSLATION AS A METAPHOR FOR LAWYERING

My ideas for describing the practice of law as a kind of translation have their foundation in a very simplified theory of knowledge.
This theory uses a model of mental activity divided into three separate levels: sensation, experience, and knowledge. In this model,
the level of sensation consists of the raw input from the external
world, the complex pattern of nerve impulses from the sensory organs. This is the lowest level of animate being; pure sensation can
stimulate an animate response but cannot be consciously experienced in that form. In order for sensation to rise to the level of
experience it must be sorted and structured in relation to independent forms of intuition. For example, the impulses from the optic
nerve are sensation; visual perception is experience. We perceive
an object as having a certain shape, size, and position, all in relation
57
to an inherently assumed space.
Instead of a sharp dichotomy between an external "real" world
and an internal "subjective" world, this model postulates a dynamic
relation. The internal world we experience is constituted out of sense
56 On that last day, we did discuss with Johnson the possibility of a civil rights suit
against the troopers. He was quite interested in such a suit; unfortunately, we had to tell

him later that our clinic was not able to take on that kind of litigation. I did contact the
director of the Michigan ACLU, who indicated they might be interested in assisting
Johnson. Two months after the trial date, I left Michigan to take my current job, but I
wrote a long letter toJohnson referring him to both the ACLU and several private attorneys who did civil rights litigation. I also said in that letter that I had called both the
Michigan Civil Rights Commission and the Intra-departmental Affairs Office of the state
police and had been told that both agencies would review any complaint he filed with
them regarding the arrest.
57 See I ERNST CASSIRER, PHILOSOPHY OF SYMBOLIC FORMS 100-01 (Ralph Manheim
trans., 1953).
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data derived from the external world. A similar relation is proposed
linking the levels of experience and knowledge. Knowledge is
neither independent of nor simply dependent on experience; rather,
the conceptual world is constituted out of the elements of
experience.
In this model, language plays a central role in the constitution
of knowledge out of experience. The very process of naming
reduces the particularity of experience to reveal inherent factors of
58
form and relation, and then formalizes and stabilizes them.
This model differs from both empiricism and idealism. It asserts that concepts are neither abstracted from empirical objects nor
derived from transcendent ideals, but rather are realized in the process of objectifying experience. By giving a name to experience,
consciousness frees itself from passive captivity to sensation and experience and creates a world of its own, a world of representation.
It is this world of representations that we "think" about and communicate to others.
The world of representation, the realm of knowledge, is in a
dynamic relation with the world of experience. Initially, experience
gives rise to the concepts which can be known and communicated.
However, these forms of knowledge in turn may alter the way in
which we experience, just as the forms of intuition structure our
sensations. 5 9 Under this model, "reality," as we know it, is neither
60
simply "out there" nor merely a social construction.
One way I have attempted to explain this model of knowledge
to my students is to show them the following picture on an overhead
projector:

58 Id. at 281.
59 For discussion of a scientific experiment that appears to show language differences influencing actual perceptions of color, see Cunningham, supra note 41, at 247579.
60 This rather simple epistemological model resembles in many ways Steven Winter's experientialist approach, which I find very congenial. See Steven L. Winter, The
Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal Power and NarrativeMeaning, 87 MICH. L. REV.
2225, 2230-55 (1989); Steven L. Winter, TranscendentalNonsense, MetaphoricReasoning, and
the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1152-59 (1989). Feminist epistemology has played an important role in emphasizing to legal scholars the importance of
experience and context in conceptualization. See Bartlett & Goldfarb, infra note 63, and
sources cited therein.
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I ask them what they see in this picture; most respond that they see
nothing but a lot of lines. I then overlay a second transparancy with
the shape of a capital B highlighted in color:
FIGURE

3
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Next I repeat the process using a transparency highlighting the
shape of a capital E:
FIGURE 4

Seeing a letter in the picture requires them to exclude part of
the picture and focus only on certain lines. Whether they see a B or
E depends on what they exclude and what they emphasize. These
letters are neither simply "in" the picture 6 nor imposed on it by the
color frames. Rather the letters are constituted out of the bewildering array of lines through a process of selection and exclusion.
The "framing" metaphor created by this exercise, although
helpful in clarifying my abstract model of mental activity, 62 overemphasizes exclusion and deemphasizes the equally important concept
that language and other forms of knowledge add something in the
process of constituting experience. The framing metaphor also suggests a unilateral progression from experience to knowledge rather
than a dynamic interaction in which the mind moves back and forth
61
One might suggest my illustration is fundamentally flawed because both letters
were "in" the picture before the framing exercises-I created the initial picture by overlapping pre-existing pictures of "B" and "E." Although I did create the picture in this
way (actually I also added pictures of "K" and "D"), students also plausibly saw other
patterns in the picture, such as "F" and "13," that I did not "put" there. Indeed, "13"
may be a more plausible pattern because to "see" the letter "B," one must "fill in" gaps
between the upright and horizontal strokes according the conventions of Gothic typeface, while the gaps are consistent with the standard image of "13."
62 For an analogous use of "framing" to discuss the exclusionary nature of legal
narratives, see Scheppelle, supra note 42, at 2085.
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from experience to knowledge, always testing concepts against experience, the results of which in turn are used to create altered
63
concepts.
The idea of translation captures and communicates more of the
theoretical model than the narrower metaphor of framing. In applying the word "translation" to the practice of law, 64 I have been influenced by James Boyd White's presentation of translation as a
complex and creative practice requiring of the translator both high
art and a demanding ethic. White uses the etymology of "translation" (from the Latin "trans" (across) and "latus" (carried)) to illustrate what he considers a common but fundamental epistemological
mistake about the nature of language and translation. 65 To think of
translation as "carrying across," transportation, is to treat language
as if it were simply a vehicle for transporting invariable meanings
from the shores of one mind to another. But White persuasively
argues that meanings invariably change as part of the "trip" because
they do not exist apart from language. 6 6 Borrowing from the terminology of the Spanish linguist Ortega y Gassett, White describes
every translation as involving two kinds of meaning transformation:
63
Katherine Bartlett has advocated a form of feminist epistemology she terms
"positionality" that similarly emphasizes a dynamic relationship between experience and
knowledge. See Katherine Bartlett, FeministLegal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 880-87
(1990). Phyllis Goldfarb has applied such an epistemology to describe how the clinical
approach to legal education promotes the use of experience to develop and test theory.
See Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-PracticeSpiral: The Ethics of Feminism and Clinical Education, 75
MINN. L. REV. 1599 (1991).
64 The translation metaphor is appearing more and more often in legal scholarship.
See, e.g., Gerald Lopez, supra note 4 at 11 (in lawyering, a representative "translates and,
if necessary, transforms" the story a person is living into a story that an audience "can
identify, believe and find compelling"); Lucie White, Mobilization on the Margins of the
Lawsuit: Making Space for Clients to Speak, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 535, 544
(1987-88) (legal culture defines the attorney's core role "as that of a translator who
serves to shape her client's experiences into claims, arguments and remedies that both
the client and judge can understand"); Nancy Rourke, The Language of the Law: A Comment on the Legitimacy of the Adversarial Trial, 1990 Annual Meeting of the Law & Society
Association 8 ("It is fairly widely acknowledged that lawyers engage in a process of
translation, changing the client's problem into a claim the law can recognize."). There
are strong similarities between the translation metaphor and the concept of "voice" in
feminist legal scholarship. See, e.g., Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The
Reasonable Woman Standard in Theory and in Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398 (1992);
Lucinda Finley, Breaking Women 's Silence: The Dilemma of the Gendered .Vature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 886 (1989); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, "Portia in a Different
Voice: Speculations on a ll'omen s Lawveing Process, 1 BERKLEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39 (1985); Ann
C. Scales, Surviving Legal De-Education: An Outsider'sGuide, 15 VERMONT L. REV. 139, 141,
144-45 (1990). For an interesting description by a linguistic anthropologist of legal
education as the teaching of a new language, see Susan Philips, The Language Socialization
of Layvers: Acquiring the "Cant ", in DOING THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF SCHOOLING 177 (G. Spindler, ed. 1982).
65 JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION 233-34 (1990).

66

Id. at 234-35.
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deficiency and exuberance. 67 Deficiencies are aspects of meaning of
the original expression not replicated in the translated expression;
exuberances are aspects of meaning that appear in the translation
but are not part of the original.6 8 Because, for White, meaning is
inextricable from language, to become aware of the deficiencies and
exuberances of a translation is to become aware of the limits and
potentialities of one's own mind and of the mind of another.
According to White, these epistemological implications of
translation make translation a model for a kind of ethic:
[Translation] recognizes the other-the composer of the original
text-as a center of meaning apart from oneself. It requires one
to discover both the value of the other's language and the limits of
one's own. Good translation thus proceeds not by motives of
dominance or acquisition, but by respect. It is a word for a set of
practices by which we learn to live with difference .... It is not
simply an operation of mind on material, but a way of being oneself in relation to another being.... The activity of translation...
offers an education in what is required for [the] interactive life [of
lawyering], for ... to attempt to "translate" is to experience a
failure at once radical and felicitous: radical for it throws into
question our sense of ourselves, our languages, of others; felicifrom the prison of our own
tous, for it releases us momentarily
69
ways of thinking and being.
The following story of how the English word "lawyer" could
plausibly be translated as "translator" is intended to illustrate how
through translation one can recognize profound difference, respond
to that difference with imagination and mutual education, and expand the meaning of one or both languages.
Imagine an American lawyer visiting the court of the emperor
of China in 1800.70 Through a Mandarin translator, he starts to tell
the emperor that he is a lawyer, only to be informed by the translator that there is no word in Mandarin for "law." The closest apT
proximation is the wordfu, meaning "punishment" or "sanction."'
67

68

Id. at 235.
Id.

Id. at 257.
My assumption that an American lawyer in 1800 would describe the practice of
law as we would today is no doubt anachronistic. In fact, in the pre-Revolutionary period, many colonies shared the Chinese attitude reflected in this story by barring lawyers
from court and prohibiting pleading for hire. LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAw 81-82 (1973). However, by 1835, if we are to believe de Tocqueville,
lawyers enjoyed the highest status and influence in American society. ALEXIS DE TocQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 284-90 (1973).
71
In constructing this story I was assisted by my colleague, William Jones, a translator of Chinese legal texts. See A Translation of the General Provisions of Civil Law of the
People's Republic of China, 13 REV. SOCIALIST L. 357 (1987); Translation, Fourth Draft of the
Civil Code of the People's Republic of China, 10 REV. SOCIALIST L. 193 (1984).
69
70
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Thus, if the translator described the American as one who practices
fu, the emperor would assume that he was a judge, one who administers punishment.
The American is encouraged to learn that at least the emperor
has a word for "judge," but the translator quickly informs him that a
better translation for the tide of the Chinese official who administers
fu would be "magistrate," because such officials exercise administrative as well as judicial functions. 72 The American then asks the
translator if there is a word for a person who assists those appearing
before a magistrate. The translator replies there is, song-gun, but
suggests against using the word because it is a term of scorn, perhaps similar to the word "shyster."'7 3 He explains to the puzzled
American that in Chinese "courts" the parties always represent
themselves. Illiterate persons often employed the services of a
scrivener, but these scriveners were generally prohibited from giving advice or trying to influence the magistrate's decision. A scrivener who ignored such prohibitions was called a song-gun. Thus
there is no word for a professional court advocate, and indeed no
noun "advocate."
The translator asks the American to explain what exactly a lawyer would do in a court. The American suddenly decides to use the
translator himself as an example, saying that as he helps the lawyer
explain himself to the emperor, so too the lawyer helps his client
explain his case to the judge. The language gap between the speakers of different languages is thus bridged by a common experience:
the event that the emperor and the American are sharing at the very
moment. This move may be especially plausible in this context because for both Anglo-American and Chinese cultures there has been
a similar evolutionary relationship between the court of a ruler, literally the physical space where subjects can approach the ruler and
be heard (the space where the American is now located),7 4 and the
court of a judge (the space where he functions as a lawyer). For
both cultures "court" has shifted in meaning from a specific location
72

For a fascinating description of a Chinese Magistrate, see CELEBRATED CASES OF

JUDGE DEE, (Robert Vangulik trans., 1976)(anonymous 18th century detective novel
based on the legendary exploits of the famous Tang dynasty Judge Dee Jen-djieh (630700 A.D.)).
73 Jones, supra note 71, informs me that song-gun literally means "litigation stick,"
i.e., one who "stirs up" litigation. "Shyster" apparently entered the English language
around 1840, derived either from the name of a specific New York lawyer, Scheuster,
frequently rebuked for pettifoggery, see WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1967) "shyster" (at 306), or from the German word Scheisse, meaning excrement,
see STUART BERG FLEXNER, I HEAR AMERICA TALKING: AN ILLUSTRATED TREASURY OF
AMERICAN WORDS AND PHRASES 167 (1976).

74 Indeed, "Court" originally meant something like "yard," thus showing the common link among such diverse uses as "tennis court," "court of law," and "courtyard."
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in a ruler's residence to one of the key functions once performed in
such a space.
This exercise in translating "lawyer" might lead the American,
the Chinese translator and, through him, the emperor to a new understanding of what happens in their respective "law courts," by
suggesting the gap between the language used by the parties and
the language used by the judge might be large enough to require
the services of a "translator," even though both might have previously assumed that everyone in their respective courts was speaking
the "same language," either English or Mandarin.
The translation metaphor suggests that the introduction of a
"new word" (typically by expanding the meaning of an existing
word by using it in a novel way) can dramatically affect a person's
understanding of experience. Indeed, by discussing lawyering as a
kind of translation, I am myself using "translation" as a "new word"
in an effort to expand my understanding of my experience of practicing law. As linguist George Lakoff and philosopher MarkJohnson
have suggested, a novel metaphor can "defin[e] reality" 7 5 by making
"coherent a large and diverse range of experiences. ' 76 The process
they describe by which a metaphor "defines reality" by highlighting
"certain aspects of our experience" and-blocking others 7 7 resembles
the model of mental activity discussed above. More recently, Lakoff
has suggested that metaphors create meaning primarily by "mapping" from one domain of experience to a corresponding conceptual structure in another domain of experience. 78 For example, the
American in my story "mapped" the domain of experience from appearance in a royal court onto the domain of the courtroom by taking advantage of structural and other similarities between the two
domains.
The translator's ethic compels a continuing cycle in which the
translator must continually confront the flaws of the expression he is
creating in the second language, return to the "other" in the first
language, and then begin the endeavor anew. 79 For White, this cycle impels the translator toward a high art he terms: "integration:
putting two things together in such a way as to make a third, a new
thing with meaning of its own.., not to merge the two elements or
75 George Lakoff & Mark Johnson, Conceptual .Mletaphorin Everydayv Language, 77 J.
PHIL. 453 (1980). This article summarized ideas which are developed more thoroughly
in a book by the same authors, METAPHORS WE LIVE By (1980).
76

Id. at 484, 485.

77

Id. at 484.
GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES RE-

78

114 (1987).
This cycle resembles the "theory-practice spiral" discussed by Goldfarb, supra

VEAL ABotrr THE MIND

79

note 63.
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blur the distinctions between them, but to sharpen the sense we
have of each, and of the differences that play between them."8 0 This
art must be constantly "remade afresh, in new forms." 8'
Through the preceding narrative (and in my interpretations of
this story in Part IV) I hope to recreate my sense of having participated in such a cycle: of creating meaning only to discover its limits,
returning anew to discover what aspects of the client's experience
were excluded, trying again, failing again, yet trying once more. For
this reason I have told the story of representingJohnson as I understood it at the time, which meant that some details of what happened were sometimes introduced not in chronological sequence,
but rather at a later point when they first developed meaning for me.
III
STUDYING TEXTS OF THE REPRESENTATION OF A CLIENT

A.

The Roots of Ethnography in Cultural Anthropology

The metaphor of the lawyer as translator would seem to lead
naturally to the metaphor of "representation as text" if the client's
story is viewed as a text for the lawyer to translate for legal audiences. "Text" also suggests an analogy to literary interpretation,
which is the primary disciplinary cross-fertilization that gives rise to
use of the translation metaphor by James Boyd White.8 2 Although
the methods of literary interpretation do influence this approach,
they are brought to bear through a circuitous route that begins in
cultural anthropology-and in the remote islands of Indonesia.
In thinking of my representation of Johnson as a text, I am taking as my model the practice of ethnography,8 3 initially developed in
cultural anthropology and since applied in a number of sociological
methodologies. A cultural anthropologist traditionally created an
ethnography by living in a foreign (usually exotic) society for an extended period. This "field work" involved becoming a "participantobserver," participating in the daily life of the society as much as
80

WHrrE, supra note 65, at 263.
81 For me the translator's art of integration can be a useful metaphor for the kind of
multiple consciousness advocated by critical race theorists. See Delgado, supra note 14;
Matsuda, supra note 14; Patricia Williams, The ObligingShell, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 2128, 2151
("It is this perspective, the ambi-valent, multivalent way of seeing that is, I think, at the

heart of what is called critical theory, feminist theory, and the so-called minority critique.
It has to do with a fluid positioning that sees back and forth across boundary....

Noth-

ing is simple. Each day is a new labor.").
82 Besides being a law professor, White is also a professor of English Literature.
83 Translating its Greek components literally, ethnography means "nation writing"
(ethnos-nation; graphein-to write) in the same way that geography means "earth writing." A geography of a country describes (writes down) its terrain and other physical

features; an ethnography of a country describes the people who live there.
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possible, sometimes by laboring in a specific indigenous work role,
while simultaneously observing all that was taking place around her.
A constant dialogue with co-operating members of the society, usually termed (unfortunately) "informants," supplemented these observations and clarified their significance.
The gap between the ethnographer and the society studied was
usually vast; many ethnographers arrived with almost no information and did not even speak the language. If an ethnographer could
gain meaningful insight into a vastly different culture despite such
hurdles, then ethnographic methods might offer some hope for
crossing the apparently smaller gap between attorney and client.
The approach to ethnography I am taking as my model is that
practiced and explicated by Clifford Geertz, one of our most influential (and eloquent) contemporary cultural anthropologists.
Geertz starts with the premise that "[t]he ability of anthropologists
to get us to take what they say seriously ...[is primarily due to] their
capacity to convince us that what they say is a result of their having
actually penetrated ...another form of life, of having... truly 'been
there.' "84 The requirement that anthropological research be based
on field work gets the anthropologist "there"; the participant-observer method ensures that she is intensively "being" while there.
But how can such a stranger in a strange land presume to "penetrate" the very foreign life being lived around her?
The trick is not to get yourself into some inner correspondence of
spirit with your informants.... The ethnographer does not, and,
in my opinion largely cannot, perceive what his informants perceive. What he perceives . . .is what they perceive "with." ...
[For example, in] my own work ...I have been concerned, among
other things, with attempting to determine how ... people...
define themselves as persons, what goes into the idea they have
...of what a self.., is. And in each case, I have tried to get at this
most intimate of notions not by imagining myself someone else, a
rice peasant or a tribal sheikh, and then seeing what I thought, but
by searching out and analyzing the symbolic forms-words,
images, institutions, behaviors-in terms of which, in each place,
people actually represented themselves to themselves and to one
85
another.
86
For example, in perhaps his most famous ethnographic essay,
Geertz studies the practice of cockfighting on the Indonesian island
84

CLIFFORD GEERTZ, WORKS AND LIvEs: THE ANTHROPOLOGIST As AUTHOR

4-5

(1988).
85

CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE:

THROPOLOGY 58 (1983) (emphasis added).
86
CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Deep Play: Notes on
OF CULTURES

412 (1973).

FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE AN-

the Balinese Cockfight, in THE

INTERPRETATION
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of Bali. After carefully describing cockfighting as a sport-inventorying its rules, strategies and techniques-and its role in the social
economy through the complex systems of gambling that surround
such fights, Geertz moves to a consideration of the cockfight as an
art form, comparable to a play or poem. 7 He assumes that by participating in a cockfight, the Balinese are saying something, about
themselves to themselves. 8 8 Thus, interpreting the cockfight need
not be an imposition of the anthropologist's foreign concepts because the cockfight is already inherently meaningful. "To put the
matter this way ...shifts the analysis of cultural forms from an endeavor in general parallel to dissecting an organism, diagnosing a
symptom, deciphering a code, or ordering a system ... to one in
general parallel with penetrating a literary text."8 9 Geertz thus
imagines culture itself as an "ensemble of texts . . .which the anthropologist strains to read over the shoulders of those to whom
they properly belong." 90
The twin metaphors-culture as text and ethnography as literary interpretation-inform ethnographic methodology as described
by Geertz. For him, the "graphic," i.e. the "writing," aspect of ethnography is key: "What does the ethnographer do?-he writes." 9 1
It is not sufficient simply to observe and participate in the events
"there"; by meticulously recording these cultural events, the ethnographer transforms their figurative texts into literal texts that can
be given the close and recurrent attention needed for the interpretive process.
[There are four characteristics of ethnographic description:] it is
interpretive; what it is interpretive of is the flow of social discourse; . . .the interpreting involved consists in trying to rescue

Id. at 445, 450.
Geertz finds the cockfight richly evocative. He regards it as saying many things
in complex, interrelated ways, like a Shakespearean play. Among other things, the cockfight says that a Balinese man, socialized to be subdued and controlled, especially in
conflict, is "at heart" full of passion capable of exploding into the kind of murderous
rage exemplified by one cock hacking another into pieces with beak and claw; it also says
that the status relationships which are portrayed in the complex patterns of cockfight
betting are, like the fight itself, "matters of life and death." Id. at 446, 447. If Americans
"go to see Macbeth to learn what a man feels like after he has gained a kingdom and lost
his soul, Balinese go to cockfights to find out what a man, usually composed, aloof,
almost obsessively self-absorbed ... feels like when, attacked, tormented, challenged,
insulted, and driven in result to the extremes of fury, he has totally triumphed or been
brought totally low." Id. at 450.
89 Id. at 448.
90 Id. at 452.
91
CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Thick Description, in THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 3, 19
(1973).
87
88
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the "said" of such discourse from its perishing occasions and fix it
92
in perusable terms .. . [and]; it is microscopic.
The goal of this methodology is to produce what Geertz calls "thick
descriptions," which both record specific events in their complex
particularity and evoke the varied nuances of their symbolic import.
The important thing about such descriptions "is their complex specificness, their circumstantiality." 9 3 They are "not privileged, just
'94
particular; another country heard from."
Although the production of thick description is necessarily interpretive, the interpretation does not become more certain as the
description thickens. 95 Rather, the more fully the ethnographer
evokes an event "there" the more complex becomes its potential
meaning and the more resistant the event becomes to explanatory
paraphrase. Likewise, a good interpretation of Macbeth does not
produce a self-apparent simple truth, a clear "moral of the story,"
but rather shows the play to be even more mysterious and subtle
than it appeared before. What thick description can achieve,
though, whether of a cockfight or a play, is the expansion of the
96
imagination.
Although ethnographic methodology was developed to describe cultures alien to the ethnographer and her audience, social
scientists have increasingly applied its techniques to their own societies. As Geertz explains, participant-observation of exotic cultures
is essentially a device for displacing the dulling sense of familiarity
with which the mysteriousness of our own ability to relate perceptively to another is concealed from us. Looking at the ordinary in
places where it takes unaccustomed forms brings out... the degree to which meaning varies according to the pattern of life by
97
which it is informed.
The very distance between the ethnographer and the people she
studies enables the ethnographer to discern what Geertz terms "experience-near concepts," concepts that a member of the society
"might himself naturally and effortlessly use to define what he or his
fellows see, feel, think, imagine, and so on, and which he would
readily understand when similarly applied by others." 9 8 Because
92 Id. at 20-21.
93 Id. at 23.
94 Id.
95 "Cultural analysis is intrinsically incomplete [and] the more deeply it goes
less complete it is .... [Its] most telling assertions are its most tremulously based."
at 29.
96 "[T]he aim of anthropology is the enlargement of the universe of human
course." Id. at 14. "To write ethnography ...[is to] enlarge the sense of how life
go." GEERTZ, supra note 84, at 139.
97 Id. at 14.
98 GEERTZ, supra note 85, at 57.

the
Id.
discan
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such concepts are so "near" to people, they tend not to be consciously aware of their complex conceptual nature. "People use experience-near concepts spontaneously, unself-consciously ....
That is what experience-near means-that ideas and the realities
they inform are naturally and indissolubly bound up together." 99
In his endeavor to understand the idea of selfhood in three different societies 0 0 -Javanese, Balinese, and Moroccan-Geertz relies heavily on such experience-near concepts as: the idea of a
bounded self with distinction between "inside/outside" (batin/lair)
for the Javanese; the fear of inept public performance-"shame"
(lek)-for the Balinese; and the varying familial, tribal, and communal affiliations all expressed through use of the Arabic linguistic
form nisba for the Moroccans. 1 1
10 2
In these ethnographic descriptions, like most of his others,
Geertz focuses on semantic explication of what I would call key
words: batin, lek, nisba.'0 3 This conjunction of linguistic and ethnographic description is not coincidental. Ethnographic methodology
owes much to the techniques of descriptive linguistics developed
before and during the rise of anthropology as an academic
discipline.
The descriptive linguist faced the challenge of developing
"techniques which would enable the linguist to overcome his own
perceptual limitations so as to discover the system of a second language."' 0 4 He could not simply ask a native speaker to explain the
language's phonetics or grammar, because such linguistic constraints "operate largely below the level of consciousness."' 1 5 The
ability of native speakers to produce well-formed utterances and to
recognize whether other utterances are well-formed, termed "competence" by linguists, appears to be based on knowledge of a complex rule system, like the ability to make correct moves in chess or
bids in bridge. Nevertheless, the competent speaker may be quite
unable to explicate any such rules. People can and do speak gram10 6
matically without ever learning a single rule of grammar.
99
100

Id. at 58.
See supra text accompanying note 88.

101
GEERTZ, supra note 85, at 59-68.
102 For example, see Geertz's comparative description of what "law" means in Morocco, Java, and Bali. Id. at 184-214.
103
In attempting to translate words that are so complexly bound to their cultural
context as to seemingly defy translation, Geertz is demonstrating for us the translator's
art and ethic.
104
JohnJ. Gumperz, Introduction, in DIRECTIONS IN SOCIOLINGUIsTIcs: THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF COMMUNICATION 6 (JohnJ. Gumperz & Dell Hymes, eds., 1972).
105

Id.

106

Recurrent differences in grammatical usage between two groups who speak the

"same" language signal the existence of different dialects, not linguistic incompetence
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Nonetheless, the descriptive linguists learned to make effective
use of speakers' competence through a variety of interactive techniques in which the linguist would first guess at a rule from an apparent pattern in his recorded observance and then test it by
generating a new utterance according to that rule and asking a native speaker whether it was well-formed. Many native "informants"
developed sophisticated insights into their own languages through
this interactive process and could increasingly assist the linguist in
determining why apparent exceptions to the hypothesized rules led
the way to a deeper consistency.' 0 7 The linguist's work was constantly driven by the expectation that even seemingly arbitrary
speech patterns reflect inherent, meaningful structure of which
speaker competence was both evidence and product.
The resulting linguistic descriptions were not simply "found"
in either the empirical speech data observed or the conscious knowledge systems of the native speakers. They were constructed by the
intellectual collaboration of linguist and native informant, yet they
arose from and were testable against empirical speech events. Thus,
the accomplishments of descriptive linguistics are a powerful example of the dynamic interaction between experience and concepts as08
sumed by the model of mental activity described above.'
Linguists generally believe that semantic structure is product of
the same kind of unreflective speaker competence as phonetics (pronunciation) and syntax (grammar). 10 9 Recording and studying different uses of what appears to be the same "word" and testing
inductive guesses by interaction with a native speaker may make explicit a complex system of meaning that the speaker can manage but
not necessarily articulate unaided. Geertz's thick descriptions can
be viewed as an extension of this technique: elaborate and eloquent
semantic descriptions of the key words-the experience-near concepts-by which members of a society express themselves. 1 0

on the part of one group (e.g., the use of "I is" instead of "I am" among many AfricanAmericans or the omission of "the" before "hospital" among the British).
107
"The process thus involves learning for both the linguist and the informant."
Gumperz, supra note 104, at 7.
108 See supra text accompanying notes 57-81.
109 For further discussion of semantic competence and an example of the application of such competence to analyze the interpretation of legal texts, see Clark D. Cunningham, A Linguistic Analysis of the Meanings of "Search" in the Fourth Amendment: A Search
for Common Sense, 73 IoWA L. REv. 541 (1988).
110 Anthropologist Charles Frake explicitly applies the techniques of descriptive linguistics in his "thick description" of litigation among the Yakan people of the Philippines. Charles 0. Frake, Struck by Speech: The Yakan Concept of Litigation, in DIRECTIoNs IN
SOCIOLINGUIsTICS, supra note 104, at 106 (leading some commentators to describe his
study as "ethnographic semantics").
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From Ethnography to Ethnomethodology

The recent application of ethnographic methods to the study of
American and British legal discourse owes much to the blend of linguistics and ethnography known as ethnomethodology. 1 1 1
Ethnomethodology extends the techniques of descriptive linguistics
to speech events such as conversations or group decisionmaking
which are more complex than single utterances on the assumption
that the social categories that produce and manage such interactions
are in essence semantic categories.' 1 2 These larger units of speech
are often termed "discourse." For some, entire ways of talking that
characterize a profession or discipline can be analyzed as a unitary
1 13
form of discourse.
Ethnomethodology extends ethnography by treating the researcher's own society as the subject of study on the premise that
ethnographic techniques can render the researcher's own "seen but
unnoticed" competence sufficiently "strange" for explication and
analysis. The distinct challenge for studying ethnomethodology is
that the researcher is a member of the same "folk" as the subjects
of the study and thus, initially, also "takes for granted" these complex reasoning processes. Therefore, a basic principle of
ethnomethodology is that all the material studied is treated from the
outset as "anthropologically strange":
1 11 Interestingly, ethnomethodology has its origin in the famous Chicago Law
School empirical study ofjury deliberations. See HARRY KALVEN,JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE
AMERICAN JURY (1966). Sociologist Harold Garfinkel, a part of the team, became intrigued while studying tapes of the jurors' deliberations which involved use of what appeared to be very sophisticated methods of lay reasoning distinct from, yet functionally
equivalent to, the legal reasoning used by the lawyers and the judge. In coming to an
agreement among themselves as to "what actually happened" the jurors found "ways of
reaching, within finite time limits, a series of decisions which are not only very complex,
but are also ofjust the sort that have provided central and elusive problematic for generations of philosophers and social scientists." Anita Pomerantz & J. Maxwell Atkinson,
Ethnomethodology, ConversationAnalysis, and the Study of Courtroom Interaction, in PSYCHOLOGY
AND LAW 283, 285 (DaveJ. Muller et al. eds., 1984); see also Harold Garfinkel, The Origins
of the Term 'Ethnomethodology, 'in ETHNOMETHODOLOGY: SELECTED READINGS (Roy Turner
ed., 1974). Garfinkel coined the term "ethnomethodology" to describe this "folk methodology," the methods used by members of a community in everyday living "to analyze,
make sense of, and produce recognizable social activities." Pomerantz & Atkinson,
supra, at 286. These methods are "taken-for-granted" in their use, "seen but unnoticed"
by the members themselves. Id.
112 Gumperz, supra note 104, at 15, 18.
113
See CONLEY & O'BARR, supra note 10, at 2; SALLY ENGLE MERRY, GETrINGJUSTICE
AND GETrING EVEN: LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG WORKING-CLASS AMERICANS 110-15

(1990); Naomi R. Cahn, Speaking Differences: The Rules and Relationships of Litigants' Discourses, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1705 (1992) (book review); Susan V. Philips, The Social Organization of Questions and Answers in Courtroom Discourse: A Study of Changes of Plea in an Arizona
Court, 4 TEXT 225, 226 (1984).
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analysts must be willing to treat even the most apparently mun-

dane or ordinary events as puzzling enough to be worthy of serious analytic attention. Otherwise, they too [like the subjects
studied] are likely to overlook, or take for granted, the very practices that they are aiming to identify and describe."14
The student of ethnomethodology renders the mundane
"strange" by applying the same techniques used by the ethnographer of the exotic: meticulous recording of naturally occurring
events and microscopic analysis of the resulting "text." This "microanalysis"11 5 operates on an assumption similar to that which underlies both linguistic and ethnographic description: the activity
studied has an inherent order that is created by the participants and
can be revealed by close and repeated examination, even though the
participants themselves may not be aware of this order. Thus, this
method paradoxically treats the commonplace as strange in order to
make it explicable.
For example, much ethnomethodological research has focused
on conversation analysis, including such apparently mundane issues
as "turn-taking," the ways speakers alternate speech so that they are
not speaking simultaneously. Although speakers may not be consciously aware of using a system for taking turns, microanalysis of
recorded conversations reveals a consistent and complex pattern of
orderliness created by the speakers to make their communication
6
coherent.11
The emphasis on how participants themselves produce and interpret each other's actions leads to two'distinctive features of
ethnomethodological research. First, the research focuses on how
human behavior works, rather than why such behavior occurs. Second, theoretical conclusions are radically inductive because the research is dictated by what the participants themselves are doing and
how they do it rather than by a pre-existing hypothesis that is tested
against the data. 1 7 These features are analogous to Geertz's approach in which he studies an event such as a cockfight, not as direct
evidence of a cultural trait, but as an expression by that culture's
members of their own understanding of their traits.
One of the most interesting and, for my purposes, suggestive
examples of conversation analysis is linguist Deborah Tannen's
study of American male-female conversation described recently in a
114
115
116

Pomerantz & Atkinson, supra note 111, at 287.
See DouGLAs W. MAYNARD, INSIDE PLEA BARGAINING 11, 199-200 (1984).
See, e.g., Emannuel A. Schegloff, Sequencing in Conversational Openings, in

TIONS IN SOCIOLINGUISTICS, supra note 104, at 346.

117

Pomerantz & Atkinson, supra note 11, at 286-87.
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popularized version entitled You Just Don't Understand.118 She succeeds in making what might seem most familiar, the speech of one's
own spouse, "anthropologically strange." Her meticulous examination of apparently thousands of male-female conversations persuasively reveals that American men and women speak in sufficiently
different ways which she terms "genderlects."' 19
Tannen does not study male-female conversation to assemble
evidence that men dominate women. Rather, her work shows how
language behavior may result in domination even absent intent to
dominate. 120 Even men and women striving in good faith to create
a nondominant relationship often have great difficulty because of
the differences in their genderlects. 12 1 Without rejecting the many
118

DEBORAH TANNEN, YOU JUST DON'T UNDERSTAND:

WOMEN AND MEN IN CONVER-

SATION (1990).

119

Tannen obviously creates this term out of "gender" and "dialect." Id. at 42. For

example, if a husband says to his wife, "I just want to be more independent," the key
word "independent" is likely to have different meanings for husband and wife. The
husband may mean, "I don't want to be controlled, I want to be free." The wife, however, may hear, "I am denying our relationship, I want to be out on my own." Tannen

attributes this difference to a general pattern that emerges from her research. Men tend
to treat conversations as negotiations in which people try to achieve and maintain the
upper hand and protect themselves from being put down by others; this way of talking
reflects a view of the world as a hierarchical social order. Id. at 24-25. Women tend to
treat conversations as negotiations for closeness in which people seek and give confirmation and support and protect themselves from being pushed away; this reflects a
world view in which the individual is part of a network of connections. Id. at 25. From
the man's viewpoint, life is a contest, a struggle to preserve independence and avoid
failure. From the woman's perspective, life is a community, a struggle to preserve intimacy and avoid isolation. Id. at 24-25. Although acknowledging similarities to the work
of Carol Gilligan, e.g., IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982), Tannen maintains that her analysis

derives directly from her own sociolinguistic data. TANNEN, supra note 118, at 300 n.25.
Tannen suggests that even men and women who grow up in the same family may
learn different ways of speaking and hearing, because boys and girls tend to spend most
of their formative language acquisition time in same-sex play groups. Ethnographic
study of such play groups shows that the forms of play differ greatly, resulting in different uses of language. Boys tend to play outside in large groups that are hierarchically
structured around a leader who tells the other boys what to do and how to do it, and
tend to negotiate status by giving orders. Play revolves around games with winners and
losers, and language is often employed in elaborate discussion of rules. In contrast,
girls tend to play in small groups or pairs. Their games, such as jump rope, hopscotch
and playing house, are co-operative rather than competitive. Girls measure status by
relative closeness; a girl is more likely to strive to be another's best friend rather than
the leader of a group. Girls who give orders are likely to be rejected as "bossy," so
preferences are usually expressed as suggestions. Girls thus tend to use language to
create closeness rather than control. Id. at 43-44.
Tannen's work is reminiscent of Geertz's ethnography in that its microscopic analysis of recorded daily events reveals more and more about entire world views as it becomes more detailed. Like Geertz, she identifies key words (intimacy, independence) as
important to participants themselves. And like Geertz, she is primarily interested in expanding the imagination.
120 Id. at 18.
121 Id. at 16.
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nonlinguistic factors influencing male-female domination, Tannen
offers a partial diagnosis and remedy for unintended domination.
By using the metaphor of cross-cultural, even cross-language communication, Tannen avoids attribution of blame and keeps open the
possibility of mutual change and mutual growth:
Taking a cross-cultural approach to male-female conversations
makes it possible to explain why dissatisfactions are justified without accusing anyone of being wrong or crazy. Learning about
go away, but it can banish mustyle differences won't make them
22
tual mystification and blame.'
Just as the ethnographer need not learn to think "like a native" to
expand her own understanding, one need not acquire the ability to
speak the other gender's language in order to improve
communication.
Can genderlect be taught? .... [A] more realistic approach is to
learn how to interpret each other's messages and explain your
own in a way your partner can understand and accept. Understanding genderlects makes it possible to change-to try speaking
differently-when you want to. But even if no one changes, understanding genderlect improves relationships. . . . Once they
know that men and women often have different assumptions
about the world and about ways of talking, people are very creative about figuring out how this rift is affecting their own
relationships. 123
Application of this ethnographic method to the attorney-client
relationship might offer similar promise to remedying patterns of
domination, control, and incomprehension that persist even when
the attorney is consciously attempting to develop an open, listening,
"client-centered" relationship. The attorney would begin by treating the client's account as "anthropologically strange," ideally by
recording it verbatim for later close study. This structured act of
distancing preserves the possibility that the client's ways of understanding and speaking may be significantly different from the attorney's. To the extent that both share similar methods for creating
order and attributing significance to events, close reading may make
these implicitly shared ways of thinking explicit, thus highlighting
areas of difference. The recognition of difference focuses the lawyer's attention on the "text" created by the client with the goal of
interpreting the meaning it already has for the client. What the client says would never be treated as naive, disorganized, or ill-informed, mere raw material needing the attorney's sophisticated
expertise to give it shape and significance. Rather, the lawyer would
122
123

Id. at 47-48.
Id. at 296, 297.
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assume that the client's account had its own inherent order and
complex interlocking meanings worthy of rapt and disciplined attention. In particular the lawyer would search for key words that might
reveal the particularities of the client's world view as focused in this
account.
The metaphor of representation as text suggests not only a literal transcription of the attorney-client interaction, but also the initial distancing of that activity from one participant-the attorneyso that he can also become an observer. Once the activity is textualized so that it can be examined other than in the attorney's memory,
so that it is presented in a stable form with inherent, autonomous
meaning, then it can be brought close again, close enough for microscopic examination.
C.

Ethnographic Methodologies for Studying Legal Discourse

Recent sociolinguistic studies of legal discourse tend to fall into
two categories.1 24 One type tends to be quantitative: researchers
code and count recurrent formal speech features across a wide sample of recorded discourse and then correlate the results either to
identify features distinctive from everyday discourse or to test hypotheses regarding the social effect of formal speech forms. 125 The
second type is more qualitative, showing the influence of ethnography and ethnomethodology: a smaller set of recorded discoursesometimes only one speech event-is read closely and repeatedly to
identify features apparently significant to the speakers rather than to
a researcher's pre-existing theory.' 26 Features cannot be coded because the researcher does not know which features are significant or
recurrent before coming to the text and because her theoretical un-

124
For a similar taxonomy, see MAYNARD, supra note 115, at 5-9; Donald Brenneis,
Language and Disputing, 17 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 221, 228-29 (1988); R. Dunstan,
Contexts or Coercion: Analyzing Propertiesof Courtroom "Questions, "7 BRITISHJ. L. & Soc'Y 61
(1980).
125
See, e.g., WILLIAM M. O'BARR, LINGUISTIC EVIDENCE (1982);John M. Conley et al.,
The Powerof Language, 1978 DUKE LJ. 1375; Brenda Danet & Bryna Bogoch, Fixed Fight or
Free-for-All? An EmpiricalStudy of Combativeness in the Adversary System ofJustice, 7 BRITISH J.
L. & Soc'Y 36 (1980); Philips, supra note 113.
126
See, e.g., Michael H. Agar, Political Talk, in POWER THROUGH DISCOURSE (Leah
Kedar ed., 1987);J. MAXWELL ATKINSON & PAUL DREW, ORDER IN COURT: THE ORGANISATION OF VERBAL INTERACTION IN JUDICIAL SETTINGS (1979); CONLEY & O'BARR, supra
note 10; Dunstan, supra note 124; Tamar Liebes-Plesner, Rhetoric in the Service ofJustice, 4

TEXT 173 (1984); MAYNARD, supra note 115; MERRY, supra note 113; Beatrice Caesar-

Wolf, The Construction of "Adjudicable" Evidence in a West German Civil Hearing, 4 TEXT 193
(1984); Pomerantz & Atkinson, supra note 111; Austin Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner,
Law and Strategy in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 20 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 93 (1986).

1350

CORNELL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 77:1298

derstanding shifts constantly as insights are gained and tested with
27
each new reading.'
The latter approach is not unlike the "moving classification system" of common law reasoning:
[T]he classification changes as the classification is made. The
rules change as the rules are applied. More important, the rules
arise out of a process which, while comparing
fact situations, cre128
ates the rules and then applies them.
From my perspective the similarity is not accidental: one can view
both common-law reasoning and the ethnographic approach to interpreting events as specialized instances of the dynamic relation between experience and knowledge that is fundamental to all thought.
The anthropologist-law professor team of William M. O'Barr
and John Conley at the Duke-University of North Carolina Law and
Language Project have conducted perhaps the most extensive ethnographic research into legal discourse. 12 9 Their most recently reported research, on the discourse of small claims litigation, provides
a useful example of current ethnographic methodology for studying
legal discourse. First, they interviewed plaintiffs at the time they
filed their pro se complaints. 130 The observation and tape recording of small claims trials formed the core of their research; they recorded 48 days of trials and collected a total of 466 cases (not all of
which went to trial). Finally they interviewed a number of the litigants approximately a month after their cases concluded.
They adapted the group analytic method, commonly used by
conversation analysts, for studying the small claims trial transcripts.' 3 ' A group composed of Conley, O'Barr and usually three
or four others trained in law, social science, or both would listen to a
tape segment (typically a single witness's testimony or the bench
opinion) while following along on the transcript. They would play
the tape repeatedly (sometimes five or six times) until all group
members were satisfied they had heard it enough; then all would
write detailed notes focusing on what each thought was important to
127
See CONLEY& O'BARR,SUpra note 10, atxiii; MAYNARD, Supra note 115, at4-13, 1821; Dunstan, supra note 124.
128
EDWARD LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 3 (1949).

129 O'Barr is on the anthropology faculty at Duke University; Conley teaches at the
University of North Carolina Law School and has a PhD in anthropology as well as a law
degree. In addition to their own extensive work, Conley and O'Barr edit a new series of
publications from the University of Chicago Press entitled Law and Legal Discourse.
130 They also attempted to conduct pretrial interviews with defendants but were
generally unsuccessful because the defendants did not have to come to court before trial
and were generally unreceptive to interviews at home. Id. at x-xi.
131 See William M. O'Barr &John M. Conley, Litigant Satisfaction versus Legal Adequacy
in Small Claims CourtNarratives, in LANGUAGE IN THEJUDICIAL PROCESS 97, 108 n.9 (Judith
N. Levi & Anne Graffam Walker eds., 1990).
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the speaker on the tape. They would then present these observations in a roundtable discussion. The entire process typically lasted
3 2
two hours.1
Although acknowledging that this method seems "deceptively
simple," Conley and O'Barr assert that it is nonetheless intensely
empirical. 13 3 They see the open-ended insights of the group participants as actualizing the participants' inherent competence as native
speakers by forcing the participants to make explicit their implicit
processes of interpreting the text.' 3 4 Conley and O'Barr report a
striking consensus among session participants in identifying and
agreeing on issues of interest in a given text, even from members
not previously involved in the research project.' 3 5 More important,
though, than the consensus among researchers is the fact that Conley and O'Barr provide their readers with the same texts so that each
reader can test the researchers' interpretations against the reader's
own competence as an interpreter of speech events. Finally, Conley
and O'Barr describe their method as intensely empirical because, in
a sense, the litigants themselves set the research agenda; what appears important to them, rather than to the researchers, is the focus
36
of analysis.1
The inductive nature of Conley and O'Barr's method is exemplified by the way their research changed their very idea of the nature of a dispute. Their original design, in seeking to capture early
"uncontaminated" accounts of disputes before they reached the
courthouse, presumed that a dispute had a concrete, essential nature independent of the various accounts of that dispute. 137 However, their research brought them to conclude
that at any particular point in time the dispute is the account being
given at that time. Each new account that the disputants give...
reflects somewhat different understandings, beliefs and emphases.
Thus, any account is both determined by what has gone before
and determinative of the present and future shape of the
38
dispute. 1
Conley and O'Barr distinguish their approach from both traditional ethnography and conversation analysis.' 3 9 Although they
CONLEY & O'BARR, supra note 10, at xii, 35; see id. at 108.
Id. at xi.
Conley & O'Barr, supra note 131, at 109.
CONLEY & O'BARR, supra note 10, at xii.
Id. "In listening to litigants' accounts, we have concentrated on what they say
and how they say it rather than trying to impose predetermined structures and categories on the data." Id. at xi.
137
Id. at x.
138
Id.
132

133
134
135
136

139

Id. at xi-xii.
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share with ethnographers an emphasis on careful, detailed observation and inductive analysis, Conley & O'Barr differ from traditional
ethnographers in that they observe and analyze language use as the
object of their study, while most ethnographers view language as a
window through which to view cultural attitudes. Although Conley
and O'Barr draw on the techniques developed by conversation analysts, they are interested in more than the accomplishment of conversational interchange. Rather, they study entire accounts in order
40
to learn how language use shapes and constructs social reality.'
One can draw a number of parallels between the methodology
used by Conley and O'Barr and my analysis of the Attitude Problem
case which appears below.' 4 ' In reviewing the records of what was
said during the case, I attempt to emulate their open-minded, inductive approach by attending to what seems significant to the speakers.
I have incorporated into my analysis many of the comments received
when presenting excerpts of the case to a wide variety of audiences, 14 2 thus approximating the two-hour group session used by
Conley and O'Barr. By making verbatim texts of the discourse in
this case available to you, the reader, to interpret using your own
competence as a speaker and member of society, I hope to create a
143
similar check against my own idiosyncracies.
In my analysis I also have worked toward creating a Geertzian
thick description, focusing on key words and offering possible explications of their broader and more complex meanings as constructions of social reality. In doing so I found guidance in two other
ethnographic descriptions of legal discourse. In the first study, the
German sociologist Beatrice Caesar-Wolf described the way a judge
transformed lay testimony into "adjudicable evidence" in a West
German civil hearing. 14 4 Her goal was to explicate how the judge,
through the way he questioned the two witnesses, transformed their
fragmented testimony into "a thematically coherent, sequentially
presented story."' 45 Caesar-Wolf subjected the transcript of the
Id. at xi; O'Barr & Conley, supra note 131, at 109.
See infra text accompanying notes 162-80.
These audiences included my students, colleagues, and participants in the various conferences listed supra note 1. These audiences typically reviewed at least the
judge's bench opinion and Johnson's initial interview description of the stop and arrest;
they watched the actual interview videotape and a re-enactment of the bench opinion
while following the text displayed by an overhead projector. Many also read the other
texts which appear in this Article. Most, however, did not repeatedly review these texts
before commenting, unlike the group participants in the Conley and O'Barr research
project.
143
I also hope that readers' independent interpretations of these facts will provide a
check against my bias as a participant in the events, a bias not present in the Conley and
O'Barr research.
144
Caesar-Wolf, supra note 126.
145
See id. at 195.
140
141
142

K
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hearing to "extensive and exhaustive content analysis with regard to
the.., largely latent meaning structures, which may not necessarily
be intended subjectively by the parties involved." 14 6 In addition to
micro-analysis of this text itself, she reconstructed its context by reviewing the legal processing of the case prior to the hearing, including all available documents, a procedure similar to my account of
the history of the Attitude Problem Case. 147 In her view, this
method
both generates and tests theoretical propositions about legal reality construction in court hearings. It is predicated on the assumption that social interactions, even strictly individuated ones, are
not determined purely idiosyncratically, but at the same time express general structures. These structures are manifested in the
objective meaning contents generated in the course of the communication process;
as such, they may be reconstructed only
8
hermeneutically.14
The second study, by Michael Agar of testimony by truckers
before the Interstate Commerce Commission, described an ethnographically-influenced method of discourse interpretation he
termed "thematic analysis":
Thematic analysis begins with a careful reading of a text to get a
sense of recurrent topics which indicate high-level content areas
significant for the speaker(s). The analyst selects one of the topics, goes through the text, and pulls out all topic-relevant
passages. These passages are then used, together with whatever
else the analyst knows, to develop knowledge that enables an outsider to comprehend them. Some parts of the knowledge so developed will be recurrently useful in understanding; these parts
14 9
are the "themes."'
These recurrent, significant topics seem akin to what I term key
words; their "high level content . . . signals differences between

worlds."'- 50 For Agar such textual analysis
serves as an occasion for the organization of the wide-ranging
knowledge that comes from participant observation and theoretical interest. Constructing and interpreting the themes allows one
• . . to pull together scattered knowledge from readings, interviews, and participant observation in a way that was both motivated and constrained by the text at hand.' 5 '
146
147
148
149

150
151

Id. at 196.
Id.
Id.
Agar, supra note 126, at 113.
Id. at 117. Compare "meaning structures" in Caesar-Wolf, supra note 126.
Agar, supra note 126, at 124.
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One problem I face with applying any of the above studies is
that in none of the cases studied was an attorney significantly involved: Conley and O'Barr studied pro se litigants in small claims
courts, in the West German civil hearing all the questioning was
conducted by the judge, 15 2 and in Agar's study the truckers apparently spoke for themselves without assistance of counsel. This absence of attorney discourse is actually typical of much of the
research done to date, which uses data from small claims courts or
informal mediation proceedings.' 5 3 Even more rare are empirical
doubt a
studies of how attorneys talk with their clients in private; no
154
privilege.
attorney-client
of
major reason is the problem
A notable exception is the research project undertaken by former American Bar Foundation Executive Director William Felstiner
and political scientist Austin Sarat to record and study 115 lawyerclient conversations in forty divorce cases. 155 Their analysis documents a consistent failure by the divorce attorneys to translate-or
even respond to-their clients' understanding of the significance of
the events that brought them to a lawyer's office:
152 In a West German civil hearing the judge examines all of the witnesses; counsel
may only ask questions with the court's permission. The judge is largely unrestricted in
the type or form of question that can be asked. Caesar-Wolf, supra note 126, at 194-95.
At the conclusion of a witness's testimony, the judge dictates into the record a summation of what he understands the testimony to be, using the first person as if he were the
witness; the witness must then explicitly confirm the judge's account. Id. at 195, 212-13.
The German judicial hearing thus has surprising structural similarities with an American
attorney's interview of a client-the judge takes the role of the attorney-which makes
Caesar-Wolf's study more relevant for my purposes than might first appear.
153 See, e.g., CONLEY & O'BARR, supra note 10; MERRY, supra note 113; O'Barr & Conley, supra note 131; Pomerantz & Atkinson, supra note 11; Barbara Yngvesson, Making
Law at the Doorwa'v: The Clerk, the Court, and the Construction of Community in a New England
Town, 22 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 410 (1988).
154 See Felstiner et al., supra note 5, at 646 ("One of the reasons that data about
lawyers and dispute transformation are so incomplete and theoretical is the paucity of
observational studies of lawyer-client relationships."); see also Dinerstein, supra note 3, at
577 n.342 (1990). Other, more limited empirical studies of private attorney-client discourse include Bryna Bogoch & Brenda Danet, Challenge and Control in Lawyer-Client Interaction: A Case Study in an Israeli Legal Aid Office, 4 TEXT 249 (1984), and Carl J. Hosticka,
We Don't Care H'hat Happened, We Only Care About What Is Going to Happen: Lawyer Client
.Vegotiations of Reality, 26 Soc. PROBs. 599 (1979).
155 The project is initially described in Austin Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Lau'
and Strategy in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 20 LAw & Soc. REV. 93 (1986). Various analyses
of the data set, which Sarat and Felstiner collected over thirty-three months in two sites
from different states, are reported in: Vocabularies of Motive, supra note 9; Austin Sarat &
William L.F. Felstiner, Lawyers and Legal Consciousness, 98 YALE LJ. 1663 (1989); Austin
Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Legal Realism in Lawyer-Client Communication, in LANGUAGE
INTHE JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 131; Austin Sarat, Lawyers and Clients: PuttingProfessional Service on the Agenda of Legal Education, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 43 (1991); and their contribution to this symposium, Felstiner & Sarat, supra note 7. Sarat and Felstiner do not
report using the group session technique employed by O'Barr and Conley; presumably
their analyses are largely the product of their own collaborative review of the texts.
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Clients focus their interpretive energy in efforts to construct an
explanation of the past and of their marriage's failure. Lawyers
avoid responding to these interpretations because they do not
consider that who did what to whom in the marriage is relevant to
the legal task of dissolving it. In this domain clients largely talk
past their lawyers, and interpretive activity proceeds without the
generation and ratification of a shared understanding of
reality.15 6
Absent even from Felstiner and Sarat's work though is the
equivalent of the input provided by the "native informant" in traditional ethnography. t5 7 The ethnographer of the exotic guesses at
the meaning of events which seem initially opaque because of their
strangeness; this opacity at least makes visible the "experience near
concepts" which are transparent to the natives who live with and by
them. But the ethnographer typically then tests his guesses by interchange with the natives themselves, who may then be able to confirm the implicit meanings the ethnographer's necessarily arduous
and therefore intense analysis has made explicit.1 58
The ethnographies of legal discourse discussed above seem to
rely almost exclusively on the researcher's own introspective insights on the meaning that a recorded event has for the participants.
Perhaps to the extent that the researcher is also a lawyer, the researcher may assume that her competence to interpret the meaning
of the discourse is co-extensive with the lawyers who participate in
the studied events.' 59 From my perspective, though, the absence
Sarat & Felstiner, Vocabularies of Motive, supra note 9, at 742.
In their article in this symposium issue, Felstiner and Sarat do report on interviews with both client and attorney about their understandings of what was happening in
the relationship. Felstiner & Sarat, supra note 7, at 1475-81, 1491-95. It does not appear, however, that they discussed their own analyses with either participant. Cf notes
154 and 155, supra.
158 Geertz, for example, claims the Balinese have confirmed his interpretation of
cockfighting as a complex dramatization of status relationships. GEERTZ, supra note 86,
at 440. Indeed he derives from his conversation with the Balinese the metaphoric de156
157

scription of cockfighting as "playing with fire." Id. Geertz has been criticized, though,

for imposing his own understandings from a privileged position in the guise of presenting the "native point of view" in the Balinese cockfight essay. See Vincent Crapanzano,
Hermes' Dilemma: The Masking of Subversion in EthnographicDescription, in WRrrING CULTURE
74 (James Clifford & George Marcus eds., 1986), discussed in Christine B. Harrington &
Barbara Yngvesson, Interpretive Sociolegal Research, 15 Lw & Soc. INQUIRY 135, 145
(1990). Because "the authority of the anthropologist to portray the world of others is
contingent on dialogue and engagement," id. at 145, ethnographers continue to strive

for collaborative relations with the people studied. A striking example is a recent ethnographic film about Australian aboriginal life that was produced through a group decisionmaking process involving both Western ethnographers and native Australians. The
film, entitled Two Laws, is discussed id. at 148.
159
By turning the ethnographic gaze onto the apparently mundane activities of the
researcher's own culture, the ethnomethodological researcher becomes her own informant, assuming she has exactly the same competence to make sense of a studied event as
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from existing studies of the reflective lay person-client or pro se
litigant-as "informant" is even more serious. Conley and O'Barr
are typical in asserting that whether their interpretations of recorded discourse are idiosyncratic can be tested against the reader's
own assessment of the same texts. But the researcher and her audience are likely to be a rather small, homogenous group of privileged, academically trained persons, probably members of the same
intellectual discipline. Thus the gap that these studies consistently
reveal between client and lawyer, party and judge-a gap related at
least in part to differences in ethnicity, class and education-could
16 0
well be replicated between researcher and studied participant.
Lost is what seemed to be the major contribution of ethnography in
the first place: the sense of encountering a mind distinctly different
from your own and of thereby expanding your own imagination of
how life can be lived and understood.
One could provide a partial answer by structuring research so
that the interpretations produced by micro-analysis of texts are then
the participants themselves. However, it is likely that few of those researchers into legal
discourse who are legally trained have practiced extensively in the settings studied; typically the cases represent areas of practice where the bar is quite specialized: misdemeanor defense, divorces, legal aid work. As Maynard persuasively showed in his study
of misdemeanor plea bargaining, such practice settings have their own distinctive forms
of discourse that have little to do with what most lawyers learned in law school. MAYNARD, supra note 115.
Admittedly, if as in this Article the person analyzing recorded discourse is also one
of the lawyers participating in the case, there is a risk of self-aggrandizing or self-flagellating bias. My suggestion that a lawyer use ethnographic techniques on her own case is
directed more toward improving the lawyer's representation of that particular client and
toward expanding the lawyer's imaginative capabilities (for a similar use of ethnography
as a model for lawyering, see Lopez, supra note 8, at 1656, 1677). I am not ready to
assert that such very participatory observation has empirical value for researchers.
A very recent experiment in using graduate anthropology students to conduct
ethographic analyses of actual client interviews by clinical law students at the D.C.
School of Law suggests that such collaboration is capable of both improving the quality
of legal representation and providing useful social science data. See Lynne Robins, et al.,
"Using Ethnography in a Public Entitlements Clinic" (Paper presented to 1992 Annual
Meeting of Law & Society Association; on file with author). In particular, Robins, et al.,
suggest that the law students' experience of studying their recorded interviews in collaboration with the anthropologists gave a far more fundamental understanding of why
they needed to alter their modes of client interaction than could be achieved solely by
teaching techniques for interviewing. Id. at 2; see supra note 3.
160
Conley and O'Barr provide incisive criticism of both traditional and critical legal
studies for failing to systematically listen to and present the voices of those actually using and affected by the legal system. CONLEY & O'BARR, supra note 10, at 170. I agree
that they provide a significant service by presenting substantial verbatim texts of the
participants' actual speech rather than simply characterizing their discourse. Nevertheless, only the voice of the scholar is heard when that discourse is given significance
through interpretation. The same criticism could have been made of this Article but for
Johnson's initiative in contacting me last year that made possible the inclusion of his
voice in the analysis of his case.
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discussed with the lay participants themselves.16 1 In earlier versions
of this Article I spoke with deep regret about my inability to engage
in such a dialogue with Dujon Johnson about my interpretations of
what had happened during our representation of him because he
was no longer my client. But last year I was delighted and surprised
to receive a letter from Johnson, now living and going to school in
Iowa, inquiring whether I had ever written that article about his
case. I responded by sending him the current draft with a number
of pointed questions. What followed was a long telephone conversation, a three page letter from Johnson, and a very pleasant meeting in Iowa City last fall (where I happened to be for a conference)
during which I finally met his family and, I think, made the transition from attorney and researcher to friend. This fortuitous experience convinces me that involving the client in the interpretive
process has great value, at least if the client is willing and doing so
does not interfere otherwise with effective representation.
With his consent, I am incorporating many of Johnson's comments on my analysis into this paper as the last section. As you will
see, his response surprised me on a number of points. I am deliberately giving Dujon Johnson the last word on the meaning the Attitude Problem Case.
IV
INTERPRETING THE TEXTS OF THE ATTITUDE PROBLEM CASE

A.

The Police Report

I begin my analysis by attempting to make explicit my own understandings, as a participant in the case, of the significance of the
161 For example, Conley and O'Barr report post-trial interviews with parties but do
not indicate whether their own group analyses (which perhaps had not yet taken place)
were incorporated into those interviews. Id. at xi. Indeed, the parties' own retrospective
interpretations of the litigation events are not generally reported beyond their general
dissatisfaction with process and result, although Conley and O'Barr state that the posttrial interviews "yielded telling insights and some of the most important clues to the
interpretation of earlier phases of disputes." Id.
Austin Sarat, in a recent ethnographic description of how nineteen welfare recipients discussed their experience in being represented by legal aid attorneys in welfare
disputes, seems to have engaged in such discussions with at least one of his informants
whom he identifies as "Spencer." Sarat takes his provocative title, The Law is All Over,
directly from Spencer's own words and builds much of his analysis around this and other
metaphoric key words and phrases used by Spencer and other informants to describe
the meaning of their experience. Austin Sarat, "... The Law is All Over". Power, Resistance
and the Legal Consciousness of the Welfare Poor, 2 YALEJ.L. & HUMANTmIs 343 (1990). Further, Sarat reports a continuing dynamic engagement with Spencer during the entire
two-month research period about Spencer's contention that Sarat "couldn't really understand" Spencer's experience, which at least suggests that he shared his provisional
interpretations with Spencer. Id. at 350-51, 379; see also id. at 369 n.63 (Sarat questioning his own ability to comprehend his subjects' immediate material needs).
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police report. When I read the police report for the first time, something like the following sentences formed in my mind: "Our client
wasn't really arrested for disturbing the peace. This is a case of a
traffic stop that escalated into an abortive Terry stop-and-frisk which
was then converted into a pretext arrest." The second sentence can
only be fully understood if one knows the meaning of the three key
phrases in the language of the Fourth Amendment: traffic stop,
Terry stop-and-frisk, and pretext arrest. The use of these phrases
brought into play a complex way of conceptualizing the relationship
between American citizens and the police, a conceptual system built
on the single sentence of 54 words that constitutes the Fourth
62
Amendment to the United States Constitution.1
The Fourth Amendment protects the right of the people to be
secure against "unreasonable searches and seizures" and specifically
prohibits issuance of warrants for searches and seizures unless the
warrant is based on probable cause, supported by sworn statement,
and specifies the place to be searched and the person or things to be
seized. The paradigmatic examples of permissible Fourth Amendment activity are the seizure of a criminal suspect pursuant to an
arrest warrant and the search of a house for evidence of a crime,
pursuant to a warrant specifically identifying the location of the
house and the items of evidence to be seized. 163 However, the core
activities of arrest and house search pursuant to warrant now represent only a small part of the Fourth Amendment world. Primarily
through a process of expanding and complicating the meanings of
"reasonable," "search" and "seizure," a Fourth Amendment language has developed which can now be used to describe and regulate an enormously wide variety of interactions between citizens and
64
the police.'
The Supreme Court's 1968 decision in Terry v. Ohio initiated
one of the most important expansions of Fourth Amendment language.' 6 5 A policeman had approached Terry on the street, asked
him his name, and then patted Terry's breast pocket, feeling a pistol
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
163
Implicit within the Fourth Amendment meaning of "warrant" is a process of
presenting the probable cause evidence to an independent magistrate; the search or
seizure can only take place if the magistrate decides to issue the warrant and then the
activity must take place within the limits set forth in the warrant.
164 In Cunningham, supra note 109, I discuss extensively the semantic history and
currently confused meanings of "searches" in the language of Fourth Amendment law.
165 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
162
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within. At that time, those actions did not readily translate into
Fourth Amendment terms. The Court chose to expand the language of the Fourth Amendment to cover what happened to Terry
by adding to Fourth Amendment vocabulary two words from police
vernacular: stop and frisk. The brief interrogation of Terry on the
street (the stop) although not an arrest was still a kind of seizure of
his person. The pat of his pocket (the frisk) was a kind of search,
albeit far less intrusive than the paradigm search of a house
Terry was not, however, a case of simplistic translation of "stop"
(police vernacular) into "seizure" (Fourth Amendment), or of
"frisk" into "search." Stop, frisk, search, and seizure all changed in
meaning as a result of the way they were used in the Terry opinion.
Indeed, the creation of new meaning in Terry is routinely recognized
through reference to this new category of search and seizure as the
"Terry stop-and-frisk." Before Terry, the stop and frisk were entirely
discretionary police procedures. Terry transformed the stop and
frisk into exercises of Fourth Amendment power and thus subjected
them to the Fourth Amendment principles of justification and restraint. But because the stop and frisk clearly could not fit within
the warrant process, the meaning of "reasonable searches and
seizures" in the Fourth Amendment suddenly became much more
complex. The Court held that if a seizure of a person is only a Terry
stop, it is reasonable as long as the officer has observed "unusual
conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude ... that criminal
activity may be afoot."1 6 6 If the search of a person is only a Terry
frisk, then it is reasonable so long as the officer can reasonably conclude "that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and
presently dangerous."' 16 7 Gone from the meaning of "reasonable
search and seizure" in this context is the requirement that the police
suspicion of criminal activity be based on the far more demanding
standard of probable cause or that an independent magistrate first
evaluate the suspicion based on sworn statement before the search
or seizure can take place. However, the officer must be able to articulate specific observations to support a stop and frisk-an "unpar68
ticularized suspicion or 'hunch' " will not suffice.'
The expansion of Fourth Amendment language to encompass
the Terry stop and frisk also led to the specialized meanings I understood when I used the phrases "traffic stop" and "pretext arrest."
Stopping a motorist to issue a traffic ticket clearly is not an arrest,
but after Terry "stop" now suggested Fourth Amendment activity.
The Court has indeed extended Terry to traffic stops, holding in Del166
167
168

Id. at 30.
Id.
Id. at 27.
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aware v. Prouse1 69 that a traffic stop must be based on "at least articulable and reasonable suspicion" that the motorist has violated
the law. 1 70 Could a traffic stop then lead to a Terry frisk? Again the
answer is yes: an officer engaged in a traffic stop can go so far as to
order a motorist out of the car and then frisk him.1 7 1 However, as in
Terry, the frisk must be justified by two separate articulable suspicions: (1) that the suspect is engaged in a crime (the traffic violation)
necessitating the investigative stop, and (2) that the stopped suspect
is armed and presently dangerous.
The phrase "pretext arrest" also has special meaning in the
post-Terry legal world. Although Terry declined to apply strict probable cause and warrant protections to the frisk, it retained the underlying principles of justification (by requiring articulable
suspicion that a frisk was necessary to protect the officer from armed
assault during the encounter) and of restraint (by limiting the frisk
to searching activities likely to eliminate that risk). However, five
years after the Terry decision, the Supreme Court abandoned even
these principles in the context of frisks taking place after an arrest.
In United States v. Robinson,' 72 the Court held that incident to a lawful
arrest, an officer could conduct a complete search of the suspect
even if he had no basis for believing that the suspect was armed or
carrying evidence of a crime. Because earlier decisions had already
sanctioned warrantless arrests if the officer had probable cause and
needed to act swiftly to prevent escape or further crime, Robinson
created the obvious danger that an officer who wanted to frisk someone, but lacked the articulable suspicion required by Terry, would
arrest the person on a pretext and then conduct the frisk with
17 3
impunity.
By changing the meanings of "searches and seizures" in the
Fourth Amendment, the Court not only created new ways of talking
about police-citizen interactions; it changed those interactions in
profound and widely-varying ways. Although Terry may have been
intended to protect citizens from unjustified or excessive police tactics, it also created new incentives to abuse the traffic stop and warrantless arrest. A patrolling officer wanting to interrogate and frisk
a suspect might be tempted to find a pretext to issue a traffic
ticket. 174 Having then stopped the suspect but lacking articulable
suspicion that the suspect was armed and dangerous, the officer
169

440 U.S. 648 (1979).

170

Id. at 663.

171
172
173
174
to bar

Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
414 U.S. 218 (1973).
See 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 10.8(a), at 59-63 (2d ed. 1986).
Fear of such potential abuse of the traffic stop led the Court in Delawarev. Prouse
the practice of stopping motorists without evidence of a traffic violation. Prouse,
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might then make an arrest for a petty crime and frisk incident to the
arrest. Police discretion over traffic violations and misdemeanors is
broad in practice and abuse is likely to go unnoticed, particularly if
the frisk reveals no evidence of serious crime. If the frisk turns up
an unregistered handgun or illegal drugs, then, in a felony prosecution based on the discovered evidence, the prosecutor may have to
litigate the legality of the stop or arrest in a suppression hearing. 17 5
But if the frisk is unproductive, only the pretextual traffic ticket or
misdemeanor charge remains. Such cases rarely draw the attention
that could uncover abuse because they are litigated, if at all,17 6 in
the lowest courts which operate almost invisibly, in part because appeals from such courts rarely result in published decisions. 7 7 Thus
it is the totally innocent person, who neither committed a traffic violation or petty crime nor carried evidence of a crime, who is least
likely to receive vindication for violated Fourth Amendment rights.
Because of these dangers, many commentators have recommended that Terry stop and frisk activities be permitted only on articulable suspicion of serious offense, excluding such petty crimes as
loitering and disorderly conduct.' 7 8 This recommendation, however, has not been acted upon, leaving the thankless task of vigilantly defending petty prosecutions as one of the few potential
safeguards.
Application of Fourth Amendment language to the police report operated in several different ways. When I read the phrase
"traffic stop," I assumed that the phrase had the same meaning in
the officer's vernacular as in my Fourth Amendment language. I did
not consciously translate; Ijust assumed the writer of the report and
I at that point were speaking the same language. However, several
440 U.S. at 663. Nevertheless, the Court left open the possibility of less-intrusive "spot
checks." Id.
The Court has sanctioned the use of roadblocks which stop all motorists to check
for sobriety in large part because the police have no discretion to stop particular motorists on the pretext of checking for drunkenness but with a real agenda of looking in the
car or frisking the driver. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990).
175
Although the felony defendant may have the incentive and resources to challenge a police abuse of the Tery doctrine, such settings are inimical to correction of the
abuse. The defendant is often unsympathetic-many cases reach appellate courts on a
guilty plea conditioned on the right to appeal a lost suppression motion. And, of
course, it appears that the "abusive" practice has in fact ferreted out and perhaps prevented criminal activity.
176
Many searches are undertaken without any intent to prosecute. LAFAVE, supra
note 173, § 9.4(0, at 537 & n.197.
177
For example, in Michigan, appeal from the district court is to the circuit court
which, unlike the intermediate state courts of appeal, does not issue published opinions.
See Mich. Ct. Rules 4.102(E) (appeals from misdemeanor trials in district court); 7.101
(appeals to circuit court); cf. Mich. Ct. Rule 7.215 (publication of opinions of the court of
appeals).
178
See LAFAVE, supra note 173, § 9.2(d).
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paragraphs later I deliberately translated the officer's request to
"pat him down only to dispel the possibility of him having any weapons"' 17 9 as an attempted Terry frisk. Understood as a Terry frisk, the
officer's initial attempt at a pat down was "abortive" because the
officer's feeling "uneasy with the situation" did not translate into
Fourth Amendment articulable suspicion that our client was armed
and presently dangerous. The statements under the heading
"Cause for Arrest" added up to no more than a hunch that our client might be armed and dangerous. The officer did not report observing anything specific, such as a bulge under clothing or a
sudden movement toward a pocket, that would indicate our client
had a weapon on his person or in reaching distance.
Still using Fourth Amendment language, I then substituted my
interpretation of what happened (a pretext arrest) for the officer's
statement, "arrested for Disorderly Person."' 80 When Johnson
(quite justifiably) refused to submit to a frisk, the officer converted
the Terry encounter into a pretext arrest in order to cover up the
impropriety of the frisk. When his hunch that Johnson possessed a
weapon or was hiding something such as contraband turned out
wrong, the officer was forced to carry through the charade that
Johnson had committed a misdemeanor.
By translating the police report into Fourth Amendment terms,
I sought to bring what happened into a universe of carefully regulated relationships between citizens and police where the officer, not
our client, was the wrongdoer. At the same time I imposed on a
rather inchoate mass of shifting and fast moving events a structure,
sequence, and set of rules, rather like a chess game or courtly dance.
This translation appealed to my desire for a sense of moral outrage to fuel my advocacy and seemed to promise a winning strategy.
Of course it had nothing to do with our client's story-which I had
not yet heard-but at the time developing a theory of the case based
entirely on the police report seemed perfectly normal. Strategically,
we would win more easily if we could take the police version of what
happened as true rather than force the fact-finder to make a credibility choice between the police account and our client's story. But
as a result, when I did hear the client's story by reviewing the videotape of the interview, I had already decided to translate the events
into Fourth Amendment terms.

179

POLICE REPORT, supra

180

Id.

note 16, at 3.
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The Suppression Hearing

In retrospect, thinking of my advocacy as translation, I now see
the suppression motion as motivated in significant part by our desire to shift the language in which the opposing lawyer and judge
discussed the case from that of substantive criminal law (the peace
disturbance) to the language of the Fourth Amendment. In the
translation of "what happened" into the language of the misdemeanor complaint much was lost from Johnson's viewpoint. The
complaint failed to indicate that the only persons "disturbed" by
Johnson were police officers. Likewise, the only setting for what
happened in the complaint was "a place of business" (the gas station). The context of police interrogation and searching was lost.
The complaint's language seemed to limit us to be arguing either
that our client did not speak and act as alleged or, if he did so, that
his conduct did not rise to the level of criminal peace disturbance.
We could hardly speak of the troopers as police at all. In contrast,
the suppression motion brought into play a language rich in vocabulary about police conduct that we could use to talk persuasively
about our client as victim rather than wrongdoer.
However, like all vital languages, the language of the Fourth
Amendment had both limitations and potentialities beyond my comprehension at the time I chose to use it. I thought of that language,
if at all, as simply one of many tools I could take to hand in the
service of my client. It took a shocking defeat to make me realize
that what I thought was well in hand possessed a life of its own.
The shock of hearing the judge's blatant disavowal of what I
thought Teny stood for caused me to become aware of how meaning
was both lost and added by translating "what happened" in Fourth
Amendment terms. James Boyd White has suggested that the
Supreme Court's interpretations of the Fourth Amendment be read
as creating a language that citizens and police officers might actually
use in talking about their interactions.'" 1 One correlative of this
concept is that the citizen and the police officer each would demand
of Fourth Amendment language that it "speak to the situation in a
way that he can respect."' 18 2 This standard does not require the
Court to satisfy the expectations of both citizen and officer; in any
given interpretation one or the other might justifiably feel that his
181

James Boyd White, The Fourth Amendment as a Way of Talking About People, 1974

Sup. CT. REV. 165 [hereinafter White, Talking About People]. A revised and edited version
appears as Chapter 8 inJusTIcE As TRANSLATION. See WHIrrE, supra note 65, ch. 8. In the

original article, White refers to this concept as a "discourse of adjudication." White,
Talking About People, supra, at 166. In the revised version which appears in JusTICE AS
TRANSLATION he has changed his terminology to "language of adjudication." WHITE,
supra note 65, at 178.
182 White, Talking About People, supra note 181, at 166.
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rights and needs have not been given adequate weight. But nonetheless, as long as the Court's language provides a vocabulary in
which each participant can voice his concern, the Court successfully
83
creates a "comprehensible public world" that both can respect.'
The alternative is an interpretation creating a language that one of
the participants, either citizen or officer, "cannot speak, in which he
cannot locate himself, which does not deal in intelligible ways with
84
claims he regards as important."'
Terry can thus be read as providing a language that gives a voice
to both the citizen and the officer. The officer can speak of his interest in protecting his safety and his corresponding need to make
quick, on-the-spot decisions; thus, in his view the court should respect his judgment and discretion. In turn, the citizen can speak of
even a momentary interrogation against his will, or a brief intrusion
on his personal privacy, as a violation of his legal rights. Terry gives
the citizen a voice to ask the officer to justify his actions in terms of
the officer's mission to detect or prevent crime, and further empowers the citizen to ask the officer to limit his intrusion to the minimum
necessary to serve that mission.
However, there is a potential danger in the language created by
Terry. What if the officer turns the language of Terry against the decision by arguing to a court in the following way:
You are not speaking fairly to the hazards and uncertainties of my
task. When I stop a suspect, my decisions must be made quickly
and on the basis of incomplete information. You are asking me to
risk my life just because I might not be able to justify my actions
months later to ajudge by pointing to what you call "articulable"
facts. Yet I know and you know that my sense of danger may be
both real and accurate even if I cannot articulate it. 185
Before Terry, the officer, in her attempt to describe the search as
"reasonable," would have been largely limited to speaking of the
need to preserve evidence and the limited intrusion of the search.
The ensuing discussion would have therefore implicitly balanced
the citizen's Fourth Amendment rights only against the effective detection and prosecution of crime. The citizen could speak of his
own real and specific harm caused by the search, but the officer
could invoke only speculative prevention of harm to a hypothetical
future crime victim if the search could not take place. But Terry
183
184

Id. at 167.
Id.

185 This passage is based on a similar imaginary argument in White's article. See Id.
at 199; WHrrE, supra note 65, at 193-94. For a well-reasoned argument that Terry and its
progeny strike the wrong balance of competing Fourth Amendment values, see Tracey
Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on the Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 1258 (1990).
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changed this by giving the officer an enormously powerful new rhetorical resource: the ability to match, and perhaps overwhelm, the
citizen's voice by also speaking in the first person of his own rights
and of the not very speculative potential harm to him while conducting his perilous public service.
The Robinson decision 8 6 can be read then as fulfilling the dangerous potential of the language created by Terry. Under the
Court's holding in Robinson the simple fact of arrest terminates the
citizen's right to speak in the language given to him by Terry: once
arrested, a citizen can no longer ask the officer tojustify a search of
his person, on grounds of either preserving evidence or protecting
the officer's safety. 187 The Robinson decision shows that, once the
citizen is thus silenced, the voice of the officer, speaking of the need
for a standardized practice of disarming and discovering evidence in
all arrests, carries the day.
Interpreted in this light, Trooper Mraz's testimony was charged
with a force I did not recognize at the time. His responses to our
insistent questioning about whether Johnson appeared armed and
dangerous no longer appear to be evasions designed to cover a
weak case. Instead, Mraz was saying that from his point of view it
did not matter whether there were visible signs that Johnson was a
potential threat to their safety because, in order to protect themselves and perform their duty, the troopers must treat every motorist "as if they were armed and dangerous."' 8 8 He took every
opportunity to speak of their need for personal safety.' 89
When we wrote our suppression motion, we thought with satisfaction that we were mounting our client on a vehicle that might
carry him to victory; instead, we had set in motion a juggernaut that
rolled right over him. I had failed to recognize that our Fourth
Amendment translation included the semantics of Robinson as well
as Terry. Beguiled by the superficial holding of Terry, I thought
Mraz's testimony was favorable to us and thus did not hear the force
414 U.S. 218 (1973); see text accompanying notes 172-73.
"A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the
arrest requires no additional justification. It is the fact of the arrest which establishes the
authority to search." Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235.
188
See supra p. 1315. Mraz essentially made this statement three times within two
pages of the hearing transcript. Toward the end of the student's examination, Mraz
emphasized the point again: "As I stated previous [sic], every time we make a traffic stop
we treat the person as if, doesn't mean that they were, as if they were carrying a weapon,
for our safety." Hearing, supra note 32, at 13.
189
See Hearing, supra note 32, at 11; supra p. 1316 ("The reason Trooper Kiser patted him down is that, for his safety along with mine.... Basically the pat down was done
for the officer's safety, the troopers' safety, myself and Trooper Kiser.") I do not know
whether Mraz's emphatic testimony on these points was spontaneous or part of a standard police "script" for testifying on Terry stop issues.
186
187
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of his consistent claim that their actions were taken to protect "the
troopers' safety."' 190 ButJudge Collins heard Mraz's voice loud and
clear, so clearly that he extended the logic of Robinson to explicitly
reject the holding of Terry itself. Acknowledging that in this particular case the troopers "didn't have any reason to believe that the person was armed and presently dangerous," he nonetheless said that
Trooper Kiser acted reasonably in doing "a brief pat down to protect both himself and his partner" because Kiser's "first duty" was
to survive. It seemed that in the world created by the language of
Robinson, DujonJohnson had no right to ask for explanations orjustifications; his role was to submit.'19 Even worse, his effort to speak
the Terry-language of the Fourth Amendment to the police was
properly punishable as the wrong "attitude." The police had the
first, last, and only word.
C.

What the Client Said
1. A Respectable Person

When I reviewed the videotape of Johnson's interview before
the trial date, the judge's key phrase "attitude ticket" alerted me to a
correlative key word in Johnson's narrative: respect. He referred to
himself as a "respectable person" and made a careful distinction between respecting authority and not respecting the abuse of authority.192 I thus interpreted his narrative as being about the troopers'
failure to give him the respect he deserved and his appropriate refusal to accord them the respect they wrongfully demanded: a problem of attitudes.
Although our intent in shifting the case's language from substantive criminal law to that of the Fourth Amendment was to move
the focus from our client's alleged wrongdoing to that of the troopers, the Fourth Amendment language did not enable us to talk
meaningfully about what Johnson perceived as their "attitude problem." The central question at the suppression hearing was whether
190
191

See id.
Ifa citizen asked how... Robinson defined his place in a public world, he

would find that he is given no right to insist that the officer explain or
justify what he does; his role is simply to submit....

Robinson ...

stands

as a permanent rhetorical resource... [for] anyone who wishes to argue
that the police should have one blanket power or another as a matter
simply of "authority.".....

[Ilt introduces into our constitutional law a

principle of moral and intellectual brutality ....
[Robinson] expose[s] to a substantial, arbitrary, and unreviewable
exercise of police power every person who violates a substantial traffic
rule, which is in practice virtually everyone... [and] defines the arrested
person as an object of unregulated power ....
Talking About People, supra note 181, at 203, 205.
192

See supra p. 1331.

1992]

LA WYER AS TRANSLA TOR

1367

the troopers had particularized suspicion that Johnson was armed
and presently dangerous. Therefore, the probing spotlight we intended to shine on the troopers promptly reflected back onto our
client. And that refracted light had a very narrow focus. The physical space illuminated was a short, narrow corridor extending from
Johnson's car at the gas pump to the point where he first stopped
when Kiser called out to him. The temporal space was even smaller:
the minute or so from the time Kiser called out to the moment of
arrest. Left obscured in darkness were the images of the police car
"whipping in" to block Johnson's car, the swaggering Kiser pulling
on his black gloves as he stepped towardJohnson, and Mraz peering
into Johnson's car with a flashlight.
And the loss was even greater. By translating the event as a
"Terry-stop," we narrowed the issue to whether Kiser justifiably felt
a threat to his safety, making only two aspects of "what happened"
relevant: how our client appeared to the trooper and how the
trooper felt about that apparent behavior. The Fourth Amendment
story we sought to tell could be imagined as a scene played out on a
tiny, briefly illuminated stage on which only one isolated actor appeared (Johnson), who spoke and responded to an unseen person in
the wings (Kiser).1 93 How the troopers behaved, and how our client
felt about their behavior, were simply not part of the picture.
The impact of thejudge's "translation" of what happened, "attitude ticket," not only shocked me loose from the constraints of
viewing the events solely in Fourth Amendment terms but also suggested a new way of hearing and communicating our client's story.
The word "attitude" inherently assumes an interactive relationship.
One can not have an attitude in total isolation. The underlying
question always is, "attitude in relation to what?" Judging Johnson's attitude therefore required inclusion of the troopers' behavior,
opening the door for us to argue that our client's attitude was en193
I have slipped into a dramatic metaphor. The proscenium arch that separates
the stage from the audience in a typical theater is literally a frame and even a "real-life"
play must be a kind of translation. No matter how the playwright, actors, and director
strive for accuracy, they can not help but exclude much of what happened in the reenacted events and add their own interpretations.
One could make the same point by imagining our Fourth Amendment framing in
terms of a television camera. By using the report as our experiential foundation, we had
used the trooper's perspective for our camera angle. We presented only what he saw
without shifting the angle to our client's perspective, putting the trooper "on screen,"
or moving the camera to a third party perspective which would have placed both client
and trooper in the camera's frame. Like the play, even the apparently verbatim nature of
videotaping is a translation, because any perspective and focus necessarily involves exclusion, an exclusion that results in an interpretation of what happened. For example,
even if the camera is held from the vantage point of a disengaged third party, it cannot
then "see" exactly what either participant sees.

1368

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:1298

tirely appropriate in response to what the troopers were doing and
saying.
2.

Being Treated Diferently

The last meeting with our client on the day of trial had left me
with the gnawing doubt that much of his bitter frustration resulted
from our inability to understand enough of what he was saying to
translate well, that our "attitude problem" translation was incomplete. But it took months before I recognized the first of what were
to be many clues that my doubt was well-founded.
As I pondered this problem, the other comment Derrick Bell
made at the symposium came back to me. 19 4 This comment was as
casually confident, in its own way, as the judge's "attitude ticket"
description. He was sure that the "problem" was a very familiar
one: our client got in trouble simply because he was viewed as "an
uppity nigger."
Bell's comment suggested that the lack of respect was part of a
story of racial oppression. Of course, such a story would extend far
beyond the narrow confines even of our lifetimes. But that story, at
a minimum, began several minutes earlier and several hundred
yards outside the frame that my "respect" translation imposed:
back at the intersection of Hewitt and Washtenaw Avenues.
When I had replayed the videotape of the client interview in
reaction to Judge Collins's bench opinion, I had deliberately fastforwarded to the point where Johnson described what happened after he got out of his car at the gas station. I only studied this threeminute segment of the videotape (which is reprinted above),1 9 5 as I
prepared and presented the first draft of this article. Although I had
seen the entire tape shortly after it was made, I did not view the tape
from the beginning of the interview again until several months after
first presenting the draft article, when I prepared to use the tape for
a discussion of interviewing in my class on pre-trial practice. 19 6
I asked the students in watching the tape to apply the translation model by using one word or phrase to summarize from the client's description "what happened" and then asking themselves what
was necessarily left out from the client's story when that word or
phrase was used. Regardless of the phrase used by the various students (typically "illegal search"), almost all of them "left out" the
194
See supra text accompanying note 47 (discussing Bell's first comment on the Attitude Problem Case made at the University of Michigan Law Review's Legal Sloiytelling
Symposium).
195
See supra pp. 1322-24.
196
I was willing to play a longer sequence because I had a captive audience for a
longer period and I wanted my students to see how the interview began and developed.
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following rather long narrative about Johnson's trouble with the
clutch in his car-a part of the videotape that I had literally omitted
up to then by my selective viewing and which of course I have left
out of the story I have told you so far:
Cl

I was having problems with the clutch; I had run
down on hydraulic oil. And when I went shopping
previously and [inaudible] observed I needed some
gas, I went shopping for some oil because every time
I went to a stop light, you know, the clutch, I
couldn't shift it, so I had to turn it off, in order to
shift it.
St
Wait. You had to turn the car off to...
Cl
You see, I was having problems with my clutch.
St
Right.
Cl
The significance will, will develop as I [inaudible].
Well, I had problems with the clutch. I know at the
time it was short of hydraulic oil. I'm not a
mechanic. Uh, I went to Meijer's for the shopping
and went to the auto department and asked them,
well I've got this problem, what can I do?
St
Was this, this right before ...
Cl
Right before I realized I needed gas.
St
Are they open 24 hours?
Cl
Yes, they most certainly are.
Other St Oh yeh!
St
I didn't know that - so that's good to know.
Cl
I can't recall the cashier's name but I know his face
so if I went back, he probably... He explained to
me that I need, um, hydraulic oil. The problem with
the clutch was that it would stick. I couldn't shift. In
order to shift the gear, I would have to turn the
engine off - that way I wouldn't damage it. So after
telling me some hydraulic oil - I bought some,
purchased some. And I said... I got into the car
and [inaudible] the gas. I said, what I'll do, I'll put
this in when I pump my gas. So I proceeded to the
gas station on Hewitt and Washtenaw. And there
was a flashing red light. I turned the car off.
St
Right.
Cl
Because I couldn't slow down and shift. Turned the
car off. Put it in first. Crossed the street and then
went on. There wasn't any traffic coming.
St
So, did you come to a complete stop?
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Came to a complete stop. Lights stayed on and

everything, though.
The failure to pay attention to this part of the interview is particularly striking because Johnson himself emphasized that the clutch
problem's significance "would develop" as he told the whole story.
When I pre-viewed the tape before class, I had mentally skipped
over the clutch story much as I had done earlier by fast-forwarding
the machine. However, as I watched the tape again with my students in class, I suddenly "saw" for the first time why the clutch
problem was significant to Johnson and why generally the moments
before our client entered the station, which I had edited out, might in
fact be indispensable to a faithful translation of Johnson's story.
The problem with the clutch was important to Johnson because
it made him certain that he had come to a full stop at the intersection. Because the clutch was "acting up," he needed to stop and
turn off the engine in order to shift gears. Thus, when Trooper Kiser approached him at the gas station, Johnson apparently felt sure
that the trooper could not have thought, even mistakenly, that he
had run the flashing red light. Given that certainty, what was the
most likely explanation in Johnson's mind for the stop?
Trooper Mraz testified that Johnson had said that night "the
only reason that we stopped him was because he was black."' 19 7 Indeed, Mraz listed this statement as the first "reason" when asked
what our client had done to be a "disorderly person." Judge Collins
clearly thought our client was making this claim and rejected it, saying "they didn't just see a black man in a gas station and say oh
there's a black man in the gas station, let's go and arrest him.., that
didn't happen."1 9 8 Yet at no point during the entire 50 minute initial interview, nor later during our representation, did Dujon Johnson tell us that he thought the trooper stopped him because he was
black or otherwise claim that their actions were motivated by racism.
Indeed, he did not even volunteer the information that the troopers
were white; the students asked that question on their own initiative.
I believe that Judge Collins introduced the actual word "racism"
first into the language of the case when he described our client as
"hollering racism" in his exchange with the troopers. 199 I find it
telling that the two-page statement of facts written by the students
after the initial interview not only did not mention a possible issue
of racism, but also did not even indicate that our client was black.
As best as I can recall, I had from the outset a common-sense
impression that what happened that night was a "racial incident,"
197
198
199

See Hearing, supra note 32, at 15; supra p. 1317.
See Hearing, supra note 32, at 27; supra p. 1320.
See Hearing, supra note 32, at 27; supra p. 1320.
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but as a lawyer I did not talk about "the case" that way, and therefore
I ceased to think in terms of racial issues as our various translations
shaped and limited our shifting understanding of what was legally
relevant. The Fourth Amendment theory seemed race neutral, and
even our "attitude problem" trial strategy did not (at least explic20 0
itly) present Johnson's demand for answers in racial terms.
But my long-overdue recognition ofJohnson's emphasis on why
he was stopped in the first place forced me to face the possibility
that we needed to include in our representation ofJohnson a legal
translation of the statement, "I was stopped because I was black."
Once I began trying such a translation, I also started noticing other
elements that I had previously excluded from the descriptions of
events given by the troopers, prosecutor, and judge. Indeed, as I
re-read the incident report in this new light, I found myself thinking
that I might have mistranslated the police report as much as our
client's narrative.
My initial reaction to reading the report had been that, despite
its title, it was not a story about arresting a "disorderly person," but
rather the account of a Terry-stop that went awry, turning into a pretext arrest. This translation not only caused me to ignore much of
my client's narrative; it also excluded the first page and a half of the
report itself by beginning the story afterJohnson exited his car. Because the new translation focused on why Johnson was stopped in
the first place, rather than simply on what happened after the stop, I
needed to examine the reasons given in the report for the stop.
Once I shifted my attention, I noticed immediately that the report itself began by identifying the "primary incident" as occurring
at the intersection; the events at the gas station were described as
"secondary." Given this clue, I soon realized that the language of
the entire report was that of routine traffic regulation, not crime detection and enforcement. 20 1 Johnson was referred to, not as "suspect," but as "Driver." The description of events at the gas station
20 2
was prefaced with the phrase, "a subsequent traffic stop ensued."
The critical paragraph, "Cause for Arrest," began with the words,
''upon continuing the normal course of action on this traffic
stop."

2 03

See supra at pp. 1326-27.
See POLICE REPORT, supra note 16. In analyzing narrative structure in plea bargaining, Maynard emphasizes the importance of "the police report as a socially constructed "documentary reality" . . . one that aims for particular readings in contexts
other than that in which it was written." Douglas W. Maynard, Narratives and Narrative
200
201

Structure in Plea Bargaining,in LANGUAGE IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 131, at 65,

80.
202

POLICE REPORT, supra note 16, at 1.

203

Id. at 2.
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Because we thought we had a strong argument that Trooper
Kiser had exceeded the proper scope of a traffic stop when he
sought to conduct a pat-down search, we never contested the powerful and pervasive claim implicit in the report that what happened
was "incident to" a routine traffic stop. But as I reread the report, I
suddenly recalled other words Johnson said at our post-dismissal
meeting: "I'm not trying to put my story against their story.
They're trying to paint a picture and I'm trying to destroy it." What
was the "picture" Johnson was trying to destroy? Probably not the
pretext that grounds for a Terry frisk existed; that was more like putting our story against their story, and accepting the basic premise, as
did the judge, that the police had legitimate reasons to be interrogating Johnson in the first place. Perhaps Johnson wanted to destroy that basic premise.
Because I did not realize the force of the language describing
what happened as a "routine traffic stop," I also failed to appreciate
the significance of the word "ticket" when I seized upon Judge Collins's phrase "attitude ticket." Instead, I just focused on the word
"attitude." But the "ticket" aspect of his translation set us up for
the devastating day of trial by trivializing what happened. What we
viewed as criminal prosecution, and what Johnson viewed as a serious assault on his dignity, the troopers, the prosecutor, and the
judge viewed as a ticket.
What were the implications of translating what happened as a
ticket? First, it continued the primacy of the "routine traffic stop,"
making the interrogation, search and arrest "incident" to a traffic
ticket. Second, it radically decreased the importance of what was at
stake. Citizens are not expected to seriously contest tickets. They
either pay them or ignore them. Because this was just a ticket, our
efforts to convert the criminal procedure into a re-enactment of the
event, a courtroom drama that would ritually restore Johnson's dignity, were not taken seriously. 20 4 The prosector had an irrefutable

response: this is not worth my time. The final, authoritative description of "what happened" was spoken in chorus by the prosecutor and judge: "this is a $50 attitude ticket." The initial affront to
our client's sense of respect was thus repeated in the guise of resolving the case in his favor.
As these implications of accepting the "routine traffic stop"
characterization sank in, I began looking harder for ways to accomplish Johnson's goal of destroying the whole picture. As a result, I
204
Maynard's study of plea bargaining in a California misdemeanor court has led
him to conclude that such judicial processes are essentially bureaucratic, that defendants
are treated "as objects in [an] assembly-line," and that the courtroom ritual is structured
so as to be "status degrading for defendants." MAYNARD, supra note 115, at 30, 48.
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noticed a number of other details that were excluded from our prior
translations:
The car: Johnson was driving a 1977 Triumph two-door convertible, no doubt a very sporty-looking car despite its age.
The time: The events took place at 4:30 a.m., a time when
police might be particularly suspicious of criminal activity. 20 5
The clothes: Johnson was still wearing his jogging clothes.
The location: the intersection was located near the county
country club in a fairly affluent white suburban area between Ypsilanti and Ann Arbor, at some distance from the "poor black" part
of Ypsilanti.
The disposition of the traffic ticket: the ticket for running the
flashing light was dismissed when neither trooper showed up for
the scheduled court date.
I also recalled another fact we had largely ignored: Johnson's
insistence, contrary to the report, that the troopers had not told him
20 6
that he had run a red light when they stopped him.
These details, combined with Johnson's certainty that he had
made a full stop, suggested that the troopers were engaged in what
might be euphemistically called "good police work." 20 7 They saw
someone who fit their own profile of a drug dealer or burglar and
decided to investigate to see what might "turn up." The fact that
the person was black might have been an important reason why the
profile "fit," both because he was "out of place" in a white part of
town in the middle of the night, and because of stereotypes about
20 8
the criminal propensities of blacks, especially young black men.
205 Johnson told us he was out so late because he had worked an evening shift, went
running after work, stopped at a relative's house in Ypsilanti to shower and change, and
then did some shopping at a 24-hour grocery store before beginning to head home for
Detroit.
206
Supra, text following note 27.
207
One survey of police officers revealed that 80% believed the need to deter crime
by an aggressive police presence justified rigorous stop-and-question tactics, even if
those tactics exceeded the letter of the law. Dan Stormer & Paul Bernstein, The Impact of
Kolender v. Lawson on Law Enforcement and Minority Groups, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
105, 115 n.56 (1984).
208
"Studies show... that police officers perceive blacks as more likely to engage in
criminal activity or to be armed and dangerous. When minorities are found outside
minority neighborhoods, race may become the principal basis for an officer's suspicion."
Id. at 116 (citations omitted).
Spend an evening on patrol with Mobile Reserve officers Dick Burgess, John Frank or John Winter and watch them stop one car after another. They are especially interested in cars with two or more young
black males, or in rental cars with out-of-state plates, which they say can
be a telltale sign of a drug car. It is all constitutional, according to the
police lawyers. 'Reasonable suspicion,' they say.
John M. McGuire, Reasonable Suspicion: The Law 's on Their Side, ST. Louis POsT-DISPATCH,
July 9, 1991, at ID, 4D.
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From this perspective, the fact that this person objected to a search
of his car and person only confirmed their hunch, or in the words of
Trooper Mraz, "[brought] up [their] intensity level a little bit
higher." 20 9 Thus the motive for a pretext arrest changed from the
grounds expressed by the judge at the suppression hearing"-an
anxiety over personal safety-to a deliberate plan to search for evidence of some unknown crime based largely on the race of the
suspect.
My new focus on why the troopers stopped Johnson revealed
another detail in the police report that we had ignored before. On
the first page of his report, Trooper Kiser stated that, as they "pursued" the car after it went through the intersection, he "observed
driver of vehicle to look over at patrol unit ....

Vehicle then made

an abrupt left turn into the TOTAL gas station."2 10 This detail acquired significance for three different translations of what happened. From the perspective of the police report, Trooper Kiser's
observation apparently suggested to him that the driver was attempting to evade pursuit, thus providing the first articulated basis
for suspecting the driver of criminal activity. According to Johnson,
he planned to stop for gas before he reached the intersection and,
far from pulling in to evade pursuit, was not even aware of the
troopers until he got out of his car. Combining these facts with
what I was now assuming to be Johnson's belief that there was no
nonracial reason for stopping him, Kiser's "observation" did not
translate into reasonable suspicion, but rather into either hypersensitivity because the driver was black or an after-the-fact lie made up
to justify his actions at the station. However, this detail in the report
took on greatest significance for the judge's translation of what happened. Although we had made no assertion in our brief that what
happened was racially motivated, the judge obviously assumed that
was Johnson's view. His confident rejection of that view was critical
to his conclusion that what happened was a justified attitude ticket.
His logic was: (a) the officers had justification to stop the vehicle,
(b) they "didn't just see a black man in a gas station and say... let's
go and arrest him," and (c) "once having stopped him, he was the
author of his own problems." 2 11 Of course for purposes of the suppression motion we had conceded the first premise of Judge Collins's argument. However, our focus on the gas station portion of
the report led us to miss an important admission in the report that
undermined the judge's second premise. The judge said:
209
210
211

See Hearing, supra note 32, at 11; supra text accompanying note 37.
POLICE REPORT, supra note 16, at 1.
See Hearing, supra note 32, at 27; supra text accompanying note 40.
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I'm sure that these two officers had no clue when they saw this
person run the red light, whether he was black or white or brown
or red or green or any other color. They just didn't know and so
his shoulder and
the person was walking around with a chip on2 12
these officers were the object of that behavior.
Judge Collins obviously assumed that the troopers saw only a car
and not the driver within it, yet Trooper Kiser's acute observation
that the driver "looked over at patrol unit" certainly suggested, to
the contrary, that he got a good look at Johnson as the car passed
through the intersection.
By eliminating race from our translation of what happened, we
not only excluded a possible alternative explanation for the troopers' actions, we also probably distorted Johnson's motivations. Our
story of what happened portrayed Johnson as a person with a lawyer's concern for the technicalities of the law, asking the police to
justify their investigative actions in terms of the Fourth Amendment.
In telling this story we did not invent elements; our client really did
report to us that he referred to Supreme Court precedent in responding to the troopers' demand to submit to a pat-down
search. 2 13 But by framing outJohnson's possible larger concern, we
may have presented a very distorted and ultimately rather unsympathetic picture of our client. 2 14 What the judge "saw" were two state
troopers just trying to do their jobs, whose patience was exhausted
2 15
by a guy who was "too smart for his own good."
Hearing, supra note 32, at 28; supra text accompanying note 40 (emphasis added).
See Initial Interview, supra text accompanying note 44.
But see Johnson's own explanation for why he did not raise the issue of racism,
infra note 248 and accompanying text.
215
During the fall of 1991, Gerald Early, a black professor at Washington University, was subjected to a Teny stop at a suburban St. Louis shopping mall because a shopkeeper had called the police when he saw Early window shopping while waiting for his
wife to come out of a meeting. In an Op-Ed article entitled, "Living in Fear of Fear,"
Early responded to the view that the shopkeeper's fear was reasonable and that the police officer was "only doing his job":
This is what happens when one becomes a category instead of a person.
Life takes on all the depressing dimensions of something vaguely yet ominously totalitarian because, if one is at the caprice of fearful whites because of one's skin color, then one is always at the mercy of something
that one can neither defend against nor deny....
[When] I received calls and expressions of support from blacks ...
almost always they were accompanied by a story of some similar indignity
that they themselves had suffered and how they were unable to get it publicized because they were not "distinguished university professors."
They were ordinary people (of course I am no less ordinary) for whom
my interrogation and demand for apology became all the interrogations
they had ever endured because some white thought them "suspicious" or
in the wrong place at the wrong time.
212
213
214

[T]here is a far more important principle at stake than concern for
the shopkeeper's security: In order to have a free society, a democratic
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In thinking about the way that our translations of Johnson's
story erased his racial identity, I am reminded of hearing Patricia
Williams, a black law professor, tell her experience of having her
race literally edited out of an article she had submitted to a law review. 2 16 The article as submitted began with a personal account of
being denied entrance to a New York City boutique when she
pressed her "brown face" to the window of the locked door.2 1 7 Her
rage when the clerk within looked at her and said, "We're closed"
(at one o'clock in the afternoon) became the springboard for the
rest of the article. 218 The editors deleted the "brown" from her
that their editorial policy barred descriptions of
"face," explaining
"physiognomy.- 2 1 9 She reported that, "Ultimately, I did convince
the editors that mention of my race was central to the whole sense of
the subsequent text; that my story became one of extreme paranoia
without the information that I am black." '2 20 It seems obvious that
the reader needed to know that Williams was black to appreciate her
rage and to understand its application to her article, but as she
pointed out, it was "the blind application of principles of neutrality,
through the device of omission [that acted] ... to make me look
crazy."
Had we, through a similar blind application of legal language,
acted to make our client look paranoid, crazy? How much blame did
we share for Judge Collins's judgment that our client was "acting
strange and unusual" and "was walking around with a chip on his
22
shoulder"? 1
Of course even ifJudge Collins believed that the troopers could
tell that Johnson was black when they first saw him at the intersection, he apparently still would have rejected a claim that their actions were racially motivated. In a very telling remark, the judge
stated: "the fact that one person is black and the other is caucasian
does not make it [a] racial incident." 22 2 At one level, of course the
society, everyone must be permitted equal and free access to public
spaces so long as he or she is engaged in publicly acceptable behavior.
To understand and accept democracy is to understand and accept the risk
implicit in this principle, for no one forfeits his or her right to unscrutinized and unquestioned public access or the presumption of innocence
in his or her actions upon mere nervous suspicion.
Gerald Early, Living in Fear of Fear,ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, November 27, 1991, at 3C.
216
This story is told in PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS:
DIARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR ch. 3 (1991).
217
218
219
220
221
222

Id. at 44.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 47.
Id.

See Hearing, supra note 32, at 27, 28; supra text accompanying note 40.
See Hearing, supra note 32, at 27; supra text accompanying note 40. It is not

accidental that the judge used the singular when describing "the other" as caucasian
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difference in race makes the incident "racial." What Judge Collins
seemed to mean was that the fact that Trooper Kiser was white did
not automatically mean that his conduct toward a black was racist.
Further, Judge Collins implied that our client had wrongly assumed
that the conduct was racist simply because the trooper was white:
"the person was walking around with a chip on his shoulder and
these officers were the object of that behavior. ' 223 If there was any
racial aspect to the incident, the source of the tension was entirely
Johnson himself. "He was the author of his own problems," the
224
judge ruled.
Up to this point our failure to argue that our client was the victim of racism may have not appeared really a problem of translation.
Rather the cause seemed to have been due to our client's failure to
raise this claim to us directly and our distraction from evidence
pointing toward such a claim by our preoccupation with other legal
theories. The translation metaphor does, however, suggest why we
were so easily distracted. While one is speaking a language, its limitations seem so natural that they are invisible. At the outset of our
representation, I seized upon the details of the frisk in the police
report in large part because I could talk about them easily in legal
language. Facts that did not translate well were excluded as irrelevant in a way that seemed perfectly natural and appropriate to us.
Perhaps use of the translation metaphor might have alerted us
to the narrowness of our Fourth Amendment account of what happened that night and prompted us to follow up on the obvious
clues; we might have asked Johnson directly if he thought race was
an issue and, if so, in what ways. An investigation might have resulted that could have produced further evidence that the troopers'
actions were racist. 2 25 But the translation metaphor also suggests
that a more profound problem existed than attention to evidentiary
proof would solve-a problem that might explain Judge Collins's
thus omitting reference to Trooper Mraz. My new sensitivity to the racial overtones of
the case caused me to remember that the judge placed considerable emphasis at the first
hearing on that fact that Trooper Mraz was Native American. He apparently was making the common, but erroneous, assumption that the presence of a nonwhite person
automatically purges a white-dominated enterprise of any potential racism. He further
made the mistake of equating all persons of color, ignoring the obvious fact that there
can be racism between different nonwhite groups.
223
See Hearing, supra note 32, at 28; supra text accompanying note 40.
224
See Hearing, supra note 32, at 27; supra text accompanying note 40.
225
We did file a motion seeking access to the personnel records of Kiser and Mraz
to find out if there had been any complaints or discipline. Judge Collins denied the
motion out of hand and, unfortunately, discovery rights in Michigan criminal proceedings were quite limited. But we could have taken other steps (e.g., trying to find former
black employees of the state patrol troop who might have confided in us, talking with
public defenders or local community leaders who might know the troopers' reputation,
and seeking records under the state freedom of information act).
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vigorous rejection of a claim of racism and our client's failure to
raise the claim with us.
Johnson might have failed to entrust us with his belief that what
happened that night was a "racial incident," because he anticipated
the same skepticism from us that his assertion received from the
troopers and Judge Collins. When a white person hears a black person use a word like "racist," the response is often a strong defensive
reaction that implicitly says to the black person, "prove it!" And the
standards of proof are those white people are comfortable with: evidence of conscious racial animus, intent to harm and degrade.
The possibility of such narrow meaning for the word "racist"
has caused some scholars to introduce a new word, "racialist," to
describe judgments and actions controlled by racial stereotypes
without adopting an accusatory tone. 22 6 Peggy Davis explains how
racial stereotypes produce countless acts of "microaggression" by
whites against blacks under circumstances where whites will vigorously deny the influence of race:
[Microagressions] "are subtle, stunning, often automatic, and
non-verbal exchanges which are 'put downs' of blacks by offenders." Psychiatrists who have studied black populations view them
as "incessant and cumulative" assaults on black self-esteem....
Management of these assaults is a preoccupying activity, simultaneously necessary to and disruptive of black adaptation.... The
microaggressive acts that characterize interracial encounters are
carried out in "automatic, preconscious, or unconscious fashion"
' 2 27
and "stem from the mental attitude of presumed superiority.
Because racial prejudice is now widely treated as socially unacceptable, whites are motivated to deny that they are influenced by racial
feelings. As a result, "Anti-black attitudes persist in a climate of denial. The denial and the persistence are related. It is difficult to
change an attitude that is unacknowledged. ' 2 28 Kiser's disrespectful, swaggering attitude reported by Johnson can be seen as just
such an example of microaggression and Kiser's insistence that he
"treats everybody that way" part of the same system of behavior. 22 9
See, e.g., Peggy C. Davis, Law as Microagression, 98 YALE LJ. 1559, 1579 (1989).
She attributes invention of the term to Stephen Carter, id. at 1570 n.51; see Stephen L.
Carter, When Victims Happen to Be Black, 97 YALE LJ. 420, 443 (1988).
227
Davis, supra note 226, at 1565, 1566 (citations omitted).
228 Id. at 1565.
229
When Patricia Williams, see supra notes 216-20 and accompanying text, and infra
note 237, read a draft of this article, she told me that she was particularly offended by
Kiser's use of the word "everybody." Placing herself in Johnson's place, she resisted
Kiser's assumed authority to include her in a single, undifferentiated mass of people
defined by him. Presumably "everybody" to Kiser was everyone he deals with as a police
officer regardless of race, gender, age, or class. (Angela Harris lodged a similar objection against the presumptive assertion by the white male authors of the Declaration of
226
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At the conclusion of one of my presentations of this article in
draft form, a white person attending the presentation identified
himself as a former police officer (and prosecutor) who now was a
lawyer in private practice (and who did substantial criminal defense
work). He said that our client's effort to receive courteous answers
from the police officers was doomed to failure because the police
are trained from the academy to take command of situations like the
one that night. By issuing only orders, not answers, the police officer creates a show of authority that prevents resort to potentially
deadly force by either suspect or officer. From this perspective, the
troopers conduct was simply sound, standard operating
23 0
procedure.
But what happens when the "everybody" subjected to this standard procedure is differentiated by race? Davis tells us that the most
potent form of microaggression is the long-established American
color-caste behavior described as "deference" by scholars of racism
more than fifty years ago:
The most striking form of.

.

. "caste behavior" is deference, the

respectful yielding exhibited by the Negroes in their contacts with
whites. According to the dogma, and to a large extent actually,
the behavior of both Negroes and white people must be such as to
indicate that the two are socially distinct and that the Negro is
1
subordinate. 23
Derrick Bell made the point more succinctly when he used the key
phrase, "uppity nigger," to tell me what the Johnson case was "re2
ally" about.

32

Independence when they begin the document with the words "We the People." Angela
P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in FeministLegal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 582 (1990)).
The problem is not just that Kiser might in fact not treat everybody the same by the
standard of observable behavior, but that white and black Americans are not the same
"everybody." AsJohnson reported saying to Kiser that night, Kiser probably would not
have approached a white, apparently middle-class suburbanite, with the opening phrase,
"Hey yo," but even if he addressed all stopped motorists that way, the impact might be
different on black persons. Williams saw in the "Hey, yo" expression a deliberate caricature of what a white person understands to be black dialect, a form of microaggression
she encounters frequently.
230
For an eloquent response to this point, see Early, supra note 215.
231
Davis, supra note 227, at 1567 (quoting ALLISON DAVIS ET AL., DEEP Soutns 22-23
(1941); see also Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 14, at 1288 ("Racism ... is ritual assertion of supremacy .... It is performed largely unconsciously .... Racism seems right,
customary and inoffensive to those engaged in it .... ").
232
See supra text accompanying note 194. In 1990 the Massachusetts Attorney General issued a report on practices of the Boston Police Department in response to complaints of racism. Among the many incidents catalogued in that report are the following
that parallel the Johnson case:
[A] black male taxicab driver was driving home in his own car when a
police cruiser pulled him over and frisked him. When the taxicab driver
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James Boyd White, in commenting on the way that the Robinson
decision treated the arrested suspect as an object "belonging to the
police" rather than as a person with a voice, 23 3 has said that it reminds him of the way the Supreme Court in the Dred Scott case 23 4
denied Scott the right to speak in court as a plaintiff by turning him
into a piece of property, and of the way the 1850 Fugitive Slave
Act 23 5 prohibited an alleged slave from testifying in the very pro-

ceeding intended to determine whether the person was indeed a
slave.2 36 It seems obvious that there is a difference between treating

a black American as if he were property and treating a white American in "the same way." But how does one make this point in legal
language? 23 7 In Fourth Amendment terms, Johnson was simply
"Everyman"; his Fourth Amendment rights were supposedly no
greater nor less because he was black. But what if the whole world
created by our current Fourth Amendment language was inherently
racist? Does the language of Robinson become racist whenever it is
spoken by a white officer to a black citizen, creating a vicious cycle
seeming to lead inevitably to the consequences suffered by Dujon
23 8
Johnson?
asked why, he was arrested for disorderly conduct. The charge was eventually dismissed.
A 20 year-old black man reported that .

.

. two police officers ap-

proached him while he was parked outside a local high school waiting to
pick up a friend. The officers searched his car. When he asked a question
he was told to "shut the fuck up."
A 30 year-old black man ... was stopped while driving in Boston with a
friend. An officer told him, " 'Get out of the motherfucking jeep and
don't let me have to tell you twice.' When the [man] said, 'Excuse me?',
the officer reportedly responded, 'Oh, you're a fucking tough guy. Give
me your registration.' The [man] was taken from the jeep, handcuffed,
and placed in the police cruiser.
Report of the Attorney General's Civil Rights Division on Boston Police Department
Practices (Dec. 18, 1990) at 21, 22, 23, quoted in Tracey Maclin, Black and Blue Encounters:-SomePreliminary Thoughts About FourthAmendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26
VAL. L. REV. 243, 251-52 (1991).
233
WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION, supra note 65, at 195.

Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
Federal Fugitive Slave Act, Ch. 60, Sec. 6, 9 Stat. 462, 463 (1850) ("In no trial or
hearing under this act shall the testimony of such alleged fugitive be admitted into evidence .... ").
236 WHITE, supra note 65, at 195.
237 See Patricia Williams' meditation on this point. PATRICIA WILLIAMS, On Being
234

235

Property, in WILLIAMS, supra note 216, at 216.

[The police officers] are especially interested in cars with two or more
young black males....
A curious thing happens when some cars are stopped. Without being asked, some of the male occupants get out, unhitch their belt buckles
and place their hands on the roof of the car-a frisk procedure they've
obviously been through before.
McGuire, supra note 208, at ID.
In their own eyes, officers stop no one except for good cause. They expect detainees to recognize that they have been detained for good reason
238
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Was the context that made my client's experience understandable as a "racial incident" as invisible to me, the student attorneys,
and the white judge as the air we breathed? How then could I understand Johnson well enough to even attempt to translate his story
to other white Americans? What in my own experience could I possibly draw upon? Many times I approached this question in writing
this Article: my fingers grew still on the computer keyboard, and I
eventually moved to a different part of the Article. But in reviewing
my notes of that painful meeting with Johnson on the day the case
was dismissed I may have found a possible bridge: my own experience of representing Dujon Johnson.
This idea was not my own; Johnson himself suggested it. Johnson made an explicit analogy between the way we treated him and
the way he was treated by Trooper Kiser. He said, "The way you
guys talk to me and approach me-it's a little like the way Trooper
Kiser approached me." At the time and for months thereafter I did
not think about those comments, perhaps because I did not understand them, perhaps because it was too painful to try and understand them.
The most obvious common element between our representation and Johnson's treatment at the hands of Trooper Kiser seemed
to be that he did not feel he was treated as an adult. 23 9 More subtle
was the similarity between our reaction to what Johnson was saying
and the reaction he received from Trooper Kiser andJudge Collins.
Naturally, we were defensive, saying that we certainly did not intend
to treat him differently or like a child. The students went further
and asserted confidently that they would not have treated him any
differently if he were white-that if they had been rude or impatient,
it was just their personalities, not him. Only when I was deep into
writing this article did I notice the uncanny way that this interchange
echoed the end of the story Johnson told during the initial
interview:
I told him [Trooper Kiser] that... I didn't appreciate you treating
me like I was a sixteen-year old kid, which obviously I am not. He

and to defer politely to authority. However, based on their prejudices,
police officers are more likely to stop minorities, and minorities are less
likely to respond with deference because of their hostility toward police.
An officer will view lack of cooperation as an indication of guilt, thereby
justifying an arrest.
Stormer & Bernstein, supra note 207, at 117.
239
Compare Johnson's post-dismissal statement that during our representation he
felt that he was not an adult, supra p. 1329, with his comment to Trooper Kiser that he
did not appreciate being treated like a sixteen-year old, infra text accompanying note
240.
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then that "I treat everybody like that." "Well I don't

240
think you do, personally."

Perhaps Johnson realized the risk that, like Trooper Kiser and
Judge Collins, we might interpret his complaints about being
treated differently as a strong accusation of being racist, "racist" as
the word is understood by white Americans. Recognizing the gap,
he told us, "I never said you were racist." Instead, he urged us to
admit that we were different from him 241 and therefore were necessarily going to treat him differently. He asked that we be sensitive to
2 42
the differences and adjust what we said and did accordingly.
What he said was something very close to the following words:
What's wrong with realizing that different people have different
needs? You wouldn't say "Hi" to someone you know doesn't
speak English. You wouldn't say, "let's run over to the store," to
someone who doesn't have legs. If both parties are making an
effort, there eventually will be a consensus about how to deal with
the solution, about how to communicate.
Rereading these words in my notes, it finally, belatedly occurred to me that at that last meeting, it was perhaps our client who
was the translator, not us. He was right: by being trapped in my
assurance as a lawyer and professor that I knew the answers, I could
not be a student, could not learn. Perhaps only if the humiliation of
that encounter matures into some humility can I begin to appreciate
our client's skill and sensitivity in trying to bridge a terrible gap.
I originally ended this Article here by quoting Patricia Williams's description of the dilemma she feels in her separation from
white Americans: "[the distance] is marked by an emptiness in myself, ...

[which] is reiterated by a hole in language, by a gap in the

law .... "243 Williams goes on, though, to move from this sense of
emptiness to conclude in hope that we can achieve a nonracist sensibility through the hard work of boundary-crossing in which a person
somehow can see multiple perspectives simultaneously. 24 4 In that
earlier draft I concluded with regret that I could not move further
because Dujon Johnson was no longer my client and, therefore, I
could not ask him to express in his own language his understanding
of how what happened was a "racial incident." Nor could I collaborate with him in reworking my legal language to express that
understanding.
240
241
242

Initial Interview, supra note 44.
Some of the comments printed supra pp. 1329-30 were made in this context.
At one point he said, "I'm not sure you guys are as careful about what you say as

I am."
243 Patricia T. Williams, The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay on Formal Equal Opportunity, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 2128, 2151 (1989).
244
Id.; cf Delgado, Storytelling, supra note 14; Matsuda, supra note 14.
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However, as I mentioned above, through no virtue of my own,
Dujon Johnson contacted me during the late spring of 1991 on his
own initiative and has since reviewed this Article and provided his
own comments. I therefore conclude differently, by relating the dialogue between us, striving to make the last words of this Article not
only mine but also those of Dujon Johnson.
V
LAST WORDS

In May 1991 I unexpectedly received a letter from DujonJohnson which read in part as follows:
Dear Clark,
It has been quite some time since I've been in contact with
you (July 3rd, 1989), and I thought I would drop you a short letter
to say all is well.... I appreciate all that you did for me concerning my experience with the Michigan State Troopers. I can only
wonder what might have happened without your (and the Univ. of
Michigan Legal Clinic) assistance. Did you ever write the article
concerning lawyer-client relationships for a law review? If so, I
would like to read it....
I wrote back, enclosing the then-current draft of this Article
(which did not include Parts II and III), along with a letter asking for
his comments in general and responses to a number of specific
questions. He responded, first with a telephone call, and then with a
detailed letter.
The first of several surprises I experienced came in his response
to this question:
Although I recall your giving me permission to write about your
case, in the more recent drafts of the Article I have used fictional
names because of concern that I may be revealing more private
information than you would be comfortable with. In some ways I
regret this change, because it diminishes the "true story" force of
the narrative. Please let me know whether you would like to be
identified or want me to continue to use fictional names.
When Johnson called me, he said not only did I have his permission
24 5
to use his real name, he insisted that I do so. He said:

If my name is not used I would be a non-person again. [During
the case] I was talked over; I was talked through. [In the version
of the Article sent to him] I still don't exist. I want to be identi-

245

I am relying on almost verbatim notes taken during the telephone conversation.
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fled. This anonymity has to end somewhere; I was anonymous in
24 6
the courtroom.

In what I thought might have been an excess of concern for Johnson's feelings and for the confidentiality of his communications, I
had replaced his real name (and the names of the locations and
other actors) with pseudonyms. It had never occurred to me (nor
do I think would it occur to most attorneys) that my client might be
upset by this removal of his identity from a recounting of "his"
case-a striking example of apparent paternalism operating below
the threshold of awareness.
I will present Johnson's other comments by alternating excerpts
from my questions with an edited version of his written responses.
Cunningham
I leave out of the article the fact that you did not, in fact, prepare
to cross-examine Kiser. 24 7 My recollection is that your car broke
down on the day you planned to come to Ann Arbor to prepare.
What, if anything, would you like me to say about this fact? What
other reasons, if any, were there for the failure of our plan to have
you share in the trial? What could have been done differently to
make the plan work? (One obvious possibility is that we could
have come to Detroit to work on the preparation.)
Johnson
I believe that the strategy to cross-examine Kiser was planned, not
the content itself. We did not develop it further than talking strategy. I would have, and could have prepared to cross-examine Kiser. I believe that counsel waited too far into the legal process to
allow me to become involved, thus any attempts to involve me
seriously into my case (with my personal responsibilities in mind)
would have been rushing it too fast. I do, however, agree that
some attempt to work with me in Detroit could not only have been
more convenient, but would have shown me that my counsel understood the economical, social constraints that I felt I had in
dealing with the legal system. The failure of my student-attorneys
and yourself to make such an attempt showed me that it was too
inconvenient (or unimportant) to leave the ivory tower(s) of Ann
Arbor. No one really asked me what I wanted or how I wanted to
proceed until long after (and in some cases after) the legal proceedings were underway.

246
Johnson's seemingly effortless skill at metaphoric extension of key words is displayed in these comments; the transition from the anonymity of "the client" in the earlier draft of this article to his anonymity in the case is apt and powerful.
247
I also omitted what may seem to some readers this important fact from the case
narrative in Part I because I wanted it to be interpreted at this point, in the context of
Johnson's comment.
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Cunningham
Have I done a fair job of presenting what you said to us after the
case was dismissed? Have I left out important things that were
said? Are there thoughts and feelings you remember from that
meeting that you did not express that you would like me to know
about now?
Johnson
More or less. What I said, or meant to imply is that as white educated men (or as two law students), the three of you would never
have to worry about finding employment or about providing for
your families. This society is geared toward and protected by
white men. No matter what the outcome of my case, no one's life
would be changed. In fact, in a matter of time this would be forgotten by the attorneys themselves. I dealt with a situation which
probably led to me losing my job at the University of Michigan,
the loss of respect and dignity in my arrest, and now I was
threatened with the very real and near prospect of being convicted. The very fact that I was involved in the legal proceedings,
as I saw it, was a presumption of guilt (I have the two requirements: I was a person of color, and I didn't know my place.) This
then was a fight of survival for whatever control I had left. How
can I not have control of my life and still have goals, dreams, and
ambitions? How could I be a husband? And father? How would
my wife view me? Yes, these were things that were pressing
against my mind when I referred to control over one's life. I felt
very emasculated, less than a man.
Cunningham
Am I right in thinking that you did not tell us in our various meetings that you thought you were stopped because you were black?
If you did tell us, can you remember when and how you told us
and what our reaction was? If you did not tell us, did you think
nonetheless that Kiser's actions were racially motivated? If you
thought so, why did you not say so explicitly to us? (I have some
guesses as to the answer to the last question, but would prefer to
hear from you.)
Johnson
I did not tell you it was a racial issue, although I knew from the
very beginning that it was (my arrest) racially motivated. I would
have confided this, but who would have believed me anyway? I
felt that on the basis of law itself that I did not have to interject the
aspect of racial bias. I knew, legally, that Kiser's actions were
wrong. And I felt I had taken the higher moral and legal
248
ground.
248 My biggest surprise was learning that Johnson had made a deliberate choice to
exclude the issue of race from his defense of the misdemeanor charge. As he further
explained to me in his telephone call and at our subsequent meeting in Iowa City, he did
not want to interject the issue of racial bias because he "didn't want to cloud the legal
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Cunningham
I would like to hear more specifically what happened when you
tried to pursue your complaint against Kiser.
Johnson
Basically, I was told that there wasn't any substantial damage
physically, and despite a clear violation of rights, it wasn't worth
their time to pursue without a substantial monetary deposit.2 4 9
Cunningham
Most importantly, how could we have represented you better?
Some who have read the draft article have suggested that my
translation metaphor misses the key point, which is that the judge
(and jury) needed to hear and understand your story told in your
own voice and words. In other words, you didn't need a "lawyertranslator." Other readers say that the inherent flaws of the legal
system made it impossible for you to get any meaningful relief
(i.e. the restoration of dignity that you wanted) and that we should
have told you so. Or do you think it is possible that you and we
could have collaborated together and produced a better translation of what happened, one that made sense to you and was effective in the courtroom?
Johnson
I agree with your two stated points, although I would argue that
2 50
I
the "untrained" needs a "lawyer-translator" to some degree.
do believe some type of collaboration would have been most effective for the officers involved and for the court as well, if indeed
the court wanted to be educated.

issues. I felt that I had enough rights in the legal realm to go on; there was a sound legal
basis for what I did." Thus while I was berating myself in Part IV, see supra pp. 1377-83,
for being insensitive to the racial issues inherent in the arrest or for failing to gain sufficient trust from my client so that he could confide "the real issue," I failed to consider
that his seemingly strange omission of the claim "I was stopped because I was black"
might be his own strategic construction of the case that he expected us to honor. A
similar point was made when Johnson explained that his comments on the day of the
dismissal (that I had a "guardian mentality," assumed I knew the needs and answers,
and was oversensitive and patronizing, see supra p. 1330), were directed in large part to
my efforts in that meeting to point out to the student attorneys that our representation
of Johnson might have been tainted by our own racism even though Johnson himself
had not gone so far as to say so. He told me: "That which has not been said, hasn't
been said; that would indicate I didn't want to say it."
249 Johnson told me that one lawyer he contacted wanted $2000 up front and that
the AGLU never got back to him.
250 In conversation, Johnson elaborated:
I didn't see you as a translator; in order for me to get even the appearance of my day in court, I needed you guys. The judge wasn't interested
in a translation of what I had to say; he was interested simply in justifying
the actions of the troopers. You are assuming that the judge-the system-was interested in a translation.
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Johnson concluded his letter with these words:
[M]y deepest regret [is] that the judge assumed he knew how I was
as an individual, and, on this assumption, he judged me on what
he believed and not on what was said by me, my counsel, or even
on what he saw (other than my race). To be voiceless was the
greatest pain of all. What struck me most about the judge is that
he seemed so compassionate [to other parties in other cases I observed] in the 10 months or so that I came to the courthouse waiting for hearing after hearing to be rescheduled. I never saw this
compassion, I never received the "I have been there before, I can
relate" talks that he frequently gave to those who came before
him. I suddenly and unconsciously realized why.
Before I received DujonJohnson's letter in May 1991, my draft
of this Article ended with these words that he said to us on the day
his case was dismissed:
You guys can afford to examine yourselves. I can't. I'm on the
threshold of existence. There's no safety net. You guys know you
won't be walking the streets tomorrow. I can't know that. The
moment you guys drop me off, I need to start thinking about
where the next month's rent is coming from. Most of the time I
don't come into contact with guys like you. We don't walk in the
same streets.
In that earlier draft I wrote that I was haunted by these words. I still
am. But I want to add to them the concluding sentences of Dujon
Johnson's May 1991 letter:
In closing, I did attempt to, two years ago, pursue my complaint

against Officer Kiser's conduct, but no attorney or legal organization considered it worth their while without a considerable monetary sum up front. I guess laws are for those who can afford it. But
I consider it a valuable experience and a lesson learned. I wish
you continued peace.
Sincerely,
M. Dujon Johnson

TRANSLATION AS A MODE OF THOUGHT
James Boyd Whitet
I think that Clark Cunningham's article, The Lawyer as Translator,' is a wonderful piece of work, full of life and interest and originality. I especially admire: his ability to make vivid to the reader the
ways in which languages do truly differ, and differ beyond our efforts to bridge them-as he shows when he imagines an attempt to
translate our most common professional terms into Chinese; his
recognition of the kind of force that our languages have over our
minds, both as we see the world and as we tell stories about it; his
sense that what we think of as "events" are really texts calling for
interpretation, and his consciousness that interpretation in turn is a
mode of thought by which the practices of our own minds can be
made the object of critical attention; his development of the idea
that the practice of translation entails an ethic of respect for the difference and equality of persons; and his constant awareness that his
own use of language, both as a lawyer in the Johnson case and as a
scholar-critic writing about it, is an ethical performance, and one at
which he-and in our turn, we-not only can, but in some sense
certainly will fail. This last is the most important point, for it is this
perception that leads him to see that he must not only say what he
thinks about the various issues that come before him, as if he were
engaged in a purely intellectual exercise; he recognizes that he will
perform his meanings in his writing, whether he likes it or not. It is
in his own use of language-and in the relation he thus establishes
with the habits of his own mind and with both Dujon Johnson and
the reader-that his central terms and values acquire their most important meanings.
I.
My first comment is about this point. The whole paper moves
from a single metaphor, that what the lawyer does is a form of transt Hart Wright Professor of Law, Professor of English Language and Literature,
and Adjunct Professor of Classical Studies, The University of Michigan.
I should say that Clark Cunningham is both a former student and a friend. I have
read several earlier drafts of his paper and discussed them with him.
1
Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator,Representation as Text: Towards an
Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1298 (1992).
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lation, to which it gives increasing meaning as it proceeds. 2 I want
to direct attention to the way in which this meaning is created. Imagine yourself being asked to define these two terms, "lawyering"
and "translation," and to explain the connection you see between
them. Many of us, I think, would have the instinct to do this by
defining the terms in propositional form: "by translation I mean
....

"; "by lawyering I mean ....

."

One would then conclude with a

comparison of the features the two practices share. This sort of
writing would assume that what is called for is at heart a kind of
definition and description, all in a single voice. In slightly fuller
form the answer might run like this:
Translation is the replication in one language of what is said in
another. The lawyer is like a translator because she represents in
legal language what is said in ordinary language. But she is unlike
a translator in that her two languages are not mutually self-exclusive, perhaps not "languages" at all; and she is more than a translator because the law is a discourse of power.
In such a form the point is true enough but almost entirely banal; if
the voice in which I have thus begun went on to trace out these
analogies and disanalogies with greater specificity, whatever it said
would tend towards the lifeless and dull. This is a form of writing
that assumes its own adequacy.
Cunningham, by contrast, sees the statement of the analogy as
defining a writing problem for him: he must give meaning to his
terms, both of them, in such a way as to make them live for the
reader. He does this, as I say above, both descriptively, as he talks
in a variety of ways about translation and lawyering, and, more profoundly, in his own prose, as he enacts the vision of language and
life that he wishes to express. In this sense this is what I would call a
highly literary piece of work.
See what the consequences are: if he had proceeded in the first
mode, he would have claimed to have stated in propositional form
an idea that could be used, without change, by others. "Cunningham's analogy between lawyering and translation" is a phrase that
could be repeated without further work, plugged into an analytic
scheme, or compared with other metaphors, themselves reproduced
in a similarly conclusory way. Instead, what Cunningham is implicitly saying to others is that you too must give these terms meanings
2 I have also used this analogy in my writing, especially inJusTIcE AS TRANSLATION
(1990). But there I focus more on the activity ofjudges than lawyers, and more on the

reading of legal texts than on clients' narratives.

THE LEGAL IMAGINATION

(1973), which

is primarily about lawyering, depends on the sense that lawyers translate what is said in
other languages into the law, but it does not develop the analogy in an explicit way. It
gives me great pleasure to see how far beyond what I have done Cunningham has gone.
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of your own, in texts of your own making. If you try to reduce either
translation or lawyering to a process describable in a conceptual or
mechanistic language you will do justice to neither human activity.
What kind of language is possible, then? One, like his, that recognizes and makes vivid the experience and meaning of translation on
the one hand, lawyering on the other. But each speaker must create
this language afresh, or the metaphor will become a dead one. We
cannot simply appropriate his text; we must make its terms our own,
and give them meanings of our own making.
It is from this point of view that I have some doubts about the
long section locating his work in its academic context. This is obviously valuable, but I do wonder whether there is not an unproductive conflict between the voice in which he does all this-talking
about methodologies a bit as though they were intellectual technologies, usable in any hands, producing replicable results, and so onand the voice in which the paper actually lives, when he gets to the
story he has to tell. The first voice may invite the reader to look at
Cunningham's work in the way he himself looks at the rest of the
scholarship, locating it on a grid, as if its merits lay in his "method"
rather than in the qualities of his own mind and prose. After all, it
would be possible to use ethnomethodology in a mechanistic or
close-minded or insensitive way-and it would be equally possible
to use the translation metaphor that way too. Perhaps this section
of the paper might stand better as a separate piece on method, or as
an appendix. For the great merit of Cunningham's work lies not so
much in the idea or analogy from which it proceeds as in what he
makes of it in working it out, his exemplification of what it can mean
to rethink one's experience and one's language. He makes rewriting
itself a mode of thought that can move him to new ways of imagining, new ways of being. To imitate him one would have not only to
start from his analogy, but to learn to write, in one's own way, as he
writes.
II.
Two other, briefer points. First, it is a great merit of Cunningham's paper that he focuses on the experience and art of the lawyer,
and does so as a lawyer himself. In my view far too much writing
about "law" proceeds on the premise that both writer and reader
are somehow outside of the process, on some remote and presumably superior platform. The issue then becomes a question of policy-"What should the rule be?"-or a question of structure and
process-"How should these judgments be made?"-as if we were
all social architects, or omnipotent legislators, shaping the world to
our ideas. Cunningham, by contrast, focuses on his own experience
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as a lawyer situated in a certain context and engaged in a certain
activity of mind and language. It is the quality and nature of this
activity, in this context, that engages his attention. He tries to make
a way of talking about it that will at once capture its ethical and intellectual qualities and provide a method for thinking about how we
might learn to do it better. He speaks to us as fellow-lawyers, too, as
people whose lives are shaped by the process of lawyering. This is a
most welcome change. There are many, after all, who tell us what
rules we should make or follow; but all too few who speak well about
the meaning and quality of the practices of mind that define our
professional lives.
This point is related to a second: that to take Cunningham's
article seriously is to consider new ways of teaching law. For if the
lawyer is a translator, should we not teach our students how to do
what translators do? This would include giving prominence to the
process of interviewing clients and witnesses, seen not simply as bureaucratic "intake" or as the occasion for emotionally supportive (or
destructive) behavior but as an essential part of all lawyering. More
than that, this kind of teaching would insist, across the curriculum,
on bringing to the surface of attention some sense of the different
ways in which the stories of cases we read could be told in different
languages and voices. It would lead us to call upon our students'
sense of ordinary language, ordinary life, not just as a matter of intellectual curiosity or political ideology, but with the sense that to
do this is an important part of training in the activity of lawyering.
III.
It is striking that Cunningham's rewritings enable him to engage critically with his own discourse. As he retells the story-partly
with Johnson's assistance-he comes to see it, and his own role
within it, very differently; the kind of language with which he began,
which he used without questioning, becomes inadequate, unusable.
This happens not only in ways familiar to the lawyer, for example as
he sees the case more sharply in terms of Robinson 3 than Terry,4 but
also in ways that are not so familiar, as he comes to see the case as
being about: the kind of respect human beings are due, both as a
general matter and under the Fourth Amendment; why Johnson was
denied this respect; the need for Johnson's own voice to be heard;
and, most of all, his own role in what he comes to see as a mistranslation. This-the extent to which it becomes an exercise in self3
4

United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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criticism-is perhaps what is most remarkable about Cunningham's
whole performance.
It is one thing to criticize someone else for failing to hear your
voice, for failing to accord you respect, and so forth, but is quite
another to criticize oneself for failing to hear another or accord that
person respect. In the first case the objects of complaint are salient
and visible-the speaker feels injured by them-while in the second
the occlusions and erasures and insensitivities are one's own and,
however visible they may be to others, they tend in the nature of
things to be invisible to oneself. Take racism as an example: as Professor Delgado and his co-author argue in their paper in this symposium, 5 a great deal of racism is simply invisible to most white
people, partly because it takes place out of their sight or because
they miss, or misunderstand, what they actually see; but, more profoundly and disturbingly, often because it is unwittingly their own.
This is a feature not only of racism and sexism, I think, but of cultural power more generally: it tends to be invisible to the person
who exercises it.
To try to learn what your conduct looks like from another's
point of view, then, is not so easy. The natural first step is to read or
try to listen to what others say, but when I, at least, read accounts of
the experience of African Americans, today or under slavery or Jim
Crow-say in the autobiographies of Frederick Douglass, Malcolm
X, Dick Gregory, or Maya Angelou, or in the novels of Alice Walker
or Toni Morrison, or in Black Ice, Lorene Cary's recent story of her
early life-I find that it is easier for me to identify with the person
suffering injustice and talking about it than it is to see myself on the
other side of things, in the slavemaster or bigot or patronizing white
liberal.
This is not surprising, I think, for it arises not only from the
desire to avoid painful truths, but from our common understanding
of the relation between narrator and audience in such a text, which
invites the sharing of the speaker's point of view. 6 In reading David
Copperfield, for example, one feels with the narrator how horrible the
Murdstones are, how lovable Peggotty, without asking how lovable
5 Richard Delgado &Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1258 (1992).
6 How can a writer avoid this blunting of her story? If she attacks her audience
directly, she risks alienating it entirely. And in some sense the deepest point of much of
this writing is to demonstrate the human reality of one's experience, which depends
upon the very sympathetic identification I describe. I have no ready answer, but can
simply report thatJames Baldwin's THE FIRE NEXT TIME (1963) did seem to persuade
many white people of their own implication in the system of race, in part by describing it
persuasively as a white invention. Something of the same thing is true of Catharine
MacKinnon's work, especially FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987), I think for the same reason.
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or brutal one is oneself. As readers we are always on the right side,
except in the greatest works of art: The Iliad, which teaches its audience both the equal reality of all human experience and our irresistible need to forget that knowledge; the novels ofJane Austen, which
implicate the reader in misreadings that parallel the misreadings the
reader makes in life; or Huckleberry Finn, which involves the white
reader in the impossibility of his language of race. 7 In his own way,
modest by comparison with those just mentioned but not with the
efforts of most of us, Cunningham has shown us how to engage in a
kind of reflection that can bring within the focus of attention our
own vices and stupidities. This is a great achievement.
It is related to another point, suggested above, namely that to
think of conversation as a kind of translation entails an ethic of fundamental equality. If it is recognized that translation always involves significant gains and losses in meaning, there can be no
universal language in which universal truths are uttered. This
means that every act of interpretation, every conversation in the
world, takes place across differences in language, for none of us
speaks exactly the same dialect as anyone else, and these differences
cannot be resolved by the imposition of a super-language. We are
each entitled to our own meanings and these can never be the same.
This point is eloquently made, in somewhat different form, by Mari
Matsuda in her recent article on accent discrimination,8 which maintains, and in a literary way demonstrates, that every American
speaks English with an accent. There is no "normal" or "standard"
pronunciation, and we should not talk as if there were. The same
thing is true of our languages as well: each of us speaks a dialect, or
a set of dialects; to see this is to recognize that lines of communication must be established among us, and among our languages, from
positions of mutual equality, across whatever lines of power may
deny this truth. It is because Cunningham knows this, and tries to
hear what Johnson is telling him as something that matters, that he
is able to subject his own language, his own ways of constructing the
world, to such an impressive kind of self-criticism.
IV.
In all of this Cunningham's work is remarkable: in its capacity
for self-criticism, its thoughtfulness, its insistence upon a wholeminded way of thought that cannot be reduced to a methodology, its
7
I mean the first sixteen chapters, which in my view stand as a complete text,
written several years before the rest of the book and different in quality from it.
8 MariJ. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and aJurisprudence
for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE LJ. 1329 (1991). On the general point, see James B.
White, Our Meanings Can Never Be the Same, 21 RHETORIC Soc'v 68 (1991).
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sensitivity to the experience of others, and its eagerness to learn.
He shows extraordinary resourcefulness and imagination as a lawyer, especially, I thought, when he has the idea of letting Johnson
cross-examine the trooper, thus giving him the legal power to demand answers to the very questions the trooper's earlier disregard
of which was the essential act of disrespect Johnson wanted redressed. But I do want to raise a question here, not so much by way
of criticism of what Cunningham has done as to suggest a line for
further thought, for him and for those who may be taken with his
way of working: What could be said in a positive way about the process of translation he describes?
Cunningham directs his attention to the way in which Johnson's
voice went unheard, and his person unrespected, by the translations
that took place, on the unstated but apparent assumption that perfect legal discourse would reflect all that without flaw or distortion,
like a perfect plane of glass. But I think the situation is more complicated. The language of the law, with all of its distortions-in fact
by means of these distortions-enables us as a society, and as citizens and litigants, to achieve something we could not do through
our own unmediated voices. Consider here as one example the
finding of Sarat and Felstiner, referred to by Cunningham, that lawyers in divorce cases seem to disregard much of what their clients
are really saying to them.9 In particular, we are told, they do not
seem interested in "who did what to whom."' 0
What might an experienced divorce lawyer say on her own behalf? Perhaps something like this:
Of course it is wrong if we fail to hear and respond to what our
clients are telling us, and I am sure I do that all too often. We
should listen with special care when they talk about their children,
for example, and try to provide a conversational context in which
they can discover more fully their own wishes as they come to recognize more fully the reality of their own situation.
But this very phrase suggests that we have a role that cannot
be reduced to meeting their wishes, or translating their stories
without distortion, even if that were possible, namely to help them
to come to see the reality of their situation and to form wishes
appropriate to that. It is so common as to be nearly universal that
divorcing people think unrealistically about their futures, both in
economic terms and in terms of their children's lives. In fact they
often deny that they are really getting divorced-they see the future as a continuation of their marriage, which has often by then
dissolved into a fight. And an essential part of the fight is blame
9

Austin Sarat & William L.F. FeIstiner, Law and Social Relations: Vocabularies of Mo-

tive in Lawyer/Client Interaction, 22 LAW & Soc'Y
10

Id. at 742.

REV.

737 (1988).
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and retaliation: wanting to retell the story of what the other
spouse did wrong and they did right, over and over, as a way of
justifying themselves to themselves and others, and indeed as a
way ofjustifying their own present hostility, their refusal to cooperate, their insensitivity to their children's needs, their denial of
changes in their economic and social circumstances, and the like.
If all goes well, someday they will in fact give up the fight, and the
claims of right and wrong by which they carry it on. The question,
who did what to whom, will then have meaning only diagnostically, as they try to figure out their own contribution to what was
bad about the marriage so that they will not repeat it.
One of our objects as lawyers is to help them move in that
direction earlier than they otherwise might: to help them to accept their circumstances and to form appropriate wishes based
upon them. As an essential part of doing that, we divert their attention repeatedly from what they wish to tell us to what they are
denying. Part of our task, that is, and a good part, is the education
of our clients. Two good lawyers, working with such an attitude
on opposite sides of a bad divorce, can greatly reduce the amount
of misery the divorcing partners inflict on themselves and others,
and do so in ways for which they will later often be grateful.
And think of this too: bad as the language of divorce law is,
and the institutions through which it works, suppose that we tried
to deal with the breakdown of relations solely in the language of
the parties themselves. We would have nothing but negotiation,
and ill-focused negotiation at that-no way to learn from the past,
and no way to reach a collective judgment about important matters, such as the value of work in the home or the way to think
about custody and visitation.
The legal process works a translation that entails a loss, but it
also entails, or can entail, a gain. The proper duty of the translator is not solely to the language and text out of which she works,
but runs as well to the language in which she speaks, and to the
demands of the social and cultural context in which she functions.
This explanation has considerable appeal to me, and not only in
connection with divorce. Think of the relation between police officer and suspect: here the law of the Fourth Amendment and unlawful arrest provides a language for thought and speech about this
relation, and for its regulation as well. It will never reflect without
distortion whatever an officer or suspect might say. But it may
nonetheless be a good language--one that can make possible
thought and argument about the transaction that they share in a way
that does more to include the legitimate concerns of both, and of
the rest of society too, than either of their own ways of talking,
standing alone, would do. I think, then, that we need to give attention not only to the erasures and occlusions and misrepresentations
that take place in legal discourse but also to what we think to be the
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merits and values of this language, or the opposite of these things,
and hence of translation into it.1" A part of our subject, in fact, is
the analysis and comparison of different languages, or different versions of the same language, of which we can ask what they enable
us-as lawyers, as people, and as a society-to achieve, as well as
what they inhibit or prevent.
A great deal of attention has recently been focused on the way
the law disadvantages the powerless. Law is indeed sometimes conceived of simply as a disguise or legitimization for the exercise of
power, a huge fraud. Of course there is the element of disguised
power, but that should not blind us to what else is present, namely
that the law also can and does provide protection to the powerless.
The cynical and power-hungry Callicles in the Gorgias showed that
he knew this when he said that all talk about justice should be discarded as pointless sentimentalism; it is only a convention, he said,
imposed on the powerful by the weak, and those who are powerful,
like him, should deny its force. But for this very reason it is right for
those of us who live with the law as its caretakers to assert its possibilities, knowing that it is partly on behalf of the powerless that we
do so.
Think of this very case: it is certainly true, from what we are
told, that Johnson was treated disrespectfully by the police, abusively by the prosecutor, and (at first) a bit ineptly by Cunningham.
But it is also true that it is the law that provides him with a hearing
before a judge, with a lawyer paid for by the taxpayer, with a forum
in which he could challenge abuse by police officers, and it does this
not only for him, but for many people. This is not a small achievement, and would be envied by the powerless in many other countries. This is of course not to deny the abuse, or the effacement, or
to say that they do not matter; of course they do and for the reasons
Cunningham so eloquently presents. But there is another side: the
law is not only a source of violence, it reduces violence; it not only
oppresses the weak, it defends them. 12 The conversion of the language of the people into the law, while always an effacement, may
also be right, both from their own point of view and from the point
of view of the larger world the law is trying to create. There is thus
in the law an ineluctably tragic element that the image of translation
captures: translation is always imperfect; but it is necessary that it
II It is important to recognize that the client or witness often has not one single
story, which will be translated well or badly, but a variety of possible ways to tell his
story, among which choices must be made. The very process of translation may draw
attention to this circumstance and help the speaker work out the version of his experience which is most satisfactory to him in this context.
12
For an eloquent discussion of this dichotomy, see the last chapters of E.P.
THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGINS OF THE BLACK ACT (1975).
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be done if we are to listen to each other at all, and certainly if we are
to maintain a generally shared language ofjustice. The question is
how-with what skills and what attitude-this is to be done, and in
his paper Cunningham offers an admirable example.

THE LOOSENESS OF LEGAL LANGUAGE: THE
REASONABLE WOMAN STANDARD IN
THEORY AND IN PRACTICE
Naomi R. Cahnt

INTRODUCTION

For feminists working with the law, the relationship between
theory and practice has been critical, although often uneasy and
2
problematic.' Part of this tension between theory and practice
stems from inevitable, and important, questions about whether the
legal process can meaningfully address women's needs.3 Nonetheless, because the strength of feminist theory is grounded so deeply
in the actual experiences of women, 4 an exchange between theory
Visiting Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. Many thanks to Joan
t
Meier, Tony Alfieri, Clark Cunningham, Cynthia Farina, and Holly Fechner for reviewing an earlier draft, to Nancy Tong for research assistance, and to Lei Udell for editing.
1
See, e.g., KATHARINE BARTLETT & ROSANNE KENNEDY, Introduction, in FEMINIST
LEGAL THEORY: READINGS IN LAW AND GENDER 1, 4 (KATHARINE BARTLETr & ROSANNE
KENNEDY eds., 1991). The following story illustrates this problem:
Several years ago I attended a small seminar where a noted feminist legal theorist
presented a brilliant paper, replete with theoretical insights into women's subordination. When she finished the presentation, we all clapped in admiration. During the
discussion period, a participant said, "Many of us are lawyers who represent women in
court, seeking protection from batterers, equal employment in the workplace, a fair trial.
Have you thought about how your theories can help us?" The noted feminist looked
blankly at the questioner. She was silent for a few seconds before she said, hesitantly,
"That is a very interesting idea. You know, I had never really thought about how my
ideas could help women in practice."
2 I am interested not only in the process of how feminist jurisprudence affects
practice, but also in more specific questions of how changes in law and methodology are
intertwined in this process. For an extraordinary study of these issues, see Elizabeth M.
Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectivesfrom the Women's Movement, 61
N.Y.U. L. REV. 589 (1986); see also Kathryn Abrams, Feminist Lawyering and Legal Method,
16 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 373 (1991). Abrams comments that "[t]he impact of feminism
on the methods of lawyers-those who work for legal change in the courts, legislatures,
and other public forums-is only now beginning to be explored." Id. at 374.
3 See Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discriminationand the Transformationof Workplace Norms,
42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1196 (1989); Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-PracticeSpiral: The Ethics
of Feminism and ClinicalEducation, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1599, 1687 (1991); MargaretJ. Radin,
The Pragmatistand the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1699, 1700 (1990) (arguing that rather
than think about justice in an ideal world, we should think about "nonidealjustice: given
where we now find ourselves, what is the better decision?"). These questions arise both
in substantive law and in methodological concerns. See Naomi R. Cahn, Defining Feminist
Litigation, 14 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 1 (1991).
4 See Cahn, supra note 3; Goldfarb, supra note 3, at 1668.
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and practice should remain central to the differing visions of what
feminism 5 can be.
This is where the theoretics of practice, a developing movement
that attempts to understand the interaction between legal theory
and practice, can inform feminism. 6 It studies how the lawyer perceives and can empower, or do violence to, her client. 7 Much of this
scholarship is based on experiences with real clients, and includes
both analysis of lawyers' struggles to translate client experiences
into language that is meaningful in the law, and critiques of the
translations. 8 As scholars, looking at practice in our theorizing not
only keeps us grounded in reality, but also ensures broader participation in the law so that changes are engendered by clients as well
as lawyers, thereby challenging existing legal catagories and
methods. 9
Theoretics of practice scholarship primarily has focused on
poverty law and drawn much of its critical strength from attempts to
reconstruct poverty law practices.' 0 In this Article, I use the theoretics of practice to examine the relationship between feminist the5 Feminism is not, of course, a single viewpoint, but includes many different ideas
from a variety of viewpoints. See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE (1990).
6
While no single definition describes the theoretics of practice, the thread common to all is a foundation in practice. By practice, we mean ways of arguing as well as
relating to other participants in the legal system, including clients, the relevant communities, judges, and other lawyers.
Theoretics of practice is different from practice theory, which "reintroduces agency
and practice into disciplines traditionally preoccupied with systems and structures, without abandoning a recognition of the shaping power of socially constructed structures as
retreating to a methodological individualism." RosemaryJ. Coombe, Roomfor Maneuver:
Toward a Theory of Practice in Critical Legal Studies, 14 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 69, 71 (1989).
7 See Lucie White, Paradox,Piece-Work, and Patience, 43 HASTINGS LJ. 853 (1992).
8 E.g., Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer As Translator,Representation As Text: TowardsAn Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1298 (1992) [hereinafter Cunningham, Lawyer As Translator]; Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking
About Law as Language, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2459 (1989) [hereinafter Cunningham, Thinking
About Law]; Gerald P. Lopez, Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice: Seven Weeks in the Life of a
Rebellious Collaboration, 77 GEO. L.J. 1603 (1989).
The method of study borrows-sometimes explicitly, sometimes not-from the ethnographic method of attempting "to provide a particularist and holistic account, based
upon... extended observation, of a single culture group." Jean G. Zorn, Lawyers, Anthropologists, and the Study of Law: Encounters in the New Guinea Highland, 15 LAw & Soc.
INQUIRY 271, 274-75 (1990). Judith Stacey provides another definition of the ethnographic method, describing it as "intensive participant-observation study which yields a
synthetic cultural account ....
Judith Stacey, Can There be a Feminist Ethnography?, I1
WOMEN'S STUD. INT'L F. 21, 22 (1988); see also James Clifford, Introduction, in WRITING
CULTURE: THE PoETsCS AND POLITICS OF ETHNOGRAPHY 1, 7 (James Clifford & George E.
Marcus eds., 1986); Mary Black & Duane Metzger, EthnographicDescriptionand the Study of
Law, in THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF LAw 141, 141 (Laura Nader ed., 1965).
9 See Martha L. Fineman, ChallengingLaw, EstablishingDifferences: The Future of Feminist Legal Scholarship, 42 FLA. L. REV. 25, 30 (1990).
10 See Anthony V. Alfieri, ReconstructingPoverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client
Narrative, 100 YALE LJ. 2107 (1991); White, supra note 7.

1400

CORNELL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 77:1398

ory and practice by exploring specific situations involving sex and
violence against women. The language of legal doctrine about "the
reasonable woman" in sexual harassment law, battered woman self
defense law, and rape law is the text I seek to interpret.' I My perspective is grounded in legal practice; I wonder how feminist theory
and legal practice interact, and how both can help women. I also
examine what it means to help women; helping some women may
12
not help others.
I examine the practice of the reasonable woman standard in the
contexts of rape, sexual harassment, and domestic violence because
these areas are linked, and because the impact of this standard in
3
each area has important implications and lessons for the others.'
The three phenomena involve different forms of violence against
women; each symbolizes different forms of women's subordinated
status. 14 The reasonable woman standard raises the possibility of
changing this status by providing a legal standard that increases the
potential for effective enforcement of laws against subordinating behavior. The need for a new standard in sexual harassment and battered woman cases emerged from the divergence between women's
experiences and legal doctrines addressing these gender-specific
acts, 15 and the concept of the reasonable woman developed to "account" for the differences between these experiences and those of
men in a form that the legal system could comprehend and
incorporate.
Part I explores some ideological considerations relevant to the
reasonable woman concept. As a constructed image of reasonable
11

Like Joan Scott, I believe that by examining the ways that "language constructs

meaning we will also be in a position to find gender." JOAN W. ScoTT, GENDER AND THE
POLITICS OF HISTORY 55 (1988). Language in the legal process occurs in many different

settings: in court, between lawyers, between lawyers and their clients, between clients,
with courtroom clerks, etc. It is important, then, not to focus on only one type of talk.
See Austin Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Legal Realism in Lawyer-Client Communications, in
LANGUAGE IN THEJUDICIAL PROCESS 133 (Judith Levi & Anne Walker eds., 1990) (exploring law talk in various contexts).

12

See Christine A. Littleton, Does it Still Make Sense to Talk about "Women"?, 1 UCLA

WOMEN'S LJ. 15 (1991).

13 See Andrea Dworkin, Against the Male Flood: Censorship,Pornography, and Equality, 8
HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 1, 21 (1985) (connection between sexual harassment, rape, battery
and other aspects of women's subordination); see also Robin L. West, The Difference in
Women's Hedonic Lives: A PhenomenologicalCritiqueof FeministLegal Theory, 3 WIs. WOMEN'S
L.J. 81 (1987) (same).
14 As Robin West argues, they are "gender-specific injuries." West, supra note 13,
at 82. Men, too, are battered, raped and harassed; overwhelmingly, however, these acts
happen to women. See Catherine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100
YALE LJ. 1281, 1301-02 (1991).
15 See Schneider, supra note 2. For a comparable discussion between women's actual roles and legal rhetoric in the context of work and family, see Karen Czapanskiy,
Volunteers and Draftees: The Struggle for ParentalEquality, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1415 (1991).
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behavior, the reasonable woman has several theoretical underpinnings, each of which has different implications for the content of the
standard. One theoretical underpinning of the reasonable woman
construct may be "difference" feminist theory, which suggests that
men and women differ as groups, and that women are more nurturing and moral than men.1 6 Through another lens, the reasonable
woman can be viewed as a construct of difference-as-dominance
feminist theory. 17 This concept persuasively shows the need to include women's experiences in a system with asymmetrical power relations that has historically excluded women's participation., A
third body of theory, critical race studies, also confronts the alleged
objectivity of supposedly "neutral" rules that exclude the experiences of outsiders.' 9 Such experiences may result in the need to
20
change universal standards.
In sharp contrast with the reasonable woman standard in sexual
harassment and domestic violence cases stands the reasonable
woman standard used to judge the victim's behavior in rape cases.
In rape law, this standard implicitly requires women to conform to a
certain image, developed largely by men, before the legal system
will recognize their experience as rape. For example, women are
still blamed for provoking or seducing men, unless they meet the
male-set standard of "reasonable" resistance. 2 1 Thus in rape law
16 Joan C. Williams, DeconstructingGender, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 797, 799, 807 (1989); See
infra notes 84-95 and accompanying text. Williams provides an insightful critique of
difference theory by showing that it adopts for women positive attributes from traditional stereotypes, such as women's connection to others, while discarding negative
ones, such as women's passivity. Williams, supra. Additionally, as discussed infra, difference theory rarely attributes positive values to men. See alsoJeanne L. Schroeder, Abductionfrom the Seraglio: FeministMethodologies and the Logic of Imagination,70 TEX. L. REV. 109,
124-130 (1991)(difference feminism establishes a universal male that is opposite to
female).
17 See Catherine A. MacKinnon, Legal Perspectives on Sexual Difference, in THEORETICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE 213 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 1990). As discussed
infra at notes 65-95 and accompanying text, I believe the standard results from a mixture
of difference and dominance theories.
18 See HISTORY AND POWER IN THE STUDY OF LAW 1, 6-11 (June Starr &Jane F. Collier eds., 1989) (discussion of power relations in the legal order).
19 See, e.g., Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizingthe Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of AntidiscriminationDoctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Policies, 1989 U.
CHI. L.F. 139 (analyzing different experiences of white women, black men, and black
women); Richard Delgado, Shadowboxing: An Essay on Power, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 813
(1992); Patricia Williams, The Obliging Shell: An Essay in Formal Equal Opportunity, 87
MICH. L. REV. 2128, 2142 (1989).
20 See Harris v. International Paper, 765 F. Supp. 1509, 1515-16 (D. Me. 1991) (exploring different responses of whites and blacks to particularly harrassing behavior, and
noting that "the fact finder must 'walk a mile in the victim's shoes' to understand" the
effects of discriminatory acts).
21 See SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (1987) (discussing societal expectations of reasonable behavior of a raped woman); see also Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813
(1991) (analogies between rape and sexual harassment law) [hereinafter Sex at Work].
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the image of the reasonable woman hurts women, confining them
within a particular discourse.2 2 In rape law, men developed this
standard to protect other men who, in their eyes, were wrongfully
accused of rape. As a result, the rape law standard's attributes of
reasonableness differ from those embodied in the sexual harassment and domestic violence law standard. 23 The image of the reasonably raped woman, because of its ubiquitous nature and
foundations in popular culture, constrains legal thought and language. 24 Once such a stock figure is developed, it is difficult to displace, to find new language to think beyond it.
Part II illustrates the potential dangers inherent in a reasonable
woman standard in any context by discussing stories that construct
reasonable women as told by lawyers and judges. At the center of
this Part is a story about a reasonable woman based on clients that I
have represented. Ms. Sims was a battered woman who, among
other things, had stabbed her husband with a knife after running
into his house. Our challenge of representing her as feminist lawyers required us to think through what it means to be a reasonable
woman. This client differs from those portrayed by other theorists
of practice because her story, in her own words, may not have been
entirely sympathetic to a legal tribunal. Her story thus shows the
need to ensure that legal constructs reflect real stories, and shows
how the powers of doctrine (not just the powers in the attorneyclient relationship) distort.
I argue that even in sexual harassment and domestic violence
cases, where the standards were developed to respond to women's
needs, the theory and practice of the reasonable woman standard
further stereotypes and disempowers. While its use may empower
some women, in the practical reality of the attorney-client relationship and in the courtroom, the reasonable women standard both encourages client passivity and ignores the complexities of the client's
situation. 25 Moreover, the use of separate standards operates to entrench differences between men and women, rather than to establish

22 By discourse, I mean "a way of talking about actions and relationships ....
Like
other discourses, law is limiting in that it asserts some meanings and silences others."
SALLY E. MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE AND GETTING EVEN 9 (1990).
23 See Delgado, supra note 19.
24 See Lynne N. Henderson, Review Essay: What Makes Rape a Crime?, 3 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S LJ. 193, 228 (1988)("Confusion and ambivalence about rape are deeply em-

bedded in our cultural consciousness and structures .... ).
25 See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describingand Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and
the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 9 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 195 (1986); see also
Alfieri, supra note 10.
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a standard that transcends issues of sameness and difference 26 and
provides for even more effective litigation strategies. 2 7 Just like a
reasonable man standard, the reasonable woman standard is biased
and deliberately ignores the reality that women's experiences are
diverse. Should the actions of an Hispanic lesbian woman be measured against those of a reasonable woman, or against those of a
reasonable Hispanic lesbian woman? In failing to address these diverse experiences, the reasonable woman standard illustrates feminists' dilemmas over how to reconstruct the law (including attorneyclient relationships) so that the dominant discourse is not male.
Feminist challenges to the traditional stereotype of the reasonable
man and its categorization of women, too often result in new stereo28
types and inflexible categories of our own.
Finally, Part III suggests the beginnings of a new paradigm
based on feminism as well as the theoretics of practice (including my
own experiences in representing victims of domestic violence and
sexual harassment), and applies it to generate some practice strategies. Using this paradigm, I reinterpret the reasonable person standard to include the experiences of both women and other excluded
groups, as well as alternative conceptions of reasonableness. I examine the attorney-client relationship, and show how we can begin
the process of developing new constructs that respect client autonomy, and create spaces for women in the law without fostering stereotypes and passivity.

26 See Lucinda M. Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including Women's Issues in a Tort
Course, I YALE J.L. & FEMINISm 41, 64 (1989).
The debate over whether men and women should be treated the same or differently
has divided feminists for decades. For a collection of citations to recent literature on the
debate, see Leslie Bender, From Gender Diference to Feminist Solidarity: Using Carol Gilligan
and an Ethic of Care in Law, 15 VT. L. REV. 1, 4 nn. 6-8 (1990); see also THEORETICAL
PERSPECTIvES ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE, supra note 17 (collection of essays on differences
between men and women).
27 See Naomi R. Cahn, Speaking Differences: The Rules and Relationshipsof Litigants' Discourses, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1705 (1992) (book review).
28
By itself, categorization is not inherently destructive, so long as "we can recognize changes and interactions within the category." MariJ. Matsuda, PragmatismModified
and the False Consdousness Problem, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1763, 1773 (1990). At the same
time, however, it is critical to examine whose community norms determine categories
such as reasonableness, and then to challenge any stasis within the category. See Nancy
S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual
Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177 (1990).
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I
SOME STORIES ABOUT THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
REASONABLE WOMAN STANDARD

A.

The Challenge to the Reasonable Man

The reasonable man standard remains an entrenched and pervasive standard by which courts measure potentially illegal conduct.
Tort law, criminal law, and employment discrimination law all employ this standard 29 to determine whether conduct is appropriate.
That conduct is acceptable if it is "reasonable" is one of those "neutral" principles with which everyone can agree. As one critique
points out, "[t]he notion that reason is divorced from 'merely contingent' existence still predominates in contemporary Western
thought ....,,0

The standard actually incorporates two different, although interrelated, requirements: first, that conduct be "reasonable," and
second, that conduct be that expected of a "man." By "reasonable
man," of course, the standard purports to be universal, to include
all "mankind," and in practice courts have applied it to women as
3
well as men. '
Feminism challenges both aspects of the standard: the implicit
assumption of a "man" as the standard, as well as the assumption of

reasonableness. The male bias inherent in a standard that explicitly
32
excludes consideration of women as reasonable actors is obvious.
Using a term that is centered on a "man" channels and informs
the content of the standard even when the court (or jury) knows that
29 See Dolores A. Donovan & Stephanie M. Wildman, Is the Reasonable Man Obsolete?
A CriticalPerspective on Self-Defense andProvocation, 14 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 435 (1981) (noting
the ubiquitousness of the standard and exploring its use in criminal law).
30 Jane Flax, Postmodernism and Gender Relations in Feminist Theory, in FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM 39, 43 (LindaJ. Nicholson ed., 1990).
31 Ronald K.L. Collins, Language, History and the Legal Process: A Profile of the "Reasonable Man, " 8 Rur.-CAM. LJ. 311 (1977).
32 See, e.g., Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 3, 20-25 (1988); see also Susan Bordo, Feminism, Postmodernism, and Gender-Skepticism,
in FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM, supra note 30, at 133, 137. For a discussion of the difficulties in defining "man," seeJuDITH BTrrLER, GENDER TROUBLE (1990); see also SuzanneJ.
Kessler, The Mfedical Constructionof Gender; Case Aanagement of Intersexed Infants, 16 SIGNs 3
(1990) (discussing assignment of gender in children born without defined sex characteristics). At a very basic level, there are at least three linguistic problems with the "generic
masculine": first, there is a "nonparallelism between the male and female terms"; second, it is unclear in particular instances whether the term includes or excludes women;
which, in turn, is partially caused by the third problem of exclusivity, because "man"
sometimes does just mean men and not women. Wendy Martyna, The Psychology of the

Generic Masculine, in WOMEN

AND LANGUAGE IN LITERATURE AND SocIETY

69, 69-78 (Sally

McConnell-Ginet et al. eds., 1980); see also Collins, supra note 31, at 315-17 (noting that,
historically, courts may have intended the reasonable man standard to apply only to
men, while they adopted a standard for women closer to that of children).
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they are applying the standard to a woman.3 3 In recognition of
these problems, courts have articulated, as at least a cosmetic improvement, a reasonable person standard.3 4 In application, however, little but the male language of the standard has changed.3 5

This leads to feminism's second critique: a reasonable person
may resemble a reasonable man because the term "reasonable" is
problematic. Existing conceptions of reasonableness are gendered
through their creation of a standard of conduct based on rationality,
exclusive of emotions and morality.3 6 Feminist theory has re-examined the reasonableness standard as part of a critique of "objective" standards.3 7 So-called neutral and objective standards may
contain unstated assumptions that are actually gendered.3 8 This
questioning of "neutral" rules has taken many forms: Regina Austin
has challenged the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
as gender, race, and class biased;3 9 Joan Williams has challenged a
33

It is a truism that language influences and structures experience. ROBIN LAKOFF,
1-50 (1975); GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE AND DAN-

LANGUAGE AND WOMAN'S PLACE

GEROUS THINGS 39-84 (1987).

The reasonable man standard renders women invisible. See Donovan & Wildman,
supra note 29, at 436; see also Collins, supra note 31, at 315-17 (suggesting that this was
based in the common law view that husband and wife are the same person in the law).
34 E.g., State v. Norman, 366 S.E.2d 586, 591 (N.C. App. 1988) (battered woman
case finding that "person of ordinary firmness" might have killed a sleeping husband in
self-defense), rev'd on appeal,378 S.E.2d 8, 12 (N.C. 1989)("person of ordinary firmness"
would not have killed a sleeping husband in self-defense).
35 See Finley, supra note 26, at 59 (in her torts course she includes some cases "in
which it appears that, despite use of 'reasonable person' language, courts are evaluating
a woman's conduct according to a male standard."). See generally Martha Minow, Supreme
Court Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987)(relationship between gender and judicial action). The contribution of Richard Delgado andJean Stefancic to this
Symposium discusses how difficult it is to recognize contemporary expressions of discrimination. Richard Delgado &Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and
Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1258 (1992).
36 Bender, supra note 26, at 23. Rationality is not a neutral standard, and includes
its own gendered versions of emotion and morality. See Ehrenreich, supra note 28 (discussing construction of meaning of "reasonableness").
37 See JANE FLAX, THINKING FRAGMENTS (1990); Bordo, supra note 32, at 136-37
(ascribing questioning of objectivity and neutrality to movements that emerged "to
make a claim to the legitimacy of marginalized cultures"); Donovan & Wildman, supra
note 29; infra notes 85-91 and accompanying text. The challenge to reasonableness resonates historically with the legal realist challenge to abstract formalist concepts. SeeJoseph W. Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465, 503 (1988).
Objectivity is not, of course, just a topic for feminist inquiry; other outsiders have
developed powerful critiques of it. See Delgado, supra note 19, at 108 (the objective
approach is accepted because it embodies the views of the stronger, more culturally
powerful, party, and renders irrelevant the perspective of the subordinated party).
38 See MINOW, supra note 5, at 51; Martha Minow, Feminist Reason: Getting it and Losing it, 38J. LEGAL EDUC. 47, 51 (1988).
39 Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and the Tort of Intentional Infliction
of Emotional Distress, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1988); see Martha Chamallas & Linda Kerber,
Women, Mothers, and the Law of Fright: A History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814 (1990)(suggesting
that the apparently gender neutral valuation in tort law of physical security and property
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workplace that establishes an ideal worker based on male norms,
40
which does not include child care.
On a practical level, feminists have challenged the reasonable
man standard in an attempt to modify it to correspond with women's lives. The challenge to a male standard of reasonableness has
been successful in two areas discussed in this Article: sexual harassment law and battered women self defense cases. 4 1 In rape law,
however, though standards have begun to change, a distorted expectation concerning the reasonable behavior of women persists not
only because a male legal system established what constitutes reasonable behavior, but also because rape is a deeply entrenched symbol of male control over women. 42 For black women, rape
represents an even more complex form of oppression: it "includes
not only a vulnerability to rape and a lack of legal protection radically different from that experienced by white women, but also a
unique ambivalence" because black men are disproportionately ac43
cused and punished for rape as compared to white men.

B.

The Reasonable Woman Standard

The parameters of the reasonable woman are largely determined by the type of case in which the standard is used, and many
are still very much in flux. Reasonable woman standards are
designed to reflect women's perceptions of what constitutes sexual
harassment 44 and what constitutes a sufficient basis for a battered
woman to kill her abuser.4 5 Unlike in the sexual harassment and
battered women's contexts, in rape cases the reasonable women's
standard rarely benefits women, instead reflecting men's perceptions of what constitutes force and consent in sexual intercourse. 4 6
over emotional security and interpersonal relationships actually disadvantages women
when it comes to torts for which there is no comparable male injury).
40 E.g., Williams, supra note 16, at 822.
41 See infra notes 49-64 and accompanying text. It has, of course, been successful in
other areas not covered by this Article.
42 See Estrich, Sex at Work, supra note 21, at 814-15 (Rape is an area of the law where
"traditional male prerogatives are most protected, male power most jealously
preserved.").
43
Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV.
581, 601; see Kimberle Crenshaw, A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Law and
Politics, in THE POLITICS OF LAw 195, 205-08 (David Kairys ed., 1990); see also Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 250 (Douglas, J. concurring) (noting studies showing that the
death penalty was disproportionately applied to blacks convicted of rape).
44 See Abrams, supra note 3, at 1206.
45 See Elizabth M. Schneider, Equal Rights for Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self-Defense, 15 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 623, 630-38 (1980).
46
In an oft-cited quote, Susan Estrich notes, "the reasonable woman, it seems, is
not a schoolboy 'sissy'; she is a real man." EsTRICH, supra note 21, at 65.
When a woman has been raped, the law (and society) impose expectations concerning her behavior. Helena Michie labels these expectations "the cultural master-narrative
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The standard is not defined explicitly so much as it is merely used
without elaboration. 4 7 To give it meaning, it is regularly contrasted
to the perspective of a reasonable man; thus, implicitly (and often
explicitly), there is an underlying belief that the reasonable woman
differs from the reasonable man. 48 The standard thus helps women
win in situations where a reasonable man standard might preclude
their claims.
The standard may include either a subjective (what did this reasonable woman think at the time?) and/or an objective (how would
other reasonable women react?) element or both. 4 9 Accordingly, it
of rape that says that in all cases of rape women are complicitous, that rape is not a rape
in the first place." Helena Michie, The Greatest Story (N)ever Told. The Spectacle of Recantation, 9 GENDERS 19, 21 (1990). As an example, consider the case of the young black
female student at St. John's University who said that she had been sodomized and sexually assaulted by six white male students, most of whom belonged to the school's lacrosse team. Joseph P. Fried, 3 St. John's Students Acquitted of Sexually Assaulting a Woman,
N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1991, at Al. At three of the men's criminal trial, the woman testified that they made her drink a mixture of vodka and orange soda, and then forced her
to perform fellatio. The defendants' lawyers argued that the woman consented to
whatever sexual activity occurred, and that she subsequently fabricated the story because she was ashamed of her actions. After the jury acquitted the three men, some
jurors explained that there were too many inconsistencies in all of the testimony they
had heard. John KifnerJurorsSay ComplainantDidn't Seem Believable, N.Y. TiMES,July 24,
1991, at B4. As with many sexual harassment stories, this rape story was not perfect.
On the campus, one student applauded the verdict, and asked, " 'Who in their right
mind would have gone to a house where eight guys lived?'" Id. As Susan Estrich asked
about the woman who claimed that William Kennedy Smith raped her after he picked
her up in a bar and brought her to the Kennedy family compound in Palm Beach, "Can
you rape a woman who voluntarily comes up for a drink at 3:30 A.M.? ...The right
question in rape cases is not what she did wrong, but what he did." Susan Estrich, The
Real Palm Beach Story, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1991, at A25.
Another example of the general distrust of rape victims is contained in the film
THELMA AND LOUISE (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1991). Thelma flirts with a man who plies
her with drinks, and then almost rapes her (she is rescued by the well-timed intervention
of Louise). Louise kills the man. The two women begin driving away; when Thelma
suggests calling the police, Louise points out that they would never believe two women
who were drunk and who had been flirting.
47 See, e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 624, 626-67 (6th Cir. 1986)
(Keith, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
48 In Ellison v. Brady, the court noted:
A complete understanding of the victim's view requires, among other
things, an analysis of the different perspectives of men and women. Conduct that many men consider unobjectionable may offend many women
....[W]e believe that many women share common concerns which men
do not necessarily share.
924 F.2d 872, 878-79 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). See Yates v. Avco Corp., 819
F.2d 630, 637 n.2 (6th Cir. 1987) (acknowledging that men and women are vulnerable in
different ways and offended by different behavior); Note, Sexual Harassment Claims ofAbusive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1449, 1459 (1984).
49 For example, the Ellison court used an objective test, explaining that a plaintiff
must allege conduct that "a reasonable woman would consider sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment." 924 F.2d at 879 (citation omitted). In another sexual harassment case, the court
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requires both an individualized inquiry and a "community norm"
inquiry.
The reasonable woman is used fairly consistently in different
contexts: in sexual harassment cases, it is used to judge whether a
similarly situated woman would have felt harassed; in domestic violence cases, it is purportedly used to judge whether another woman
would have felt comparably endangered; and in rape cases, it is used
to judge whether another woman would have felt herself raped. By
providing an authoritative image of acceptable conduct, the reasonable woman standard enhances the credibility of women whose conduct or beliefs conform with that image. Its use makes women's
accounts believable within a system that puts the reasonable man on
a pedestal and denies legal protection to unreasonable behavior. 50
used a similar objective test, but also required the plaintiff to show that the discrimination adversely affected her. Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1480-81,
1486 (3rd Cir. 1990)(two female police officers who were regularly subjected to derogatory and obscene name calling, and to pornographic pictures in the workplace could
have alleged "a work environment hostile and offensive to women of reasonable sensitivitiess"); see Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1524 (M.D.
Fla. 1991), appeal docketed, No. 91-3655 (11th Cir. 1991) (same test). The reasonable
woman standard is actually only one component of a larger test to determine hostile
environment sexual harassment.
In State v. Wanrow-a women's self-defense case that has been used as a model for
battered women's cases-that court used a subjective test, stating that Ms. Wanrow "was
entitled to have the jury consider her actions in light of her own perceptions of the
situation." 559 P.2d 548, 559 (Wash. 1977).
50 As Kathleen Lahey points out, "various kind[s] of abuse... [including) sexism
... condition and shape people in ways that often make it easy to label them 'unreasonable.' " Kathleen Lahey, Reasonable Women and the Law, in AT THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW:
FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY 3, 5 (Martha A. Fineman & Nancy Thomadsen eds., 1991).

Senate hearings on the nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to the Supreme
Court dramatically illustrate the need for a reasonable woman standard. After Anita
Hill, a law professor at the University of Oklahoma, reported that Judge Thomas had
sexually harassed her, the judiciary committee attempted to determine the "truth" ofher allegations.
Although Professor Hill described her experiences, often in graphic terms, there
was a sense throughout the Senate debates that many men did not "get" it-did not
understand sexual harassment. E.g., Anna Quindlen, Public & Private: Listen to Us, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 9, 1991, at A25. As Senator Dennis DeConcini explained his reaction to
Professor Hill's statement, "people have to make their judgments based on what happens to them in their life at their period of time. I don't say that it didn't happen but I'm
convinced that there's another side to this story." Excerptsfrom 2 PanelMembers' Comments
on Allegations Against Thomas, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1991, at A20; see Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REv. 971 (1991) (discussing how narrative accords with
personal experiences). His attitude of incredulity typifies that of many Senators and
shows, in the words of Professor Susan Deller Ross, that men simply may not understand what it feels like to be "a vulnerable and trapped female." Maureen Dowd, The
Thomas Nomination: The Senate and Sexism, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1991, at Al, A21.
Repeatedly, Senators questioned how a woman could remain silent for ten years
about egregious sexual harassment, and even maintain a cordial relationship with her
harasser. Excerpts From Senate's Hearings on the Thomas Nomination, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12,
1991, at A12, A15. Beyond questioning Professor Hill's actions in not reporting the
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In some cases, the reasonable woman standard has successfully
helped women win sexual harassment and domestic violence
cases.5 1 Indeed, the "reasonable woman" is starting to become
something of a stock figure 52 in such cases because it helps women
explain their experiences to judges and juries. For example, in sexual harassment cases, the standard shows why a woman might find
that sexually explicit pictures in the workplace constitute harassment;53 in domestic violence cases, it helps explain why a woman
might reasonably feel that she is in imminent danger at a time when
54
her husband is sleeping.
In both sexual harassment and battered woman's cases, expert
testimony has helped to establish the conduct and reactions of the
reasonable woman, 5 5 providing additional support for the reasona57
bleness of the woman's feelings.5 6 For example, in State v. Stewart,
Ms. Stewart had been repeatedly abused by her husband: he had
beaten her with a baseball bat, shot one of her cats, and threatened
repeatedly to kill her.5 8 She shot him while he slept. At her trial,
she called an expert witness who testified that she suffered from battered woman syndrome.5 9 The court held that "expert evidence of
the battered woman syndrome is relevant to a determination of the
sexual harassment, Senators also raised questions about her character. Andrew Rosenthal, White House Role in Thomas Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1991, at Al. Pennsylvania
Senator Alan Specter accused Professor Hill of perjury. Id. In an extreme example of
male incomprehension, Senator Thurmond noted that he had "been contacted by several psychiatrists, suggesting that it is entirely possible she is suffering from delusions.
Perhaps she is living in a fantasy world." 137 CONG. REC., S14,649 (daily ed. Oct. 15,
1991) (remarks of Senator Thurmond). In evaluating all of the evidence, Senator
DeConcini (who voted to confirm Justice Thomas) explained that it was appropriate to
use a "reasonable person" standard. Id. at S14,656 (statement of Senator DeConcini).
51 See, e.g., Ellison, 924 F.2d at 872 (sexual harassment); State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d
364, 577 (N.J. 1984) (self-defense) (expert testimony is relevant to determining the reasonableness of the belief of a battered woman that she was in imminent danger).
52 For discussion of "stock stories," see generally Delgado & Stefancic, supra note
35; Gerald Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1 (1984).
53
See Robinson v.Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
54 See State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 820 (N.D. 1983) (expert testimony on
the battered woman syndrome helps the jury to decide "the existence and reasonableness of the accused's belief that force was necessary to protect herself from imminent
harm.").
55 Robinson, 760 F. Supp. 1486 (sexual harassment); Kelly, 478 A.2d at 364 (battered woman's syndrome).
56 As Kim Lane Scheppele explains, "The use of expert testimony allows a woman
to win a case against a man by having a 'qualified person' testify that she was suffering
from trauma or delusion .. " Kim L. Scheppele, Just the Facts, Ma'am: Considering
Considered Stories 33 (Nov. 1991) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Cornell Law
Review).
57
763 P.2d 572 (Kan. 1988).
58
Id. at 575.
59
Id. at 576.
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reasonableness of the defendant's perception of danger." 60 Evidently, even under a reasonable battered woman standard, the reasonableness of a particular woman's conduct is not always obvious;
she often needs additional corroboration. Expert testimony provides the means to look outside of "objective" rules and expectations; that is, while many women have been raped, battered, or
sexually harassed, their experiences may not be familiar to judges or
juries. Alternatively, because prevailing societal myths blame women for letting these things happen to them, it is easy to believe that
these women are aberrational, and even for other victims not to rec61
ognize the feelings.
Indeed, this is how the reasonable woman standard works in
rape cases. Several myths exist about how women act that make
rape cases difficult, such as: "women mean 'yes' when they say 'no';
women are 'asking for it' when they wear provocative clothes, go to
bars alone, or simply walk down the street at night; only virgins can
be raped." 6 2 In the future, the reasonable woman in battered women self-defense cases and in sexual harassment cases may come to
resemble the reasonable woman in rape cases, rather than the rape
63
standard changing.
The following section explores the reasonable woman in feminist theory. This examination helps to illustrate why a new "quasimetanarrative" 64 has been created to replace the reasonable man,
and how the reasonable woman fits into some debates in contemporary feminist theory. Because the reasonable woman standard is
also a construct which attorneys use in practice when seeking to rep60
61

Id. at 577.
See Christine A. Littleton, Women's Experience and the Problems of Transition: Perspec-

tives on Male Battering of Women and the Problem of Transition, 1989 U. CHI. L.F. 23. These
myths are held by women, as wIl as men. Morrison Torrey reports:
In one experiment, female subjects believed that over 25 percent of the
female population would derive some pleasure from being victimized [by
rape], even though the subjects themselves clearly believed that they personally would not derive pleasure from being victimized under any
circumstances.
Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair Trial in Rape
Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 1013, 1039-1040 (1991).
62 Torrey, supra note 61, at 1015. Professor Torrey notes the need for expert testimony concerning the falseness of these myths in order to change attitudes and expectations about women's behavior. Id. at 1067.
63 See Estrich, Sex at Work, supra note 20 (making similar observation with respect to
the standards in rape and sexual harassment cases); letter from Nancy Ehrenreich,
3/5/92 (on file with Cornell Law Review).
"Quasi-metanarratives" are concepts which "tacitly presuppose some commonly
64
held but unwarranted and essentialist assumptions about the nature of human beings
and the conditions for social life." Nancy Fraser & Linda Nicholson, Social Criticism without Philosophy: An Encounter between Feminism and Postmodernism, in FEMINIsM/POSTMODERNISM, supra note 30, at 19, 27.
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resent "reasonable women," later sections then examine how these
theoretical debates can inform future practice strategies.
C.

The Reasonable Woman and Feminist Theory

Feminist practice 6 5 and scholarship are mainly concerned with
issues of sameness and differences between and among men and
women. 66 Two somewhat overlapping perspectives from within
feminism exist on these issues: sameness-difference and domination-subordination. Critical race theory adds a third perspective.
"Sameness" feminist theories are concerned with similarities
between men and women, and differences among women; they "target overtly sex-based legislation as problematic because it limits
'67
how we may define ourselves and how we can unfold over time."
"Difference" theories are concerned with differences between men
(as a group) and women (as a group); theorists argue that "abolishing overt sex categories in the law does not ...

directly attack wo-

68

men's disadvantages and subordination."
Catharine MacKinnon
rejects both sameness and difference feminism, arguing that these
theories do not address the experiences of women who live under
conditions of sex inequality. Both sameness and difference feminists use a male standard to evaluate issues of sameness or difference, and MacKinnon argues that women simply are not similarly
situated to men, especially with respect to issues of sexual assault
and reproduction. 69 Indeed, she believes that the sameness approach to legal issues obscures women's inequality because it finds
70
discrimination only where men and women are similarly situated.
Her theory also diverges from difference feminism in that she objects to reifying differences, perceiving this as insulting because it
65

See ALICE ECHOLS, DARING TO BE BAD (1990), for an historical perspective on the

sameness-difference debate among radical feminists.
66 Joan Williams begins her 1989 article as follows: "I start out, as have many
others, from the deep split among American feminists between 'sameness' and 'difference.' " Williams, supra note 16, at 798; see also Bender, supra note 26.
Feminist jurisprudence and epistemology challenge the exclusion of women's experiences from prevailing discourses and the (male) perspective of the all-knowing, objective person. See generally Marie Ashe, Mind's Opportunity: Birthing a Post-Structuralist
FeministJurisprudence,38 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1129 (1987); Clare Dalton, Where We Stand:
Observations on the Situation of Feminist Legal Thought, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ. 1 (1989);
Mari J. Matsuda, When the FirstQuail Calls: Multiple Consciousness asJurisprudentialMethod,
11 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 7 (1989); Heather R. Wishik, To Question Everything: The Inquiries of FeministJurisprudence, I BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ. 64 (1985).
67 Wendy W. Williams, Notes from a FirstGeneration, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 99, 108.
68 Id.
69
MacKinnon, supra note 14, at 1296-99.
70 See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 217
(1989); Holly Fechner, Note, Toward an Expanded Conception of Law Reform: Sexual Harassment Law and the Reconstruction of Facts, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 475, 483 (1990).
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only affirms, as "feminine," what a male society has permitted women to be.7 1 MacKinnon contends that sex discrimination results
from the power inequality between men and women, and she has
developed a difference-as-dominance theory. 72 Under MacKinnon's
theory, gender is a hierarchy constructed by men. 73 Because men
have power, they have constructed this hierarchy of inequality. 74
Difference is the way that men dominate women.
Like feminists, other outsider groups have developed new ways
of challenging how difference is constructed. Critical race theory,
which focuses on the relationship between the law and race, critiques how law "create[s] racial categories and legitimates racial subordination. ' 75 Critical race theorists believe that racism is part of
American culture, 76 and that telling counterstories about the vic77
tim's experience may help to change the dominant culture.
Through these stories, others may be able to recognize the com78
plexity of oppression for outsiders.
Even though some feminists are seeking to move beyond the
sameness-difference discussions and related ideas, 79 and to incorporate insights from critical race theories, these discussions are still
useful in sorting out the significance of the reasonable woman standard. We cannot move beyond the sameness-difference debate until
we better understand its implications.
Sameness feminism suggests that the reasonable woman standard is too limiting. Such a standard perpetuates distinctions between men and women, rather than developing a standard
applicable to both sexes. Thus, sameness theories would advocate a
reasonable person standard. Difference feminism critiques a rea71

CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Diference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination,in FEMI-

NISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW" 32, 39 (1987).
72
Others have developed modifications of MacKinnon's approach.

Ruth Colker
bases her analysis of sex discrimination on the antisubordination principle. Ruth
Colker, Anti-SubordinationAbove All: Sex, Race, and EqualProtection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003
(1986). Under this approach, any policy or practice that contributes to the subordination of an historically dominated group is discriminatory.
73
MACKINNON, supra note 70, at 227.
74 Id. at 219.
75
Crenshaw, supra note 43, at 213 n.7. She emphasizes that there is no single definition of critical race theory. The first conference on critical race theory was held in July
1989. Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758, 758 n.2.
76 Richard Delgado, Recasting the American Race Problem, 79 CAL. L. REv. 1389, 1395
(1991).
77
See, e.g.,
Richard Delgado, Storytellingfor Oppositionistsand Others: A Pleafor Narrative, 87 MicH. L. REV. 2320 (1989).
78
Crenshaw, supra note 43, at 212.
79 E.g., Lucinda M. Finley, TranscendingEquality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and
the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118 (1986);Joan C. Williams, Dissolving the Sameness/Difference Debate: A Post-Modern Path Beyond Essentialism in Feminist and Critical Race
Theory, 1991 DUKE L.J. 296; Williams, supra note 16.
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sonable person approach, because only the language, and not the
underlying content, changes. It would call for a reasonable woman
standard that takes into account women's perceptions and experiences that differ from men's, and likewise a reasonable man standard that reflects these different experiences. Dominance theorists
might articulate a reasonable woman perspective for both men and
women,8 0 imposing women's perspectives onto men's lives, 8 l just as
men's perspectives have been imposed on women.8 2 The problem
would be determining a woman's perspective that is developed
83
outside of the structures which subordinate women.
As a theoretical construct, the reasonable woman standard accords nicely with difference feminism because it focuses on similarities among women and differences with men.8 4 An examination of
the premises of difference feminism reveals that the reasonable
woman standard parallels difference theories. Consequently, critiques of difference theory provide insights into the shortcomings of
the reasonable woman standard from which we can generate more
effective practice strategies.
Many difference theorists draw upon the work of psychologist
Carol Gilligan 8 5 and philosopher Nel Noddings.8 6 These "cultural
feminists"8 7 assert that women use an ethic of care in their moral
reasoning, while men are more oriented to an ethic of rights.8 8 Dif80 See Ruth Colker, Feminist Consciousness andthe State: A Basisfor CautiousOptimism, 90
COLUM. L. REv. 1146, 1157 (1990) (review of MacKinnon).
81 Id
82 See MACKINNON, supra note 70, at 183.
83 Id. at 117. For a critique of false consciousness, see Kathryn Abrams, Ideology and

Women's Choices, 24 GA. L. REV. 761 (1990) (suggesting alternative strategies to describe
women's choices, such as articulating multi-causal explanations).
84 However, unlike dominance theory, which suggests a new standard for all based
on a reasonable woman, difference theory suggests different standards based on sex. As
discussed supra notes 44-64 and accompanying text, courts have contrasted reasonable
men and women, rather than suggesting a reasonable woman's perspective should control the action of both sexes.
85 E.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982) [hereinafter GILLIGAN, DiFFERENT VOICE]; CAROL GILLIGAN, MAPPING THE MORAL DOMAIN (Carol Gilligan et al.,

eds., 1988) [hereinafter GILLIGAN, MORAL DOMAIN].
86 E.g., NEL NODDINGS, WOMEN AND EVIL (1990); NEL NODDINGS, CARING (1984)
[hereinafter NODDINGS, CARING].
87 See Robin West, Jurisprudenceand Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988).

88

This perspective views women as more caring and oriented towards relationships

than men. Women tend to perceive morally troubling problems as situations in which
people might be hurt, RAND JACK & DANA C. JACK, MORAL VISION AND PROFESSIONAL
DECISIONS 173 (1989), and try to resolve conflicts by using strategies that maintain connection and relationship, NODDINGS, CARING, supra note 86, at 8. Correspondingly, women are contextual, looking at the concrete circumstances surrounding any problem.
GILLIGAN, DIFFERENT VOICE, supra note 85, at 38; NODDINGS, CARING, supra note 86, at 8,
96; Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 72 VA.
L. REV. 543, 587 (1986). Men, by contrast, are oriented towards individual autonomy
and impartial rules. They tend to see problems in terms of violations of rights, rather
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ference feminism criticizes the legal system because (white) men
constructed it to accord with male values, overlooking or devaluing
female values. The legal system values claims of individual rights,
and overlooks claims that are based on interconnection and responsibility. A legal system based on connection, rather than on competing rights, would value different aspects of each case, and might
result in court opinions that "cr[y] out in anguish about the lessons
of history, power and domination, '8 9 rather than opinions that use
"neutral" language. It might result in according the right to shelter,
a basic human need, a higher status than the right to own property,
a male assertion of individual rights. 90 Procedurally, litigation
might involve more negotiation and mediation, rather than aggressive litigation battles. 9 1
For women in the workplace, difference feminism appears to
free women from the need to succeed according to male standards, 9 2 because it aspires for a workplace that appreciates both traditionally male and female attributes. It allows women to value both
motherhood and work. This newly restructured workplace would
"fit female persons and lifestyles to the same extent they now fit
male ones." 93 In battered women's cases, feminists have developed

an image of a reasonable battered woman as a way not only to explain battered women who kill their husbands, but also to justify the
need for special intrafamily statutes that offer protection to battered
94
women.
than relationships between people. JACK &JACK, supra, at 173. Men are more likely to
resolve conflicts by examining competing rights, and applying neutral and abstract standards. Nona Plessner Lyons, Two Perspectives: On Self, Relationships, and Morality, in
MORAL DOMAIN, supra note 85, at 35.
89 Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered
Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 887, 897 (1989) (discussing dissent in
City of Richmond v. Croson) 488 U.S. 469, 528 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
90 JACK & JACK, supra note 88, at 167-68; see also Bender, supra note 32; see, e.g.,
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 537 (1989) (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (contrasting the (nonexistent) duty to rescue from an ethic of right and an ethnic of
care); Tracy Higgins, Note, Rethinking (M)otherhood: Feminist Theory and State Regulation of
Pregnancy, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1325 (1990) (contrasting treatment of pregnant, drug-addicted women from an ethic of right and an ethic of care perspective).
91 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Woman's
Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ. 39 (1985).
92 June Carbone & Margaret Brinig, Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Ideology, Economic
Change, and Divorce Reform, 65 TUL. L. REV. 953, 984 (1991).
93
Christine Littleton, Equality and Feminist Theory, 48 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1043, 1052
(1987).
94 For the development of this image on the criminal side, see LENORE E. WALKER,
TERRIFYING LOVE (1990); LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME (1984);
LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATrERED WOMAN (1979) [hereinafter WALKER, BATrERED
WOMAN]; Schneider, supra note 25. On the civil side, see SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND
MALE VIOLENCE (1982).
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Given that existing legal standards generally exclude women's
experiences, a new standard that centers and values women's experiences is needed. To ensure that women's lives are adequately recognized, this recommended standard accordingly recognizes that
women and men may need different treatment. 95 The reasonable
woman standard is a powerful development in practice for women
in sexual harassment and self-defense cases.
II
MORE STORIES ABOUT REASONABLE WOMEN: FEMINIST
THEORY, STEREOTYPES, CATEGORIES, AND

CLIENTS
A.

Double-Edged Nature: Stereotypes and Categories

Notwithstanding its many benefits, the reasonable woman standard is problematic. Not only does it remind us of earlier stereotypes of women as more pure and moral than men, 9 6 but it also
reduces women's experiences by attempting to capture the essential, relegating "other" experiences to the margins of acceptance.
While the standard nonetheless has enabled women to win some
cases, and it may also depict some valuable attributes that can contribute to new possibilities of lawyering on behalf of women, its
problems ultimately overwhelm its utility.
First, the reasonable woman standard is reminisent of earlier
dominant images of white middle class women. The prevailing discourse of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries depicted women as
pure, chaste, virtuous, and altruistic. 9 7 Today, women are still en95
See Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75
1299 (1987).

CAL.

L.

REV.

1279,

96 Joan C. Williams, Domesticity as the Dangerous Supplement of Liberalism, 2J. WOMEN'S
HIsT. 69, 71-72 (1991) (men were associated with baseness, women with "higher"
virtues).
97 See Barbara Welter, The Cult of True Womanhood: 1820-1860, 18 AM. Q 151
(1966); see also SUZANNE LEBSOCK, THE FREE WOMEN OF PETERSBURG 232-34 (1984) (suggesting that while the true womanhood cult was closer to reality than is comfortable, it
was a conservative response to changes in women's status). In Victorian literature, women were generally depicted as thin, delicate creatures. They rarely ate because to eat
was to display hunger and sexuality; the very absence of female bodily needs defined
women. HELENA MICHIE, THE FLESH MADE WORD (1987). It is important to note the
many women were excluded by this discourse: women of color, lesbians, and women of

a lower socioeconomic class. See

HAZEL CARBY, RECONSTRUCTING WOMANHOOD

23-30

(1989) (contrasting discourse that defined the roles of the white plantation mistress and
female slaves); see also Harris, supra note 43, at 598-601 (exploring differences between
rhetoric of rape, which is based on white women's experiences, and the meaning of rape
to black women). In the early twentieth century, these stereotypes resulted in courts
upholding "protective" employment restrictions for women. E.g., Muller v. Oregon,
208 U.S. 412 (1908) (limiting hours women could work).
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couraged to reject self-interest. 98 Similarly, the reasonable woman
standard today denies the needs and realities of women in order to
create them as passive, delicate creatures. 9 9 By definition, the reasonable woman standard establishes certain expectations for women
that are different than those for men. A reasonable woman is offended by workplace decorations that depict nude women; a reasonable woman will not go to a man's house at three a.m. (nor allow a
man into her house at that time) unless she expects sex, and will
report promptly to the authorities if her virtue is violated; a reasonable woman will not tolerate repeated battering or, if she does, she
will certainly not respond aggressively or resort to violence herself.
The reasonable woman thus becomes a victim who needs protection; when her actions can be portrayed as those of a victim, she is
protected by the courts. Other women do not, unfortunately, fit the
reasonable woman stereotype.
A second problem with the reasonable woman standard is that
it does not accommodate the experiences of all women. Women
define harassing behavior differently. 10 0 Some women accept as
normal operating behavior actions that other women would equate
with harassment; indeed, various forms of sexual harassment are so
pervasive that many women have learned to "take it and smile," lest
they be labelled an "uptight bitch."''
The reasonable woman standardizes harassing behavior, making it conform to a certain standard before it is legally actionable. Women who have suffered the
98 See Joan C. Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1559 (1991) (discussing current effects of domesticity).
99 See Finley, supra note 26, at 64.
100
Professor Anita Hill's experiences, see supra note 50, show the diversity of attitudes among women about what conduct is reasonable. Many women understood why
Professor Hill only reluctantly reported sexual harassment years after it occurred. On
the other hand, however, many other women simply did not believe Professor Hill and
dismissed her claims. Various polls found differing percentages of women who believed, or did not believe, Professor Hill. An ABC News poll conducted on the eve of
the confirmation vote showed that 49% of women found Judge (now Justice) Thomas
more credible. Priscilla Painton, Woman Power, TIME, Oct. 28, 1991, at 24. In a USA
Today poll taken after the hearings, 45% of women believedJustice Thomas, while 26%
believed Professor Hill. Steve Marshall, Poll Sexes in Agreement on Thomas, USA TODAY,
Oct. 14, 1991, at Al. One woman stated, "There were too many inconsistencies in [Professor Hill's] story .... I think women are scheming little creatures." Eloise Salholz et
al., Dividing Lines, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 28, 1991, at 24.
According to Catharine MacKinnon's perspective, we can dismiss these views as
constructed by genderized power relations. See generally MAcKINNON, supra note 70.
Such a perspective, however, denies women any agency, negating the reality that many
women experience. See Abrams, supra note 83; Colker, supra note 80.
101
If we acknowledged that these actions were sexual harassment, our work environments would be intolerable. See Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women:
Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MicH. L. REV. 1 (1991); cf Littleton, supra note 61
(notwithstanding the pervasiveness of domestic violence, victims are isolated and unbelieved, because of the horror of their reality).
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requisite type of conduct have been harassed or raped; others who
suffer different types of behavior, or react differently to "accepted"
behaviors, have no claim.
Finally, the reasonable woman standard is victim-focused. It is
used in evaluating the behavior of sexual harassment, rape, or domestic violence victims. Rather than the harasser/rapist/abuser being held to certain standards of behavior, it is the recipent of male
actions who is judged according to whether she reacted
appropriately.
Yet I find myself reluctant to dismiss entirely the reasonable
woman standard. Yes, the reasonable woman standard builds on
earlier stereotypes of women, emphasizing women's virtuous and
sensitive nature in sexual harassment cases, and her passivity in selfdefense cases. Sometimes, however, these images are accurate:
more women than men are apparently offended by certain types of
sexually explicit behavior. 10 2 Some of these images are inaccurate,
especially, of course, in rape cases. Many women are reluctant to
report that they have been raped, not because the rape never occurred, but because they do not want the publicity, or do not want
to acknowledge their vulnerability, or they fear being debased by
the legal process. The question then becomes whether and how to
balance some of the truths behind stereotypes with the damage
caused by the stereotypes in legal theory and practice in these areas.
Stereotypes about women, when "viewed differently, reflect
real injuries of subordination and subtle strategies through which
people cope with a relative lack of social power."' 10 3 We need not
embrace the stereotypes as accurate in order to acknowledge that
they may contain positive attributes. 104 These "outsider" exper102

The research by Pauline Bart on women's and men's attitudes towards pornogra-

phy shows that they respond differently. E.g., Pauline Bart, et. al., The Different Worlds of

Men and Women, in BEYOND METHODOLOGY 171 (Mary Freeman &Judith Wok eds., 1991).
For example, she found that 29%o of women moderately or strongly agreed that pornography has its place, compared to 61% of men. Id. at 175.
103
Lucie E. White, Lawyeringfor the Poor, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 861, 881 (1990); see also
Kathleen Lahey, On Silences, Screams and Scholarship: An Introduction to Feminist Legal Theory,

in CANADIAN PERSPECTIVES ON
been a form of resistance).
104

LEGAL THEORY

319, 320-21 (1991) (women's silence has

Joan Williams has suggested that many of the stereotypes of women as nurturing

and moral as compared to selfish, self-interested men, that underlie Gilligan's work and
feminist difference theory men are more of a "status report" of contemporary gender

role ideology than a description of how women actually behave. Williams, supra note 98.
She suggests that women's behavior is actually far more complex than these stereotypes
suggest: women are caught in a society which promotes a selfish ideal worker, rather
than the moral and nurturing mother that female gender ideology promotes, and women feel themselves torn between the two competing images. Id. at 82.
As Kathryn Abrams notes, however, Williams's analysis results in "abstracting"
gendered attributes from gender. Abrams, supra note 3, at 1193. Abrams points out
that this is dangerous because men and women often do act differently, and it may bene-
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iences contain potential sources of strength and positive imagery,10 5
although they are not necessarily "more" valid than insider's experiences. Thus, stereotypes that show the effects of disempowerment
can also illustrate strategies of resistance. 10 6 For example, women
used the value of their supposed virtuousness as a reason to get suffrage in the early twentieth century. That women had to manipulate
male legislators by using the stereotyped attribute of "virtue" in this
manner does illustrate their comparative powerlessness, but also
shows that they could use this "positive" stereotype to their advantage. Or take "deference," an attribute that Kathryn Abrams labels
"unproductive" for women.1 0 7 This powerless quality may be an
important component of a reconstructed attorney-client relationship where the attorney defers to her client's goals, encouraging
some clients to assume control over the terms of the representation.
The stereotype here may empower the clients and help the lawyer to
resist the tendency toward lawyer domination.
The reasonable woman standard can be seen as a comparable
strategy of resistance. It was developed by reclaiming stereotypes
about women, using the positive aspects of those stereotypes but
not challenging the utility of the stereotypes themselves. 10 8 While it
fit women to value traditionally female attributes. Id. at 1193-94. Unlike Williams,
Abrams believes it is possible to separate those traditional feminine attributes that are
"desirable" from those that are "undesirable," and to utilize the former while rejecting
the latter. Id. at 1194 & n.47.
I agree, in part, with both Williams and Abrams about the effect of stereotypes and
the need to value gendered attributes. Williams is correct that males are far more "female" than gender ideology credits them (and, similarly, females are far more "male"
than gender ideology acknowledges); Abrams is right that the positive attributes of what
has been defined as "woman's voice" must be valued as gendered attributes. I think,
however, that it will be very difficult to isolate undesirable attributes because of the tenacity and pervasiveness of stereotypes. Moreover, we need to re-examine some of
these negative attributes to help us understand what they say about women and whether,
and how, they can be useful in constructing new images.
105
See Matsuda, supra note 66; see also Patricia H. Collins, Learningfrom the Outsider
Within, in BEYOND METHODOLOGY 34, 39 (Mary Fonow &Judith Cook eds., 1991) (While
stereotypes are used to control subordinated groups, "many of the attributes extant in
Black female stereotypes are actually distorted renderings of those aspects of Black female behavior seen as most threatening."). But see Williams, supra note 79, at 317 (noting that, unlike difference feminists, "outsider-scholars" do not try to revive traditional
stereotypes of blacks because they "are so unambiguously insulting.").
106
Women have some power even in a male-dominated society. See Colker, supra
note 80 (if male power were so all-encompassing, there could be no feminist consciousness); Flax, supra note 30, at 56; Linda Gordon, Response to Scott, 15 SIGNs 4 (Summer
1990).
107
Abrams, supra note 3, at 1194 n.47.
108
I am not arguing for a full endorsement or adoption of stereotypes. To the contrary, I am arguing for the need to disclose the historical link between certain modes of
self-understanding and modes of domination, and to resist the ways in which we have
already been classified and identified by dominant discourse. This means "redefining []
from within resistant cultures." June Sawicki, Identity Politics and Sexual Freedom: Foucault
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establishes a new standard, however, this standard is one that accepts that there is a reasonable man, and that the reasonable woman
acts differently from him in ways that the legal system can understand, and that courts can apply.1 0 9 It does not change the underlying standard, which still applies male notions of reasonableness to
women.
The reasonable woman thus remains an image drawn in reaction to male images of women, which in turn draw upon women's
biological nature.1 1 0 Even in the areas of sexual harassment and
battered woman self defense law, where women have assumed some
of the power to define legal images, the resulting standard still can
be destructive to women because it embodies and perpetuates stereotypes and requires women to conform to them. In the rape context, the reasonable woman standard certainly is destructive because
it establishes myths for juries about women's behavior. While some
interpretations of the reasonable woman do help women, the standard accepts commonly held images of women and as such, is "conservative." 1' 1 It constructs rhetoric based on moral or passive
women, regardless of who controls the imaging powers. It is not a
standard that facilitates the slow and careful exploration of individ1 12
ual client realities.
The multiplicity of voices which emerges from the experiences
of individual clients is the undoing of the reasonable woman. As is
clear, the experiences of women in different groups (and the experiences of individual women within these groups) varies. Not all women who were sexually harassed never indicated welcomeness; not
all battered women are helpless; and some raped women flirted and
acted seductively with their rapist. The variety, depth, and complexity of conduct that can be reasonable within given circumstances
needs to be recognized within legal theory and practice. Although it

and Feminism, in FEMINISM AND FOUCAULT 177, 186 (Irene Diamond & Lee Quinby eds.,
1988).
109 But see Williams, supra note 67, at 106 (arguing that when laws assign benefits
based on whether one is Jake or Amy (Carol Gilligan's paradigmatic male and female),
then "the women who are supposed to be Amys but look more like Jakes, or in some
other way not-Amy, are foreclosed from expressing who they are and are officially invalidated for it.").
110 See Schroeder, supra note 16.
111 Jeanne L. Schroeder, Feminism Historicized: Medieval Misogynist Stereotypes in Contemporary FeministJurisprudence,75 IowA L. REV. 1135, 1216 (1990).
112 This was Elizabeth Schneider's goal in developing women's self-defense. See
Elizabeth Schneider, Lesbians, Gays, and Feminists at the Bar, 10 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 107
(1988). Of course, whenever a new and powerful theory is developed, there is a temptation to transform it into a "grand theory." See Frances Olsen, Feminist Theory in the Grand
Style, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1137 (1989); supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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is easier to use one grand stereotype,1 1 3 convenience simply does
not justify this practice.
There are, of course, many practical problems to representing
women's differences while seeking to end (at least some forms of)
discriminatory treatment. Indeed, the issue of how to represent the
complexities of women's experience within the legal system is complicated and frustrating. Professor Abrams suggests various methods for presenting multiple views to a legal forum, such as
presenting the interests of different clients in an amicus brief.114
The reasonable woman standard is another attempt to represent
women's differences, at least by suggesting their differences from
men (although not from each other). While it essentializes women,
the standard is, nonetheless, an attempt to meet the need for different standards that respond to concrete realities.
B.

Practice: How the Stereotype of the Reasonable Woman
Affects Attorney-Client Relationships

Our clients come to us for many different reasons, with diverse
backgrounds and motivations, not all of which are comprehensible.
We translate their experiences into legally recognized claims or defenses. 115 We see individual clients, but we also see these clients as
manifestations of larger patterns."16 In fact, it is imperative to determine whether similar claims have been made by others, and what
strategies have been effective.1 17 Consequently, stereotypes operate
within the attorney-client relationship for both attorney and cliAbrams, supra note 83; Olsen, supra note 112.
Abrams, supra note 2, at 393. This strategy may work well at the appellate level,
where amicus briefs serve as a recognized forum for presenting multiple overlapping
and supporting perspectives. See Sally Burns, Notes From the Field: Reply to ProfessorColker,
13 HARV. WOMEN's LJ. 189 (1990) (discussing the development of amicus briefs in
Supreme Court cases).
But the problems are more difficult at the trial level. Nonetheless, trial counsel
often do convey a multiplicity of perspectives when they plead in the alternative as permitted under procedural rules. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2) ("A party may set forth two
or more statements of a claim or defense alternately or hypothetically ....A party may
also state as many separate claims or defenses as the party has regardless of consistency."). Even under this strategy, which presents multiple, possibly competing claims,
each claim is considered separately, without an attempt to develop a whole mosaic.
115
"The job of a lawyer is to re-present her client's views in such a way that the
client's 'story' comes across as compelling to ajudge orjury." Kim L. Scheppele, Telling
Stories, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 2073, 2090 n.53 (1989); see Cunningham, Thinking About Law,
supra note 8, at 2492 (contrasting "re-presenting" with translation).
116 For a discussion of how we apply these patterns, see Steve Winter, Contingency
and Community in Normative Practice, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 963, 993-94 (1991).
117 1 mean "effective" in the limited sense of the plaintiff achieving the purpose of
her suit, as declared in her pleadings. I am not addressing empowerment.
118

114
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ent.118 For the attorney, the focus in these cases is often on whether
her client is a victim and whether she meets the requisite standards
for legal recognition. 119 The lawyer must try to fit her client ("the
victim") into an acceptable story so that she can win. Her actions
must become "reasonable," as that term is defined, by some community standard.120 Rather than examine standards of conduct that
allow the aggressor to behave as he has, we must instead examine
our client's actions to see whether she is a worthy victim. If she did
not resist enough, if she led him on, or if she did not leave when she
had (what we now see as) the opportunity, then she did not act sufficiently reasonable and will not win. Instead, she will be blamed for
talking to a man, flirting and teasing, drinking too much, or being
12
too wild.
At the same time as we scrutinize her individual behavior, we
are trying to fit her into a group with distinguishable characteristics.
We are familiar with the legal requirements for sexual harassment
victims, battered women, and rape victims. There are syndromes
that help to describe their behavior. We want our clients to fit into
the recognized patterns. Not only does it make our jobs easier, but
118 See Alfieri, supra note 10, at 2124 (poverty lawyers name their clients as dependent); Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness, 79 GEO. LJ.
1499 (1991) (discussing dominant visions of the poor).
119
For an example of how a rape survivor had to be represented as weak and vulnerable, rather than angry, see Kristin Bumiller, Fallen Angels: The Representation of Violence
Against Women Legal Culture in AT THE BOUNDARIES OF THE LAw 95 (Nancy S. Thomuelsen
& Martha Fineman eds., 1991). For a comparable discussion of homelessness and victimization, see Lucie E. White, Representing "The Real Deal", 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 271, 298
(1990-1991); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes:
Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 46 (1990) ("The lawyer had scripted
[her client] as a victim. That was the only strategy for the hearing that the lawyer...
could imagine for [her client].") [hereinafter White, Subordination].
120
See Ehrenreich, supra note 28; Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73
CAL. L. REV. 1152 (1985).
121
See Camille Paglia, Rape: A Bigger Danger than Feminists Know, NEWSDAY, Jan. 27,
1991, at 32 ("A woman going to a fraternity party is walking into Testosterone Flats ....
A girl who goes upstairs alone with a brother at a fraternity party is an idiot."); Ann
Landers, After Hours of Petting, It's Too Late to Stop, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 4, 1991; see also VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 204 (1986) (citing studies ofjury attitudes in rape cases that reflect male perspective of what is reasonable: many beieved
50%o of all rapes are reported by women seeking revenge on men or trying to cover for
an illegitimate pregnancy); 2 Charged with Assault on Student from Loyola, Cm. TRIB.,
Sept. 9, 1987, § 2, at 4 (two men who allegedly gang raped a woman were charged with
misdemeanor criminal sexual assault rather than felony rape because woman had been
drinking and delayed reporting the incident until the morning after it occurred). But see
Naomi Wolf, We're All "Bad Girls" Now: Our Lives areJust as "Lurid" as Those of Alleged Rape
Victims, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 1991. Similarly, as discussed infra, in our domestic violence
cases, it is more difficult to construct a case to support a client's receipt of a protection
order, especially for women who are too angry, hit back, started fights, or who left home
without their children.
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it also may help our clients overcome some of the distrust directed
against them, so that they will be believed.
Thus, the actual physical violence committed against our clients
may be compounded by their lawyer's and judge's reactions.1 22 An
example from one of my classes shows the potentially damaging effects of stereotyping within the attorney-client relationship. We
were exploring the reasons that battered women might stay with
their abusers. Many of the students suggested that the battered
woman was a victim of learned helplessness and could not leave for
psychological reasons. Then a formerly battered woman, who had
observed hundreds of cases and talked with thousands of victims,
spoke. She suggested that the battered woman may stay because
she loves her abuser and cannot afford to live apart from him.
A lawyer who cannot see (or understand) how love affects a battering relationship or the importance of economics is missing important aspects of her client's life. 12 3 She will not understand why
her client stays with the abuser or returns to him. As a result, she
will grow angry and frustrated with her client, and perhaps seek
ways to terminate the representation. This will make her client feel
blameworthy for her "unreasonable" love for the batterer, and the
client will feel judged-by her own lawyer-at the moment she first
enters the legal system. Of course, understanding this context does
not ensure that the attorney will not become angry and frustrated;
however, her emotions will be tempered with understanding.
Even if she does understand her client's circumstances, in her
role as intermediary between the client and the court, the lawyer
may nonetheless choose to portray her client in a certain way so that
she will win. I do not criticize feminist lawyers for trying to help
their clients in this way. But having achieved some success, we must
evaluate the costs and benefits of existing legal standards and the
mode of their development within-and to-the attorney-client relationship. A reasonable woman image does help make difficult stories more comprehensible within the legal system. However, the
same problems that arise from theoretical insights also appear in
practice. First, as the foregoing discussion makes clear, the reasonable woman standard essentializes women. It defines characteristics
that a reasonable woman must exhibit in order to become a reasonable client who may succeed. 12 4 Consequently, it excludes all other
122
See Schneider, supra note 25 (abuse of battered woman self defense syndrome);
White, supra note 7.
123
See Littleton, supra note 101, at 43-47; Mahoney, supra note 101.
124
See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text; see also Shirley Sagawa, A HardCase
for Feminists: People v. Goetz, 10 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 253, 266 n.71 (1987) (citing to
criminal case in which defense counsel's use of battered woman syndrome was held er-
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characteristics as unreasonable. Second, the image marginalizes
those women whose stories do not fit within the image, and those
women who have different, and difficult, stories to tell. 12 5 For example, what do we do with the sexually harassed woman who had a
consensual sexual relationship with her harasser and then sued
him?1 26 What about the woman who was raped by a former boyfriend with whom she previously had consensual sex? 127 What
about the victim of domestic violence who wants custody of her children but has "abandoned" them when she fled the violence, or
worse, has beaten them?' 28 As lawyers, we must look at the entire
contexts in which these actions occur in order to make sense of
them, and we must convince courts to examine context, rather than
29
to rely on summary standards.'
Third, although the reasonable woman standard emerged from
women's actual experiences, it has since been overtaken by lawyers
and legal theorists. Consequently, it shifts power from women to
their lawyers.' 3 0 Rather than challenging definitions, women must
still accommodate their experience to someone else's reasonableness standard. Moreover, because reasonableness is a powerfully
roneous because the relationship between the victim and the defendant did not conform
to the "characteristic patterns" of the syndrome).
125
Interview with Marie Ashe, Oct. 4, 1991; see Naomi R. Cahn, A PreliminaryFeminist
Critique of Legal Ethics, 4 GEo. J. LEGAL Em-ics 23 (1990).
126 E.g., Keppler v. Hinsdale Township High School Dist., 715 F. Supp. 862 (N.D.
Il1. 1989); cf Shrout v. Black Clowson Co., 689 F. Supp. 774 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (employee has duty to notify superior, with whom she had a consensual sexual relationship,
that continued contact is unwelcome).
127
State v. Ciskie, 751 P.2d 1165 (Wash. 1988); State v. Alston, 312 S.E.2d 470
(N.C. 1984); Estrich, supra note 21, at 60-65 (discussing Alston).
128 See Marie Ashe & Naomi Cahn, Abuse of Women and Children: Issues for Feminist
Theory, 2 TEx. W. LJ. (forthcoming 1992); Naomi R. Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women:
The Impact of Domestic Violence on Child Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1041 (1991)
(discussing battered women who abuse their children).
129
Of course, we must also figure out how to set limits. See Abbe Smith, Presentation at Frontiers of Legal Thought: Race, Gender and Justice (Duke University School
of Law, Jan. 24, 1992) (discussing criminal defendant who shot two women after he saw
them making love because he is homophobi'). In setting these limits, we may appear
arbitrary: why should domestic violence be relevant, while homophobia is not? My answer is that we must choose certain determinate values. SeeJoan Williams, Rorty, Radicalism, Romanticism: The Politics of the Gaze, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 131, 143 (discussing the
possibilities of certainties without absolutes-we can believe in right and wrong so long
as we recognize that they are arbitrary beliefs).
130 See White, supra note 103, at 886 (arguing that poor people must take the power
to define themselves away from the courts); see also Tove S. Dahl, Taking Women as a
Starting Point: Building Women's Law, 14 INT'LJ. Soc. L. 239, 239-40 (1986) (articulating
the purpose of women's law as describing, explaining, and understanding actual experiences to improve their position in law and society; women's experience is removed from
the subjects themselves and becomes filtered through the interpretations of their
lawyers).
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drilled-in legal standard (beginning in first year torts), it is difficult
for lawyers to challenge the paradigm of reasonableness.
We represent our clients in a system that has excluded women
from the legal process. 13 1 As we think about litigation on behalf of
women, we must beware of reverting to traditional methods of
thinking and developing doctrine. Instead, we must focus on the
impact of our theory on practice as a method for understanding the
impact of doctrine on images and cultural stereotypes of women
that operate within the attorney-client relationship.
C.

A Representation
A client representation that occurred in our clinic illustrates
132
many of these themes.
We first met Arlene Sims at our Citizens' Complaint Center,
where the local police send virtually all victims of domestic violence.
She came in through Center intake with a one-page form setting out
a summary of her reason for being there. She had already seen at
least two people that day, one from the local prosecutor's office and
another from the Court Social Services office. She had been at the
Center since nine a.m.; by the time we interviewed her, it was about
two p.m.
A student in my clinic called her into our office from the central
waiting area. Ms. Sims followed slowly. The student began by apologizing to Ms. Sims for the long delay at the Center and that she
hoped we would be the last people Ms. Sims needed to talk to that
day. Ms. Sims looked up, and smiled a little. The student explained
that she was a law student, acting under the supervision of an attorney-professor. She then informed Ms. Sims that we understood she
was at the Center because her husband had beaten her with a chair,
and that she wanted to go to court about this. The student then
asked, "Is this accurate?"
131 See White, Subordination,supra note 119, at 20-21 (while some women do participate "fluently" in the legal process, many are unable to do so).
Historically, of course, married women did not have a legal existence separate from
that of their husbands. See Richard H. Chused, Married Women's Property Law: 18001850, 71 GEO. LJ. 1359, 1361 (1983). Women have also been excluded from practicing
law. See KAREN B. MORELLO, THE INVISIBLE BAR (1986) (history of women in the legal
profession); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Excluded Voices: New Voices in the Legal Profession Making New Voices in the Law, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 29 (1987).
132
To protect my clients and my future practice, the facts in this case are based on a
compilation of several cases and, for this reason, I have summarized the attorney-client
conversation. Clark Cunningham has commented that my methodology takes away the
client's voice. Because Ms. Sims does not exist, there was no way to get her permission
to use her actual words; yet, I did not want to invent either her actual words or mine.
This article, then, omits illustrating some of the steps in the process of how client language is distorted by the law. The attorney deliberations discussed infra are
hypothetical.
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Ms. Sims said, "yes." Looking back, I am not sure what she
meant; what we later learned she wanted and what had happened to
her were different from what the intake form stated.
Ms. Sims explained that she already had a civil protection order
(CPO), but that had not stopped her husband from beating her.
The student asked for a copy of the CPO; it did indeed direct Mr.
Sims to stay away from his wife, and not to molest or assault her.
We also noticed that the order was issued by consent. Ms. Sims and
her husband, with the help of a victim advocate, had negotiated the
terms of the order. The victim advocate is not a mediator, and she
explains at the start of each session that she is there to help the
complainant. The advocate has handled virtually all domestic violence cases in the local court for more than ten years, and is sensitive to power disparities between the parties. She is also skilled at
negotiating terms that the complainant wants and that are acceptable to the abuser. When the parties consent in this kind of process
there is no hearing. The judge generally reads out the terms of the
agreement, and makes sure both parties understand the penalties
for a violation. Even though such orders only direct batterers to
stay away from victims, judges often tell victims also not to go anywhere near the batterer.
The fact that an abuser consents to a civil protection order does
not necessarily mean that he admits to any of the allegations underlying the initial complaint. Nor does it mean that he is more likely to
comply with the order than if it had been issued after a full factfinding hearing. It often does mean, however, that the abuser is intimidated by the court process, that neither party wants to explain
all the details of their relationship in court, or that the parties still
have some type of minimal relationship. Ms. Sims explained later
that she felt intimidated by being in court and had gone through the
consent process because she did not want a hearing. She was concerned,' however, that because there had been no court hearing, Mr.
Sims had not taken the court proceedings as seriously as she had.
This was of particular concern because, as Ms. Sims explained, she
and her husband still lived within one block of each other. She continued to visit friends on his street, and he lived with her uncle.
Within the previous two weeks, he had beaten her twice. The
first time, he came to her house one weeknight to visit their three
children, Alice, who was two years old, Jim, who was five, and Dan,
who was seven. Even though the civil protection order allowed him
to visit only on weekends, she let him into her house. She explained
that she wanted him to see the children, and that she was also scared
he would bang on her door until she let him in. As soon as he
walked in, he began to hit her, punching her on the right side of her

1426

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:1398

face with his fist, kicking her legs. She screamed, and by the time a
neighbor came to the door, he had stopped. We could still see the
faint bruise marks on her face.
The second time he beat her after she refused to hand over the
keys to "his" car. When they were first married, Mr. Sims bought a
1980 Chevy. Ms. Sims did not work, so he provided the car payments and kept up the insurance. While he was at work, she used
the car mostly to drive the children to and from school, to go grocery shopping, and for other errands. At the court hearing on the
CPO, neither of them had brought up use of the car, so the order
said nothing about it. Because he had lost his keys, she knew that
she had the only set.
Ms. Sims explained that on the day before she came to the
Center, she and the children had stopped to visit some friends on
her husband's street after doing grocery shopping. As she was
standing in front of a friend's house, she saw Mr. Sims pull up in his
truck. He parked, and she watched him, hoping he would not come
near her. He came towards her, yelling at her to give him the keys
to his car. She ran into her uncle's house (also her husband's home)
to ask him for help. Mr. Sims followed her inside the house and her
uncle walked outside, leaving her in the house with her husband.
He again demanded his keys. She ran into the kitchen, and got a
knife, because she did not think he would let her leave the house.
She tried to leave the house, but he blocked the door. She was
somewhat confused about what had happened next. She believes
that he picked up a chair and approached her with it, and that she
stabbed him as she tried to ward him off. He then lifted the chair
over his head and brought it down on her head several times. A
friend of his ran into the room and told him to stop beating her.
She left, got her kids, went home, and called the police.
About an hour later, two officers appeared. She showed them
her CPO, but they told her that there was nothing they could do
because he was no longer around and they had not seen anything
happen. They referred her to the Center for help. This police response seemed frustrating to her-it certainly was to me. I had just
finished working on a survey of how the police respond to domestic
violence victims in the District of Columbia, which found that,
notwithstanding a police general order to the contrary, the existence of a CPO had little effect on police response.' 3 3
As she told her story, Ms. Sims was soft-spoken and matter-offact. Even when she showed us the bruises, her demeanor did not
133
Karen Baker et al., Report on District of Columbia Police Response to Domestic
Violence 45 (1989) (unpublished study, on file with the Cornell Law Review).
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change. She seemed prepared to talk to many "professionals"
before she could get help. She said that what she wanted was for
Mr. Sims to stop abusing her. She had hoped the CPO would take
care of his violence; it had not, and she was resigned to taking the
next step. When we told her that we might be able to represent her,
she seemed desperate for our help. Several times, she asked if we
really thought we could represent her, and she seemed genuinely
glad when we said we would. When she asked if it made any difference to us that she had refused to give him the car keys, run into his
house, and then used a knife against him, we reassured her that it
did not. We tried to take photographs of her bruises (they did not
appear on our Polaroid pictures), and arranged to meet with her two
days later so that we could file the necessary court papers to enforce
her CPO through a motion for contempt.
During the next few days, the student and I had numerous discussions about how to handle the second incident. We were concerned about what might appear to a judge to be "inconsistencies"
in her story, such as her grabbing the knife and stabbing him.
Clearly, he had approached her first and she had acted only in selfdefense. Refusing to give him the car keys seemed reasonable because she did not want to be bullied by him, and she needed the car
for family errands. Running into her uncle's house to ask him for
help also seemed reasonable, although we did wonder why her
friends on the street did not try to protect her. We assumed that she
did not want to involve any of them in her "personal" problems,
and that they did not even know that she had a civil protection order. When we asked her why she had run to her uncle rather than to
a friend, she explained that he was family and knew something
about her relationship with her husband; while her friends were also
her husband's friends and they told her they did not want to get
involved in choosing sides. We struggled with how to present these
facts to a judge, who might blame Ms. Sims for visiting friends on
her husband's street, not leaving as soon as he arrived, running into
"his" house, and drawing a knife on him.
In discussions with Ms. Sims, we developed two theories. Our
first theory concluded that any reasonable woman in her situation
would have acted as she did. Many of her friends lived on the same
street as Mr. Sims did and she did not want to stop seeing them nor
always ask them to come see her. Her friends were also his friends;
these friends knew little of his past violence, and thought he was a
decent man. Given this, she could turn only to her family for help.
After her uncle refused to help her, she had to help herself. When
her husband still lived with her, he had broken her nose, pulled out
her hair, and threatened to do worse. She feared him, justifiably
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and reasonably so. Grabbing the knife was an act of desperation. In
this version of the story, she would tell the judge that she was confused about when exactly she had stabbed him with the knife.
In our second story about the incident, Ms. Sims was a lifelong
victim. 1 3 4 She had become stuck in an abusive situation, and was
unable to step out of a cycle of violence with her husband. Her father had abused her mother, and her mother had abused her. She
expected abuse in a relationship. In the first incident that formed
the basis for the contempt motion, she knew that he had been building towards a severe beating, notwithstanding the CPO. She let him
into her house, resigned to his abuse. In the second incident, she
again knew that a beating was inevitable, and almost literally walked
into it. She had grabbed the knife, but felt unable to use it to hurt
him, and in fact dropped it quickly.
The facts in both stories were true (that is, they corresponded
to Ms. Sims's actual experiences). In discussions with Ms. Sims, we
needed to decide which story had fewer "inconsistencies," whether
she would have a better chance at winning a contempt proceeding if
she appeared to be a victim or a reasonable woman.13 5 We three
lawyers preferred the reasonable woman approach because it allowed Ms. Sims some dignity in telling her story to the judge and in
front of her husband. We knew, however, that at the time, she was
not thinking about whether her reactions were reasonable. Moreover, as her representatives, we felt it was important to let her know
that we believed many judges would find her actions unreasonable
and provocative. A judge quite simply might not believe that she
had acted reasonably in visiting friends across the street from where
her batterer lived, running into his house, and then stabbing him.
We told her we especially feared this result because we tried to talk
to the friend who intervened in the second beating, but he told us
he did not want to get involved. In a case where ajudge must determine credibility based on the parties' testimony, with a high burden
of proof (beyond a reasonable doubt), a judge simply might not believe her, and could easily find reasonable doubts about her actions.
We did not have a trial. On the day we were scheduled for
court, she decided that rather than having a hearing at which the
penalty might be jail time for him, or at which she might lose, she
134
See White, Subordination, supra note 119, at 46. Our victim theory was based on
the cycle of violence/battered women syndrome identified by Lenore Walker. See
sources cited supra note 94.
135
At the time, the stories seemed too inconsistent to combine. On reflection, I
think we could have tried harder to combine the two images. Even so, we might have
faced the same issues in court. It may also be that the stories are too divergent. See
Delgado, supra note 77, at 2411 (discussing different stories for dominant and subordinant social groups).
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would rather Mr. Sims relinquished possession of the car and paid
child support. She reasoned that he could not earn money while he
was in jail. Thus we do not know whether our reasonable woman
36
strategy would have worked in practice.'
Looking back, I am particularly aware of the risks of painting
her actions as reasonable to a court. Mr. Sims clearly violated the
order, and Ms. Sims's actions are irrelevant. Nonetheless, his behavior could be excused or justified because of her actions. Even to
me, her behavior initially seemed somewhat risky, not quite reasonable. I imagine that if I were in her situation, I would have called
the police as soon as he came over on a weeknight to visit the children. But then I remember that not only did she not have a phone
at the time, but in the past when she called the police, they had not
come in time.13 7 I also imagine that I would give up visiting my
friends, so as not to run into him. And I believe that I could never
stab anyone.' 3 8 But I do not really know.
My definition of the actions of a reasonable woman is based on
my own experiences. I am not a black mother of three who receives
AFDC and has been battered by my husband. The only way that I
can begin to represent her situation is to know as many facts about
her life as possible, to understand my position in interpreting
them,' 3 9 and to examine the power structures underlying her

136 Another story shows the gap in understanding that we feared. A friend recently
represented a victim of domestic violence who had been raped repeatedly over a ten
year period. The victim testified that she returned to her batterer because he promised
not to rape her again, and because she could not earn enough money to support herself
and their children. The judge simply did not believe that she could have stayed for ten
years with a man who repeatedly raped her (and thus it must not have been rape). Staying with her rapist-husband simply does not appear to be the action of a reasonable
woman. Mahoney, supra note 101, at 64; West, supra note 13; see also Maryland Special
Joint Committee, Gender Bias in the Courts 7 (May 1989) (judges do not understand why
victim of domestic violence might not leave the abusive situation or might return to her
husband). Another influence may have been that, until recently, marital rape was a legal
contradiction.
137
Several courts have found that police respond discriminatorily to domestic violence calls. E.g., Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Com. 1984); see
Carolyne R. Hathaway, Comment, Gender Based Discrimination in Police Reluctance to Response to Domestic Assault Complains, 75 GEO. LJ.667 (1986).
138
My doubts illustrate some of the limits of the method of "participant observation
study." My beliefs and knowledge are central to this story. I have labelled this story "a
story of representation" because it is my story of how I represented this client, both to
myself and within the legal system. See Ross, supra note 112, at 1546; White, Subordination, supra note 119, at 45 n.143.
139
Clifford Geertz suggests that any interpretation is particular and holds different
meaning in any cultural setting. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE 167-234 (1983).
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story. 140 How can we possibly give such a "thick description"' 14 1 to a
judge, given current definitions of relevance and limited images of
reasonableness for poor black battered women? 4 2
III
PRACTICE STRATEGIES

We have seen how the reasonable woman standard affects sexual harassment, domestic violence, and rape law. When it emerges
from women's experiences, it has the capacity to help women, to
make women feel less alien in the legal system, and to make women's experiences appear more credible. When the standard develops from a male legal system, it clearly disadvantages women.
Obviously, when it responds to the concrete realities of the lives of
women who are using the legal system, it succeeds; in any other situation, as in the context of rape law, it fails, and, indeed, damages
women. What, then, do we do with the reasonable woman standard? How should it affect legal strategy and representation?
It seems to me that we can choose from several possible approaches. Understanding its dangers of essentialization, marginalization, and potential disempowerment, we can nonetheless
embrace the standard when it does account for women's lives, and
reject it in all other situations; we can use a reasonable person standard; or we can articulate a new standard that does not depend on
an analysis in each situation of whether the reasonable woman image developed from women's lives. Whichever of these difficult
strategies we follow, it must be accompanied by revisions to the attorney-client relationship.

140 See Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1597,
1647-52 (1990) (in examining the particular experiences of individuals, it is important to
examine larger patterns of power and oppression to aid in judgment).
141

See ALICE MILLER, BREAKING DOWN THE WALL OF SILENCE 156 (1991) (explaining

that because an American fighter pilot's feelings were frozen inside of him, he could not
feel the anger and powerlessness of the people he was bombing). Geertz borrows this
term from Gilbert Ryle to refer to "the multiplicity of complex conceptual structures,
many of them superimposed upon or knotted into one another, which are at once
strange, irregular and inexplicit and which [an ethnographer] must contrive somehow
first to grasp and then to render." CLIFFORD GEERTz, Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture, in THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 3, 10 (1973). That is, there
are multiple levels of significance to any single action.
142 On the difficulties of doing exactly this, see Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 35.
The problem lies not just in the the lawyer's ability to translate the client's story, but also
in the law itself. While much of lawyering does involve translation, see Cunningham,
supra note 7, and interpretation, it requires some responsiveness, some similarity of concepts, between the law and the original speaker. These concepts simply may not exist.
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Reasonable Person Standard

One solution, in accord with sameness theory, is to give meaning to the "reasonable person" standard. The reasonable person
would not become simply a linguistic substitute for the reasonable
man; rather, it would be "premised squarely on an androgynous
rather than a male prototype." 143 This androgynous creature would
combine gendered male and female attributes, and would transcend
the characteristics of each sex. It would embody a standard that
could be universally applied. To develop a new conception of the
reasonable person standard requires taking the "male tilt" out of its
existing application 144 so that it truly establishes a new standard.
The reasonable person standard has the advantage of simplicity
and custom. We are accustomed to evaluating reasonableness. Indeed, the reasonable person appears to provide a neutral and abstract standard so that the law is not interpreted according to the
whims of individual judges or juries, but instead is based on a societal consensus. 14 5 Reasonableness protects against the extremes of
the egg-shell plaintiff and the sledge-hammer defendant by setting
out a mediating middle ground with seemingly determinate standards. In addition to providing neutral norms, a reasonable person
standard, rather than a reasonable woman standard, prevents gender-attributed characteristics from controlling the appropriate legal
standard.
Nonetheless, the standard may be impractical in implementation, as well as undesirable in theory. It is subject to the same criticisms as traditional conceptions of sameness feminism. Use of the
reasonable person construct has not meant sudden equality for women, it has meant applying a male standard under a different
name. 14 6 Theoretically, we may be confining ourselves and our cli143
Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special
Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325, 367 (1984-1985). But see Littleton, supra note 95, at 1292-95; West, supra note 87, at 22; Frances E. Olsen, The Family
and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1577 (1983);

Mary F. Radford, Sex Stereot)ping and the Promotion of Women to Positions of Power, 41
TINGS

HAS-

L.J. 471, 476 n.22 (1990).

144 Wendy Williams argues that feminists must challenge "in court a male defined
set of structures and institutions ... [using, among others] a doctrinal tool with which
to begin to squeeze the male tilt out of a purportedly neutral legal structure." Williams,

supra note 143, at 331.
145
For analysis of the falseness of this consensus, see Ehrenreich, supra note 31, at
1204-07; see also Richard Delgado, Norms and Normal Science: Toward a Critiqueof Normality
in Legal Thought, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 944 (1991) ("We must preserve the fiction that
normative principles are neutral authorities we consult, humbly and objectively.").
146
Senator DeConcini used a reasonable person standard, and drew on his experiences in deciding to believe Justice Thomas, rather than Professor Hill. See supra note
50. The Norman court stated that a reasonable person does not kill a sleeping spouse.
See State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989).
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ents if we adopt a reasonable person standard. Moreover, as with
the reasonable woman, a reasonable person standard pretends that
there is an objective neutral standard that can be applied appropriately to all facts. As Lucinda Finley notes, "the purportedly objective reasonable person standard may actually be subjective due to its
failure to include a variety of perspectives and experiences and its
1 47
use of biased stereotypes."'
B.

Reasonable Woman Standard

The reasonable woman standard developed from the experiences of outsiders. As such, it provides valuable information about
how the legal system has excluded women. It also forces lawyers to
consider how existing standards are male-biased, and how they can
be changed to become more inclusive. Yet it differs from a genderneutral standard because of its explicit focus on women; it requires
the fact-finder to think about the reasonable woman's reactions to a
particular situation, rather than proceeding from the perspective of
the reasonable man or reasonable (male-dominated) person.' 48
The reasonable woman is a powerful image because of its implicit
critique of the reasonable man. Its very phrasing shows that the reasonable man is a gendered, exclusionary standard.
When we litigate, we need concrete strategies that show the inadequacy of existing standards. Using a reasonable woman standard in sexual harassment cases dramatizes why behavior that many
men find acceptable constitutes harassment to women. 14 9 In the
rape context, a reasonable woman standard could explain why a
woman failed to report her rape, perceived a man's behavior as
threatening, or did not understand herself to have consented to
sex. 15 0 The reasonable woman standard is seductive because it not
Finley, supra note 26, at 63.
See Estrich, supra note 21, at 859 (noting that some courts are "ready to meet the
challenge" of protecting women from sexual harassment by pointing to the adoption of
the reasonable woman standard in Ellison v. Brady); see also Ehrenreich, supra note 31, at
1207.
149
See Abrams, supra note 3, at 1202-03.
150
For example, some states still require marital rape to be reported within a certain
time period, or else there was, legally, no rape. In Virginia, marital rape must be reported within ten days. VA. CODE ANN. § 18-2-61(B) (Michie 1988); see Cathleen M.
Gillen, Violence in Marriage: A Comparison of the Legal System's Approach to Domestic Violence
and MaritalRape, AM. CRIM. L. REV. (forthcoming 1992) (manuscript on file with Cornell
Law Review).
As Kim Scheppele explains, "[a]dopting the 'reasonable woman' ... allows women's views to have a strong impact on the outcome of rape trials while simultaneously
putting men on notice that they must consider how women's perceptions of sexualized
situations may be very different from their own." Kim L. Scheppele, The Reasonable
Woman, THE RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY, Fall 1991, at 45.
147
148
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only sounds like familiar language (the reasonable man or person),
but unlike the traditional language, it explicitly includes women.
Nonetheless, as Clark Cunningham points out, when one
speaks a particular language, its limitations seem so natural that
they are invisible.' 5 ' The term "reasonable woman" is both legal
language and feminist language; its very familiarity as legal language
obscures its problems. It still assumes the possibility of defining the
reasonable woman's perspective, both imagining the theoretical
likelihood of a standard capable of general application to women,
and pretending that, in practice, judges can apply the standard in a
"neutral" fashion that will benefit women. 152 Indeed, it tries to separate the process of applying the law from the substantive content of
the law, which depoliticizes the law.' 53 That is, it does not recognize
that the process of applying the law is interrelated with the actual
54
content of the law.'
Consequently, courts that use a reasonable woman standard
can apply it in a manner that subordinates women just as easily as
one that supports women. As with the reasonable person standard,
a mere change in language does not, alas, mandate a change in application and result. The trial court judge in Rabidue v. Osceola Refinety Co. 155 explicitly used an "average female employee" standard in
support of its finding that no harassment had occurred. 156 In rape
cases, the reasonable woman standard-as currently developed and
articulated (albeit not by feminists)-hurts women. When we leave
the interpretation of substantive norms "to the sole discretion of
judges, most of whom are upper-or middle-class white men,"
they will naturally perpetuate their traditional white male viewpoint. 15 7 On this perspective, women are subjected to a reasonable
151 Cunningham, Lawyer as Translator,supra note 8 at 1319; see generally Delgado &
Stefanic, supra note 35 (racism and sexism maybe so imbedded in our culture as to obscure their existence).
152 See Finley, supra note 26, at 64.
153 See William Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement. Moderation
as a Postmodern CulturalNorm, 89 MICH. L. REV. 707, 765 (1991).
154 See, e.g., Katharine Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829 (1990).
155 584 F. Supp. 419 (E.D. Mich. 1984), aft'd, 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
156 Id at 433. The conduct that was not harassing included: "In common work

areas plaintiff... [was] exposed daily to displays of nude or partially clad women belonging to a number of male employees .... ; a male employee who "regularly spewed
anti-female obscenity"; and a general exclusion in formalities that Ms. Rabidue (the only

female manager) needed access to in order to to her job. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 623-34
(Kieth, J., dissenting).
157 Kit Kinports, Evidence Engendered, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 413, 420 (discussing evi-

dentiary rules). Similarly, the substantial discretion that judges enjoy in other areas
often disadvantages women. Id.; see, e.g., Karen Czapanskiy, Gender Bias in the Courts: Social Change Strategies, 4 GEO.J. LEGAL Emnics 1, 18-21 (1990) (discussing effect ofjudicial
discretion in child support awards).
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woman standard that is again constructed with male bias. 158 Indeed, the goal of making the reasonableness standard reflect the actual experiences of women may be too difficult because of this
entrenched bias that prevents judges from analyzing conduct and
circumstances from the perspective of a reasonable woman (rather
than a reasonable man labelled a reasonable woman). 159
Moreover, the reasonable woman standard establishes a standard for women that differs from the standard for men, incorporating and perpetuating stereotypes of women. This suggests that men
are not harmed by conduct that a reasonable woman might find offensive. This conclusion is unjustified. Some men may be injured
by the same harassing behaviors that subordinate women. Men can
be harmed by a legal standard that tolerates domestic violence, not
only by its affect on them as children, t-ut also by its relationship to
fostering violent and abusive behavior in other men.' 60 Moreover,
the perpetuation of certain stereotypes of women can reinforce limiting stereotypes of men. For example, the image of women as sensitive, delicate, and needing protection in the workplace from
conduct that men easily tolerate, reinforces the restrictive images of
men as the necessary breadwinner and provider, thick-skinned and
hardened.' 6 1 Finally, the actions of a reasonable woman may differ
depending on whether she is black or white, rich or poor, a professional or unemployed. The reasonable woman standard does not
include these multiple perspectives, generating instead a cookie62
mold stereotype.'
Having said all that, however, a reasonable woman standard
may remains a better alternative than any other formulation based
solely on reasonableness. The standard could be applied to both
men and women, ensuring that one standard governs behavior.' 6 3
Indeed, it could even be applied to the behavior of the harasserabuser-rapist to judge whether his behavior was reasonable. 164 Its
very language instructs courts to think from a different perspective
than that of the reasonable man or person. Notwithstanding its capacity for misinterpretation, the reasonable woman standard en158
Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S.
CAL. L. REv. 777, 809 (1988).
159 Id.
160 Cahn, supra note 128.
161 Williams, supra note 16.
162
The intent of the standard was actually different. Within the legal system, how-

ever, in the interest of ease of application, or in order to accommodate expectations
about women's behavior, the standard has collapsed into itself.
163 Donna Lenhoff, General Counsel of the Women's Legal Defense Fund, suggested this as one solution to the practical quandary of litigating sexual harassment
cases. Interview with Donna Lenhoff (Dec. 7, 1991).
164
Of course, this would mean a dramatic shift in how cases are structured.
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courages judges and juries to recognize the impact of different
gender ideologies on the actions of women, and on their own expectations. 16 5 It can also help clients like Ms. Sims feel more "fluent"
within the legal system by formulating legal rules in terms that are
meaningful in her experience.
C.

Towards a New Standard

Given the problems with both a reasonable woman and a reasonable person standard, we need to develop a new conception
against which to understand and evaluate behavior. A new standard
must recognize that reasonable men and women can and do disagree both within and across gender groups; yet it must also acknowledge that prevailing gender, race, class, and sexual orientation
ideologies construct a different and subordinate role for (sometimes
intersecting) groups. Such a new standard must reformulate reasonableness, not merely because of its indeterminacy but because it
is a mirage. It is an illusion that promises objectivity but actually
incorporates subjective beliefs, and an imaginary standard that does
not describe how people such as Ms. Sims think about their actions.
It also allows (encourages) lawyers to reshape their clients' stories to
conform to this objective standard. I envision a standard that is tailored to the experiences of individual litigants in a manner similar to
that proposed by Lucie White for poor people's hearings. 166 As
Professor White explains, in order to "shap[e] the law to respond to
the needs of subordinated groups[,] the power to tailor must shift to
those that the tailoring seeks to help. Those who have been diagnosed as different, as disabled, must assume the power to describe
167
their own circumstances."
Consequently, a new standard would presume that each
woman's experience be viewed according to how she experiences
it. 168 Rather than listening for a story that constructs one dominant
image in the courtroom, we must develop ways to admit multiple
voices and images. Instead of requiring a victim to conform to preexisting images, a new standard would be contextual, focusing on
the victim's actual reactions.1 6 9 It would incorporate all the circum165
It might drastically alter the range and types of evidence admissible, as has already happened with respect to battered women syndrome. For other possible effects
on evidence, see Kinports, supra note 157.
166
See White, supra note 103, at 877-87.
167
Id. at 886-87.
168 But see RosemaryJ. Coombe, supra note 6, at 80 (claiming that we cannot rely on
a particular woman's belief as to whether she has consented to intercourse because
those beliefs are "invaded by social power and dominant notions."); MAcKINNON, supra
note 70, at 177 ("women are socialized to passive receptivity.").
169
To some extent, this proposal is similar to a standard articulated by Kathryn
Abrams. She suggests that the victim's "description of the defendant's sexually oriented
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stances surrounding a woman's actions. In the rape context, for example it would ask, Was the consent to sex mutual, 170 neither
economically nor physically pressured? If there was any form of
pressure, when did it occur? How did the woman perceive the pressure? How did it make her feel at the time she "consented"? Such a
standard subjectively considers the pressure on an individual who is
a member of a community with explicit standards for her behavior.
This new standard could permit lawyers to return to the excitement of learning from our clients' experiences in order to craft
more effective and responsive legal theories. Such a standard must
draw its strength from communities of disempowered people, while
seeking to change prevailing community attitudes. Its application
entails educating judges so that they better understand and respect
victims' perspectives.'

7

1

This new contextual standard is justified because it responds to
the texture of our clients' lives and gives them space to speak their
own words. While reshaping clients' stories is certainly appropriate
in some instances, 17 2 both the lawyer and her client must acknowledge the lawyer's role as intermediary, her role in translating the
client's (narrative) language into law language (rules). 73 By recognizing the diverse nature of our clients' stories, a new contextual
standard allows for the diversity of real experiences, and recognizes
the distortion imposed by any particular doctrinal standard. This
may allow litigants to feel "counted" within the legal system, providing the recognition and validation that are important goals of
many who seek legal relief. 174 And it ensures the continuing responsiveness of legal doctrine to legal practice.
Of course, one major problem with such a standard is its subjectivity. It ignores the perpetrator's intent, focusing instead on the
victim's context, resulting in broad indeterminacy of legally appropriate behavior.' 7 5 Given the importance of mens rea to our concepts
behavior and of the feelings of coercion or devaluation it produced would establish the
plaintiff's prima facie case." Abrams, supra note 3, at 1209; see also Brief Amicus Curiae
of Women's Legal Defense Fund, Robinson (proposing standard that credits plaintiff's
credible allegations). The standard set out in this Article differs in its focus on the victim's context and its attention to the attorney-client relationship.
170 Chamallas, supra note 158, at 837-39.
171 For suggestions, see Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change, 43
VAND. L. REV. 1665 (1990).

See infra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
See Cunningham, Lawyers as Translator,supra note 8; Cunningham, Thinking About
Law, supra note 8; Cahn, supra note 27.
174
See JOHN CONLEY & WILLIAM O'BARR, RULES VERSUS RELATIONSHIPS (1990).
172

173

175

Many of us are suddenly concerned with line-drawing. Women I know report the

same type of conversation with men about where to draw the line between appropriate
and inappropriate sexual behavior. Indeed, some might argue that this is not "law" at
all; rather it is a process of ad hoc authoritative exercises of discretion.
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of responsibility and the importance of the presumption of innocence to our adjudicative system, we want to find deliberate, or at
least reckless, disregard for the victim's rights or interests before we
impose liability.' 7 6 We have rapists who claim, "I didn't intend to
rape her-I thought she consented," or harassers who state, "I
didn't know that my conduct was unwelcome to her," or batterers
who stated (before they were killed), "I didn't intend to hurt her
again." Can we ignore their understandings so that it is the victim's
perspective that becomes dominant?
To some extent, the legal system has ignored the victim's perspective, focusing only on that of the perpetrator. 17 7 That is, burdens of production and persuasion in the legal system are allocated
to assume that the perpetrator's conduct was reasonable, asking
only if the victim's conduct was reasonable according to the perpetrator. 178 The "objective" reality of what happens in rape, sexual
harassment, or domestic violence cases is how the man thinks about
his conduct.' 7 9 This does not mean that we should make women's
experiences the only reality; we must recognize that there are multiple realities. A new standard could recognize the multidimensional
nature of disputes 8 0 and experiences of reality. Instead of labelling
the male reality the "objective" one, each reality is both objective
and subjective for the participants. In the past, one reality has been
dominant; both must be weighted more equitably within the legal

176 A recent survey of sex bias in criminal law teaching concluded that "[t]he central
role of mens rea... in criminal responsibility is reflected in the almost universal coverage of the 'mistake of fact' defense [in rape cases]." Nancy Erickson & Mary Ann Lamanna, Sex-Bias Topics in the Criminal Law Course: A Survey of CriminalLaw Courses, 24 U.
MicH.J.L. REF. 189, 208 (1990).
See Scheppele, supra note 150, at 45 (noting that given the harshness of penalties
and stigma for criminal conduct, "[t]o base criminal convictions on potentially idiosyncratic perceptions of victims is unfair to those accused.").
177 See David Luban, Partisanship,Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client Relationship:
A Reply to Stephen Ellmann, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1004, 1034-35 (1990).
178 The possibility of asking whether the reasonable woman (man or person) would
have acted as did the perpetrator adds another dimension to this picture. The reasonable woman makes more explicit the existing focus on whether she acted reasonably,
given his conduct; perhaps we should focus on whether he acted reasonably, given her
conduct. See id.
179 MACKINNON, supra note 70, at 180.
180 See Brenda Danet, Language in the Legal Process, 14 LAW & Soc. REv. 445, 509 &
n.32 (1980) (noting that while
[d]isputes constitute two different versions of reality, each advocated with
all the resources-linguistic and nonlinguistic, substantive and formalthe parties can muster, [i]n fact there are likely to be more than two versions of reality since even witnesses on the same side may vary considerably in their versions of events.).
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system.' 8 ' Even with a presumption of innocence, one could infer
intent from the victim's perceptions and the perpetrator's actions.
In this way, the facts that had previously been "discounted" would
82
be heard in a new way.'
A second problem with a more subjective standard is that in its
focus on the victim's perspective, it requires that she expose her
feelings. The reality is that this already happens: when a victim
comes forward, she is put on trial. Under a standard of conduct that
respected her reality, she could explain her experiences in a supportive, or at least nonjudgmental, environment rather than a
criticial one. For example, the notion of "imminence" in self-defense law would be flexible enough to accommodate the genuine
perceptions of a woman who viewed her sleeping batterer as a threat
(unlike the person with "ordinary firmness"). In employment discrimination cases, the law could acknowledge the influence of power
relationships in the workplace so that a woman could explain why
she did not complain loudly and often about harassment. In rape
cases, the concept of consent would be transformed to one of real,
affirmative consent, so that a woman could explain why, notwithstanding her past sexual activity, forced intercourse with a social acquaintance was still rape: she knows when sex is consensual and
when it is not.
Finally, a new context-based standard may not always be appropriate in all cases. We may need "broader" norms, at least in some
cases.183 But this, too, is a context specific inquiry, which recognizes
that setting out one standard is sometimes, but not always,
reasonable.
To see how this standard would work in practice, I suggest
some reforms within the attorney-client relationship that would
transform traditional standards to take account of different experiences, without setting out a separate standard for each gender.
181
See Abrams, supra note 50, at 979 (many lawyers believe that the "truth" can best
be established by a "neutral decisionmaker with the task of discovering it.").
I am focusing on the process of constructing and valuing alternative narratives.
This process dramatizes the problem of conflicting narratives, an issue that Abrams does
not directly address. Where two people tell compelling, resounding narratives, how do
we know which is "right"? How can we move away from "neutral" arbiters without
trusting all to the discretion ofjudges? For some thoughts, see Ashe & Cahn, supra note
128 (the first step is telling new stories); Sally E. Merry, The Culture ofJudging, 90 COLUM.
L. REv. 2311, 2327 (1990) (suggesting it is appropriate to consider allowing in some
aspects of "pluralism" into judging); Judith Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations
of the Aspirationsfor ourJudges, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1877 (1988) (exploring how feminist
notions of caring can inform judging); see also Martha Minow & Elizabeth Spelman, supra
note 140 (an analysis of context and power can lead to better judgments).
182 Finley, supra note 26, at 64-65.
183 See Fechner, supra note 70, at 487.
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D. Transforming the Attorney-Client Relationship
Phyllis Goldfarb has pointed out that feminists have much to
learn from legal clinicians about the nature of the legal system, client stories, and the attorney-client relationship. 18 4 In addition, feminists have much to learn from practicing lawyers and clients. Some
feminists have begun this process by examining the legal methods
that we use in challenging the law's exclusion of women's perspectives and the different claims of truth implicit in those methods.
Others examine women's relationships to other actors in the effort
to produce social change.' 8 5 I too ask how feminists have used the
legal system to produce change, but also ask how do we think about
feminists as litigators? What changes must we make in our methods
in order to practice feminist representation of our clients? What
happens when a particular theoretical construct is used in practice?
What about when a practical construct is transformed, through
court decisions or scholarly commentary, into legal theory?
While there are many theoretical perspectives from which to explore answers to these questions, any answers must include an examination of the representation process 18 6 and the attorney-client
relationship. It is not enough simply to develop theory; we must be
concerned about what happens when it is implemented.
Underlying this problem of implementation is a concern with
power issues in the surrounding society as well as within the attorney-client relationship. 187 A complicating factor is the existence of
many distinct power issues in the attorney-client relationship in the
Goldfarb, supra note 3, at 1689-90.
Abrams, supra note 2; Bartlett, supra note 154.
Representation is a complex process and has multiple strands, including: 1) the
client's representations to herself concerning the nature of her problem and her use of
the legal system; 2) the client's representations to her lawyer; 3) the lawyer's representation of the client to the world outside of the attorney-client relationship; 4) the lawyer's
representations to the client within the attorney-client relationship; and 5) the lawyer's
representations to herself concerning her client. This Article has focused on the last
three aspects because they are the ones to which I, as a lawyer, have easy access. It is
easy to see how the reasonable woman standard affects these three levels by allowing for
the creation of a comfortable yet novel image such that these three forms of representation are in accord.
Awareness and understanding of these different levels of representation can help in
rebuilding the attorney-client relationship. See Goldfarb, supra note 3, at 1675-1687
(suggesting how to reshape the attorney-client relationship into a method that joins personal and professional ethics).
187
Michael Foucault identified the importance of deconstructing power issues. See,
e.g., Michael Foucault, Truth and Power, in THE FOUCAULT READER 51 (Paul Rabinow ed.,
1984). Robin West disagrees with Foucault, arguing that power is not a creative force
because women are silenced and unable to develop their own discourse under patriarchal power. Robin West, Feminism, Critical Social Theory and Law, 1989 U. Ci. L. FORUM
59, 59-65. She points out that we must look at the violence inflicted by this power,
rather than the structures it has constructed. Id.
184
185
186
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cases discussed in this Article. One is women's powerless position
in a male-dominated society, which breaks down further into white
women's positions relative to white men and "minority" women's
position with respect to white men and women and "minority" men.
A second is clients' relationship to their lawyers, which can, in turn,
be seen as the result of the inherently distorting nature of legal doctrine-when lawyers translate clients' stories into the law, the resulting story is always different 8 8 and the problematic nature of the
representation process itself.18 9 Because of these inherent power
structures, lawyers must be careful to respect their clients and to
ameliorate, or at least avoid aggravating, the pre-existing power
structures in the attorney client relationship. The most meaningful
strategies in legal representation have emerged as lawyers learn
from their clients. Others have suggested some strategies that lawyers can use to work with their clients. Gerald Lopez suggests a rebellious style of lawyering that requires lawyers to work with, not
merely for, their clients. 190 This involves an understanding of the
context and complexity in which legal issues arise,' 9' as well as a
willingness to work with other professionals who are similarly committed to confronting subordination.' 9 2 Tony Alfieri suggests strategies that allow lawyers to break out of client stereotypes by
reinterpreting client stories. 193 Lucie White focuses on how lawyers
shape their clients' stories. 194 Underlying these practices is a need
for the lawyer to be critically aware of her motivations. She must
188

As Brenda Danet points out, "the 'facts' of a case do not preexist but are con-

structed through interaction." Danet, supra note 180, at 509 (citing Thomas J. Scheff,
Negotiating Reality: Notes on Powerin the Assessment of Responsibility, 16 Soc. PROB. 1 (1968)).
Lawyer client talk helps to construct the facts; indeed, lawyers need to appreciate that
"language is not only a tool they use but a cultural artifact that subtly channels .... "
Lawrence Rosen, A Consumer's Guide to Law and the Social Sciences, 100 YALE LJ. 531, 537
(1990) (book review).
189 Of course, not all women are subordinated to all men. Issues of race, class, and
sexual orientation are intertwined in women's relationship to men. Similarly, in many
situations clients are not subordinated to lawyers. E.g., Robert L. Nelson, Ideology, Practice, and ProfessionalAutonomy: Social Values and Client Relationships in the Large Law Firm, 37
STAN. L. REV. 503 (1985) (showing the dominance of client interests in large law firms);
see William L.F. Felstiner & Austin Sarat, Enactments of Power: Negotiating Reality and Responsibility in Lawyer-Client Interactions, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 144 (1992).
190
See Lopez, supra note 8, at 1608; see also Gerald Lopez, Training Future Lawyers to
Work with the Politically and Socially Subordinated:Anti-Generic Legal Education, 91 W. VA. L.
REV. 305, 358-60 (1989) [hereinafter Lopez, TrainingFuture Lawyers] (suggesting changes
in legal education to prepare students to engage in this rebellious style of lawyering);
Gerald Lopez, The Work We Know So Little About, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1985) (pointing out
that modern legal education does not seek to address, much less to understand, the
concerns of low-income women of color).
191 See Lopez, Training Future Lawyers, supra note 190, at 381-82.
192
See Lopez, supra note 8, at 1608-09.
193

Alfieri, supra note 10.

194

White, supra note 119.
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understand when she is using others' images, rather than her client's, for what she sees as her client's advantage.
Three other aspects of this mode of lawyering lead to a contextualized approach to lawyering. First, a client-centered representation recognizes clients' varied goals-to win, to tell their stories, to
feel respected by the legal system (including their lawyers)-and attempts to translate these goals into the legal system. 19 5 Second, a
representation process must also respect that a lawyer herself is not
completely neutral and objective. Third, there needs to be a recognition of the importance of explicit examination of the doctrine and
practice interconnection.
First, a client-centered representation recognizes that clients
come to lawyers for many reasons. They may seek access to the
legal system because they have no other choice, 196 they want the
legal system to validate their claims, they seek to tell their stories to
a judge, 19 7 or they want a particular legal result. As lawyers, we
must understand our clients' needs, and then use doctrine accordingly. This means listening to our clients.' 9 8 For the client who
wants to win, it may be appropriate to reshape her narrative and fit it
into a stock story, rather than risking a more innovative turn to narrative strategy. For a client who wants both to win and to tell her
story to a judge, we need to explore her willingness to take the risk
of losing, especially if her story does not conform to prevailing
norms of reasonableness. A client like Ms. Sims wants to use the
legal system to send a message to her abuser that his behavior is
illegal, and that the law, at least, gives her some power over him. 199
195
These suggestions assume that lawyers and clients want to use the legal system
so that clients can tell their stories. However, I am not here proposing an immediate
overthrow of the legal system, and the construction of a new system in which all clients
could tell their stories. See Kathryn Abrams, Lawyers and Social Change Lawbreaking: Confronting a PluralBar, 52 U. Prrr. L. REV. 753, 783 (1991) (exploring different motivations
of lawyers with respect to working within and outside of the legal system).
196 See Austin Sarat, "... The Law is All Over": Power, Resistance and the Legal Consciousness of the Welfare Poor, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 343, 359-65 (1990).
197 See CONLEY & O'BARR, supra note 174 (although they discuss unrepresented litigants, their conclusions about the motivations of parties apply as well to represented
litigants).
198 A study of physicians found that empathetic doctors who listen to their patients
are more satisfied with their work and have patients who are more satisfied with their
medical care. Daniel Goleman, All Too Often, The Doctor isn't Listening, Studies Show, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 14, 1991, at Cl, C15.
For some discussion on listening in attorney-client relationships, see DAVID BINDER
ET AL., LAwYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1990); Robert Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 502, 604
(1990).
199 See MERRY, supra note 22 (concluding that this was one reason that women in
abusive relationships sought court protection).
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As lawyers, we need to help clients clarify their goals, and explore
the risks of different strategies.
This is particularly important given the diversity of client stories and objectives. Not all clients tell sympathetic stories; lawyers
do not (and should not) represent only those clients who initially
relate legally "winnable" tales. For these "unwinnable" clients, we
may be obligated, ethically and morally, to transform their unsympathetic stories into compelling ones that will prevent further beatings or harassment. Indeed, we can contextualize their stories in
ways that they might not be able to do themselves in court, or that a
judge might otherwise be unable to do. 2 0 0 For example, a battered
woman who "abandons" her children when she leaves the batterer
may have left the children because she was fleeing for her life.
Alone in court she might not explain the history of violence, how it
made her feel, how she felt her options were restricted, or how
scared she was of assault at separation. 20 A woman who was sexually harassed may not, without the aid of an attorney, be able to
explain why she did not leave her work situation after she was sexually harassed, why she needed to continue at the job, why the contacts and references she established were helpful. 20 2 This additional
information might be overlooked unless her lawyer tries to understand and appreciate her client's context, without judging her client's actions.
Second, many feminist lawyers undertake representation because of their commitment to legal reform. Lawyers may choose to
represent particular clients to achieve larger goals that benefit all
women, 2 S and can choose to use their own experiences to inform
200 Clients really do need some form of translation during this process. Poverty law
clients often do not speak in the language recognized by courts. See id.; Barbara Bezdek,

Silence in the Court: Participationand Subordination of Poor Tenants' Voices in Legal Process, 20
HOFSTRA L. REV. (forthcoming 1992) (manuscript on file with Cornell Law Review).
201
See Mahoney, supra note 101, at 79-80:
The idea that the woman should have left the relationship and especially
the idea that she failed to leave, shapes the court's analyses of many aspects of self-defense cases, including the reasonableness of the woman's
perceptions and reactions, the imminence of the threat of death or threat
of bodily harm and her duty to retreat from the confrontation.
202 See F. Lee Bailey, Where Was the Crucible? The Cross Examination that Wasn't, A.B.A.
J. 46-49 (Jan. 1992) (pointing out that Anita Hill did not have any lawyers who were her
advocates).
203
See Bums, supra note 114, at 191 (addressing the importance of challenging
"forces that obscure women's interests" as "[o]ur first duty to ourselves as litigators and
to our clients"); Cahn, supra note 3, at 12-14 (discussing work of ACLU Women's Rights
Project); Ruth Cowan, Women's Rights through Litigation: An Examination of the American
Civil Liberties Union Women's Rights Project, 1971-1976, 8 COLUM. HUMAN RTS. L. REv. 373,

374 (1976) (acknowledging that the Project resulted in a "blurring of the distinction
between litigant and advocate"); see also Abrams, supra note 195 (exploring motivation of
lawyers in representing socially subordinated groups).
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the representation process. 20 4 They thus empathize with the particular goals of their clients, and place the particular representation in
the context of a larger effort to challenge women's subordination.
Consequently, there is a danger that the lawyer will impose her
feminist theories on the client without listening to her. 20 5 To some
extent, this danger is unavoidable. 20 6 All lawyers have a particular
philosophy that they impose on the attorney-client relationship. For
example, the professional responsibility rules for lawyers, which
control the ethics of representation, are not neutral. 20 7 The values
they elevate-professional neutrality-e.g., zealous advocacy-may
conflict with feminist goals of empowered representation because
feminists do not advocate professional neutrality and may want to
redefine the meaning of zealous advocacy. 20 8 Therefore, it is important to ensure that one's perspective is explicit to oneself and to
20 9
one's clients; and to question how it affects client narrative.
Accordingly, lawyers must remember that it is not their ideals
but the client who is being represented. This means ensuring that
clients are involved in the representation process. Although the
rules of professional ethics tacitly permit lawyers to control every204 For examples of personal experiences informing litigation, see, e.g., Cahn, supra
note 3, at 14; Katrina Grider, Hair Salons and Racial Stereotypes: The Impermissible Use of
Racially DiscriminatoryPricing Schemes, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 75 (1989); Schneider, supra
note 112.
205
I observe this tension in many different situations. For example, when Ms. Sims
did not want to go forward with the contempt proceeding, I was torn: feminist theory
argues that prosecution may be in the woman's best interest. See Naomi R. Cahn & Lisa
G. Lerman, Prosecuting Woman Abuse, in WOMAN BATTERING: POLICY RESPONSES 95
(Michael Steinman ed., 1991); LISA G. LERMAN, PROSECUTION OF SPOUSE ABUSE: INNOVATIONS IN CRIMINALJUSTICE RESPONSE (1981); Kathleen Waits, The CriminalJustice System's Response to Battering: Understandingthe Problem, Forgingthe Solutions, 60 WASH. L. REV.
267 (1985). I did not want to manipulate her, but I did want the violence to stop. I had
to step away from theory and respond to my client's objectives. (This is, of course, a
simplification of the issues presented and ignores issues of false consciousness).
206 See Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law
with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal BargainingPower, 41 MD. L. REV. 563,

646-49 (1982) (arguing that paternalism is pervasive and desirable).
207 Cahn, supra note 125.
Some have critiqued the system because it is self-serving, protecting lawyers at the
expense (literally and metaphorically) of their clients. See Thomas Morgan, The Evolving
Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARV. L. REV. 702 (1977); see also Richard Abel,
Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEx. L. REV. 639 (1981) (suggesting the
answer is to legitimize the legal profession). Others have critiqued the system for ignoring the interests of third parties who are affected by any particular client's decisions. See

Peter Margulies, "Who Are You To Tell Me That?" Attorney-Client DeliberationRegardingNonlegal Issues and the Interests to Nonclients, 68 N.C. L. REV. 213 (1990).
208
See, e.g.,JACK &JACK, supra note 88, at 92 (describing a lawyer who used an ethic
of care to resolve his case and "flirted" dangerously with violating the conflict of interest
and disclosure rules).
209
See Austin Sarat & William Felstiner, Lawyers and Legal Consciousness: Law Talk in
the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 98 YALE LJ. 1663 (1989).
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thing but the underlying "objectives" of the representation, requiring only that "[i]n questions of means, the lawyer should assume
responsibility for technical and legal tactical issues," 210 representation can and should be more of a collaborative process. 21 1 Even
though true collobaration is extremely difficult (some suggest impossible), 21 2 it is an appropriate goal. In attempting to approach
this goal through a critical self-awareness, we can improve existing
relationships.
Third, a new type of lawyering must consider the influence and
effects of doctrine on practice. Much of the distortion (and even the
"rhetorical violence") 21 3 that occurs in the attorney-client relationship results from the limits of doctrine. We shape our clients into
reasonable women because only they can win. But at least in some
circumstances, we must challenge the effect those stereotypes have
on client relationships, as well as in the courtroom. Theories such
as the reasonable woman do not develop in a practice-free vacuum;
they are based on the realities of practice, or at least on cases and
laws that result from someone's practice. 21 4 But theoretical insights
must maintain a continuing dialogue, and dialectic, with practice. 2 15
We can begin to implement this changed form of practice by
sharing information, power, and empathy. For me, a telling example of this need is my experience with doctors. With their knowledge, jargon, and instruments, they intimidate me. I know that
through them, I can gain access to a whole new embodied world, if
only I cooperate. Once they begin talking to me, I forget any questions I had, or else I do not ask them for fear of being labeled troublesome. I am ready to take whatever advice they give me, even if I
210

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 cmt. 1 (1983). The Rules

acknowledge that it may be difficult to distinguish between the objectives of representation (over which the client has control) and the means of representation, and that "in
many cases the client-lawyer relationship partakes of ajoint undertaking." Id. Nonetheless, the rules do not require this type of undertaking.
211 See Andrew D. Gitlin, Educative Research, Voice and Social Change, 60 HARV. EDUC.
REV. 443 (1990). Even in a collaborative process there is a risk of manipulation, of the
lawyer redefining the client's goals and problems. See Stacey, supra note 8 (pointing out

these problems with ethnographic study itself).
212 See Marilyn Strathern, An Awkward Relationship: The Case of Feminism andAnthropology, 12 SIGNS 276, 290 (1987) (arguing that feminists believe that the anthropological
ideal of a truly colloborative process is a "delusion" given the underlying power

relationships).
213 See White, supra note 7.
214

For example, a significant impetus to the development of the battered woman

syndrome resulted from Lenore Walker's studies of battered women, and from the need
in cases to explain battered women's actions. BATrERED WOMAN, supra note 94; Schneider, supra note 20; Walker, supra note 94.
215 This is not an obvious point, as Elizabeth Schneider emphasizes as well. See
Schneider, supra note 2; Schneider, supra note 25; Schneider, supra note 45; Schneider,
supra note 112.
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have little or no understanding of my diagnosis or treatment. I feel
disempowered and unrespected. 2 16 It is only with great effort that I
can overcome my own paralysis. From this experience, I can only
2 17
begin to imagine what it feels like to be a client.
There remains an issue of "meta"-manipulation. By sharing information and power, I am manipulating my client so that she becomes my image of an appropriate client. I want a client who will
collaborate with me in any manner she can, just as I want to collaborate with her in the ways I can. 2 18 Is imposing this image on my
client just as violent as imposing a reasonable woman standard on
her? Perhaps. As Tony Alfieri perceptively points out, I am confronting contradictions between "client-centered decisionmaking
and lawyer authority ....,,21 These contradictions are further reinforced by doctrine. Even though I know that these contradictions
may never be resolved and that lawyers by themselves will never
overcome them, I believe it is important to recognize and to challenge them. I thus accept that there are some images of the attorney-client relationship which are better than others, 220 and fostering
new forms of that relationship is appropriate.
CONCLUSION

Much of feminist theory has emerged from feelings and experiences of exclusion. 2 2 1 The practical reality of confronting standards that explicitly and implicitly exclude women's experiences has
See Goleman, supra note 198.
Such empathy, however, can be dangerous. See Trina Grillo & Stephanie
Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of Race: The Implications of Making Comparisons between
Racism and Sexism, 1991 DUKE L.J. 397; see also GEERTZ, supra note 139, at 59 (describing
the need to move beyond Western conceptions of empathy to see others' experience in
their own framework).
218 As such, this differs from the family law lawyers studied by Sarat and Felstiner,
who shared knowledge and demystified the legal system, but only in an attempt to bolster their own authority and better maintain client control. Sarat & Felstiner, supra note
209.
219 Anthony V. Alfieri, Stances, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1233, 1247 (1992).
220 While I am not claiming access to a universalized truth, I am claiming that, from
my standpoint, I can imagine that there are less manipulative types of attorney-client
relationships. Postmodernism has shown the dangers of universalized narratives; see,
e.g., Fraser & Nicholson, supra note 64. But feminists have critiqued postmodernism for
not acknowledging its own point of view(s) on the impact on women of power structures, and the need for some type of grounding. See e.g., Bordo, supra note 32, at 140; see
also Drucilla Cornell, The Doubly-Prized World: Myth, Allegory and the Feminine, 75 CORNELL
L. REV. 644, 681-682 (1990) (choosing between competing interpretations requires
"ethical and political" criteria) Joan Williams, supra note 129, at 134, 153-154 (noting
the importance for pragmatists of looking at patterns of oppresion to - their theories).
221 See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 131; Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989
Wis. L. REV. 539.
216
217
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encouraged theory. 2 22 Indeed, feminist theorists continually acknowledge their debt to practice. 223 Yet in this role, practice merely
serves as a predicate, as a stepping-stone, to theory. Theory is the
goal, practice merely a method to help achieve that goal. A more
appropriate sequence is to view theory and practice as a continuous
iterative process, with adjustments in one prompting refinements in
the other. It is not sufficient to draw upon practice when we develop
theories; our theories must return to practice.
That has been my goal in this Article: to show how theory and
practice must be intertwined, 224 and how concepts of practice must
extend to the attorney-client relationship. At times, it is easier to do
one or the other: in practice, we may be too focused on the multitudes of clients who need our help to think about theory; as theoreticians, we may never represent a client and thus may never be
forced to grapple with the need to develop concrete strategies that
either will change the law as it is interpreted or will help real clients
win. In theory, we can abstract the actual violence that occurs in
women's lives, and overlook the physical damage inflicted. 225
The reasonable woman standard has emerged from practice,
and it accords with some strands of feminist theory. As theory and
practice learn from each other, however, we see the dangers of the
standard, as well as the difficulties of developing new standards that
reflect women's (sometimes different) experiences and yet do not
confine women in male norms. As theory remains grounded in
practice and ethnographic, localized study, not only of courts, but
also of what happens in the attorney-client relationship, we can truly
begin to construct new images of women in law and in practice.

Cahn, supra note 3, at 3-5, 8-10.
E.g., Littleton, supra note 12, at 18.
See Finley, supra note 89, at 891; Schneider, supra note 2, at 610; see also Elizabeth
M. Schneider et al., "FeministJurisprudence"--The1990 Myra Bradwell Day Panel, 1 COLUM.
J. GENDER & L. 5 (1991) (noting perspectives on the relationship between feminist theory and practice); Fineman, supra note 9.
222
223
224
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The view that social relations are constructed and power is exercised through complex processes of negotiation is now widely
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shared.' While the dynamics of power and negotiation are always
uncertain and difficult to chart, most contemporary theorists no
longer assert either that "society is ...an association of self-determining individuals" 2 or that social action is epiphenomenal and determined by underlying structural realities. 3 They realize that
power is always "involved institutionally in processes of interaction. ' 4 In the past the effort to understand power oscillated between the antinomies of structure and action.5 Today, every variety
of theory recognizes that "notions of action and structure presuppose
6
one another."
Social structure is no more than patterns of behavior generated
7
and re-generated through negotiations in people's daily lives.
However it may appear to people subject to it, social structure is
produced and maintained through human action. Neither social
structure nor the power associated with it can be external to human
interaction or abstracted from the practices of everyday life. To the
contrary, both are encoded in seemingly uneventful and routinized

I See, e.g., PETER L. BERGER & THOMASJ. LUKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
REALITY: A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 30-32, 119 (1966); STANFORD M.
LYMAN & MARVIN B. ScoTr, THE DRAMA OF SOCIAL REALITY 106-11 (1975); Thomas J.
Scheff, Negotiating Reality: Notes on Power in the Assessment of Responsibility, 16 Soc. PROBS. 4
(1968).
2 Robert Paul Wolff, Beyond Tolerance, in A CRI0.UE OF PURE TOLERANCE 3, 5
(1965).
3 See CLAUDE LEvI-STRAUSS, STRUCTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY (1968); INO Rossi, THE
UNCONSCIOUS IN CULTURE 16-21 (1974).
4 ANTHONY GIDDENS, CENTRAL PROBLEMS IN SOCIAL THEORY 88 (1979).
Giddens adds, "[e]ven a casual survey of the massive literature concerned
with the concept of power and its implementation in social science indicates that the study of power reflects the same dualism of action and
structure that I have diagnosed in approaches to social theory generally."
Id.; see also STEPHEN LUKES, POWER, A RADICAL VIEW 21-23 (1974) (arguing that other
conceptions of power are inadequate because of their "association of power with actual,
observable conflict.").

5 Giddens describes these antithetical views: "Social systems are produced as
transactions between agents, and can be analysed as such on the level of strategic conduct.... Institutional analysis, on the other hand, brackets action, concentrating upon
the modalities as the media of the reproduction of social systems." GIDDENS, supra note
4, at 95.
6

Id. at 53. Giddens defines action "as involving a 'stream of actual or contem-

plated causal interventions of corporeal beings in the ongoing process of events-in-the
world .... Id. at 55. In contrast, " 'structure' refers to 'structural property,' or more
exactly, to 'structuring property,' structuring properties providing the 'binding' of time
and space in social systems. Structures exist paradigmatically, as an absent set of differences, temporally 'present' only in their instantiation, in the constituting moments of
social systems." Id. at 64.
7 For an interesting case study of this process, see LAWRENCE ROSEN, BARGAINING
FOR REALITY: THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL RELATIONS IN A MUSLIM COMMUNITY

(1984).

165-69
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experiences.8 It is because of this presence in every social situation
that structure and power are vulnerable to major changes of
practice.
Although structure and power are created through ordinary action in ordinary circumstances, past practice as it is embedded in
history and habit limits the choices that can be made. While people
work out the terms of their interactions daily, they do not begin with
a clean slate each day or in each situation; within any setting there is
a limited number of available moves. Consider the situation of
teacher and student or employer and employee at the beginning of
any ordinary day. Hierarchical relationships, routine divisions of labor, and parochial practices will generally dictate who exercises
what kinds of authority over what kinds of matters, who will do what
and how each of the participants will feel about the day's tasks. The
student will not question the lesson plan or the teacher's prerogative to evaluate student performance; the employee will not openly
resist the day's assignment or the employer's prerogative to say
when a job is ready for delivery to a customer.
However, over long stretches of time these exercises of hierarchical control may be resented and resisted in minor and subtle
ways. Or in an abrupt fashion they may be overtly and definitively
challenged. When we next examine these relationships, if we find
that lesson plans are negotiated and teacher performance is evaluated by students and that employees have control over work assignments as long as certain end goals are met, we see that structure has
changed and power is reallocated although no revolution has been
proclaimed and no general notice may have been taken.9
Whatever the form of these interactions, the social phenomena
that occur are negotiated. If this negotiation is not explicit, it is carried on through the exercise of power and attempts at resistance
and subversion.' 0 Surprisingly, a review of the empirical literature
on the lawyer-client relationship hardly suggests that lawyers and
clients negotiate relationships, or that they enact the structure and
meaning of professionalism and professional power through negotiation. The literature portrays professional practice as dominated by
the lawyer or the client, depending on who has superior status or
resources, or as split into rigidly defined spheres of influence, with
8
"Analysis shows that a relation (always social) determines its terms, and not the
reverse, and that each individual is a locus in which an incoherent (and often contradic-

tory) plurality of such relational determinations interact."

MICHEL DE CERTEAu, THE
PRACTICE OF EVERYDAY LIFE xi (1984).
9
ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959).
10 See JEAN COMAROFF, BODY OF POWER, SPIRIT OF RESISTANCE: THE CULTURE AND
HISTORY OF A SOUTH AFRICAN PEOPLE
ARTS OF RESISTANCE (1990).

(1985);

JAMES C. SCOTT, DOMINATION AND THE
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clients autonomously defining goals and lawyers determining the
means to achieve them.' 1
In this paper we challenge these views. After studying the enactments of power in lawyer-client interactions in divorce, 12 we find
that these interactions run with the great tide of social life rather
than counter to it. Power in these interactions is a complicated phenonomenon that, over time, is constructed and reconstructed so
that its possession is neither necessarily obvious nor rigidly determined. Indeed, it is probably more accurate to say that power is not
possessed at all. Power is mobile and volatile, and it circulates such
that both lawyer and client can be considered more or less powerful,
even at the same time. 13 Even to describe power as an "it" implies
more of an independent existence than we intend. It is better, perhaps, to view it as a dimension of relationships rather than a resource under someone's control.
In the traditional ideology of professionalism, professionals
maintain control over the production of services. 14 But in the cases
that we observed, the delivery of professional service instead involved complex processes of negotiation between lawyer and client;
processes in which we saw resistance as well as acquiescence, contest as well as cooperation, suspicion as well as commitment. These
cases indicate that the services provided by lawyers to clients are
contested and negotiated in the stream of interactions that constitute the professional relationship, and that the content and contours
of the interaction vary considerably from case to case, and from moment to moment within cases.' 5
In this article we first discuss conventional views of power in
lawyer-client relations. We then summarize our contrasting view of
11

See infra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.

In the research on which we base our analysis, we observed divorces over a period of thirty-three months in two sites, one in Massachusetts and one in California. We
followed one side in forty cases, ideally from the first lawyer-client interview until the
divorce was final. We followed those cases by observing and tape-recording lawyer-client sessions, attending court and mediation hearings and trials, and interviewing both
lawyers and clients about those events. We observed one hundred fifteen lawyer-client
conferences and conducted an equivalent number of interviews. For a more complete
description of the research strategy, see Austin Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Law and
Strategy in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 20 LAw & Soc'y REV. 93, 94-99 (1986).
13 We think this is one lesson that can be drawn from Lucie White's analysis of the
case of Mrs. G. See Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday
Shoes: Notes on the Hearingof Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1990).
14
See ANDREW ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE DIVISION
OF EXPERT LABOR 10-15 (1989).
15 Our view of power differs significantly from the view prevailing in most literature
on the legal profession. Heinz, for example, believes that the crucial distinction in the
lawyer-client relationship is whether lawyers have the power to modify their clients'
goals and that the lawyer's control over tactics and techniques is both assumed and irrelevant. See John P. Heinz, The Power of Lawyers, 17 GEO. L. REV. 891, 897 (1983).
12
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power, which we illustrate through divorce cases. We develop our
view in two important arenas of lawyer-client negotiation: what we
call the "negotiation of reality," or the search for goals; and the "negotiation of responsibility," or the search for control over case progress and division of labor. Next, we describe the enactment of
power in both of these areas through analysis of an illustrative case
history. Finally, we estimate the extent to which our view of the negotiation of power in divorce cases is relevant to more technical and
rule-centered areas of legal practice.
I
CONVENTIONAL VIEWS OF POWER IN LAWYER-CLIENT

RELATIONS

The predominant image of the lawyer-client relationship is one
of professional dominance and lay passivity.1 6 The lawyer governs
the relationship, defines the terms of the interaction, and is responsible for the service provided. The client, in contrast, is the consumer of a service whose quality is difficult to evaluate.1 7 Studies of
a wide range of legal situations and types of legal practices bolster
this image. For example, Hunting and Neuwirth, writing more than
thirty years ago, found that the majority of litigants in automobile
accident claims in New York City had no idea what their lawyers
were doing in their cases and had no say in when to settle or how
much to accept.18 Legal services lawyers studied by Hosticka rarely
even asked their clients what they wanted them to do.1 9 Such lawyers habitually engage in maneuvers that "exploit and reinforce client dependency on the lawyer's specialized knowledge and technical
skill."' 20 Kritzer's review of a national survey of lawyers and clients
16
See ZENON BANKOWSKI & GEOFF MUNGHAM, IMAGES OF LAW 111 (1976); HOWARD
S. BECKER, The Nature of a Profession, in SOCIOLOGICAL WORK 96-97 (Howard S. Becker
ed., 1970); TERENCEJ.JOHNSON, PROFESSIONS AND POWER 53 (1972); Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking About Law as Language, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2463, 2465
(1989); Heinz, supra note 15, at 892.
17 On the idea of client as consumer, see Rick S. Carlson, Measuring the Quality of
Legal Services: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, II LAW & Soc'Y REV. 287 (1976); Ralph
Nader, Consumerism and Legal Services: The Merging of Movements, II LAW & Soc'Y REV. 247
(1976); see also John Griffiths, What Do Dutch Lawyers Actually Do In Divorce Cases?, 20 LAw
& Soc'Y REV. 135, 155 (1986) (finding that "clients make a fairly passive impression,

asking few questions, showing little interest in the procedural and legal aspects of their
divorce, and manifesting little inclination to use legal strategies in their conflict with

their spouse.").
ROBERT HUNTING & GLORIA NEUWIRTH, WHO SUES IN NEW YORK CITY?

A STUDY
107-09 (1962).
19 See Carl Hosticka, We Don't Care About What Happened, We Only Care About What Is
Going to Happen: Lawyer-Client Negotiations of Reality, 26 Soc. PROBS. 599, 604 (1979).
20 Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: LearningLessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE LJ. 2107, 2132 (1991).
18

OF AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT CLAIMS
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in litigated cases found low client involvement in case development
and strategy. 21 From these studies one might think that contemporary lawyers fulfill Bakunin's 19th century prediction about scientific
intelligence, namely, that it would lead to an aristocratic, despotic,
22
arrogant and elitist regime.
Indeed, even where clients are involved in the management of
their own cases, their involvement often is limited. Thus, Rosenthal's notion of a high level of client participation in personal injury
litigation is confined in its interactive dimensions to expressing special concerns and making follow-up demands for attention. 23 Lawyers resent and resist the few clients who take an active role in their
cases, considering them hostile and problematic rather than helpful
and persistent. 24 In the conventional wisdom, people have
"problems" and experts have "solutions." 25
There is, however, a less polemical view, one that is more reliable as a general view of the profession because it is more sensitive to
context. 26 Spangler, for example, reports that private practitioners
and corporate counsel are less likely to dictate action to their clients
than are legal services lawyers. 2 7 Heinz and Laumann recognize
that there is considerable variation, by area of law, in the practice
characteristic they term "freedom of action," 2 8 a notion reflecting
the lawyer's unilateral power to decide on strategy and operate free
29
of close client supervision.
While these scholars see variation in enactments of power by
area of practice, others have found it on a case-by-case basis. 30 Still
21

HERBERT KRITZER, THE JUSTICE BROKER: LAWYERS & ORDINARY LITIGATION

66

(1990).
22

See CHARLES DERBER ET AL., POWER IN THE HIGHEST DEGREE: PROFESSIONALS AND

THE RISE OF A NEW MANDARIN ORDER 5 (1990).
23
See DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? 33 (1974).
24 See Hosticka, supra note 19, at 607.
25
IVAN ILLICH, DISABLING PROFESSIONS 11 (1978).
26 See HUBERTJ. O'GORMAN, LAWYERS AND MATRIMONIAL CASES: A STUDY OF INFORMAL PRESSURES IN PRIVATE PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE 3 (1963).
27 See EVE SPANGLER, LAWYERS FOR HIRE 166-67, 170 (1986).
28 See JOHN HEINZ & EDWARD 0: LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 108-09 (1982).

29

See id. at 104. The comparative aspect of the Heinz and Laumann findings must

be treated with some care, since the data are two steps removed from actual behavior.

Heinz and Laumann did not observe lawyers exercising "freedom of action"; nor did
they interview lawyers or their clients about what went on between them. Instead they
used a panel of law professors and social researchers to rate this characteristic for thirty
fields of service. See id. at 30.
30 See Maureen Cain, The General PracticeLawyer and the Client, 7 INT'LJ. SOC. LAW 331
(1979). Cain notes that the array of power between lawyer and client varies from client
to client: the solicitors she observed adopted their clients' goals as the given agenda
unless they had a conflict of interest or the clients exhibited unreal expectations. Id. at
342-51. Macaulay's careful analysis of the range of transformative effects that lawyers
have on clients' goals contrasts with the picture presented by Cain. See Stewart Macau-
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other researchers find power distributed between lawyer and client
according to task. 3 ' Finally, other analysts suggest that power in the
professional relationship directly reflects control over resources.
Thus Flood, having observed the history of two lawsuits in his ethnographic study of a large Chicago law firm, suggests that the allocation of power between lawyer and client depends on whether
clients are likely to produce repeat business or pay fees that command attention.3 2 Abel is perhaps the strongest proponent of this
view. He argues that corporate clients are typically the "dominant"

lay, Lawyers and Consumer ProtectionLaws, 14 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 115 (1979). It is unclear
whether the difference reflects differences in American and British practice or differences in the sensitivity of legally trained and lay observers. The low frequency of clients
exhibiting "inappropriate" behavior in Cain's data suggests that the cases she observed
were considerably more straightforward than those generally encountered by American
lawyers. In the same vein, Bottoms and McClean find that the extent of participation of
criminal defendants in their cases varies by culture, personality and ideology. See
ANTHONY E. BOTTOMS &J.D. McCLEAN, DEFENDANTS IN THE CRIMINAL PROCESS 69, 232

(1976).
O'Gorman's role division into counselors and advocates implies a correlative active
or passive part in devising client goals and tactics. See O'GORMAN, supra note 26, at 132,
134. He sees a causal relationship, dependent on degree of specialization, between professional security and tolerance of client direction. The less secure the lawyer, the
greater the control he (almost all of his subjects were men) is willing to cede to the
client. Id. at 145.
31 Reminiscent ofJohnson's distinction between defining needs and the manner of
fulfilling them, work on large law firms indicates that even though corporations set goals
and policy independent of lawyer influence, lawyers have a major say in tactical matters.
Moreover, Rueschemeyer believes that American lawyers are more closely in tune with
their clients' orientations than are continental lawyers whose roles are explicitly defined
and whose personal contact with clients is less frequent. See JOHNSON, supra note 16, at
46-47; ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS wrrH POWER 264 (1988); SPANGLER, supra note 27,
at 60-61, 64. See also DIETRICH RUESCHEMEYER, LAWYERS AND THEIR SOCIETv 112 (1973).
32 See John A. Flood, Anatomy of Lawyering: An Ethnography of a Corporate Law

Firm 386-90 (1987) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University (Evanston)). In a similar vein, Olson summarizes studies that find client participation in several
countries to vary directly with their socio-economic status. SUSAN M. OLSON, CLIENTS
AND LAWYERS: SECURING THE RIGHTS OF DISABLED PERSONS 131-35 (1984). See SUSAN R.
THOMAS BUCKLE & LEONARD G. BUCKLE, BARGAINING FOR JUSTICE: CASE DISPOSITION
AND REFORM IN THE CRIMINAL COURTS 25 (1977); JOEL E. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A THEORY OF LAw REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE 25 (1978);
O'GORMAN, supra note 26, at 58-59; ROMAN TOMASIC, LAWYERS AND THE COMMUNITY 99

(1978); John Baldwin & Michael McConville, Plea Bargainingand Plea Negotiation in England, 13 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 295-96 (1979); Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practiceof Law as a
Confidence Game: OrganizationalCooptationof a Profession, I LAw & Soc'y REV. 28-38 (1967);
William L.F. Felstiner, Plea Contracts in West Germany, 13 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 321 (1979).
But seeJEROME CARLIN, LAWYERS' ETHICS 166 (1966) (lawyers with low-status clients are
subject to more client pressures to violate ethical norms); FRANK SORAUF, THE WALL OF
SEPARATION: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLICIES OF CHURCH AND STATE 155 (1976) (factors
other than socio-economic status important in explaining client participation in church-

state litigation); Jack Katz, Legality and Equality: Plea Bargainingin the Prosecution of WhiteCollar and Common Crimes, 13 LAw & Soc'y REV. 447 (1979) (suggests significance of
crime type in explaining client participation in plea bargaining).
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actors in lawyer-client relationships, while solo and small-firm practitioners "dominate" their clients. 33
Two things should be noted about conventional views of power
in lawyer-client relationships. First, these views are basically structural: they suggest that power varies by status, economic resources,
field of law, or the vagaries of particular clients. 34 Second, they treat
power as a "thing" possessed at one time or another by one of the
parties to a lawyer-client relationship. As we see it, power in lawyerclient interactions is less stable, predictable, and clear-cut than the
conventional view holds. Power is not a "thing" to be possessed; it
is continuously enacted and re-enacted, constituted and reconstituted. The enactments and constitution are subtle and shifting; they can be observed only through close attention to the
microdynamics of individual lawyer-client encounters.
II
ENACTMENTS OF POWER IN DIVORCE CASES

In the divorce lawyer's office two worlds come together:3 5 the
legal world for which the lawyer speaks and to which he provides
access 3 6 and the social world of the client, beset with urgent emotional demands, complex and changing relationships, and unmet financial needs.3 7 Just as the legal world appears arcane and
ritualized to the uninitiated, the world of the client is one to which
the lawyer has access in only a limited, very mediated way. When
lawyer and client interact, each confronts, in the world the other
inhabits, something new and opaque, yet something of indisputable
relevance to their relationship.
To each, the hidden world of the other becomes known mostly
through reciprocal accounts.3 8 This means that lawyer-client interaction is a process of story-telling3 9 and interrogation in which lawSee RICHARD ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 204 (1989).
The picture of client participation is composed of conflicting as well as convergent strands for two very different reasons. The people whose behavior is analyzed are
33
34

very different personally, demographically, and institutionally from each other. The
other reason that the picture of lawyer-client interaction is so varied is that the data
come from such different sources. The ability to identify and comprehend the content of
dyadic relationships like those between lawyers and clients varies widely when the information is secured through national surveys, structured interviews, open-ended interviews, telephone interviews, mail questionnaires, case studies, file reviews, participantobservation, or longitudinal observation.
35
See Griffiths, supra note 17, at 152-55.
36 See Austin W. Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Lawyers and Legal Consciousness: Law
Talk in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 98 YALE LJ. 1663, 1671-84 (1990).
37 See Sarat & Felstiner, supra note 12, at 117-24.
38 Marvin B. Scott & Stanford M. Lyman, Accounts, 33 AM. Soc. REV. 46 (1968).
39 For an interesting discussion of the value of attending to stories in the legal process, see Kim L. Scheppele, Foreword, Symposium of Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REV.
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yer and client seek to produce for each other a satisfying rendition
of her distinctive world. What each accepts as "real" in the these
accounts is negotiated, implicitly as well as explicitly, and frequently
transformed over the course of their interaction. 40 Negotiating a
version that overlaps and is treated as a joint product is essential if
lawyers and clients are to construct a mutually tolerable story that is
likely to be persuasive to the other side or to a judge.
Making a landfall in the treacherous waters of each other's
world can be a threatening experience for both lawyers and clients.
In the world of law, unknown rules and people operating in forbidding surroundings and through alien processes can influence or decide matters of great moment to clients: child custody, the rights of
a non-custodial parent, the disposition of the family home, the division of property and income. In the social world of the client, the
lawyer's professional skills may be severely tested by the client's
guilt about marriage failure, unresolved feelings for the spouse,
continuing and often irritating disputes over children and money, or
by a new relationship whose relevance to the divorce may not be
acknowledged. 41 Even when the lawyer tries to keep it at bay, the
42
social world of the client is continually present.
For both lawyer and client the stakes are high in what the other
knows and reveals. While the client must rely on the lawyer's legal
experience, the lawyer is largely dependent on the client's interpretations of her social world. For both, motives, goals and data may
be suppressed by plan or inadvertence. 43 Each may consciously
adopt a narrative style and rules of relevance that limit what the
other can assimilate.4 4 They may each say both more and less than
they intend as they explain what they want the other to know.
Although lawyers and clients are highly dependent on each
other, the stories they tell about their interactions are tales of suspicion and doubt. Clients are suspicious about the depth of commitment lawyers bring to their cases and their own ability to control the
content and timing of their lawyers' actions. They worry about lawyers who are too busy to attend fully to the idiosyncracies of their
cases, and about divided loyalties, competence, judgment and per2073 (1989); see also LANCE BENNETr & MARTHA FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN
THE COURTROOM 3 (1981).
40
See Austin Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Law and Social Relations: Vocabularies of
Motive in Lawyer/Client Interaction, 22 LAw & Soc'y REV. 737 (1988).
41
See JANET JOHNSTON & LINDA CAMPBELL, IMPASSES OF DIVORCE: THE DYNAMICS
AND RESOLUTION OF FAMILY CONFLICT 102 (1988); CATHERINE RIESSMAN, DIVORCE TALK:
WOMEN AND MEN MAKE SENSE OF PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS 121-22 (1990).
42

Sarat & Felstiner, supra note 40, at 744-52.

Erving Goffman, The Nature of Deference and Demeanor, 50 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST
473 (1956); SCOTT, supra note 10, at 4-5.
44
See Cunningham, supra note 16, at 2491; White, supra note 13, at 21-32.
43
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sonality. Lawyers, on the other hand, are concerned because they
have to deal with and depend on people who are likely to be emotionally agitated, in the midst of a profound personal crisis, ambivalent about divorce, determined to hurt their spouse, and misguided
45
about what they can expect from the divorce process.
These concerns lead to responses that themselves produce secondary problems. Lawyers worried about the emotional instability
of their clients often appear hyper-rational, detached, disloyal, and
callous. 4 6 Clients, put off and alienated by such appearances, appear even more unstable and unpredictable to their lawyers. Lawyers worry about distortions introduced into client accounts and
attempt to test client stories without expressing overt skepticism.
Recognizing this combination of mutual dependency and suspicion has enormous, and previously unexamined, consequences for
the way scholars understand the exercise of power in lawyer-client
relations. In the standard analysis of the profession, lawyers are
presented either as agents moving tactically toward their clients'
clearly expressed goals, as principals paternalistically operating in
accordance with their sense of the clients' best interests, or as op47
portunists using the clients' cases to work out their own agendas.
Given these very different images of lawyers, it is natural to pose
Rosenthal's well-known question, "Who's In Charge?" 4 8 However,
asking "who's in charge" implies both that a single, stable answer
can be provided, and that the possessor of power can be clearly
identified.
We think that neither is the case. Both lawyers and clients are
sometimes frustrated by feelings of powerlessness in dealing with
the other, 49 and such feelings must be taken seriously. Often no
one may be in charge. Interactions between lawyers and clients involve as much drift and uncertainty as they do direction and clarity
of purpose. It may be difficult, at any one moment, to determine
who, if anyone, is defining the objectives, determining strategy, or
devising tactics.
Power in lawyer-client relationships would not be so ambiguous
if it were just an attribute of position, or if it could be captured by
attending simply to offices, roles and forms. Whether in lawyer-client interactions or elsewhere, however, power does not exist
outside of particular social interactions. It is always generated from
46

See Sarat & Felstiner, supra note 12, at 105-07, 117-20.
See Griffiths, supra note 17, at 148-49.

47

For two different images, see JONATHAN CASPER, LAWYERS BEFORE THE WARREN

45

COURT: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND CIVIL RIGHTS,

note 22, at 140.
48
49

See ROSENTHAL, supra note 23.
See White, supra note 13.

1957-66 at 194 (1972);

DERBER ET AL.,

supra
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the inside in a continuing series of situated assertions and rejoinders, by claims and responses to those claims, and by particular gestures and the resistance those gestures provoke.50 It is not like a
tool sitting on a shelf, waiting to be picked up and applied to the
task at hand. Power, rather, is enacted and constituted moment-bymoment. It is seen in indirect moves and sleights-of-hand, in ruptures and ellipses, and in what is left unsaid and unacknowledged as
well as in forceful, continuous and overt assertion. 51
Power is continuously produced in the regular and apparently
uneventful routines and practices that comprise most social interactions. But it is also conditioned by the cultural resources that particular lawyers and clients bring to their relationships. Even when it
seems robust and irresistible, power may be fragile and contested. 5 2
Each of the social interactions through which power is constituted
has its own distinctive history and its own particular future. In this
sense power is always created anew and, like any newborn, its progress and outcome is uncertain.
The malleability of power, however, does not mean that the respective positions of lawyer and client are decided by a coin toss, or
that they are open to limitless development at the start of every ses55
sion. Lawyer-client interaction always occurs in the space of law.
For the lawyer, this means that interaction takes place in a familiar
space, a space of privilege. The books on the lawyer's shelves are
books the lawyer has read or knows how to read; the language spoken is a language in which lawyers are trained and with which they
are comfortable; the rituals performed give special place to the lawyer even as they are forbidding and unwelcoming to the uninitiated.
Thus, following de Certeau's formulation, lawyers are able to act
"strategically" in relation to their clients; that is, they act "in a place
that can be circumscribed as proper and thus serve as the basis for
generating relations with an exterior distinct from it.' ' 54 For the client, on the other hand, the space of law is unfamiliar and forbidding. In such a space the client's enactments of power are, in de
Certeau's sense, "tactical." 55
See DE CERTEAU, supra note 8, at xvii-xx.
See ScorT, supra note 10, at ch. 2.
52 See RAYMOND WILLIAMS, MARXISM AND LrrERATURE 112 (1977). Williams argues
that power "does not exist passively as a form of dominance. It has continually to be
renewed, recreated, defended, and modified. It is also continually resisted, limited, altered, challenged by pressures not all its own."
53 For an interesting exploration of this spatial metaphor, see Thomas L. Dumm,
Fear of Law, 10 STUD. IN L., POL. & Soc. 29, 34 (1990).
54
DE CERTEAU, supra note 8, at xix.
55 A tactic insinuates itself into the other's place, fragmentarily, without taking it over in its entirety, without being able to keep it at a distance. It has
50

51
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Here, as in each moment and location in society, there is a limited reservoir of possibility defined by history and habit. The possible enactments of power are situationally and organizationally
circumscribed in ways that advantage some people or groups and
disadvantage others. 56 To understand these limits, and the patterns
with which they are associated, we must attend to the nature of professional projects and privileges, as well as to their connections to
legal institutions, the meaning of divorce in society and the prerogatives of class, race and gender. Yet the lawyer is never solely in control of the production of legal services, and the client is never simply
a timid consumer. Consumption of legal services is itself another
domain of production. 57 As a result, the particular evolution of any
lawyer-client interaction in divorce must be situated in the history
and culture from which both parties drw when they enact their spe58
cific plays of power.
Power has many dimensions and is enacted in many domains.
It involves interpreting the past, defining the present, and setting an
agenda for the future. It is enacted in the domain of knowledge and
understanding, in crafting definitions of situations and assigning
meanings to them, as well as in the domain of action and behavior. 59
In legal affairs, the conceptual domain may be as important as the
behavioral. As a consequence, we chose to illustrate enactments of
power in both domains. In the next section we report how lawyers
and clients negotiate a working definition of "reality." We consider,
in particular, the strategies and tactics employed as they identify and
settle on the goals that will be their joint objectives in the legal process of divorce. In a later section, we describe strategic and tactical
enactments of power as lawyers and clients negotiate responsibility,
and we examine struggles about who is going to do what in the case,
and who is responsible for keeping it moving.

at its disposal no base where it can capitalize on its advantages, prepare
its expansions, and secure independence with respect to circumstances.
Id.
56 For a useful example, see Barbara Yngvesson, Making Law At the Doorway: The
Clerk, the Court and the Construction of Community in a New England Town, 22 LAw & Soc'y
REv. 409 (1988).

57 As de Certeau argues, "The latter is devious, it is dispersed, but it insinuates
itself everywhere, silently and almost invisibly . . . through its ways of using products .... . DE CERTEAU, supra note 8, at xii-xiii.
58
59

Id.
See MICHEL FouCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE 109 (1972).
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III
ENACTMENTS OF POWER AND THE NEGOTIATION OF
REALITY

In the world of no-fault divorce, the legal process formally has
limited functions-dividing assets and future income, fixing custody
and visitation, and, occasionally, protecting physical safety and
property.60 Lawyers must understand their client's objectives concerning these issues. But determination of clients' interests is a
known quagmire. 6 1 Clients may not know what they want or may
not want what they ought to want. They may change their minds in
unpredictable ways, or they may not change their minds when they
ought to do so. Clients may be insufficiently self-conscious, or
plagued by false consciousness. Moreover, they may find it difficult
to distinguish between lawyers who are trying to impose their vision
of client needs on clients and lawyers who are trying to get clients to
share a vision of those needs that is not controlled by the power of
62
the lawyer's professional position.
When it comes to defining goals, lawyers generally are permissive. That is, they are intensely concerned that the client adopt
"reasonable" goals, but within the rather broad parameters of that
notion, lawyers are not directive. 6 3 For divorce lawyers and their
clients, the realm of "reality" is the realm of the possible. Within
that realm, the final choice is generally left to the client.6 However,
before that choice can be made, considerable energy is devoted to
the construction of a mutually acceptable account of the reality of
divorce. Defining and identifying "realistic" goals, and orienting
and reconciling clients to the world of the legally possible, occurs
60

See HERBERTJACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE LAW

IN THE UNITED STATES 5,

7-8 (1988); LENORE J. WErrZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION:

THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN

AMERICA C. 2 (1985).
61
See Kenneth Kressel et. al., ProfessionalIntervention in Divorce:A Summary of the Views

of Lawyers, Psychotherapistsand Clergy, 2J. DIVORCE 119 (1978).
62 See William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 469
(1984). These difficulties, at first glance rather straightforward, have been built by Simon into an elegant set of distinctions between conservative, liberal and critical "visions
of practice".
63 Lawyers frequently exert considerable pressure on their own clients to be
reasonable. When possible they cooperate with the lawyer for the other
party in seeking to get their respective clients to agree to a reasonable
settlement. They use all sorts of ad hoc tactics to try to bring about a
'reasonable divorce.' But the key to their role is a common strategy from
which they seldom diverge: the maintenance of a stance of relative
neutrality.
Griffiths, supra note 17, at 166.
64 For a contrasting view, see William H. Simon, Lawyer's Advice and Client Autonomy:
Mrs. Jones's Case, 50 MD. L. REV. 213 (1991).
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during complex negotiations in which struggle, if not overt conflict,
is frequent.
The mutual construction of reality takes two forms in divorce
cases. On the one hand, lawyer and client may develop, over time, a
set of goals and tactics that capitalize on the lawyer's knowledge of
the legal world and the client's knowledge of her own social world.
The final version of what is real is not dictated by one or the other,
but built by them together without the need for either to alter the
other's view in many important respects. On the other hand, lawyer
and client may not see reality in converging terms and each may
seek to defend and/or advance his particular vision. 6 5 Developing a
mutually satisfying sense of what reasonably can be expected or
achieved is at the heart of the complex lawyer-client interactions we
observed. 6 6 Yet that sense is not so concrete and tangible that, once
achieved, it can be taken for granted and easily maintained. It is
always in danger of slipping away as events from the client's social
world intrude into the deliberations, and as lawyer and client together gather information about the goals, expectations and strategies of their adversaries.
In examining the ongoing and fragile negotiation of reality between lawyers and clients, we focus first on the factors that "distort"
reality for lawyers and clients, and then on the strategies and tactics
employed to promote particular versions of reality. Clients, of
course, have greater difficulty than lawyers in becoming oriented to
the world of the legally possible. 6 7 Some of the difficulty is obvious.
Emotionally off-balance, angry, depressed, anxious or agitated, they
may have trouble understanding what they are told, believing the
information that they get and focusing on the alternatives that are
presented to them. 68 They may be impelled to strike at or "pay
back" their spouse in ways that are inconsistent with reality and
even, by altering the posture of the other side, make their goals
more difficult to attain.
Second, clients may expect more of the legal system than it can
deliver under even the best of circumstances. 69 Unrealistic expectaOften this clash of views is not made explicit. See White, supra note 13, at 46-48.
66 Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE LJ. 950 (1979). While Mnookin and Kornhauser's notion of
65

"bargaining in the shadow of law" refers to bargaining between the opposing sides in a
divorce, it might equally well apply to relations between lawyers and their own clients.
67

See KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF ATTOR-

NEYS AT WORK ch.3 (1985); Blumberg, supra note 32, at 32; Macaulay, supra note 30, at

159-60.
68

69

See JOHNSTON & CAMPBELL, supra note 41, at chs.4-5.
On the nature of citizen expectations of the legal system, see SALLY MERRY, GET-

TINGJUSTICE AND GETTING EVEN: LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG WORKING-CLASS AMERICANS 179 (1990).
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tions may range from saving the marriage to transforming the
spouse, but they are most likely to be centered on financial affairs.
Clients tend to reason up from needs, rather than down from resources, and they have great difficulty in dealing with the gap between the two. Additionally, clients are slow to realize that many
legal entitlements are not self-executing.7 0 Thejudge at the hearing
on temporary support may say that the client is entitled to $100 a
week, but that does not guarantee that the client will receive anything. Many clients are naive about their own financial needs, and
may have to be patiently educated by their lawyers. Some clients
have difficulty grasping the limits of what is possible because they
cannot believe that the law actually is as it actually is. Finally, clients
are slow to understand the costs of achieving their objectives. Vindication, the last dollar of support, meticulous estimates of property
value, a neat and precise division of property, a visitation scheme
that covers a very wide range of contingencies, and equitable arrangements that govern the future as well as the present may be
theoretically possible, but even approximations require extensive
services that middle-class clients generally cannot afford.
Lawyers, of course, are less encumbered on the legal side in
developing a view of reality in particular cases. Nevertheless, it is
not all clear sailing for them. There are, for instance, three kinds of
information problems. In order to form a view of the possible they
may need to know things that clients sometimes cannot tell them.
These include client goals 7 1 as well as things that clients sometimes
will not tell them, such as their feelings. In addition, there are
things that clients sometimes try to tell lawyers that lawyers do not
recognize or understand. 7 2 For example, in a case that we previously analyzed at some length, the client could not decide whether
she wanted to settle or litigate, and could not make the lawyer understand that she had great difficulty in negotiating a settlement
with her spouse because she could not trust him to fulfill any com73
mitments that he made.
It would, however, be a mistake when thinking about divorce
cases to assume that clients are emotional cripples and that the personalities, problems and politics of lawyers do not interfere with
their ability to define reality and/or respond to their clients' defini70

See STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY,

AND POLITICAL CHANGE 23

71

(1974).

For a discussion of the rationales for imputing goals to clients who do not, or

cannot, articulate them, see David Luban, Paternalismand the Legal Professional, 1981 Wis.
L. REv. 454.
72 See Simon, supra note 62, at 221; see also Alfieri, supra note 20, at 2123-24; Cun-

ningham, supra note 16, at 2464-65.
73 Sarat & Felstiner, supra note 12, at 111, 121.
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tions. 74 Lawyers may not be astute, attentive or experienced
enough to catch the client's message. 75 In addition, they may be so
overworked or so worn down by practice that they do not have the
patience or stamina to negotiate effectively with their clients.
However serious the distortions in the lawyer's grasp of the legally possible, the difficulties they face in determining social reality,
in determining what is socially possible, are more serious. The lawyer's ability to interpret the social world of the client depends on the
raw information they receive from clients, the interpretations that
clients present, and the interpretations or re-interpretations that
lawyers themselves make. All of these steps are complicated and
pose difficulties for lawyers. 7 6 Occasionally, information is
presented without an overt interpretation. For example, a client
may simply state, "He did not give me money for tuition." More
often, however, the information the client does provide is reconstituted through the client's experience and perception of self into
highly interpreted material: "He had no interest at all in furthering
my education." Often the client's presentations are influenced by
emotional and financial stakes, or are incomplete or conflicted. The
nature of client communications means that lawyers must continually sift through and evaluate the social world presented by the client in order to reconstruct a picture of the world that they can
effectively use in promoting the client's interests. 7 7 In this effort
they may, from time to time, be assisted by information that comes
from other sources, such as opposing counsel or relevant documents. For the most part, however, lawyers must depend on their
78
own experience and judgment.
Lawyers use an array of strategies to try to persuade their clients to adopt a particular definition of reality. Of course, their
knowledge of legal rules and process, and the information that they
have about specific players, such as other lawyers, judges and
mediators, provide powerful arguments. 79 Unless they have been
74
Some lawyers may be so committed to a particular political perspective on divorce that they do not easily recognize clients who are uneasy about or reluctant to
endorse such a program. Alfieri calls this phenomena "pre-understanding." See Alfieri,

supra note 20, 2123-24. "Pre-understanding is a method of social construction that operates by applying a standard narrative reading to a client's story." Id. at 2123.
75 See Anthony V. Alfieri, The Politics of Clinical Knowledge, 35 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 7

(1990).
76

See Alfieri, supra note 20, at 2131-45 (describing techniques that lawyers can use

to get a fuller grasp of the client's social world).
77

See id.; see also Cunningham, supra note 16, at 2482-83. For a discussion of the

techniques of sifting, see DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN C. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND

COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 104-23 (1977).
78 See Alfieri, supra note 20, at 2131.
79 See David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 468 (1990).
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through the process before, clients' only sources of information
about the nature and limits of divorce law are their own lawyer and
anecdotes related by their family and friends. In addition to their
feel for the legal system and for the dramatispersonae, lawyers, particularly specialists in family law, benefit from their experiences in
prior cases. Having "heard it all before," they frequently interpret
the behavior of the spouse and his or her lawyer with some accuracy,
looking beyond words and positions articulated to more fundamental concerns.8 0
Still, many divorce lawyers use their knowledge and experience
in a manipulative way. 8 1 The most common technique is to engage
in what we call "law talk."18 2 Law talk consists of the conversations
that lawyers and clients have about the legal system, legal process,
rules, hearings, trials, judges, other lawyers and the other lawyer in
the case. In general, we have found law talk to be a form of cynical
realism through which the legal system and its actors are trashed on
various accounts, frequently in an exaggerated fashion. The purpose of this rhetorical style is usually to convince the client that the
legal process is risky business, that legal justice is different from social justice, and that clients can only achieve reasonable certainty at
a reasonable cost, and maintain some control over a divorce, by negotiating a settlement with the other side.
Even when it takes the form of hyperbole, law talk is not commonly introduced into lawyer-client conversations in an aggressive
way. Lawyers often join with their clients' positions and appear, at
least initially, to be sympathetic. They introduce their clients to reality by invoking their own understanding of legal norms and their
own expectations about what courts would do were they to go
before a judge.8 3 Clients are told that it does not make sense to
"insist on something that is far out of line from what a court would
do."
Lawyers use delay and circular conversation to convey messages
about what is legally realistic. They engage in a form of passive
resistance, maintaining the form of the agency relationship while
subtly altering its substance. Rarely are expectations overtly
branded as unrealistic in a judgmental sense; instead, most lawyers
patiently, but insistently, remind their clients of the constraints that

80

81
30.
82

83

Luban, supra note 71, at 454.
For similar observations in a different context, see Alfieri, supra note 20, at 2123Sarat & Felstiner, supra note 36, at 1671.
See Simon, supra note 64, at 214-16.
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the law imposes on both of them, that is, of law's definition of
84
reality.
The behavior of clients mirrors that of their lawyers. Expectations about lawyer performance are generally not made explicit.
Clients rarely specify what they want their lawyers to do or how they
want their lawyers to behave.8 5 In fact, one of the chief difficulties
with which lawyers and clients must contend is their mutual aversion
to confrontation. In the face of continued client demands for the
unreasonable, lawyers restate technical or strategic difficulties, try to
recast reasonable goals into acceptable outcomes, or simply change
the subject. They do not, however, directly tell their clients that
86
they are being unreasonable.
In the face of lawyers' insistence that they accommodate themselves to the reality of what the law allows, clients generally persist,
at least initially, in expounding their needs, explaining their notions
of justice, or reiterating their objectives. But rarely do they insist
that their lawyer make a particular demand, argue a particular position, or even endorse their view. Where dissatisfaction is great, the
87
usual client response is exit rather than voice.
Although law talk is the divorce lawyer's basic device in efforts
to reorient her clients' views of reality, others include rhetorical
flourishes, technical language and role manipulation. Perhaps proceeding from experience in the law school classroom, some lawyers
conjure up a "parade of horribles." In this scenario, clients are informed that if they continue to seek one goal or another, they will
suffer a series of negative consequences of continuing and mounting
severity. Alternatively, lawyers tell stories about other clients who
have persisted in similar courses of action, pursued understandable
but unrealistic objectives, and suffered disastrous results.
While technical language is rarely used as a strategy to confuse
a client or make him feel dependent on professional expertise, clients report to us that it has this effect nonetheless. Some lawyers
invest, or try to invest, their views with added persuasive authority
by puffing up their status in the legal community. They cast themselves as the "dean" of the divorce bar, or as one of its most experienced and astute practitioners, or as an insider with special access
84

See Griffiths, supra note 17, at 160:
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Lawyers rarely present something as their own opinion. Their steering of
the discussion and persuading of clients are largely presented in terms of
the formal and practical margins set by the legal system, by the law and
more particularly by the decisions that can be expected from the local
court.
See Simon, supra note 64, at 215; see also White, supra note 13, at 46-48.
See Griffiths, supra note 17, at 160.
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to the judge and other functionaries. A rather striking example of
the latter comes from a Massachusetts case:
Now I think I have a good reputation with the Registrar of Probate here. Judge Murdoch is married to, no, what am I saying,
Judge Murdoch's sister is married to Bob's wife. My God, try
again. His sister is Bob's wife. They talk all the time. Bob likes me
very, very much. We get along very, very well. And I have a good
reputation in this court and I think it is going to get through to
the Judge.
In addition, most lawyers keep their clients at a social distance.
Particularly in California, where we found that clients often consult
a therapist as well as a lawyer during divorce, lawyers work hard to
restrict their efforts to the legal side of divorce and leave the personal difficulties to someone else. The exceptions, however, are
striking. One lawyer in Massachusetts routinely engages in behavior
common among friends, but rare in lawyer-client interaction. She
reveals extraordinary biographical detail to her clients, talking at
length about her own divorce, health, finances, housing and the eating habits of her children. This lawyer violates the standard understandings of professional distance, becoming friend and therapist as
well as legal adviser.8 8 These multiple roles enable the lawyer who
adopts them to use therapeutic moves and appeals to friendship to
shape her clients' definitions of reality and blunt any critique of her
performance.
Clients are more limited in the resources that they can mobilize
to persuade lawyers to accept their view of reality.8 9 Their inherent
advantage is their knowledge of their spouse and generally superior
ability to estimate the spouse's reaction to offers or demands. Lawyers are sensitive to this comparative advantage and often try to exploit it. As one lawyer put it in speaking with one of his clients:
Let me ask you this, because you know him a lot better. Which do
you think he'd be more likely to give a good response to? Something that's in writing, that he needs to respond to in writing, or
something oral?
Or, as another stated,
That's what I'm inclined to do here, unless you're of the opinion
you would rather start at sixty-forty. I mean, you know Joan and
you know how she would react.
In the latter instance the lawyer is even prepared to alter her favored pattern of negotiation in the face of the client's superior
88 For a discussion of various roles that lawyers play in divorce, see O'GORMAN,
supra note 26, at ch.6.
89 See Anthony V. Alfieri, Speaking Out of Turn: the Story ofJosephine V., 4 GEo.J. LEGAL
ETmcs 619 (1991); see also White, supra note 13, at 46-48.
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knowledge. For that instant, the social world of the client, rather
than the world of law and legal experience, defines the parameters
of the reasonable.
In addition to deploying their knowledge of their own social
world, clients frequently assert their views, or resist their lawyers',
through repetition and denial. 90 Lawyers may talk about the unreasonable or the unobtainable, they may predict this or that outcome,
but clients need not, and frequently do not, acquiesce. Rather, clients may become quiet or change the subject, only to reintroduce
the same topic later. What may seem to the observer to be wasted
motion and circularity, may really be a tactic in an ongoing negotiation. Finally, clients on occasion fight back by withholding information, sometimes explicitly, sometimes not. 9' They use this tactic
when they want to exclude the lawyer from some field of inquiry,
often because they consider an issue out of bounds or would be em92
barrassed by some disclosure.
The negotiation of reality between lawyer and client is timeconsuming and repetitive, yet often incomplete or unclear in its results. Whose definition of reality prevails is often impossible to determine. Even as decisions are made and documents are filed, how
those decisions and documents relate to lawyer-client conversations
about goals and expectations can be mysterious. It is, however, precisely by attending to this mystery that one can understand enactments of power and tactics of resistance.
IV
ENACTMENTS OF POWER AND THE NEGOTIATION OF
RESPONSIBILITY

Unlike the effort to define reasonable and attainable goals, the
task of securing the client's objectives initially appears to be neither
opaque nor ambiguous. The steps that must be taken to get on with
the case are routine. Particular, well-defined procedural requirements must be satisfied to secure various kinds of court assistance.
Knowing and executing the necessary steps are conventionally regarded as the lawyer's responsibility. 93 Many involve details of procedure beyond the experience of even the most sophisticated client.
90
Other work emphasizes the way client stories are silenced in lawyer-client interaction. Our observations suggest that clients resist the definitions of reality their lawyers
provide through persistent and recurring assertion.
91 See White, supra note 13, at 48-52.
92 See Peter Margulies, "Who Are You to Tell Me That?".- Attorney-Client Deliberation
RegardingNonlegal Issues and the Interests of Nonclients, 68 N.C. L. REv. 213 (1990).
93 See ROSENTHAL, supra note 23, at 15. This is, of course, subject to the norms of
informed consent. See Mark Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent
and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 41 (1979).
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Most of the remaining steps involve various kinds of negotiations
with the other side. Where the lawyer believes tasks are more easily
or more cheaply carried out by the client himself, such an assignment ought to be straightforward. Some activities are clearly the
exclusive preserve of the lawyer-preparing the pleadings, conducting hearings and trials, for example. However, other aspects of
divorce that can be shared or assigned to the client often are not.
In general, lawyers try to maintain control over negotiations
with the other side, except in discussions about personal property.
They do this by insisting that these negotiations take place on a lawyer-to-lawyer basis. To lawyers, these professional exchanges are a
core element of legal services in divorce, an arena in which their
professional experience and competence are more nearly actualized
than in helping clients comprehend the legal process or figure out
their financial prospects. Nevertheless, some clients, perhaps fearful that their interests will not be adequately represented, want to
negotiate directly with their spouse.
But whatever the explicit assignments of responsibility, divorce
cases are not self-executing. It is not always clear what needs to be
done, who is going to do it, and who is responsible for assuring that
it gets done. Either lawyer or client might not take the steps that
they ought to take, have agreed to take, or been urged to take. In
this context, enactments of power, either in assuming or assigning
responsibility, are, like those in the negotiation of reality, often unclear or confused.
One reason legal action in divorce does not proceed in a clear
and orderly way is simply that individual and organizational agendas
are beyond the control of any single party to the case. 94 However,
the divorces that we observed suggest that the fundamental reason
cases do not proceed steadily or smoothly is that lawyers and clients
on the same side encounter, from each other, various levels of procrastination, vacillation, disapproval, withdrawal, repression, and information problems that delay, distort and jeopardize what they are
trying to accomplish.9 5 These moves involve indirect enactments of
power and indirect tactics of resistance.9 6 Rarely do lawyers or clients acknowledge that they are not going to do what they said they
would do, or that they are repressing their inclination to say someFor an illustration in another area of law, see TOM DURKIN, ET AL., PLAITED CUN(American Bar Foundation Working
Paper No. 9004, 1991).
95 In the literature on client counselling and interviewing these phenomena are
treated as symptoms of client misbehavior rather than recognized as tactics of resistance.
See DAVID A. BINDER, ET AL., LAWYERS As COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH
237-56 (1991).
96 See Scorr, supra note 10, at 29-33.
94

NING: MANIPULATING TIME IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION
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thing they are not going to say. The effect of these covert enactments of power becomes manifest only after a price has been paid,
97
and these enactments are more powerful on that account.
One of the surprising aspects of the lawyer-client relationship
in divorce proceedings is the rarity of the imperative mode. Put
quite starkly, clients almost never say to their lawyers something on
the order of "I am the client, I am paying the bill, now do this." 98
This finding is not a comment about a form of speech. It is not that
clients just find a more diplomatic way of issuing a command.
Rather, in the face of disagreement, clients do not assert their prerogative to tell the lawyer what to do. Such a finding would not be
so remarkable if the professional in question possessed scientific or
technological expertise, such that a lay person would be out of order
were he to issue commands against the professional's technical
judgment. However, in the context of divorce, many of the judgments over which conflicts occur do not reflect technical considerations; rather, they are questions of timing, motive and interpretation
for which the lawyer may have no comparative advantage. Indeed,
insofar as the resolution of those questions depends upon a feel for
the behavior of the spouse, the client's qualifications may well be
superior.
Lawyers are no more inclined to. command than are their clients. 99 They may urge, cajole, flatter, use rhetorical tricks, provide
unqualified or contingent advice, predict harm, discomfort, frustration or catastrophe, but they almost never say, "I am the professional, I am the expert, now do this." Furthermore, although
lawyers frequently fail to act, they rarely invoke their knowledge and
experience as grounds for refusing to act.
The avoidance of imperative modes suggests that the expressive forms used are intuitively sound. Both lawyers and clients apparently recognize that, were they to behave as if they were
hierarchically empowered, they would undermine the legitimacy of
what is generally considered to be a cooperative enterprise.1 0 0 But
sound as the conventional forms may be for defining the limits of
overt power, an unwillingness to issue commands opens a wide territory for subtle and latent maneuver.
97 Id. at 202-03.
98 This is, of course, the case where the client is not paying the bill, as in the legal
services context. We were surprised that it was also true in the fee-for-service context.
99 For a discussion of different understandings of the lawyer's right to command,
see William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: ProceduralJustice and Professional Ethics,
1978 Wis. L. REv. 29 (1978).
100 Some scholars argue that the prevailing cultural form is hierarchical. See, e.g.,
Simon, supra note 62, at 485.
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As in many human endeavors in which progress is not externally imposed or organized, procrastination in divorce cases is frequently the weapon of choice.' 0 ' Almost all of the actions that need
to be taken to move a case from initiation to conclusion can easily be
avoided. Procrastination may occur when neither lawyer nor client
does anything, although each thinks that the other is committed to
action, and it may occur when the action not taken is concrete and
bounded. Procrastination's effects may be increased by the haze
that eventually settles over the question of who had responsibility in
the first place.
Procrastination may be purposeful and self-conscious. It may
also be structural, built into the way that lawyers organize their practice. Lawyers in small and medium-sized practices are extremely reluctant to turn prospective clients away. As a consequence, they
frequently order their workloads in some form of queue. In the
doctor's office one waits in line to see the doctor. In legal matters,
the wait is not to see the lawyer, but once having seen him, to have
him attend to your case. The outcome of such a regime is clients
who press their lawyers to keep their cases moving, or clients who
are frustrated and angry at the lack of progress.
Additionally, lawyers sometimes lose interest in cases, especially when the other side is intransigent over settlement and the
client does not have the resources to pay for full-scale adjudication.
Just such a stalemate led a California client to tell us:
I'm hung up over the matter that it's not wound up yet. And nobody is eager to wind it up ... all the sympathy, but yet on the
other hand they are not concerned about finishing the deal, closing the book. And I just find that really bizarre for lawyers to be
like that and let it linger on and on. It's like it's stashed in another
pile and I can't figure out why they are not doing anything.
On many occasions, rationalizations for inaction are offered
that may simply excuse poor organization, inattention or bad work
habits. Matters do not receive attention because the lawyer is concerned about provoking the other side, is trying to conserve the client's money, or is trying to get the client to take more responsibility
for his own life.
Competing loyalties are another reason for procrastination.
Blumberg's well-known paper, The Practice of Law as a Confidence
Game,10 2 dramatically alerted us to the influence of the work context
on lawyer allegiances. But his theory was developed in the organiza101 Power, as is now widely recognized, is exercised in the refusal to act just as surely
as it is involved in assertion. See LUKES, supra note 4, at 23; see also PETER BACHRACH &
MORTON S. BARATZ, POWER AND POVERTY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 43-46 (1970).
102 Blumberg, supra note 32.

1470

CORNELL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 77:1447

tionally tight confines of a lower criminal court, where defense lawyers are highly dependent on their continuing relations with judges
and prosecutors. These kinds of continuing relations are inherently
less important in the divorce context. Divorce lawyers in the sites
we studied are most often general practitioners; they practice in
many courts and deal with a shifting cast of actors. Nonetheless,
many of these lawyers went to great lengths to stay on good terms
with the lawyer on the other side, even if this meant not prosecuting
10 3
their client's case to the extent they had promised.
However, procrastination can originate in sound strategy. Lawyers frequently do not do what they have agreed to do, or implied
they would do, because they disapprove of their client's agenda, disagree over questions of timing, or are deterred by cost. In these
circumstances divorce lawyers are especially affected by their view of
their client's emotional situation. Are the client's emotions under
control? Is he able to function as a reasonable litigant? Has the
psychic divorce kept pace with the legal proceedings, or ought the
latter be delayed until the client achieves a more stable emotional
10 4
perspective?
Clients also may have sound reasons to procrastinate. While
they frequently do not agree with their lawyers, they may not want
to contest the issue with them directly.' 0 5 A client may be in this
posture because of information she is unwilling to share with the
lawyer, because she may be embarrassed by her own ambivalence,
or because she may be inclined to trust her own, rather than her
lawyer's, judgment or intuition.10 6 Client procrastination may relate
to major as well as minor matters. We observed a client decline to
tell his spouse that he intended to seek a divorce after he assured his
lawyer that he would; another client refused, without explanation, to
authorize service of a divorce petition on the spouse from whom she
repeatedly claimed she wished to be divorced; and a third client successfully evaded her lawyer's entreaties to agree to a medical examination to determine whether she was fit to hold a job.
Moving from procrastination to other strategies and tactics in
the negotiation of responsibility leads, as it were, from the core to
the periphery, from routine practice to more exceptional activities.
For instance, repression, or the failure to state goals or views of
which one is very much aware, is not at all unusual. 10 7 In addition,
See Griffiths, supra note 17, at 165.
Id. at 166 ("Lawyers' control over the legal procedure makes available various
techniques for cooling off conflict. Simple delay is often used to this end.").
105 See White, supra note 13, at 45.
106 Id. at 47.
107
For an argument about how lawyers should respond, see Luban, supra note 71, at
491.
103
104

1992]

ENACTMENTS OF POWER

1471

we encountered vacillation and indecision in three different sets of
circumstances: first, when both negotiations and adjudication appeared seriously flawed; second, when either the lawyer or the client
viewed the other as unstable or unpredictable; and third, when one
or the other apparently lacked the ability to order and rank alternatives. These occasions do not involve overt assertions of power;
rather, they are power drifts, instances where context or personality
disables lawyers and/or their clients from grasping the reins of
power.
In the abstract, the lawyers we studied espoused an ideology of
shared responsibility.10 8 They said that they try to divide the labor
with their clients such that, once they provide the client with the
capacity to understand the technical requirements and with the relevant distillation of their professional experience, lawyer and client
together can set overall strategy and plan tactical moves. Sometimes behavior conforms to this ideology; most of the time it does
not. As one lawyer told us,
[The client] seems willing [to] . . . take my advice ....
I would
say, ".... [W]e've got an agreement .... This is as good as you're

going to get in court, and I think it's not worth the risk of going to
court." And I think she would say, "OK, fine." On the other
hand, if I said, "Look, I think you can do better in court, and I
think it is worth the ordeal," which it will be, to go in there, and I
think "OK let's go in there and let the judge decide." She would
agree to that, too.
This is not joint consultation. These are the words of an "expert" who assumes his advice will be heeded. This language can be
interpreted as a reflection of power derived from professional structure, power that lawyers have because they are lawyers. It is, however, unclear what precise claim the lawyer is making-that the
client will do as he says because he is a lawyer, or that she will do as
he says because, being a lawyer, he has the knowledge and experience to warrant her reliance on him. In either case, the client is on
foreign terrain, terrain where the deployment of knowledge and experience may be resisted in various ways. That resistance complicates and enriches the enactment of power in lawyer-client relations
even as it makes difficult, for both lawyer and client, to determine
who is responsible for what.
In the following section we examine enactments of power in the
negotiation of reality and responsibility within a single case. By attending to a single case, we hope to demonstrate the forms that
power and resistance take in lawyer-client interaction, to show how
108

See Simon, supra note 62, at 486-89.
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clients re-make the advice they receive as they consume professional
services, and to illustrate changes over time in the enactments and
dynamics of power.
V
THE CASE OF THE "UNSUPPORTED

WIFE"

The narrative that follows involves the divorce of Kathy, a client
whose case we followed, and Nick. Kathy has retained Wendy, a
solo practitioner, and Durr, Wendy's paralegal. When our observations began, Kathy had already conferred once each with Wendy
and Durr. We observed four conferences between Kathy and
Wendy and one between Kathy and Durr. In addition, we conducted five interviews with Kathy and three with Wendy.' 0 9
Kathy is a housewife and part-time secretary living in California.
She had been married for 28 years when Nick, a local government
official, initiated divorce proceedings. They had four grown children, one of whom was living at home. Kathy tried for many
months, without success, to bring about a reconciliation with
Nick."10 Beside the family house, where Kathy lived throughout the
divorce proceedings, the couple's assets consisted of their pensions,
modest collections of sculpture and rugs, two small savings accounts, two vehicles, and assorted personal property.
Wendy began her legal career in 1963, a time when women lawyers in her community were rare.I' Throughout her career she has
been primarily involved in family law, first working for the government, then in a firm, and now alone. Although she says she has an
unusual understanding of the emotional dimensions of divorce, particularly with respect to women, she is nonetheless ambivalent about
this practice:
I kept getting these family law cases and I really kept fighting it
and I really didn't think I wanted to be a family lawyer because it is
really a miserable business. But one day I woke up and I thought,
"Well, I've been through it myself and I really know what these
people are going through and how they are hurting and somebody had to do it."

Wendy believes she has a distinctive way of practicing family
law. Her theory is that, in addition to possessing all the expertise of
109 All conferences and interviews were audio-recorded. Nick and Durr attended
part of the first lawyer-client conference that we observed.
110 At the time we entered the case Kathy was clearly still trying to hold onto the
marriage. She was psychologically unwilling or unable to accept the idea of being rejected. For an insightful picture of the psychological dynamics of separation, see DIANE
VAUGHAN, UNCOUPLING (1972).
111 This was typical of the situation of the profession as a whole. See CYNTmA F.
EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAw 79-95 (1981).
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a certified family law specialist, she provides superior service because she can recognize and validate the emotional trauma typically
experienced by people in divorce. She is able to provide this service
because she had been divorced herself, because she is a woman and
thereby naturally empathizes with the situation of rejected women,
and because in Durr she has a superior support structure, available
at all hours, willing to listen to anything, and knowledgeable about
the intricacies of law enforcement and social service resources.
To illustrate the dynamics and trajectories of power in the negotiation of reality and responsibility between lawyers and clients,
we present this case chronologically, beginning with our first
observation.
FIRST LAWYER-CLIENT CONFERENCE. The first conference we
observed was unusual because of the presence of Nick, who had not
yet retained a lawyer. The stated reason for the conference was to
discuss the division of marital property. Wendy opens the meeting
by asking Nick what his thoughts are concerning the property division: "Did you have a proposal for how you wanted to divide it or
did you want ... ?" Nick responds in a disarming way:
To me it's real simple. I mean, if she's going to ask for whatever,
I'm not contesting anything. I don't care about what happens
with that. I've given her the car, half the house, if it ever sells,
whatever part of my retirement or whatever part I own, she can
have it. I'm not trying to keep anything from her. To me it's simple. Just come up with whatever you feel is right and that's it.
This response is both passive-Nick says he is willing to do whatever
Wendy feels is fair-and, at the same time, hostile. He talks about
Kathy as if she were not present, and acts as if there really is nothing
to discuss; everything is already settled. He appears both in control
and ready to settle on whatever basis Wendy proposes.
Wendy all-too-readily accepts this posture and moves quickly to
discuss how to determine the worth of the assets. In so doing she
too largely ignores Kathy. She suggests that Nick obtain an evaluation of the pensions. Later, she delegates to Kathy the tasks of determining the value of their life insurance and of finding an
appraiser for the sculptures. These tasks are, in her words, "little
executory things." Kathy accepts her assignment without comment.
But signs of trouble quickly emerge as Wendy and Nick discuss
various items of personal property. While Nick acknowledges that
rugs exchanged in barter for his labor during the marriage are community property, he nevertheless feels that he has a privileged claim
to them because he had to hold two jobs to obtain them. Before
Nick leaves the conference, Wendy reminds him and Kathy of the
nature of the process that they are embarking on. "Most divorces
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nowadays," she says, "although there are a lot of emotions involved
with it, and you know, 'he said' and 'she did,' and things like that, it
really comes down to an accounting problem."
We see here the beginning of the negotiation of reality, of what
the legal process of divorce can do for the participants. The reality
that Wendy represents undervalues emotions, although she
presents herself as a lawyer who cares, a lawyer who understands the
emotional trauma of divorce. Even for a lawyer purportedly as emotionally sensitive as Wendy, everything must be assigned a value or
else it is of no consequence.' 12 There is little explicit resistanceneither Nick nor Kathy openly contest the version of legal reality
that Wendy presents. Yet as soon as Nick leaves, Wendy predicts
that Nick will "collapse" when he realizes the net difference between
his and Kathy's pensions, and "scream bloody murder and hit the
ceiling" when Kathy and Wendy make a comprehensive property
proposal to him. Her warning that the legal process is really about
accounting, not emotions, begins to have some bite.
Kathy responds by acknowledging that Nick has a temper problem. Yet the conference closes with Kathy defending Nick. She says
that Nick is really "a nice man," and she expresses her hope that the
divorce process will not "take that away from him." Wendy again
tries to introduce a note of reality based on her experience with the
legal process of divorce: "I hope we can do it with a minimum of
animosity. But there's bound to be a little resentment." The reality
of the divorce process is not just that it is an accounting problem,
but that the best that one can hope for is a "minimum of animosity"
and "a little resentment." While Kathy says she understands what
Wendy is saying, she nonetheless insists that the reality of the legal
divorce is not, and will not be, her reality. "I hate it," she says, "I
hate the whole thing" (the divorce and the divorce process).
Thus, almost before this case begins, reality and responsibility
are on the table. In the domain of responsibility, the lawyer tries to
get the client and her husband to do the drudge work, ostensibly to
save money. In the domain of reality, Nick's feelings about moonlighting, the reality of his hard work-i.e., that the first job is to support his family and the second is for himself-are at war with his
recognition that the law draws no such distinction. And Wendy
warns the pair that they can indulge their emotions as they wish, but
in the end emotions must give way to the "accounting problem."
Yet Wendy also recognizes that legal reality does not square
easily with the social reality that both Kathy and Nick experience.
112
For an extended discussion of this version of the reality of divorce, see Sarat &
Felstiner, supra note 12, at 93, 116-25.
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She knows that displacing emotions is not easy and predicts that
Nick's volatility will take over when he comes face to face with the
economic reality of divorce. 113 In making this prediction, Wendy
claims to know Kathy's social reality in a way that Kathy cannot
claim to know Wendy's legal and experiential reality. Thus lawyer
and client together paint the picture of a spouse whose first reactions to new developments are likely to be extreme. The client's
contribution to this joint effort is based on first-hand experience
with her husband's temperament, the lawyer's more cynical and
pragmatic view is based on what she has seen in similar cases. Together, they lay part of the mosaic of reality.
In her final comments about Nick and the divorce process,
Kathy resists and distances herself from the adversarial reality that
Wendy represents. Power slips away; Wendy will not be able to dictate a single, uncomplicated reality. There is no easy acquiescence;
for Kathy the negotiation of the reality of her divorce has just begun. Yet Kathy herself recognizes that she is now in an alien space
where the procedures and traditions that will govern her divorce are
not freely chosen. Whatever the possibilities for movement within
this space, the legal divorce is legal precisely because it is law's to
give. Entering the divorce process, she encounters rules that, while
self-evident and taken for granted by others, are not of her own
making. She must deal with professionals with well-established routines, no matter how foreign she finds these routines and no matter
how hard she resists. Her freedom of action, though considerable,
is constrained. Her resistance, however resourceful, will only become meaningful as a reaction to the hierarchically structured legal
world.
FIRST INTERVIEW WITH CLIENT (4 days later). Kathy speaks easily to the interviewer about the breakdown of her marriage. She believes that counselling might have saved her marriage, but says that
Nick would not take part. She only found out that Nick had filed for
divorce when a friend noticed the announcement in the local newspaper. Nevertheless she admits that she still "has a glimmer of hope
that maybe he will come to his senses."
Kathy consulted a lawyer (not Wendy) reluctantly:
Kathy: So I went to the lawyer and I waited and waited and waited
and I thought, "Boy, it's sure taking him a long time to do something about this." So I called him one day.
113 At another point in this conference we observe the first hint of how the lawyer
tries to keep the conversation focused on financial matters: when the client starts to talk
about her struggle to help her "kid through his drug problem," the lawyer successfully
changes the subject to the house and car payments. That part of the client's social world
relating to her child's problems is not to be part of the "reality" of this case.
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Interviewer: You mean this is waiting for your lawyer to do
something?
Kathy: Yeah, to do something. Like three months had passed and
I thought I surely should have heard something by now. Well, he
says: "Oh, I just found this sitting on my desk and the papers
were there."

Interviewer: You mean he had forgotten completely about the
whole thing?
Kathy: Yes.
Kathy chooses "exit"'1 14 and switches to Wendy, who has a reputation as "a go-getter" and someone who will "really fight for her
clients." Moreover, Wendy makes available to her a person, Durr,
who seems to guarantee she will not be just another lost file.
This interview provides both a graphic illustration of a failure in
responsibility for case progress with the first lawyer, and intimations
of difficulties with the current lawyer in defining reality and assigning responsibility. Kathy tells the interviewer that she wants to
get her "fair share," which to her translates into the house, the opportunity to escape from her dead-end secretarial job, and something to even out their incomes. Yet she has not been asked to make
her goals clear to her lawyer. Given Wendy's previously demonstrated tendency to extrapolate from her experiences with other
cases to the reality of Kathy's case, Wendy may assume she does not
need to ask in order to know what her client wants.
In any event, assuming rather than asking is an exercise of
power by indirection. Power here consists in what is not being said,
with the burden then shifted to the client, contrary to the picture of
lawyer-client relations in which lawyers are portrayed as agents of
their clients. But for the client, silence is its own kind of power and
protection. Not stating one's goals means that they cannot be labelled unreasonable and dismissed. 1 15
Another silence involves the division of labor between lawyer
and paralegal. Wendy has told Kathy that much of her case will be
processed by the paralegal, even though the paralegal's training and
functions have not been defined. Had Wendy explained the role of
the paralegal, Kathy might not have accepted that level of participation. The lawyer again exercises power by taking action without
consultation, rather than through an explicit decision.
FIRST INTERVIEW WITH LAWYER (6 weeks after the first conference). To Wendy, gender is the touchstone to tactics and strategy,
and explains her acute interest in power.
114

HIRSCHMANN,

supra note 87, at 21.

On the power of silence as a strategy of power and resistance, see Scorr, supra
note 10, at 17-18.
115
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Interviewer: Do you see a difference in your role with women
clients?
Wendy: ... The women have a problem. All of a sudden their
career is threatened. They've been a housewife all these years
....When the other attorney starts pushing a woman who's been
a housewife for 20 years .. .[to] go out and get a job, it really
angers me because they have to realize that if they were suddenly
told they could no longer practice law .. it would really be just
devastating .... I'm very protective of these women, especially
because I feel they are going to make a career change which is
going to affect them the rest of their lives, and as a result I want
them to take their time ....I mean I don't want them making any
rash decisions when they are under such an emotional strain. So I
will cover for my clients. I will drag. I will delay.
Wendy either seeks to exercise maternal power over, and on
behalf of, her clients, or likes to think of herself as doing so. She
seeks to protect them from aggressive lawyers who underestimate
what women go through during a divorce. In addition, by controlling the pace of the divorce, she serves interests that the client, in a
rush to closure, does not know she has.
Interviewer: What if a woman is married for 20 years, so she's in
her middle forties, [and her] kids are off in high school?
Wendy: The courts here feel she should become a useful, productive member of society. I don't agree with them. I think that a
woman who has been a career mother and wife all these years has
put in her time. If she had been in the army she'd be retired. But
they don't look at it from that standpoint.
At this point the lawyer's view of what is desirable departs from
the reality of law itself. Wendy presents herself as powerful because
she knows both the reality of the everyday world of law and the reality of the everyday lives of women.
Interviewer: What kind of expectations do these women come to
you with?
Wendy: Well, I think most of them see in the movies or read the
books where the husband is going to pay for the divorce, and they
are going to get alimony and they are going to get the house.
Wendy thinks of her clients as living in a world of fiction, as
resisting the harsh realities of husbands who refuse to pay alimony
and houses that get sold as just another piece of community property.' 16 She has struck at the core of the procrastination dilemma.
Clients may not be emotionally ready to face legal and economic
realities. The supportive lawyer ought then be prepared to "cover,
116

For a discussion of the impact of divorce on the economic status of women, see
supra note 60, at 323-56.
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drag and delay." But for how long? And who is to decide how long
is long enough?
At the same time as they expose the ambiguous nature of delay,
Wendy's actions show the indirect and elusive nature of some enactments of power. Interrogatories had been served on this lawyer and
yet she has not looked at them. Have they been ignored as part of a
conscious strategy of delay, or have they been shunted aside because of other, more pressing work? It is, moreover, unlikely that
Wendy has told Kathy about the interrogatories. Is this a laywer's
self-protective move, or a deliberate decision to let the client heal
emotionally before she is dragged back into the minutiae of the
case? Has the lawyer focused on the situation of this client, who has
by this time been separated from her husband for nearly three years,
or does she assume that all similarly situated middle-age women
should be treated alike? Is this an instance of benevolent maternalism or simple neglect, of an enactment of power or the power of
inattention?
SECOND INTERVIEW WITH CLIENT (11 weeks after the first conference). Kathy begins by saying, "I don't know what's going on. Not
a heck of a lot is going on. We're just getting paperwork done."
Although the required attention to financial detail was "a pain in the
neck ... you sure know where you stand when you are finished."
When asked about her attitude toward the pace of the case, Kathy
said:
I think I'm reaching a point now where I either want to get it over
with or something else better happen .... Ijust can't stand this
any more .... Ijust feel like I'm floating around in space .... I
don't care if I clean my house ....
I don't care about anything.
I'm not normally like this.
Despite her sense of urgency, Kathy had not said anything to
1 17
either Wendy or Durr about "the pace at which things get done."
She believes that Nick is also anxious to get the case going, especially because his living conditions are "terrible." Yet at the same
time that Kathy wants the marriage to be over, she continues to be
upset by its breakup.
I have a feeling that if we could have had counselling together that
this is a marriage that could have been saved because it was a
good marriage, it was a strong marriage, and I just feel like God,
why are you doing this. But it is a need in Nick. I can really see
that .... But I haven't changed the way I feel. I really miss him
very much .... It's [the feelings about rejection] the worst thing
I've ever dealt with in my life.
117 It is as if we were being given access to the kind of "hidden transcript" that Scott
argues is constructed to resist dominant power. See Sco-rr, supra note 10, at 4-5.
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At this point, the social world of the client and the legal world
of the lawyer appear to overlap, at least in terms of determining the
client's financial needs. But in the more important matter of the
client's emotional posture and whether or not to prosecute the case,
there does not appear to be any connection between lawyer and client. It is not that the lawyer has prevailed in a contest over timing
and progress and is now simply "in charge." Instead, the question
of timing and progress is an unexplored, unaddressed irritant-a
weakness, not a strength, for a lawyer who imagines herself as
mother-protector.
Kathy wants to go in two directions at once. The status quo is
intolerable. She wants her husband back and she desperately awaits
the miracle that will return him to her life. But she fears this will not
happen and is consequently resigned to getting on with the case.
The problem in constructing a joint reality between lawyer and client is that, while the client tells this all to the interviewer, she fails to
tell the lawyer. As a result, the case hardly moves at all.
THIRD INTERVIEW WITH

CLIENT

(23 weeks after the first confer-

ence). In a short interview, Kathy several times expresses her belief
that substantial progress should have been made in her case, and
disappointment that it had not:
I expected a lot to happen before I went on vacation, and I
thought, "Nothing is happening," so I paid my bill and I went on
my vacation and came back and still nothing has happened .... I
expect it to be final pretty soon or something.., but there's been
nothing from a lawyer ....

I really have not talked to those peo-

ple for a good, I don't know, five months maybe.
Although she still seems bothered that progress in the case
would carry her further away from marriage, she is increasingly reconciled to the fact that there is no alternative:
I don't really want [things to get going], I mean I have mixed feelings about the whole thing, but when I talk to my kids, they say,
"Mom, just don't hold out any false hopes, so why don't you just
get it over with." And I think, "Ok, they are right. It's time to
stop this stuff."
This interview shows that the silence over case progress persists. The client's views are clear to us, if not to the lawyer. She
wants to get on with the case unless her husband is coming back,
which she understands is not really going to happen. But the lawyer
is doing nothing to push the case along.
For Kathy the experience is mysterious; she does not confront
the reality of a lawyer who is not paying attention to her case. Instead, in the face of her own inability, or unwillingness, to do more
than pay her bill and hope that something will happen, of her inabil-
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ity and unwillingness to enact the power of the principal to command her agent, there is the ambiguity of inaction.
Is Kathy's case again lost in her lawyer's office, out of sight and
off the agenda? Or is Wendy acting on a theory that the best indicator of this type of client's readiness to proceed is when she affirmatively asks the lawyer to get on with it? Both alternatives would be
passive enactments of power by the lawyer: the difference between
them is that the first is about responsibility (the lawyer is not doing
what the client wants because it does not suit her), the latter about
reality (the lawyer knows the state a client must be in before progress is feasible and knows how to identify it).
FOURTH INTERVIEW WITH CLIENT (25 weeks after the first conference). This interview occurred in a brief interlude before the second lawyer-client conference. Kathy reports that she and Nick
"were never going to be able to talk to each other again if something did not happen pretty fast," so she made an appointment with
Wendy. She says that she hated the process of haggling over small
amounts of money or items of property: "it's just so picky." At this
point, the harmony of the earlier conversation between Wendy,
Nick, and Kathy has disappeared. As Kathy feared, the divorce process is bringing out the worst in Nick. The legal reality is fast contaminating her social world. Despite the fact that she is paying the
bill, she feels powerless to make things happen.
While the social world has finally signalled Kathy that she must
take responsibility for getting the process going, in another domain
the world of divorce has yet to make an imprint. While most people
are generally quite concerned with style, since it is one of the common ways to draw social boundaries, Kathy has what might be called
an unusually severe case of bourgeois manners. Arguing over small
amounts of money is distasteful. But divorce, in its entirety, is in bad
taste and the full range of its unattractiveness is not yet clear to
Kathy. Although the lawyer appears to think that she comprehends
the social world of the client, she has not fully initiated the client
into the reality of the legal world.
SECOND LAWYER-CLIENT CONFERENCE (25 weeks after the first
conference).
Wendy: Okay, from what I understand, Kathy, you want to get
going on this again.
Kathy: I do. Nick is getting to the point where he would hardly
talk to me and I don't want that to happen. I still would like to
remain friends if we can.
Wendy's opening comment shifts the blame for the lack of progress in the case from lawyer to client. Yet Kathy chooses not to
hear or feel the blame. Her "I do" resonates with what she hopes to
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preserve from the marriage by moving forward to end it.118 Her
wishes are finally made clear; what had been until now unspoken is
finally put into words.
Yet the conference does not actually focus on how to get the
case moving. Instead, attention shifts to financial detail. Discussion
turns to the net value of the house, the value of other significant
items, and the relationship of spousal support to property division.
Kathy's fleeting assertion of power is quickly lost in "accounting."
Wendy: I can't see that we can come up with enough to offset
your equity in the house unless he's willing to take a note or
something to that effect. Have you discussed this with him at all?
Kathy: .

.

. At one time he said that he might be willing to go

along, but this was about two months ago.
Wendy: I think you have to give him a note for $24,000.
Kathy: That's a tremendous amount.
Wendy: Maybe we can get him to keep on making the house
payments?
Kathy: I doubt it very much. I think he's really sick of it.
Wendy: You've had a long marriage and you should be entitled to
some support because he does make a lot more money than you
do ....

So that's something we have to consider.

[You could sell the house and get a condominium or] buy a mobile home.
Kathy: I would prefer to keep my house if I could.
Wendy: The only way we can get this part resolved is by getting
that little loose end tied [the value of some sculptures]. We have
all the figures on everything else ....

I can write her [Nick's

lawyer] a comprehensive letter saying I think we should do it this
way. I don't think your husband is going to agree to it, but I think
at least ...

we will get things moving again.

There is one important diversion in this conversation:
Kathy: [The youngest child is] my cross to bear.
Wendy: The baby, huh? Doesn't want to leave. They must call
that nesting now.
Kathy: Yes. I'm afraid that's what it is.
Wendy: And he's all settled in.
Kathy: Well, he's going to have to unsettle himself because I've
told him ....
118

do."

"I do" is also an eerie reminder of the marriage vow; "Do you take ...

?" "I
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Wendy: Now, what about the sculptures? We still haven't
touched on those. We have the furniture divided, right?

The conference has begun on a by now familiar and ambiguous
note. The plain meaning of Wendy's introductory remarks is that
the client is responsible for the hiatus in case progress and has now
decided to get things going again. Since we know that is not the
case, Wendy is either smoothly shifting blame for the dead time to
Kathy or trying to get a fix on her client's emotional readiness to get
on with the case. But the language used is rather roundabout for a
lawyer interested in the client's emotional condition.
Wendy quickly gets to what is for her the heart of the case.
How can Kathy keep her house? Wendy is not optimistic about the
house, and is rather cavalier in suggesting a move to a mobile home.
Given Kathy's age, low income, and skill level, the question of
spousal support would seem to be as important as the house, yet it is
only raised as an item for future negotiation. Wendy is not ready to
confront this aspect of reality and Kathy rather passively follows her
lawyer's lead.
Wendy interrupts Kathy's attempt to explain how she is going
to kick her youngest child out of the house with a question about the
sculptures. This interchange repeats a sequence in the first conference and reflects Wendy's unwillingness to give her client's nonfinancial personal problems a place on the agenda. Although those
problems have no legal standing, they are not explicitly ruled out of
order; rather, they are shunted aside by a change in subject.
THIRD LAWYER-CLIENT CONFERENCE (31 weeks after the first
conference). This conference is the defining moment in negotiations over both reality and responsibility. The agenda proves to be
focused on three questions: who is going to conduct the negotiations; what are the lawyer's and client's goals concerning the house
and support; and, if the goals are not clear, how they are to be determined. Kathy begins with a report of her discussions with Nick
about the house. She had presented him with four scenarios:
I - Sell the house.
2 - Sell the house in two years when they would be eligible for

favorable tax treatment.
3 - Buy him out.
4 - Trade the house for two condos.

After a discussion of all the asset values, Wendy tells Kathy that
it would take about $20,000 to buy out Nick's share:
Wendy: So what we tell them, I don't know whether you want to
tell him, because you seem to be negotiating fine, or I can call his
attorney and say, "Well look, we have certain costs of sale and
everything when you do sell the house. Because you will be sell-
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ing it eventually. Therefore we figure the net equity is so much,
and in adding the items that you should get versus what I should
get and everything, I figure that $20,000 is approximately"-I'll
be glad to make a copy of this for you, in fact, so that you can take
it along and show him if you wish.
Kathy: Yes.
Kathy: And this way you [imagining what she will say to Nick]
don't have to pay any support.
Wendy: All right. Well, whatever, however you want to do that.
But shouldn't you be getting support from him? Are you getting
support from him?
Kathy: He's paying the house payment.
Wendy: Well, I think even after you get divorced you are going to
need some continued help from him. If he's making the house
payment now and you are going to have a $20,000 second to pay
on it, to him, how are you going to do that?... You know a little
practicality around here won't hurt. You've had a long marriage
and therefore you are entitled to support and obviously you can't
make enough on your own to support yourself and become selfsupporting. Now you can rent out rooms, take in laundry and
things like that, but let's look at it from a practical standpoint.
Kathy: No, I threw my iron away.
Wendy: You know, as I have told you, whatever you take out of
this marriage has got to last you the rest of your life. Prince
Charming just has not been known to come along and sweep up
my clients .... It is a practical matter that we have to figure out.
Wendy: This is really your best opportunity to keep this one
[house] if you can. As you said, you are probably going to have to
rent out a room or take a second job, if you want to do that, or
turn to robbing banks ....Your husband is just going to have to
get used to the fact that you are his forever insofar as responsibility for support is concerned. I mean, he may get rid of the body,
but he ain't going to get rid of the responsibility. You are going
to have to get support from him. You just don't make enough
money.
Kathy: He's not going to want to hear that.
Wendy: Well, he's not going to want to hear it because people
don't hear what they don't want to hear .... But it doesn't work
that way. He is stuck with you.
The question of who will do the negotiating surfaces early in
this conference. It is rather clear that this lawyer, unlike most, does
not want to do it. She compliments Kathy on her performance to
date, even though that performance has produced no concrete results. Then she says she could talk to the other lawyer, but in the
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middle of the imaginary conversation that she would have with the
lawyer she switches to the voice of her client--"in adding the items
that you should get versus what I should get"-indicating, at least
indirectly, that she is not really going to have'any such discussion
with the other lawyer.
The focus then shifts from the house to support. Kathy does
not think that her husband will agree to pay support. Still, Wendy
does not accept that picture of the future. Regardless of the disposition of the house, Kathy cannot support herself and should not delude herself that someone ("Prince Charming") is going to come to
her rescue. Reality is again juxtaposed to fantasy, the world of the
legally possible to the world of dreams and fairy-tales.
Wendy asserts that their job is to convince Nick that he cannot
evade his responsibility simply through denial. Despite the force of
both the argument and the language in which it is expressed, this
enactment of power misses its mark, is evaded, and left unaddressed. Kathy does not contradict Wendy on the issue of need, but
she never agrees that support is a fixed objective.
In a sense, two static versions of reality are at war with one another. Both Wendy and Kathy agree that Kathy needs support.
Kathy does not think that Nick will agree to provide it, but she does
not express this view forcefully enough to make her lawyer explain
how to go about getting it. Again, no one seems in charge. This
case, like most of the cases we observed, does not move in a linear
fashion. Important questions are raised, discussed, but then left
hanging; positions are advocated to an audience which seems alltoo-able to tune them out.
This condition is most clearly reflected in the discussion concerning the disposition of the house. The conference began with
Kathy talking about four different schemes that the client and her
husband had discussed. In response, Wendy presents a series of alternatives, some of them intelligible, some of them not.
[1] The nice thing would be if you could buy him out and then,
eventually, if you sell it you'll have the rollover by yourself.
[2] Another alternative would be taking spousal support of
whatever your house payment is, $400 something a month, and
saying, okay I'll give you a note for $20,000 and what you do is
Uust give it back to him].
[3] Now you might also work out some kind of agreement with
him that you will owe him $20,000 from the house that you will
pay him when you sell the house or die, whichever comes first.
[4] Do we divide it up then [the time of sale] and figure out your
[husband's] equity based on what is the actual price of the house
or do you take your chances with me and hope it goes up in value,
or if it goes down in value, you get less money?
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[5] What we can do is put something to the effect that you'll keep
the house, the house will be sold no later than or listed for sale no
later than such-and-such a date, that upon the close of the house,
that within 60 days thereafter, either one of you may put on a cap
under the issue of support for the court to determine what your
needs are at that time.
[6] [You could waive support in exchange for his interest in the
house]. I really think that you would be giving up far more than
you would be getting in a case like that because you are talking
about $400 a month is $4800 a year and in four years he would
have paid you $20,000. If in that four year period of time you were
to get injured and could not work, you may need to have the support continued. If you waive it for now and forever more, then if
you get sick in two years, you may end up having to sell the house
and live off that and go on welfare eventually because you have no
recourse to have him help you. So it's one of those things you
have to decide.
[7] Another possibility is the two of you refinance the house and
he gets his $20,000 out that way, and then you have a bigger
house payment and guess who is going to help with that too?
[8] Of course, we talked about the possibility of using the renter
to pay off the $20,000.
[9] Also you could arrange with your husband for interest only,
payable at the end of five years or something and negotiable, renegotiable at that time.
[10] Maybe he'd also work out something where he'll only have to
pay half the support and he'll waive, he'll give you the house. I
mean, that's another thing to look at. Say "Look, I'll agree to take
only $200 a month support in exchange and even make it
nonmodifiable or something."
These alternatives were neither generated logically from some
set of empirical and normative assumptions nor presented all at
once; rather, they seemed to be the product of Wendy's stream of
consciousness engagement with the problems of the house and support. That Kathy, even if she took notes, could keep much of it
straight as she set off to deal with her husband, is doubtful. In midstream she confessed that the conference "gives me ideas, but I get
totally confused when I thought I really knew what I was doing. I
mean I really thought I had that thing [the house question] wired."
Despite the rather haphazard presentation of alternatives, we
see in the following exchanges that Wendy does have a negotiation
strategy in mind, however unusual it appears to be:
Wendy: You may need to talk to him some more before you come
up with a conclusion or something and see if he's interested in any
of these.
Kathy: That sounds like quite a few alternatives.
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Wendy: Quite a shopping list right there that you can go over
with him and kick around. Maybe one of these will be acceptable.
Kathy: Yeah, maybe.
Wendy: And if it is then we can work things out.
Wendy: Well, anyway, do some talking and see what you come up
with and if you want me to step in and talk to the attorney I think
Kathy: I may have to.
Wendy: I'd be glad to.
Kathy: Because, as I say, I'm not that knowledgeable and I just
hope that I can [interrupted].
While there is considerable confusion and circularity, there is
also some forward movement. But it is still not a directed movement and neither Wendy nor Kathy seems to have the case in hand.
Power drifts. Wendy extends a half-hearted offer of help, yet Kathy
is re-assigned the responsibility to negotiate even as she admits that
she is not sure what she is doing. Wendy and Kathy seem to agree
that without spousal support Kathy has no income security. But
Kathy still does not believe that her husband will agree to provide
support. Despite Wendy's pressing concerns about the risks of life
without at least the possibility of support, she gives Kathy carte
blanche to relinquish such a claim, a remarkable position for a lawyer who, as we will see, believes her professional role is to stiffen the
"backbone and spine" of her women clients. This negotiation about
the reality of goals is, from Wendy's perspective, a negative enactment of power: the major theme seems to be that it is the client's
life, hers to mess up if she pleases.
Wendy provides virtually no professional contribution, no explicit direction, despite her decades of family law practice. All she
can do is list alternatives, as if to say, "Here is a set of outcomes that
are technically feasible; see if your husband will buy any of them."
Perhaps this is a subtle way to ascertain Nick's opening position, but
it sounds more like an invitation to consider anything that he finds
acceptable.
Wendy sends Kathy out to negotiate with Nick without any advice about psychology, structure, stakes, moves, tactics, or order of
alternatives, and without any background about what a judge would
be likely to do if a settlement is not achieved. Moreover, Wendy
offers no justification for her abdication. Why, the client might wonder, does my lawyer exclude herself from negotiations with the
other side?
This phase of the case is difficult to interpret. Have we encountered a lawyer who speaks the language of a politically correct professional woman, but whose behavior is in fact disorganized and
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ineffective? Or is she, to the contrary, deftly sending Kathy out to
negotiate with Nick, knowing that little will be accomplished, but
believing that only these frustrating encounters with him will lead
her to redefine their relationship in realistic terms, which then will
form the basis for sound negotiations?
There is no point in searching for some positivist reality that
drives out alternative meanings. This text is simply our reproduction of their production. But the truth of what is going on in
Wendy's mind, if there is any one authentic version, does not make
any difference to our larger point about the nature of power in professional relationships. Whether Wendy is a very poor, or a very
crafty, lawyer does not affect the proposition that lawyers and clients
are not fully conversant with each others' agendas, that their interactions are in the form of negotiations, and that direction and influence flow back and forth between them, and even away from them
both.
FOURTH LAWYER-CLIENT CONFERENCE (37 weeks after the first
conference). This conference may be viewed as something of a corrective to the proceding one. Wendy takes a strong position about
goals, reinforces her view by describing a court's likely attitude, and
establishes a practical plan for conducting the next stage of negotiations. However, because of Wendy's lack of preparation, the conference gets off to a bad start:
Wendy: Okay. Let's see. Where's your file, do I have it here?
What are we here for?
Kathy: I wish I knew what I was here for.
Wendy: ... You were going to go back and talk to your husband,

I believe.
Kathy: Yes, I did ....
Wendy: ...

Hejust said anything I wanted to do, do it.

What can we do. There are several alternatives ...

I'm trying to remember because this was November 3rd, so it's
been six weeks.
Kathy: You mean you can't remember that long?
Wendy: I don't understand.
Kathy: Gee, I can.
The image in this initial dialogue is not of a lawyer who has
taken charge, but rather of one still unable to grasp the reality of the
client's pressing needs. Those needs are indicated when Kathy says
she wishes she knew what she was "here for." Wendy hears that
comment as if Kathy had forgotten something, rather than understanding it as a general statement of Kathy's continuing doubts and
disorientation. Moreover, Wendy quickly becomes the disoriented
one, unable to grasp why the client would care that she remember
the earlier meeting.

1488

CORNELL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 77:1447

The conference moves on to review the conversations that
Kathy has been having with Nick:
Wendy: And so you haven't told him the sad facts of life that you
are going to have to continue to have money?
Kathy: I have not told him anything like that. I figured the less I
said the better.
Wendy: [Whether you sell the house or not] you'll probably be
entitled to some support .... What do you want to do?
Kathy: I don't know what the best thing to do is. I honestly don't,
just listening to you. That's where I'm at a total loss. I do not
know what the best thing to do is.
For the first time in their interaction, Wendy asks Kathy directly
what she wants to do. Power is shifted; the client is invited to assume the directive role. But Kathy does not take up the invitation
and substitutes the question of what is "best" for the question of
what she wants. Any reality that she may want to construct seems to
demand knowledge that she does not possess.
In Kathy, Wendy confronts a client unable to articulate goals
despite the negotiations she has been conducting with her husband
for months. Wendy responds by upping the ante:
Wendy: Well, it's really your decision because you have to live
with it for the rest of your life.
Kathy: I know.
Wendy: If I make that decision and later on you are unhappy
about it you are going to say, "Well, why did she choose this road
to go." I think probably, unless you let him know he's going to
have to pay support, you may be working on a false assumption.
He's going to have to know that whether you keep the house or
sell the house or whatever, he's going to have to pay you support.
Kathy: . . . I really wish that I didn't have to take anything.

Wendy: I understand that. But let's be practical.... You have all
these basic expenses that there is nothing you can do about. You
cannot meet them. You cannot make enough money to do so.
Kathy: You know I'm just a wimp.
Wendy: If you were a brain surgeon I'd tell you to tell him to go
buzz off and waive it. But you can't do that. You don't make
enough money, and I'm really concerned about how are we going
to take care of you. You have to have income from him too.
There is just no other way that you are going to get around it.
Once past the formulaic lines about whose decision counts,
Wendy goes beyond the "we could do this or we could do that"
stance that she took in the previous conference, insisting that the
client demand the necessary spousal support. The world of the client's wishes is now vividly contrasted with that of practicality.
Wendy insists that the client face a reality that, from her lawyer's
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experience in divorce, she knows best. As the lawyer becomes more
strident, the client's seems to lose all decisiveness-she has no idea
what to do, and refers to herself as a "wimp." This apparent indecision may reflect resignation rather than weakness, a paralysis induced by knowledge that she will not get that which she requires. In
Wendy's insistence that there are no alternatives, what might look
like a power grab seems more like the hard sell.1 1 9
The negotiation of goals and the allocation of responsibility between Wendy and Kathy take on new dimensions when recent financial experience is reviewed:
Wendy: So what he's paying you is certainly a fair amount ...
based on his income. But I still think you need more on top of
that. Didn't I tell you you needed a couple of hundred dollars
more than he's giving you already .... Is he paying the taxes and
insurance or are you paying them?
Kathy: No, I'm paying it.
Wendy: So he's paying about $400 a month.
Kathy: Uh-huh.
Wendy: Oh, he's not. That's ridiculous. Here we go again. He
should be paying more now.
Kathy: ... I know I've gone through the savings account almost.
Wendy: ... Why have you let him get away with this all this time?

Conscious or not, Wendy is engaging in classic scapegoating:
"why have you let him get away with this all this time?" Unappealing as this behavior may be, it is a forceful attempt to shake the
client out of her reluctance to ask for support. Thus, in negotiating
the reality of the client's post-divorce financial situation, Wendy
now appears ready to employ whatever tools it takes to get her
message across.
In the following exchange we see the reality that lawyer and
client are trying to negotiate. That reality again involves ajuxtaposition of Wendy's self-proclaimed practicality with Kathy's increasing
willingness to play the role that Wendy is assigning to her.
Wendy: What do you do if the roof falls down? You have to have
a new roof put on.
Kathy: I don't know.
Wendy: Well, you have to think about this. It's a very practical
situation.
Kathy: I'm not, see, I've never really given much thought to me.
Wendy: Well, I understand that and we've already talked about
being number five and now you are number one. You really have
to start thinking about what's going to, what's best for Kathy.
What are you going to do. And I'm really awfully concerned.
119

On the dilemmas of such a position, see Simon, supra note 64, at 217.
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Kathy: Well, I will, I'll tell him. I can hear it now.
Matters of real significance are contained in this brief exchange.
Kathy appeals to Wendy to take care of her by suggesting that she
has never been able to take care of herself. Wendy seems to acknowledge that Kathy's difficulties spring from her view of herself
and the world, as well as from simple naivete about the hard realities
of living by herself. Kathy needs help to look out for herself, and if
she cannot muster the courage to confront her husband about his
responsibilities, her financial future will be bleak. The client initially
resists: she cannot think about the confrontation without cringing.
Yet, in the end, she imagines herself doing what Wendy has asked
her to do, while fearing Nick's expected outrage.
A concrete proposal and a plan for negotiations is then worked
out for the first time.
Wendy: What we will give him, no interest, $22,000 payable in
five years out of the sale of the house, and it would be secured by
a second trust deed on the house. But at least if we make this kind
of offer, now, if you like I can instead write a letter to his attorney
making this offer. Generally, this is the way people do it, involving the attorney. But I know the two of you have been trying to
keep the costs down and have been able to negotiate. So if the
two of you can do it, that's just fine.
Kathy: Well, I will go back to him and tell him exactly as it's here.
Wendy: This way you've at least made an offer, so you've gotten
things moving a bit; I mean this thing is really kind of mired down
and it's silly for us every six weeks to get together and go over the
same figures again and the same conversation.
Kathy: I know. And I'm such a dunce when it comes to anything
like this, I just .... I can remember that.
Wendy: Okay, give him a $20,000 note payable in five years, secured, and that you need support of a minimum of $500 a month.
It should be more than that. Tell him that I said that's rock bottom.., and I'm appalled that you haven't been getting more.
This climactic exchange is both clarifying and confusing. It is
clarifying in that the lawyer and client have been able to negotiate a
proposal and have agreed on a definite plan for its delivery. They
have settled on reality and responsibility simultaneously. However,
the exchange is confusing because they discuss two very different
versions of the proposal. The first version includes a $22,000 transfer, to be made from the proceeds of a sale; there is no mention of
support. The second version involves a $20,000 transfer, no sale,
and includes support. Kathy says that she can remember "that," but
which "that" is she to remember?
The exchange also suggests that Wendy's supposed interest in
minimizing Kathy's legal fees, manifested in the assignment of ne-
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gotiations to Kathy, is based on a lack of commitment to the case, a
certain laziness about really getting involved. Wendy is well aware
of both the inefficiency of Kathy's past efforts at negotiations and of
the repetitive and circular nature of their exchanges. She acknowledges that it would be routine at this point to send the demand in
writing to the other lawyer. But rather than make that effort, she
makes only a half-hearted offer to take over the negotiations.
Is Kathy just a helpless victim of a lazy lawyer or, even now, are
circularity and repetition her way of exercising power? At some
level is she aware that, as long as she keeps the divorce process from
reaching closure the possibility of reconciliation with Nick remains?
Who is "using" whom and for what purpose? Is Kathy a passive
consumer, or an agent whose apparent passivity produces an intended circularity and repetitiveness that Wendy now recognizes?
At the end of the conference, it is apparent that Kathy is still
unconvinced that there will be any spousal support in her future.
Wendy: Once he finds out that you have to get spousal support,
he may say "You'll rot in hell before I'll give you a nickel," which
you can tell him, "Well heck, my attorney's heard that one before,
umpteen hundred times." But that's not true. You will get
money from him. There's just no question.
Kathy: I'm sure of that. I mean, I'm sure he's not sure of it.
Wendy: Right. But I'm just telling you if we go to court, you are
getting money from him. You will probably get more. He's been
getting away with murder and we've been letting him do it, but no
more Ms. Nice Guy ....

Too many people have lived to regret

the fact that they wanted to get along with their ex-husband. If
getting along with him means you live at the poverty level and he
lives on Easy Street, how long are you going to get along with him
before you start resenting it?
Kathy: Not very long, I'm afraid. I'm afraid that's very true.
In this exchange, Wendy mobilizes the conventional authorities, "what the court will do" and "what other clients have experienced," in an effort to persuade Kathy to accept the legal view of
reality. She should receive support because a court would grant
support; 120 she will regret the day she bargains for privation, as have
other women. The client leaves and will talk to her husband-but
what will she say? Neither lawyer nor client really know.
SECOND INTERVIEW WITH LAWYER (immediately following the
previous conference). The interview focuses on Wendy's view of
Kathy as a negotiator and the court's probable attitude toward
support:
120 This claim is a vivid example of the "bargaining in the shadow of the law" that
takes place between lawyer and client. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 66.
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Interviewer: Did you expect her, the last time that she talked [to
the husband] to say the things that she's now going back to talk to
him about?
Wendy: Yeah, I really thought that, well that was November 3rd, I
really figured at that point she would take it to him and we would
have it wrapped up ....
It's not really a terribly satisfactory thing
having her negotiate it like this ... because she is not getting her
fair share. And if she had said, "OK, you can handle it," she'd be
getting quite a bit more than she's going to be settling for .... If
I had it my way, we'd have been in court six months ago with an
order to show cause to get a little more spousal support.
Interviewer: Do you think it's possible that she thinks if she sort
of lives with this situation and behaves in a nice fashion, that he'll
give up the idea of the divorce?
Wendy: No. But I think a lot of women delude themselves intofeeling that if they are nice and fair that if they run into financial
trouble, their ex-husbands will help them financially. And I try to
get across to them that that is not going to happen.
In this conversation, Wendy initially portrays herself as the
powerless victim of a client who will not let her act: if Wendy were
able to act, Kathy would receive more spousal support. But Wendy
still refuses to recognize that what Kathy wants from Nick is emotional rather than financial support. Thus, Wendy quickly dismisses
the suggestion that Kathy may actually know what she is doing, that
she has a clear purpose in mind. The reality on which Wendy focuses is not the reality of the continuing emotional tie between
Kathy and Nick. Instead, Wendy is now in full "accounting" mode.
Interviewer: What do you think a judge's attitude would be about
spousal support?
Wendy: There's no question. She's been married to him for a
long, long time. He's making much more money than she is ....
She's established her ability to earn an income and established a
need. So there's no question a judge would order her support.
And she would easily get $500 a month.
The reality against which Wendy evaluates the posture of the
case is shaped by her view of what the court would do. This reality
places her in the unpleasant position of having to admit that their
negotiating strategy is not working. As Wendy puts it, "I just don't
think I'm going to get her enough money. But is there ever
enough?" Yet Wendy seems helpless to change the strategy.
FIFTH INTERVIEW WITH CLIENT (43 weeks after the first conference). Kathy had come to the office to see Durr, but also spoke to
the interviewer about Nick's response to the support proposal and
her reaction to that.
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Kathy: Wendy wanted me to go back and tell him [Nick] that I
wanted to stay there two years or something and that I needed x
dollars a month.
Interviewer: Did he have a specific reaction to that?
Kathy: Do you really want to know what he said?
Interviewer: Yeah, what did he say?

Kathy: He said, "Christ, I'm not going to do that." And I said,
"Well, I'm just telling you what the lawyer said."
Kathy's response is as telling as her husband's. She did not argue for support on the merits. She puts all responsibility for the
demand on her lawyer. She is not asking for this arrangement that
infuriates her husband; she is simply a messenger relaying information from a professional. The reality that her lawyer thought she
had finally negotiated with Kathy was, in Kathy's presentation to
Nick, only an expedient, a way to end an unpleasant conversation.
That Kathy's social world was highly conflicted was made clear
by this interview and by the conversation with the paralegal.
Interviewer: Do you think he is trying to push you to the wall?
Kathy: Well, I don't. I told him one time, I said I'm really scared.
I am scared because I've been a wife and mother for a heck of a
long time and all of a sudden I'm thrust out there. And he's always made fun of my stupid littlejobs, as he called it. Now, all of
a sudden, my stupid little jobs have got to be my livelihood.
Interviewer: Right.
Kathy: And I'm scared. I'm really scared.
Interviewer: And is he sympathetic, do you think, to that?
Kathy: Oh, I think so. He says, why should you be. You are intelligent. But intelligence has nothing to do with it.
This picture is one side of her reality -a vulnerable, untrained
worker in a tough job market, with no prospects for improvement
and no second line of defense. But despite her worry about the future, Kathy's definitive position seems to be: "You know, I'm not
going to ask for the money. I really am not."
Throughout the case Wendy has been inconsistent, inattentive,
and too late in her efforts at the joint construction of the social and
legal world that make up the reality of her client's future. In the
defining enactment of power, Wendy gave Kathy more responsibility than Kathy could carry, and she did this despite her misgivings
about Kathy's ability to realistically imagine the future and confront
21
its difficulties.
121 At this point in the case the client asked that we stop observing conferences and
not interview her further. She did not give a reason for withdrawing from the study.
Her withdrawal paralleled the way clients react to the accummulation of unstated dissatisfaction with lawyers. See infra text accompanying note 87. The exit without explanation marked the limits of her tolerance for the social science strategy in which everything
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The marriage was eventually dissolved and

a settlement agreement incorporated into the judgment one year
and seven months after the first conference. Kathy kept the house.
Her share of community property was stated to be worth $27,000
more than Nick's. In consideration of Nick's foregoing any claim
based on this unequal distribution, Kathy irrevocably waived any
claim to spousal support.
THIRD INTERVIEW WITH LAWYER (14 months after judgment was
entered). This interview was, for the most part, devoted to securing
background information about Wendy's education, career, and her
goals in divorce practice. The latter have a distinctly therapeutic, if
not political, cast, yet they were hardly apparent in Kathy's case:

Wendy: Nobody wins. It's not a question of winning in this. It's
how much can you take out with your sanity and dignity intact. I
try to encourage them that living well is the best revenge and that
they can't look back over their shoulders and worry about what
he's doing with whom. They have to go on. And I guess the major satisfaction we've gotten out of it is to see some of these women come in who are just, I mean you have to scoop them up in a
basket, they are just so awful. I mean, the women who come in
here say: "Give him everything. He's going to kill me if I don't."
Or the husband tells them "You are not going to get anything
after all because the kids are grown and you don't deserve any
support." And who believe their husbands because they have
been conditioned to. And how we can bring them in here and
they are absolutely spineless creatures that are just spread all over
the floor and build them back into something with a spine and a
backbone and finally realize, I'm a human being and I have rights,
and they learn to stand up for themselves. It really is a real sense
of accomplishment.
This program has two dimensions, one empirical and one rehabilitative. Wendy often acts for women who have been intimidated
or conditioned by their husbands to accept less in divorce than the
law would secure for them. Transmitting this technical information
to such clients is not enough. Rather, their self-identity must be
reconstituted so that they understand that they deserve that to
which they are entitled. In the end, Wendy imagines that she produces not only optimal outcomes, she also produces new women.
Did she believe that she had wrought this transformation in
Kathy's case?
becomes a subject of inquiry. It was both a gesture of resistance and an assertion that no
more questions would be answered, not even that of why she was withdrawing. In a
domain where clients become subjects, it was a striking enactment of her power in relation to us.
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Interviewer: Did you find her an easy client, a hard client, to work
with? Sort of typical or not typical?
Wendy: I would say the biggest problem with that case was that it
was one of those hurry up and wait. There would be a lot of activity and then there was nothing.
Interviewer: Why do you think that was? Do you think she was
ambivalent about the divorce?
Wendy: Yes. I think that they still kind of cared for each other
quite a bit and I think that there was a lot of trouble letting go.
And a lot of hurt. And I used to hurt her feelings so much because I called her Kitty all the time because she struck me as a
Kitty.... A very soft person and to me that's a Kitty. And I mean
I would often call her Kitty and she would look so crushed-"My
own lawyer doesn't even know my name." I do know your name,
but you are just a Kitty to me. So I tried to be really careful and
call her Kathy. Kathy is harsher and to me she was just such a very
sweet person. I really felt very sad about that case because I liked
her so much as a person. So it was kind of sad the way it worked
out. But I think she was happy with the results in the long run
....
I get some cases where I just wish they would go away and
get somebody else because this is costing them too much for what
they are getting.

The gap between programmatic objectives and actuality in this
case is obvious. To remake clients requires powers no divorce lawyer possesses. And Kathy was by no means remade into a new
woman. In fact, Wendy candidly admits to compounding the client's difficulty of self-assertion.
CONCLUSION

We began this paper by arguing that power in lawyer-client interaction is not the straightforward phenomenon generally depicted
in the literature, but a more subtle and complicated construct enacted through often ambiguous and conflicted behavior. 12 2 Some of
the more important respects in which power in lawyer-client relations differs from the conventional picture are that it is enacted
through implicit negotiation as well as overt action; that motives,
goals and data are often deliberately concealed; that power can be
elusive, even to the point of disappearing; that assertions of power
may be resisted openly or covertly; 12 3 that the locus and nature of
power changes over time; and that lawyer-client differences, even on
matters of great moment in a client's affairs, rarely result in open
confrontation.
122
123

See supra text accompanying notes 4-6, 10-92.
Scorr, supra note 10, at 136-38.
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We illustrated each of these attributes of power in the Case of
the Unsupported Wife. There was implicit negotiation in the continuing silence over case progress and in the ambiguity over who,
and under what circumstances, would control the critical decision
about spousal support. Concealed motives and goals were reflected
in the client's hopes about her husband's return, the lawyers' abdication of an active role in negotiations, the lawyer's failure to raise
the support issue at an early date, and her interest in personality
transformation. The insubstantiality of power is found in salient issues with which no one connected, such as taking the support issue
to court or controlling the pace of case progress.
In addition, both Wendy and Kathy overtly as well as covertly
resisted efforts by the other to exercise power. Wendy resisted her
client's implicit attribution of responsibility for delay. Kathy resisted her lawyer's insistence that she ask for support: even as Kathy
made the demand, she disowned it. Kathy resisted the notion that
the costs of maintaining good relations with her husband were too
high.
Avoidance of confrontation where there were differences about
important issues was also common. Though Kathy was upset with
the pace of progress, she did not complain about it to Wendy.
While she did not think that her husband would ever agree to pay
support, she did not confront her lawyer with her belief. Wendy, in
turn, believed that her client might well be headed for the welfare
rolls, but let her go her way without a fight.
In all of this we saw changes over time in the play of power and
resistance. But those changes were by no means linear. Subjects
would appear and disappear quite unpredictably from the negotiating agendas of lawyer and client. Indeed, in some sense Kathy and
Wendy traveled along different, and separate, trajectories throughout the case. Power was enacted and performed, yet it was often
difficult to say who, if anyone, was "in charge," who, if anyone, was
directing the case. Power was at once shaped and reshaped, taken
and lost, present and absent.
When power is considered to be dynamic and fluid rather than
solid, stable and centralized, the subtle negotiations over reality and
responsibility that we see in the Case of the Unsupported Wife are
to be expected. Roughly comparable negotiations occur in all cases
we observed. This view of the nature of power in the professional
relationship does not, however, predict two dimensions of lawyerclient interaction that we also observed-the avoidance of confrontation even in the fact of disagreement over important issues and
the reliance by clients on exit, rather than confrontation, as a response to dissatisfaction.
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Divorce clients are typically weaker parties in their relationship
with their lawyers. The weaker party in a relationship that reflects a
major disparity in power does not often directly confront the
stronger. Slaves, prisoners, students, and wives subjected to patriarchal hegemony have realized that effective resistance, even effective symbolic resistance, must be indirect, subtle, elusive and
ambiguous. In divorce, lawyer and client negotiate power, but they
do so on uneven terms. We have pointed out the entrenched position of lawyers-their turf, their rules, their vernacular-and the enhanced vulnerability of clients-high stakes, high affect, and
inadequate resources. Avoidance and exit become the ultimate recognition of legal hierarchy, the final expression of a structurally-inferior person who cannot fight, but will not surrender.
But what can we learn from the relutance of lawyers to insist
that clients accept their professional opinion, from their disinclination to insist on action that incorporates their professional judgment? We interpret this behavior as a signal that the relationship
between lawyer and client is hierarchically complex; that although it
is not symmetrical, it is two-sided. The lawyers' position reflects
professional power, but clients have two sources of structural power
of their own-they pay the bills and they make the ultimate decisions to settle or fight, to accept the deal or not. Lawyers almost
always want to retain clients on whose cases they have worked, and
they almost always want to be paid. Since clients who come into
direct and explicit conflict with their lawyers may conclude that their
only recourse is exit, lawyers who engage in explicit confrontation,
who draw lines in the sand rather than maneuver around impasses,
jeopardize both these objectives. Thus, our model, like any analysis
of the negotiation of power in human interaction, must take structural realities as well as individual initiatives into consideration.
To what extent is our view of the enactment of power in the
negotiation of reality and responsibility limited to the divorce cases
from which it is derived? Divorce practice is different from most
other legal practice.124 Divorce, more than most litigation,
originates in personal failure and rejection. The number of clients
in divorce who are experiencing some form of personal crisis is
high, probably higher than in parallel fields such as criminal law,
personal injury, worker compensation, landlord and tenant, consumer, and bankruptcy. As a consequence, the negotiation of reality
may be more difficult and salient in divorce. And because divorce
law lies at the discretion end of the rules-discretion continuum, the
opportunity for creativity in interpreting the legally possible is
124

For a discussion of those differences, see

O'GORMAN,

supra note 26, at 61-64.
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greater than where rules narrow the scope of interim maneuvers
and acceptable outcomes. Perhaps most importantly, the relative
social status and economic power of divorce lawyers and their clients, rather than conforming to a single pattern, (as may be the case
in fields as diverse as criminal and corporate law), is more varied,
since the status of clients reflects the population at large. Thus, divorce lawyers tend to encounter clients of diverse social and economic status and, as a result, are less likely to develop patterns of
domination and control than lawyers whose social position, relative
25
to that of their clients, is more consistent.'
On the other hand, many of the enactments of power in negotiations of reality and responsibility between divorce lawyers and
their clients do occur in other areas of practice. Lawyers and clients
must always negotiate a consistent version of events, an account of
the client's situation and interactions with the other side. They
must negotiate a fit between the client's goals and expectations and
the results achievable through legal process. They must negotiate
the timing of action to be taken in pursuit of the client's goals, and
the division of labor between them. In each of these areas, whether
the area of law be commercial or criminal, power is neither stable
nor static.
Only on rare occasions, then, does interaction between lawyers
and clients resemble a straightforward provision of technical services to a generally complacent, dependent and weak laity. The interaction is more often complex, shifting, frequently conflicted, and
negotiated. In the relationship between lawyer and client, the professional, like it or not, shares power and resources with the client.
It is a relationship where the knowledge and experience of each may
be challenged by the other; where the economic investment of the
lawyer in any particular client may equal or out-strip the client's investment in the lawyer; where lawyers have conflicts of interest that
clients seek to identify and protect against; and where the humanity
of each may be constantly under the scrutiny of the other. Thus, the
nature of lawyer-client relationships beyond the context of divorce
cannot be captured by simple models of professional or lay dominance, or by simple estimates of lawyer and client resources. Power
in those relationships is, like power everywhere, deeply embedded
in complex and changing processes of negotiation.

125
The importance of client status in determining the nature of lawyer-client interaction is highlighted in HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 28, at 59-64.

SEEKING ".... THE FACES OF
OTHERNESS .. ."': A RESPONSE TO

PROFESSORS SARAT, FELSTINER, AND CAHN
Lucie E. Whitet
This comment addresses Naomi Cahn's The Looseness of Legal
Language: The Reasonable Woman Standardin Theory and in Practice,2 and
William Felstiner and Austin Sarat's Enactments of Power: Negotiating
Reality and Responsibility in Lawyer-Client Interactions.3 I will begin with
a recollection about my own education. I will then turn to "metatheory," or, more simply, the images we use to frame our thinking
about the social world. 4 I conclude with a brief story from my current work.
I
THE RECOLLECTION

When I went to college, our intellectual gurus-in addition to
Timothy Leary and John Lennon-were people like Noam Chomsky
and Claude Levi-Strauss. Their theories talked about boxes, bipolar oppositions, exchanges (usually of women, it seemed), and
law-ruled transformations. 5 Their intellectual maps were geometric
and symmetrical, and covered the entire social world, as we then
imagined it. Although there was a lot of movement within their paradigms, that movement resembled a military drill more than a
1 SeeJacques Derrida, Force de Loi: Le "Fondement Mystique de l'Authorite"/Forceof Law:
The "Mystical Foundationof Authority," 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 919 (Mary Quaintance trans.,

1990) [hereinafter Derrida, Force of Law].
t B.A. Radcliffe College, J.D. Harvard Law School.
2
See Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman Standard
in Theory and in Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398 (1992).

3 See William L.F. Felstiner & Austin Sarat, Enactments of Power: Negotiating Reality
and Responsibility in Lawyer-Client Interactions, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1447 (1992).
4
It is difficult to discuss "meta-theory" without losing touch with solid ground.
There is a parallel risk, however, in failing to interrogate the assumptions that frame our
understandings of the world. See Cahn, supra note 2, at 1410 n.64 (citing Nancy Fraser
and Linda Nicholson's discussion of "quasi-metanarratives" in Social Criticism without Philosophy: An Encounter between Feminism and Postmodernism, 19, 27, in FEMINIsM/PosTMODERNISM (Linda J. Nicholson ed., 1990)).
5 See, e.g., CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUss, THE SAVAGE MIND (G. Weidenfeld & Nicholson
Ltd. trans., 1966); CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS, STRUCTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY (ClaireJacobson
& Brooke Grundfest Schoepf trans., 1963); NOAM CHOMSKY, SYNTACTIC STRUCTURES
(1957); NOAM CHOMSKY, Topics IN THE THEORY OF GENERATIVE GRAMMAR (1966); NOAM
CHOMSKY, LANGUAGE AND MIND

(1968).
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dance. Those days, the late 1960s, were the salad days of what we
now disparagingly call "structuralism."
I remember reading during those years an essay by a young anthropologist named Clifford Geertz. 6 This essay used the technocratic talk of the times, but its message was out of synch with the
positivism that such talk often assumed. The essay made reference
'7
to a new "meta-concept" that Geertz called "terminal screens."
This term is a wonderful reminder of how the words we use are inevitably colored by the historical moment in which we write. Clifford
Geertz does not talk about "terminal screens" any more. Instead,
he writes about "thick descriptions,"" and works and lives. 9
By "terminal screens," Geertz meant something similar to what
one might describe, in the lingo of the 1990s, by reference to the
array of designer "shades" that one can buy in places like Los Angeles, to color the world different tints for one's varying moods.1 0
Geertz used "terminal screens" to point out that one can view the
same social "reality" through a range of different conceptual or theoretical screens or filters. Depending on the screen one looks
through-the matrix of terms or concepts through which one filters
what one sees-the same event can take on many different
appearances.
In the days when structuralism was still in vogue, this was a
marginal, though by no means novel, idea. Since then, it has entered the intellectual mainstream. Many people now talk of the partiality-or inevitably interpretive nature-of all of the
"discourses,"' ",paradigms," 2 or "lenses" through which we make
sense of our human world, and in turn constitute ourselves. Many
scholars now teach us how our understandings of the world both
reflect and define the positions from which we view it."s
6

CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Person, Time and Conduct in Bali (Yale Southeast Asia Program,

Cultural Report Series No. 14, 1966), in

THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES

360 (1973).

ProfessorJames Boyd White points out that the concept of"terminological screens" was

first introduced into the discourses of social criticism by Kenneth Burke.
7

See GEERTZ, supra note 6.

8

See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture, in

THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES, supra note 6, at 3. Naomi Cahn reports that Geertz

borrowed this term from Gilbert Ryle. See Cahn, supra note 2, at 1430 n.141.
9
See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, WORKS AND LIVES: THE ANTHROPOLOGIST AS AUTHOR
(1988).
10 I have heard Professor Kimberl6 Crenshaw, for example, use such an image in
several informal presentations to Los Angeles audiences.
11
See, e.g., Michel Foucault, History of Systems of Thought, in LANGUAGE, CouNTERMEMORY, PRACTICE: SELECTED ESSAYS AND INTERVIEWS 199 (Donald F. Bouchard ed., &
Sherry Simon trans., 1977).
12

13

See THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1970).
For particularly compelling elaborations on this insight, see RENATO ROSALDO,

CULTURE AND TRUTH: THE REMAKING OF SOCIAL ANALYSIS

(1989);

ELIZABETH U. SPELMAN,
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II
META-THEORY

At the same time that Clifford Geertz's star was rising in the
world of social theory, Noam Chomsky's was falling: structuralism
was overtaken by new "post-structuralist" ways of thinking. The intellectual leader of this movement was Michel Foucault. Foucault,
with a little posthumous coaching from Nietzsche, was indisputably
a genius, a paradigm smasher. He, more than any other single figure, moved us beyond the "conventional," structural understanding
of power that Professors Sarat and Felstiner describe in their essay.
In this conventional view, power is a thing that people have and
wield over others, usually on the basis of their roles in stable institutional hierarchies. Foucault gave us a new meta-theory of powerone that was so intriguing, so fitting for the uncertain times of the
1970s, that many other theorists-sociologists, linguists, and historians-took up the joint project of filling in its details, and of using it, lens-like, to sharpen their view of social life.
According to this new meta-theory, power is not a tool. Rather,
like an evanescent fluid, it takes unpredictable shapes as it flows into
the most subtle spaces in our interpersonal world. In this picture,
we no longer see distinct "persons" controlling power's flow. Indeed, we cannot really separate the agents of the movement from
the movement itself. Sometimes we may think we see more or less
familiar human actors, who seem to guide the fluid, like children
might make giant soap bubbles in a park. Yet at other moments,
these familiar "persons" disappear, and we see only the patterns
that linger as the bubbles dance.
Power is lyrically described in Professors Felstiner and Sarat's
essay. It is "mobile and volatile, and it circulates ... it is a complicated resource that is constructed and reconstructed so that its pos14 It
session is neither necessarily obvious nor rigidly determined."'
is "continually enacted and re-enacted, constituted and re-constituted ... shaped and reshaped ... taken and lost ... present and
INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988). If there is

currently a serious debate about this notion, it is not about whether each of us sees the
world from behind a particular, contingent "terminal screen." Rather, the debate is
about whether we have any power to shape the screens through which we see, or to shift
between them-either by authoring our own moral, political, or intellectual identities, or
by expanding the language that we use-or whether our perspectives on the world are
dictated by matters of fate, be they our genes, our life fortunes, the circuits wired into
our brains, or the categories inscribed into our native tongues. For a short but elegant
exploration of some of these themes, see Maria Lugones, Playfulness, World-Travelling and
Loving Perception, 2 HYPATIA 3 (1987).

14 Felstiner & Sarat, supra note 3, passim (quotes are in an original draft, on file with
author).
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absent.., shifting, deeply embedded in complex processes of contestation and negotiation."' 15
This theory of power offers a very interesting lens through
which to view social interactions, including interactions between
lawyers and their clients. Professors Felstiner and Sarat demonstrate this. Their picture of power works like one of those infrared
periscopes that military tank crews might use to render a desert
landscape visible in the dark. Through their lens, Professors Felstiner and Sarat are able to see and study, in astonishing topographical detail, the interactions of Wendy, a well-meaning but probably
lazy divorce lawyer, and Kitty, or rather Kathy, her excessively wellmannered client. Their lens enables Felstiner and Sarat to see in
the interactions of these two women subtle enactments of power
that other spectators, using a more conventional structural lens, for
instance, would miss.
Felstiner and Sarat's work is part of a larger collective project
undertaken by several legal scholars. Sally Merry, for instance, has
recently used Foucault's lens to produce a detailed account of how
working class people interact with the courts. 16 Regina Austin has
applied the lens to the workplace. 17 Others are producing similar
work.' 8 Of this new work, Gerald L6pez's writings stand out. He
uses the new conception of power to make visible complex interactions between groups of poor people and the professionals who try
to help them. 19 In this work, he shows how power is indeed very
fluid, even across the formidable barriers of race and class identity.
This new meta-theory of power is especially important to progressive law teachers, scholars, and advocates for at least two reasons. First, this lens is bringing forth a new body of situated microdescriptions of lawyering practice. For the first time, these descriptions give us a substantial base of data that we may use to reflect on
our work. This new data enables us to see exactly how and when we
deploy power within the routines of our own lawyering. With this
new insight into what we do, we can begin to ask why we do it and
how we might change. We can begin to envision different habits15
16

Id., passim (quotes are in an original draft, on file with author).
SALLY E. MERRY, GETrING JUSTICE AND GETrING EVEN: LEGAL

CONSCIOUSNESS

AMONG WORKING-CLASS AMERICANS (1990).

17 See Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and the Tort of IntentionalInfliction of Emotional Distress, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1988).
18 See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of
Client Narrative, 100 YALE LJ. 2105 (1991).
19
See GERALD P. L6PEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PRoGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992); Gerald P. L6pez, Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice: Seven

Weeks in the Life of a Rebellious Collaboration, 77 GEO. LJ. 1603 (1989); Gerald P. L6pez,
TrainingFuture Lawyers to Work with the Politically and Socially Subordinated:Anti-Generic Legal
Education, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 305 (1989) [hereinafter L6pez, Training Future Lawyers).
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different ways of talking and paying attention-that may make our
deployments of power less disruptive of our clients' efforts to empower themselves. This kind of reflective reconstruction of our dayto-day lawyering routines can make our practice, as progressive lawyers, more consistent with our aspirations of greater social justice. 20
Thus, the descriptive project undertaken by Felstiner and Sarat
makes possible a new field of critical reflection on advocacy and
pedagogy2 t-a "theoretics" of practice-the potential of which we
are just beginning to explore.
The second reason that Foucault's picture of power is so important to progressive advocates is that it has opened up new possibilities in the political practice of relatively disempowered groups. The
conventional theory of power reveals a dichotomized world of domination and subordination; through such a lens, the hegemony of the
dominant class is virtually absolute. Not only does that class confine
the actions of the subordinated, but it also dictates their language,
preferences, thoughts, dreams, and indeed most deeply held moral
and political intuitions. In American legal scholarship, Catharine
MacKinnon has used this dichotomized picture of power with great
skill to challenge claims that women can experience authentic sub22
jectivity in contemporary society.
MacKinnon posed this challenge in an encounter with Carol
Gilligan at Buffalo Law School in 1984.23 In that exchange, MacKinnon argued that values of "caring" and "connection" that Gilligan
and other feminists sought to reclaim and celebrate are symptoms of
women's subordinate position in a closed system of power. 24 According to MacKinnon, even women's feelings of sexual pleasure
are suspect; these feelings, like every other feature of Woman, de20 I use "we" because many legal scholars have expressed similar aspirations in
their writing and practice. A recent symposium issue of the Hastings Law Journalon the
Theoretics of Practice collects some of the most recent works to which I refer. See Symposium, Theoretics of Practice: The Integration of Progressive Thought and Action, 43 HASTINGS
L.J. 717 (1992).
21
See Gerald P. L6pez, The Work We Know So Little About, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1989);
L6pez, TrainingFuture Lawyers, supra note 19; Howard Lesnick, Being a Teacher, of Lawyers:

Discerningthe Theory of My Practice,43 HASTING LJ. 1095; Schon, Bridges to Where: What
Are Our Objectives, Keynote Address at Association of American Law Schools 1992
Annual Conference, Mini-Workshop on Theory and Practice: Finding Bridges for the
Classroom (Jan. 4, 1992) (available on audio cassette from the AALS, 1201 Conn. Ave.,
N.W., Washington, D.C.).
22

See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE
(1987) [hereinafter MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED]; CATHARINE A.

AND LAW

MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE
23
See Ellen C. DuBois et al., Feminist Discourse,Moral

(1989).
Values, and the Law-a Conversa-

tion, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 11 (1985) (transcript of a discussion held on October 19, 1984 at
the law school of the State University of New York at Buffalo as part of the James McCormick Mitchell Lecture Series).
24

Id. at 73-76.
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fine a colonized subject, a being whose essence has been shaped by
25
and for men.
Thus, as Angela Harris has demonstrated in her critique of
Catharine MacKinnon's work, 26 a conventional understanding of
power locks women, and indeed every subordinated group, in a discursive "prison-house" 2 7 from which there is no escape. Just as the
dominators can do nothing except wield their power, the
subordinated can speak nothing except their masters' will. No
change is possible in this universe; indeed, even the most creative
tactics of resistance or gestures of solidarity reinforce the bonds of
domination. This understanding of domination, designed to reveal
injustice, leads to two perverse results. First, it excuses those in the
dominant class from attempting to reflect on or change their own
conduct, or to ally themselves with subordinate groups. Second, it
reinforces in relatively disempowered groups the very doubts about
their feelings, capacities, and indeed human worth that subordination itself engenders.
Foucault's picture of power disrupts this closed circle of domination. By showing that the dominators do not "possess" power,
his picture makes possible a politics of resistance. It opens up space
for a self-directed, democratic politics among subordinated groups,
a politics that is neither vanguard-driven nor co-opted, as the politics of the colonized subject inevitably is. At the same time, and of
more immediate relevance to lawyers, this new picture of power
makes possible a self-reflective politics of alliance and collaboration
between professionals and subordinated groups. Given the new
theaters of political action that Foucault's theory of power has
opened up, it is not surprising that it has stolen the stage in historical, cultural, and finally legal studies from those who speak of power
in more conventional terms. The Foucaultian picture of power
makes insurgent politics interesting again; it brings possibility back
into focus, even in apparently quiescent times when resistance is visible only in the microdynamics of everyday life.
Yet with the power of this new lens comes a risk. With such an
instrument in our hands, it is easy to forget the lesson that Professor
Geertz taught. Any "terminal screen" gives us only a partial view of
the world: it enhances some features of reality-probably those that
25 These themes are developed throughout MacKinnon's writings. For one clear
early statement of the link between male domination and even "normal," ostensibly
noncoercive heterosexuality, see MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 22, at
46.
26 Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV.
581, 590-601 (1989).
27 The allusion is to FREDRICKJAMESON, THE PRISON-HOUSE OF LANGUAGE: A CRrrICAL ACCOUNT OF STRUCTURALISM AND RUSSIAN FORMALISM

(1972).
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its inventors most wanted to see-while erasing or obscuring others.
The risk for those who use Foucault's lens is that they will forget this
lesson, and begin to think of their own meta-theory as the last word
on how power "really" works-the terminal screen. Foucault's lens
reveals such a longed-for landscape of possibility that it has begun
to entrap our imagination, deluding us into thinking that with this
lens we have finally seized the power to comprehend the world.
One consequence inevitably follows when we forget that our
latest theories are not absolute. This is the risk that, in our own
certainty, we will lose patience with those who do not share our
faith. As Professor Delgado points out, such intolerance often
reveals itself only after time renders our certainties obsolete, and
thereby ridiculous. 28 At least two further risks are specific to Foucault's lens.
The first risk has been identified by feminist scholars such as
Nancy Fraser and Robin West. 29 While the Foucaultian lens reveals

the fluidity of power, it does not show how power can become congealed in social institutions in ways that sustain domination. It may
be true that everyday interactions create and maintain social institutions, but this insight does not enable us to map those interactions
against the institutional matrices they create. Nor does this insight
show us how institutions constrain the circulation of power, channeling it to flow toward some social groups and away from others.
In short, the Foucaultian lens does not move us toward a theoretics
and a reconstructive politics of institutionaldesign.
Without richer meta-theories-stronger lenses-that focus on
institutional as well as interpersonal realities, we will remain bewildered by exactly how our actions reiterate what has been called
"structural" or "institutional" subordination."0 We will remain unable to critique'and repattern our actions, so that we enact more
democratic institutions as we seek to live more ethical lives. These
other lenses need not replace Foucault's; rather, they can provide a
second filter on the same landscape, enabling us to study the geol28 Richard Delgado &Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1258 (1992).
29

See NANCY FRASER, UNRULY PRACTICES: POWER, DISCOURSE, AND GENDER IN CON-

TEMPORARY SOCIAL THEORY 17-34 (1989) [hereinafter FRASER, UNRULY PRACTICES];
Robin West, Feminism, Critical Social Theory and Law, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 59; Nancy

Fraser, The Uses and Abuses of French Discourse Theories for Feminist Politics (1989)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author); see also BRYAN D. PALMER, DESCENT
INTO DISCOURSE: THE REIFICATION OF LANGUAGE AND THE WRITING OF SOCIAL HISTORY

(1990).
30
See, e.g., KimberlE W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformationand
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN.
L. REV. 317 (1987).
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ogy of the ocean floor as well as the action of the waves. Without
these other lenses, the dynamics of systemic injustice-dynamics
that stunt the life-chances of some social groups with more than random frequency-will remain invisible and therefore go
unchallenged.
In divorce lawyering, Professors Felstiner and Sarat have studied an area in which systemic patterns of race and class privilege do
not always figure in obvious ways. Therefore, in that setting it may
be, as they suggest, that their theoretical framework does pick up
much of what is interesting to see. However, we cannot tell what
different lenses might show us until we try them out. The work of
Martha Fineman,3 1 for instance, suggests that theories about gender
and motherhood, as well as a Foucaultian theory of power, might
help us make sense of Felstiner and Sarat's story of the unsupported
wife.3 2 And in areas of legal practice where hierarchies of race and
class routinely figure, such as criminal law or social welfare law, the
risk that a Foucaultian lens will unduly limit our vision is great. In
those domains of practice, recurring patterns of domination will go
uncharted unless lawyer-client interactions are studied through a
3
lens that explicitly theorizes race and class. 3
Getting stuck inside the Foucaultian worldview carries a second
risk as well. In addition to stunting our ability to rethink institutions
in emancipatory ways, this lens obscures our human capacity-or,
more accurately, our longing-to realize ourselves in the world by
feeling with other people, as well as by winning against them. Foucault's lens defines and thereby reveals human interactions as strategic contests. Our personhood takes form in those moments when
the contest shifts power our way. This lens does not pick up those
moments when we feel the force of another's emotions or the resolve behind her commitments. If such moments appear at all, they
look like surges of the other's power rather than images of the
other's face.
We must not discount the risks imposed by theories that make
human connection seem too easy to attain. As Professor Cahn
points out, such theories are very dangerous in our not-yet-postcolonial world.3 4 Such theories have typically sanctioned domina31

See, e.g., MARTHA FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND REAL-

ITY OF DIVORCE REFORM (1991).

32 Felstiner & Sarat, surpa note 3, at 1471.
33 See, e.g., Peggy C. Davis, Law as Microaggression, 1989 YALE LJ. 1559; Isabelle
Gunning, Teaching Methods to Discuss Racial Stereotyping and Discrimination, Address at Association of American Law Schools Workshop on Clinical Legal Education
(May 3, 1991) (audiotape available from AALS).
34 See Cahn, supra note 2, at 1429 n.139; 1445 n.217; see also GAYATRI SPIVAK, THE
POST-COLONIAL CRITIC: INTERVIEWS, STRATEGIES, DIALOGUES (1990) [hereinafter SPIVAK,
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tion of the most insidious kind, by encouraging the privileged to
name the feelings of less powerful others, without cautioning that to
name another's feelings is also to silence her voice. 35 We cannot
give up Foucault's contest-focused theory to return to a simplistic,
imperialist version of humanism. At the same time, however, we
must recognize that Foucault's theory is ultimately-and indeed, inevitably-incomplete.3 6 For although Foucaultian power is always
in motion, it hovers outside of the other, circling in what is ultimately a closed field. Foucault's theory does not make sense of our
yearning for, or our occasional movement toward, a more fully and
freely interconnected human world.
What if we seek to map the elusive moments of human connection as well as the endless currents of contest? What if we seek to
transform our practice and the institutions that practice enacts, not
merely so we will be more adept at manipulating power, but also
more present when others call our names? If we want to reflect on
our longing for connection as well as our zeal for contest, what theoretical lenses might we use?
There is no easy answer to this question. Nonetheless, Renato
37
Rosaldo, in an arresting essay in his recent book Culture and Truth,
offers some promising thoughts. He describes his effort to comprehend, in order to "translate," the ritual of headhunting among the
Ilongot group in the Philippines. He studied the practice exhaustively, using the best methods academic ethnography had to offer.
After extensive conversation with local informants, he carefully
mapped out all of the features of the ritual. He then attempted to
interpret the practice-to translate its underlying cultural logic in
terms that would make sense to his own people. His informants had
explained that the ritual was their way of enacting the grief they felt
for loved ones who had died prematurely. Yet even with the benefit
of this explanation, Rosaldo could not fathom how the grotesque act
of beheading a member of a neighboring group and then eating his
flesh could be endorsed by any human beings as a sensible, let alone
THE POST-COLONIAL CRITIC]; GAYATRI C. SPIVAK, IN OTHER WORLDS: ESSAYS IN CULTURAL POLITICS (1987); ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE COLONIAL ENCOUNTER (T. Asad ed.,

1973).
35 This is the underlying paradox of "advocacy" for a less powerful other. See Lucie
E. White, Goldberg v. Kelly on the Paradoxof Lawyeringforthe Poor, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 861
(1990). Advocacy is inescapably-etymologically-a practice of translation, of carrying

the voice of the other into a new domain. Id. at 861 n.3. Yet translation is also a re-

placement of the other's voice. Thus, Professor White appropriately raises the theme of
"tragedy" in his comment on Professor Cunningham's article. James B. White, Translation as a Mode of Thought, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1388 (1992).
36
See FRASER, UNRULY PRACTICES, supra note 29.
37
See ROSALDO, supra note 13.
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sacred, act. For all of Rosaldo's anticolonial commitment, he felt
38
that this practice came from a radically Other world.
It was only when Rosaldo witnessed his wife plunge down a
gorge to her death that he finally felt for himself the rage that follows the loss of a loved one before her time. It was the force of this
feeling that enabled him, for the first time, to imagine why the
Ilongot might have acted out their own grief in the way that they
did. When he recalled his informant's explanation in the context of
his own experience, he finally began to comprehend the ritual's
human sense.
Rosaldo does not fully elaborate a theory of empathy in his essay. Rather, he offers this story to suggest some themes on which
such a theory might draw. He suggests that the force of one's own
emotions may cast a moment's light on others' lives, revealing both
irreducible difference and, paradoxically, common ground. Contrary to Professor Cahn's suggestion in her essay,3 9 Rosaldo suggests that we need not know all of the "facts" about the other in
order for these moments to occur. Nor need we share all the features of the other's "identity," categorically defined. Indeed, as prerequisites for empathy, both of these conditions are impossible to
meet.
But there is also a deeper problem with the two conditions for
empathy that Professor Cahn's essay identifies. This deeper problem is that these two paths toward empathy are also practices of
domination. The advice that we must find out the "facts" of the
other to feel empathy toward her counsels us to objectify that person, to confine her subjectivity in categories that we construct. And
the idea that to feel empathy with the other person we must identify
with her, along such dimensions as race, parental status, and class,
dashes all hope of empathy in many settings. In those few circumstances where empathy remains possible, this view condones practices of perception and definition that "essentialize" the other,
naming her as more "like" us than she may wish to be. These practices of collecting facts about the other or cataloguing similarities
with her may indeed enable us to feel closer to the other person. At
the same time, however, such practices effect interpersonal domination. Perhaps we must take such steps, if we seek to understand the
other. But we must also renounce these practices, or at least our confidence that they can work, if we are to recognize the other as a fellow-unique-human being.

38

Cf

39

See Cahn, supra note 2, at 1429.

SPIVAK, THE POST-COLONIAL CRITIC,

supra note 34.
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Thus, the practice of empathy is a paradox. It takes place beyond the fields of interpersonal contestation, beyond our obsession
to know exactly who we are and our maneuvers to name the other.
The practice of empathy takes place beyond our certainty that, in
listening to a battered woman who has fought back, that we, unlike
'40
her, "could never stab anyone."
III
A STORY
My present research involves the role of parents in two local
Head Start programs. 4 1 In doing this work, I have become acutely
aware of our need for multiple theoretical lenses, lenses that focus
on institutions, on moments of recognition, as well as on the ebbs
and flows of interpersonal power. I felt this need with a particular
urgency after conducting an interview with a seventy-two year old
former sharecropper in rural North Carolina. This woman was the
great-grandmother and legal guardian of a Head Start child. In the
interview, she gave me a brief account of the highlights of her life.
She told me of her father's defiance in sending his daughter to
school when the white plantation bosses expected her to be working
in the fields. She told of receiving a scholarship to an elite women's
college, but turning it down because she could not afford a bus
ticket to get there. She told of graduating from an AfricanAmerican teacher's college and of teaching for fifty years in the public schools. She told me what it was like to teach before the schools
were integrated, when her students were given text-books handed
down from whites. She also told me what it was like to teach after
integration, when white children asked, and were allowed, to transfer out of her class. She referred only in passing to the civil rights
movement. I learned from others that she had been one of the
movement's many local leaders in the rural counties of the south.
As I contemplated this story, comparing it to what others had
told me about the record of racial violence in the county and the
courage this woman had shown in combating it, two features stood
out. First, throughout the story, she expressed inexhaustible patience, and indeed love, for the white people she had dealt with over
the years. Second, although she recounted many injustices, her narrative carefully excluded the details of the violence she had en-

Id.
Head Start is a federally funded social program providing pre-school and other
services to poor families. See Head Start Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9831-9858 (1991).
40
41
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dured. I had noted similar themes in interviews with other African42
American Head Start parents.
After the formal interview was completed and the tape recorder
turned off, I casually inquired about the woman's older greatgrandchild, who, like my own daughter, had recently started kindergarten. When I asked this question, my informant became visibly
sad. She told me that when she had dropped this child off at school
earlier that morning, a young white child had run up to take her
hand. Just as her great-granddaughter reached back, however, a
second white child came up to the first and yanked her hand away,
explaining that white girls should not touch people who were black.
Then the woman looked hard at me, and said, "The white people will go to any lengths to keep us down, even if it means keeping
themselves down as well. They're making Frankensteins of us all."
This encounter could be examined through a Foucaultian lens.
Such an examination would reveal an important reality. It would
reveal this woman's skillful maneuvers, designed to ensure that our
mutual reality was negotiated on her terms. This lens would show a
woman who was artful in controlling the pace and extent of her revelations, and in determining how the injuries she had suffered
would be named. This lens would reveal a woman negotiating the
power between us to shape an account that she wanted me to hear.
Yet this lens reveals only a partial reality. For when this woman
told me of her child's morning at school, she was not merely controlling how that event would be interpreted, and thereby trumping
my own power to do the same. She was also speaking to me as another person. Through her brief story, I "felt," for a moment,
something of the impossible sadness that eluded our language
game. At the same time, I picked up her astute reminder that as one
43
of those whites, I dare not claim to have "felt" her pain.
The risk of domination is inextricable from every humanist
practice. Yet we must still seek to listen when others speak to us,
42

SeeJUDITH ROLLINS, BETWEEN WOMEN: DOMESTICS AND THEIR EMPLOYERS (1985)

(documenting interactions between African-American maids and their white employers);
JAMES SCOTr, DOMINATION AND THE ARTS OF RESISTANCE: HIDDEN TRANSCRIPTS (1990)

(describing ways in which systematically dominated groups conceal feelings and exper-

iences in interactions with members of dominating groups).
43 In thinking about the (im)possibility and practice of empathy, I am guided by
Jacques Derrida's reading of Emmanuel Levinas. See, e.g., JACQUES DERRIDA, Violence and
Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas, in WRrrING AND DIFFERENCE (Alan
Bass trans., 1978); Derrida, Force of Law, supra note 1. In writing about justice, as distinguished from rule or law, Derrida seeks guidance from Levinas's "difficult" conception,
which is centered in the paradox of empathy. According to Derrida, Levinas imagined
justice as the "equitable honoring of faces ... the heteronomic relation to others, to the
faces of otherness that govern me, whose infinity I cannot thematize and whose hostage
I remain." Id. at 959.
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and to be moved. We must still seek to hear in the words of others
not just negotiations of power, but appeals to our most difficult
memories and deepest emotions. We must seek, in our encounters
with others, not just to map the power or read the text, but also to
recognize, in all its alterity, the other's face.

